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ARYADEVA ON THE BODHISATTVA'S CULTIVATION OF MERIT AND KNOWLEDGE

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Āryadeva on the Bodhisattva's

Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge

by

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INTRODUCTION

The *Catuḥśataka* (CŚ) is the major work in four hundred concise verses of the second to third century C. E. Mahāyāna Buddhist philosopher Āryadeva. Buddhist tradition identifies Āryadeva as the student of Nāgārjuna and his immediate successor in the Madhyamaka lineage. Candrakīrti (ca. seventh century) in his commentary on the CŚ, the *Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśatakaṭīkā* (CŚṬ) notes a close relationship between the CŚ and Nāgārjuna's major work, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ* (MMK): "Since he was a follower of his teaching, the truth of the *Four Hundred Treatise* is not different in character from the truth taught in the *Middle Treatise*."[1] Between the CŚ and a number of Nāgārjuna's works there are notable similarities. The first half of the CŚ treats in similar fashion some of the topics covered in Nāgārjuna's epistles, the *Suhṛllekha* and the *Ratnāvalī*. While Āryadeva draws upon the epistles in his exposition of the practices, generosity (*dāna*), etc., that form the basis for a Bodhisattva's accumulation of merit (*puṇyasambhāra*), he draws upon Nāgārjuna's logical works, the MMK, the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (VV), the *Śūnyatāsaptati* (ŚS) and the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (YṢ) in the second half of the CŚ. In the latter half of the CŚ Āryadeva defends the

Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness against its detractors. It is the insight into emptiness that provides the basis for the Bodhisattva's accumulation of knowledge (jñān-asambhāra). A study of this text yields important information about the early development of the Madhyamaka school and also about the beliefs and practices of its opponents, members of rival Buddhist schools and members of non-Buddhist schools, chiefly, the Sāṃkhyas, the Vaiśeṣikas, and the Jainas.

The CŚ is no longer extant in its entirety in Sanskrit, although fragments of the text and Candrakīrti's commentary on it do survive. Haraprasad Shastri discovered in 1911 these fragments among some old palm leaf manuscripts that he had acquired. Three years later he published an edition of the manuscript in the Memoirs of the Asiastic Society of Bengal, vol. III, no. 8, Calcutta, 1914, pp.459-514.[2] Unfortunately these fragments represent less than a third of the original four hundred verses of the CŚ. A few additional Sanskrit verses of the CŚ occur in Candrakīrti's commentary on the MMK, the Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti Prasannapadā (PP.)[3] The number of citations and references to the CŚ in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese Buddhist works attest to this work's influence and wide circulation throughout the Buddhist community. Several commentators on Madhyamaka works support their views by quoting appropriate passages from the CŚ;[4] even a non-Madhyamaka

work, Harivarman's Tattva/Satyasiddhi quotes from the CŚ.[5] These citations and the text's translation into Tibetan and Chinese have preserved Āryadeva's major contribution to Madhyamaka literature.

Ye shes 'od, the tenth century king of western Tibet (mNga ris), sent the first of many Tibetan translators (lo tsa ba) to Kashmir to study Sanskrit and Buddhist teachings. The two surviving members of an original group of twenty one returned to Tibet with texts and Indian scholars who would assist in the translation of these works. A century later, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (b.1055), the translator of the CŚ and the CŚṬ, traveled to Kashmir and remained for twenty-three years studying the Sanskrit language and Buddhist texts with the sons of Sañjana and other learned teachers.[6] The collophon to the CŚṬ describes Sūkṣmajana, Nyi ma grags' collaborator in the translations of the CŚ and the CŚṬ, as "having been born into the lineage of a family of scholars for countless generations, the son of the great brahmin Sañjana, and the greatgrandson of the great brahmin Ratnavajra."[7] Nyi ma grags, working with Suksmajana, translated the CŚ and the CŚṬ into Tibetan around the turn of the twelfth century. The dBu ma section of the Tibetan canon contains both translations:

1. bsTan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba'i tshig le'u (Catuḥśatakaśāstrakārikanāma).

D 3865 v.2., pp. 1-9 (tsha f.1b-18a).

P 5246 v.95, pp.132-140 (tsha f.1b-20b).

2. Byang chub sems dpa'i rnal byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa (Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśatakaṭīkā).

D 3865 v.8, pp. 15-120, (Ya f.30b-239a).

P 5266 v.98, pp. 169-183 (Ya f.33b-273b).

One of Nyi ma grags' students, Zhang thang sag pa ye shes wrote a commentary on the CŚ, but it seems not to have survived. However, two late fourteenth to early fifteenth century commentaries on the CŚ have survived:

1. dBu mz bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa of the Sa skya scholar Red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros (1349-1412).

2. bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po of the dGe lugs pa scholar rGyal tshas dar ma rin chen (1346 - 1432).

In addition two twentieth century rNying ma scholars have written commentaries on the CŚ:

1. bsTan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba'i tshig le'ur bcas pa'i mchan 'grel of gZhan dga gzhan phan chos kyi snang ba (1871-1927).

2. dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i tshig don rnam par bshad pa klu dbang dgongs rgyan of Bod pa sprul sku mDo sngags bstan pa'i nyi ma (1907-1959).

The present study and translation of the CŚ is based upon the Tibetan translation of the CŚ and the CŚṬ,

although the Sanskrit fragments of the CŚ and CŚṬ also have been consulted. The commentaries of Red mda' ba, rGyal tshab, gZhan dga', and mDo sngags, all written in an interlinear style in which the text of the CŚ is incorporated into each author's work, largely summarize or paraphrase the CŚṬ; however, these commentators' explanations of difficult verses also have proved useful in this study.

Chinese scholars also traveled to India in search of Buddhist texts and scholars who could explain the philosophical ideas found in them. The Chinese pilgrim and scholar Hsüan-tsang (596-664) journeyed to India in 629 C.E.; he studied at the great Buddhist university Nālandā and returned to China in 645 C.E. with a large corpus of Buddhist texts, which he and his students began to translate into Chinese.[8] The Chinese canon contains Hsüan-tsang's translation of the last eight chapters of the CŚ, which he completed in 650 C.E. and his translation of the commentary of Dharmapāla (ca. 530-561?) on these eight chapters:

1. Taisho 1570 <u>Kuang pai lun pen</u>.

2. Taisho 1571 <u>Ta ch'eng kuang pai lun shih lun</u>.

The Chinese Translation was consulted in the translation of the latter half of the CŚ; the lengthy commentary of Dharmapāla was not used since it is the work of a different school of Buddhist philosophy, the Yogācāra.

Critical work on an edition of the CŚ began with the publication of P. L. Vaidya's doctoral thesis, _Études sur Āryadeva et son Catuḥśataka_, Paris, 1923. Vaidya edited chapters eight to sixteen, using the manuscript of Haraprasad Shastri (HPS) and the Peking (P) and sNar than (N) editions of the Tibetan translation of CŚ and CŚṬ. Where the Sanskrit text of Āryadeva's verses could not be found in HPS or among the citations of the CŚ in Candrakīrti's PP, he reconstructed (or retranslated) the verses into Sanskrit. He prepared also a French translation of these verses.

Two years later, Giuseppe Tucci in "Studi Mahāyānici: La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva confrontata col testo sanscrito e la traduzione tibetana", Rivista degli Studi Orientali X (1925), pp.524-567, translated into Italian chapters nine to sixteen of the CŚ from the Chinese translation of Hsüan-tsang. Tucci criticized numerous times Vaidya's reconstructions and translations in the notes to his own translation of the same chapters.

Another critic of Vaidya's work, Vidhusekhara Bhattacarya began a new edition of the CŚ, also based upon HPS and the N edition of the CŚ and CŚṬ. In an article, "The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva, with extracts from the commentary of Candrakīrtti, reconstructed from the Tibetan version with an English translation, chapter VII, "in _Proceedings and Transactions of the Fourth Oriental Conference_,

Allahabad, 1928, pp.831-871, Bhattacarya edited and translated a chapter of the CŚ that had not previously been edited or translated into any western language. He criticized extensively Vaidya's earlier work and re-edited the Tibetan text of chapters eight to sixteen of the CŚ, along with his own Sanskrit reconstructions of the verses, in a later publication, The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva: Sanskrit and Tibetan texts with copious extracts from the commentary of Candrakīrtti, reconstructed and edited, part II, Calcutta, 1931. A recent edition of the CS by Bhagcandra Jain Bhaskar, Āryadeva's Catuḥśatakam, along with the Candrakīrti Vṛtti, and Hindi translations, Nagpur, 1971 republished from HPS the few surviving Sanskrit verses of chapters one to five and the verses and commentarial extracts from Bhattacarya's editions of chapters seven to sixteen. Bhaskar also translated into Hindi the verses of chapters seven through sixteen.

The present study utilizes the earlier work of HPS and the later editions of Vaidya and Bhattacarya (Bhaskar's edition is virtually identical to Bhattacarya's), as well as Tucci's study of the Chinese translation of the CŚ. This study has three parts. Part one contains chapters on the historical context of Āryadeva's work; a study of his list, using current studies and the Tibetan and Chinese biographical sources; brief survey of other texts attributed to him; and a study of the contents of the CŚ.

The exposition of the CŚ examines also the influence of Nāgārjuna's work on Āryadeva's treatment of similar topics. Part One concludes with a summation of Āryadeva's contributions to the development of Madhyamaka philosophy.

Part two contains an annotated translation of the sixteen chapters of the CŚ, along with a paraphrase of portions of the CŚṬ. The length of the CŚṬ precluded the translation of the entire text; the decision to paraphrase, rather than translate excerpts from the CŚṬ, was made because Bhattacarya's edition of extracts from the CŚṬ is not entirely reliable and a translation needs to be based upon a good edition of the text. A critical edition of the CŚṬ is desirable but was not attempted here, in part because of a desire to keep this study focused on the CŚ, rather than on its commentaries. As the commentaries of Red mda' ba, rGyal tshab, gZhan dga', and mDo sngags rely on the CŚṬ, this commentary was the major source for the clarification of the context and intent of the CŚ verses. The annotation also serves to draw attention to parallel treatment in the works of the early Buddhist canon and the early Mahāyāna _sūtras_ and _śāstras_ of the topics discussed in the CŚ.

Part three contains a critical edition of the Tibetan text of the CŚ and includes the few surviving Sanskrit verses. Both Vaidya's and Bhattacarya's editions of the CŚ were helpful on occasion and although I disagree in

some instances with these editions, I have not made an effort to indicate each instance of disagreement. In a number of cases, the P and N editions used by Vaidya and Bhattacarya contain readings that should be rejected in the light of comparison with the Cone (C) and sDe dge (D) readings. In preparing a new edition of the ĆS, I have consulted the Peking edition reprinted by the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute under the direction of D. T. Suzuki; the sNar thang edition kept at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives at Dharamsala; the microfiche edition of the Cone published by the Institute of Advanced Studies of World Religions, Stonybrook, New York; and the sDe dge edition reprinted under the editorship of K. Hayashima, J. Takasaki, Z Yamaguchi, and Y. Ejima, published for the Faculty of Letters, Tokyo University. The Chinese text of the ĆS that was consulted is from the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, edited by J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe.

INTRODUCTION

NOTES

[1]CŚṬ (D f.31b, P f.34b): *de'i lugs kyi rjes su 'jug par gyur pa de nyid kyi phyir na bstan bcos bzhi brgya 'di'i de kho nyid gang yin pa de ni dbu ma'i bstan bcos las bshad pa'i de kho nyid las mtshan nyid tha dad pa can ma yin no* //

[2]The original manuscript is now kept in the collection of the Asiatic Society in Calcutta.

[3]Louis de La Vallée Poussin (LVP) in the index to his edition of Candrakīrti's commentary on the MMK, *Mūla-madhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna, avec la Prasannapada commentaire de Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica, no. IV (St. Petersburg, 1903-13), pp.625-626, 628 identified the following verses of the CŚ: II.25 (PP pp.460,506); VIII.15 (PP p.359); VIII.19 (PP p.370); VIII.20 (PP p.372); VIII.22 (PP p.378); IX.2-3 (PP p.505); IX.6 (PP p.397); X.3 (PP p.199); X.17 (PP p.116); X.25 (PP p.376); XI.15 (PP p.393); XII.23 (PP p.352); XIII.1-2 (PP p.71); XIII.25 (PP p.173); XIV.14 (PP p.71); and XVI.25 (PP p.16). Vaidya, *Études sur Āryadeva*, p.119, and Bhattacarya, *Catuḥśataka*, p.253, identified the quotation on p.80 of LVP's edition with CS XV.16; Bhattacarya, pp.210,250 notes in addition that XIV.13 is quoted on p.89 and that XV.14 is identical with MMK. XXI.12.

[4]The **Akutobhaya* and Ch'ing mu's commentary on the MMK cite CS VII.5; both commentaries have been translated by Max

Walleser, Die Mittlere Lehre (Mādhyamika-śāstra) des Nāgārjuna, Nach der tibetischen Version übertragen, (Heidelberg: (Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1911) and Die Mittlere Lehre, Nach der chinesischen ersion ubertragen, (Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1912). On CŚ quotes in the Madhyamakavṛtti and in the Prajñāpradīpa see Christian Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on Emptiness," JIP 23 (1981):212 n.22.

[5]Harivarman's Tattva/Satyasiddhiśāstra, chap. 105 quotes CŚ II.8. See N. Aiyaswami Shastri, Satyasiddhiśāstra of Harivarman, vol. 1, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, no. 159 (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1975), p.252.

[6]See also Bu ston, Chos 'byung, ed. Lokesh Chandra, The Collected Works of Bu ston, vol. 24, Śata Pitaka Series no. 64 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1971), p.208; 'Gos lo tsa ba, Deb ther sngon po, ed. Lokesh Chandra, The Blue Annals, Śata Pitaka Series no. 212 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1974), pp.304-5; Śākya mchog ldan, dBu ma'i byung tshul, (Thimpu, Bhutan: Kunzang Tobgey, 1975), p.231.

[7]CŚṬ (D f.239a), P f.273b): gdung rabs grangs med par paṇḍita brgyud ma'i rigs su sku 'khrungs pa bram je chen po rin chen rdo rje'i dpon po bram je chen po sañjana'i sras). Cf. Jean Naudou, Les Bouddhistes Kasmiriens au Moyen Age, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), p.139ff.

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE CATUḤŚATAKA

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

1. The Development of Divisions Among the Community

> It may be Ānanda that among you some will think: "The word of the Teacher has passed, We have no Teacher." But that should not be regarded as true. The Teaching (Dhamma) and the Monastic Code (Vinaya) that I have taught and ordained for you will be your teacher after I have gone. [1]

The traditional accounts of early Buddhist history maintain that a large group of the Buddha's disciples, numbered as five hundred, who had attained the rank of arahant, met together during the first rainy season retreat after the death of the Buddha to collect and codify his teachings. According to tradition, Kāśyapa had assembled the group at Rājagṛha because one monk had claimed that since the Buddha had died, the monastic community was free from his influence and any monk could do now just as he wished. On the second day of the second month of the rainy season, the monks assembled in the great meeting hall. The monastic code was recited first, as it was agreed that the monastic code endures. Kāśyapa asked questions concerning the monastic code of Upāli who recited the answers. At the close of this question and answer session, all the arahants recited the collection of rules in the same manner as it was adopted. In similar fashion, Ānanda replies to Kāśyapa's

questions on the discourses (sutta). Some accounts of this meeting state also that Kāśyapa recited the Abhidhamma texts.[2] Although Buddhist tradition assigns the formulation of the Buddhist canon to this early, and perhaps apocryphal meeting of arahants, the actual division of the collected words of the Buddha into three distinct groups: discourses, monastic code, and Abhidhamma, must have occured much later. Some of the monastic code and discourses date back to the first generation of the Buddha's disciples, but as the works were written down several centuries later, and having passed from one group of disciples to another and from one regional dialect to another, the core of material became enlarged. The Abhidhamma literature is a later exegetical corpus commenting on teachings contained in the discourses of the Buddha, as well as factional disputes among the various Buddhist schools that developed in the centuries after the Buddha's death.

About one hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, traditional accounts state that a second council met to discuss certain relaxations of the monastic code, including the acceptance of gold and silver coins. The monks assembled at Vaiśālī recited the discourses and the monastic code; the council concluded that relaxing the rules should not be permitted. The result of this council, according to some accounts, was that the community split into two factions: the more conservative Sthaviras and

the Mahāsāṅghikas. Other accounts of this split of the community attribute the division to different reasons. A controversy developed over five points concerning the nature of the arahant. Mahādeva, the author of the controverted points, argued against the self-aggrandizement of the arahants; he asserted that their claims to omniscience were greatly exaggerated, for example. The reigning monarch in Magadha, Mahāpadma Nanda convened a council at Pāṭaliputra ca.349 B.C.E. so that the dispute might be settled. The more numerous Mahāsāṅghikas, who supported less stringent standards for the attainment of arahant status, prevailed.

Further accounts of divisions among the community state that a third council met two hundred and eighteen years after the death of the Buddha, during the reign of King Aśoka, circa 237 B.C.E.. At this council, also convened at Pāṭaliputra, Moggaliputta recited the Katthāvatthu, the fifth book of the Pali Abhidhamma.[3] One of the debated issues concerned the existence of past and future factors of existence (dharma); Kātyāyana and his supporters who held this position became known as those who maintain that everything exists, the Sarvāstivādins. The council decided in favor of those schools who held that there are distinctions (vibhajya) to be made with respect to past, present, and future things, viz., the Sthaviravādins and the Mahāsāṅghikas.[4] It is

against these schools and subsects that sprang up from them that Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva argued in favor of ideas associated with the new Mahāyāna movement.

2. The evolution of the Mahāyāna

Scholars suggest that the northwestern and southern regions of India as areas in which the Mahāyāna movement originated. Circa 100 B.C.E. to 100 C.E. in regions populated by Mahāsāṅghika sects, new ideas about the nature of the Buddha, the role of the Bodhisattva, and the characteristic marks of individuals (pudgala) and factors of existence (dharma) began to emerge.[5] This development of new ideas that we now associate with the Mahāyāna appears to have taken place among subsects of the Mahāsāṅghikas. From a center in Magadha, these subsects spread into the northwest and south. Few of their works survive; the Mahāvastu, the work of a Lokottaravādin, and the Tattva/Satyasiddhi, the work of Harivarman, a Bahuśrutīya, are notable exceptions. Consequently we know of their views primarily through the records kept by their opponents, namely, the Kathāvatthu and Buddhaghosa's commentary to it, and the treatises on the origins of Buddhist sects composed by Vasumitra, Bhavya, and Vinītadeva.[6]

Influential in the northwest, the Lokottaravādins held that the nature of the Buddha was supramundane (lokottara); they saw the Buddha as a transcendent being who adopted the imperfect body of humans for the sake of converting them

to his teachings. The Lokottaravādins and the Mahāsāṅghikas in the southern region of Andhra held that the Bodhisattvas are voluntarily reborn, even in unfortunate rebirths, for the sake of converting sentient beings to the Buddha's teachings. "Il semble que le soit plus particulièrement aux Lokottaravādin que l'on doive la conception du Buddha transcendent, le docétisme et l'insistance sur la carrière des Bodhisattva qui caractérisent le Véhicule des Bodhisattva," Bareau says.[7] According to Paramārtha, the Lokottaravādins maintained that only supramundane things really exist, since these are not the products of error (viparyaya); mundane things, on the other hand, since they are the results of action (karma), and products of error, do not really exist. The cognition capable of comprehending the path and its fruition, and the emptiness of both individuals and factors of existence are supremundane.[8] The Bahuśrutīyas similarly distinguish between the Buddha's teaching on supramundane matters, e.g., impermanence (anityatā), suffering (duḥkha), emptiness (śūnyatā), and non-substantiality, (nairātmya) and his teaching on all other topics.[9] The Bahuśrutīyas and the Āndhra Mahāsāṅghikas hold also that there are two truths: the conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) and the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya).[10] The views of these Mahāsāṅghika subsects resemble the views that the early Mahāyāna discourses and treatises promulgate.

In particular, the views of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva on the transcendent nature of the Buddha, the career of the Bodhisattva, and on the two levels of truth have much in common with the views ascribed to various Mahāsāṅghika schools. On the basis of these similarities, scholars sought the origins of the new Mahāyāna movement in the Mahāsāṅghika strongholds in the northwestern and southern regions of India.

The earliest of the Mahāyāna discourses, those collected under the rubric of the Ratnakūṭa (Jewel-Heap) and the Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Insight), were translated into Chinese during the latter part of the second century. C. E. Warder suggests that some of the early Mahāyāna sūtras later incorporated into the Ratnakūṭa collection may have formed part of the Tripiṭaka of one of the Āndhra Mahāsāṅghika schools; the Sthaviravāda treatise, the Nikāyasaṅgraha, attributes the composition of the Ratnakūṭa to the Āndhra schools. He notes that one section of the Ratnakūṭa, the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, sets forth the teaching that Bodhisattvas in the course of their career must fulfil six perfections (pāramitā): generosity (dāna), moral conduct (śīla), patience (kṣānti), energy (vīrya), meditation (dhyāna), and insight (prajñā). The understanding that all things are insubstantial and empty is integral to the pursuit of the Bodhisattva career, according to this text.

Moreover, as Warder points out, the intention of awakening (bodhicitta) occurs in this text and the term 'awakening' (bodhi) is used not in the sense of the Buddha's and the arahant's understanding of the four noble truths, and the acquisition of the knowledge of the recollection of past lives, the rebirth of sentient beings in accordance with their actions, and the exhaustion of all defilment (āśrava); the intention of awakening signifies that a Bodhisattva has set out to attain the ominiscient status of a Buddha. By producing this intention the Bodhisattvas surpass the auditors (śrāvaka) and the solitary Buddhas (pratyekabuddha). This categorization of the auditors and the solitary Buddhas as 'inferior' (hīna), Warder concludes, marks the separation of the Mahāyāna from the earlier Mahāsāṅghika schools.[11]

The Prajñāpāramitāsūtras also may have originated in southern India. The first of these texts translated into Chinese in 187 C.E., the Aṣṭasāhaśrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, states that after the death of the Buddha the perfection of insight will proceed to the south and from that region spread to the west and north; otner recensions of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras agree that these teachings spread to other regions from the south and south-east. This literature also may have developed among the Āndhra Mahāsāṅghikas, for according to a Tibetan tradition the Āndhra Mahāsāṅghikas had a Prakrit version

of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras that may have been the prototype for later Sanskrit versions.[12] Candrakīrti in the Madhyamakāvatāra and the PP quotes a stanza attributed to one of these Mahāsāṅghika sects: "not destroyed, not produced, the world is the same as the realm of the Law (Dharmadhātu). He teaches about the age of conflagration--this is in conformity with the world."[13] This reference to the Buddha employing two levels of instruction, ultimate and conventional, is an idea held by the Mahāsāṅghikas that found acceptance in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras.

The Prajñāpāramitāsūtras emphasize that the Bodhisattva exercises generosity in giving gifts to sentient beings and with compassion works for their salvation; employing skilful techniques (upāya), including the use of conventional language in order to convert them to the truth of the Buddha's teachings. The Bodhisattva realizes, however, that the giver, the act of giving, and the recipient are all ultimately empty, like dreams and illusions. According to the Aṣṭa, even the fruits of arhatship resemble illusions. Rawlinson finds that the attitude of the Aṣṭa towards the auditors is ambiguous: some are criticized for clinging to Buddhahood and other factors of existence, while others are thought capable of understanding the new teachings on the perfection of insight. But the essential difference between the Aṣṭa and the Ratnakūṭa

compared to other early Mahāyāna sūtras, he believes, is not their attitudes towards the auditors, but the fact that they are concerned with defining the new movement and its notion of what makes a person a Bodhisattva. Rawlinson suggests that the reason for the Aṣṭa's concern with definition is that is was a product of a reform movement that grew out of the traditional notions of early Buddhism.

He postulates the existence of separate groups of Buddhists, all simultaneously engaged in the gradual transformation of early Buddhism. Their respective contributions to the evolution of Mahāyāna can be determined from an analysis of the differences regarding the Bodhisattva ideal in their sūtras. The first stage of this evolution is found among those sūtras which idealize the Buddha; the Bodhisattva ideal occurs in the context of actions undertaken by the Buddha when he was a Bodhisattva, e.g., those involving generosity, moral conduct, and sacrifice ([pari]tyāga). The second stage indicates a reinterpretation and reform of early Buddhism; a Bodhisattva follows the new tradition, while the auditors cling to the old tradition. In the third stage, the "revolutionary" Mahāyāna movement distinguishes itself from the old tradition by rejecting the auditors who refuse to accept the new teachings. Rawlinson identifies the Ratnakūṭa literature with stages one and two and the Prajñāpāramitā literature with stage three.[14]

In the early sūtras of the new Mahāyāna movement we see the gradual transformation of early Buddhism, and specifically the ideas associated with the Mahāsāṅgihikas, viz., the emphasis on the Buddha as a supramundane being who skilfully employs two levels of discourse to attract and convert sentient beings to his teachings, the emphasis on the Bodhisattva's career, and the emphasis on the teaching of the emptiness of both the individual and the factors of existence. These ideas influenced the composition of the new Mahāyāna sūtras. And these Mahāyāna sūtras, the Ratnakūṭa and Prajñāpāramitā collections, in turn, influenced the composition of the early Mahāyāna treatises.

3. Is Nāgārjuna a Mahāyānist?

Warder argues that, since Nāgārjuna's major treatise the MMK nowhere cites or refers to any Mahāyāna sūtra, the traditional view that he criticizes the early Buddhist schools in order to establish the Mahāyāna is open to question. He finds no evidence in the MMK that Nāgārjuna had ever seen any of the Prajñāpāramitā literature.[15] Nāgārjuna quotes in MMK XV.7 only one sūtra by name, the Kātyāyanāvavāda from the Saṃyukta Nikāya: "In the 'Instructions to Kātyāyana' the Blessed One, who perceives distinctly existence and non-existence, rejected both 'it exists' and 'it doesn't exist'."[16] Nāgārjuna in MMK XII.1 refers also to another sūtra from the Saṃyukta, the

Acelakāśyapa: "Some hold that suffering is produced by oneself, by someone else, or by both, or produced without a cause. But that it is an effect is incorrect."[17] He also draws upon in MMK XXVII some version of the Brahmajalasūtra from the Dīrgha Nikāya in his analysis of the following speculative views: that the self is eternal, that the world is eternal, that the self has an end, and that the world has an end.[18]

In each of these citations mentioned by Warder Nāgārjuna uses the authority of the Buddha to support his attack on the philosophical positions of his opponents. In the first instance he cites the Kātyāyanāvavāda as proof that the Buddha denied both the position that something exists and the position that something does not exist. In the second instance Nāgārjuna notes that in reference to the topic of suffering all four positions of the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi) are denied; he concludes in the last verse of the same chapter: MMK XII.10 "Not only is the fourfold [analysis] of suffering not possible, but also the fourfold [analysis] of external things is not possible."[19] In the last instance he repudiates various speculative views; these views are encompassed by the two extremes, viz., the speculative view of eternalism (śāsvatadṛṣṭi) and the speculative view of nihilism (ucchedadṛṣṭi). Nāgārjuna equates in MMK XV.10 these two extremes with the first two positions of the

tetralemma: "The belief in eternalism is 'it exists'; the viewpoint of nihilism is 'it does not exist'. Therefore the wise should not rely on existence and non-existence."[20] Clearly, in the MMK Nāgārjuna sets out to demonstrate the inconsistency and inadequacy of various philosophical positions. And in doing so he appeals in MMK XXVII.30 to the authority of the Buddha as a justification for his undertaking: "I pay hommage to Gautama, who taught with compassion (<u>anukampā</u>) taught the true teaching for the sake of destroying speculative views."[21] The fact that Nāgārjuna cites the authority of the Buddha's word in criticizing the views of his opponents suggests that they were fellow Buddhists whom he wished to convert to the true teaching. But is this true teaching the Mahāyāna? Warder is correct in stating that Nāgārjuna's citation and references in the MMK to the canonical texts of an early form of the Tripiṭaka indicate that he considered the four truths (inter-dependent origination being an expanded analysis of the second truth) to constitute the core of the Buddha's teaching. But while there may be, as Warder points out, "nothing overtly Mahāyānist" in Nāgārjuna's MMK, his claim that "even in its deeper implications there seems to be nothing distinctly Mahāyānist" in his references to the early Tripiṭaka deserves further study.[22]

Warder notes that the reference in MMK XIII.1 'that is false which has the nature of delusion (<u>tan</u> <u>mṛṣā</u>)

mosadharma yad) seems to come from the Dhātuvibhaṅgasūtra of the Madhyamaka. Candrakīrti in commenting on this verse quotes the sūtra more fully, adding the words "true which has the nature of non-delusion, Nirvāṇa" (satyaṃ yad idam amoṣadharma, nirvāṇam). In the Pali canonical text what is delusive is described as sensation (vedanā) or suffering. Nāgārjuna in MMK XII.1 extends this description to all conditioned forces (saṃskāra):[23] "The Blessed One said that is false which has a delusive nature. And all conditioned forces are delusive in nature; therefore they are false."[24] The Theravāda text the Suttanipāta (vv.756-758) contrasts the views of those who think this world is true with those who consider it to be false, deceptive in nature (musā hoti mosadhammaṃ) and know that Nirvāṇa is non-deceptive in nature (amosadhammaṃ nibbānam).[25] Whatever the source for Nāgārjuna's citation, he utilizes it to define the conditioned forces as false and delusive in nature; and in the second verse of MMK XIII he states that the phrase 'that is false which has the nature of delusion' was spoked by the Buddha to illumine emptiness (etat tūktaṃ bhagavatā śūnyatā paridīpakam).[26]

In MMK XXIII.8 Nāgārjuna again seems to quote from the Suttanipāta (v.759). The prose passage preceding this verse contrasts the perception of ordinary people, viz., 'this is pleasure' (idam sukham) with the perception

of the saints (ariya), the viz., 'this is suffering' (idam duhkham). The verse that follows explains the basis for ordinary people's wrong perception: "Forms, sounds, tastes, smells, touches, and factors of existence, all are pleasing, delightful, and charming while they exist."[27] Nāgārjuna in MMK XXIII.8 quotes the first line of this verse: "Forms, sounds, tastes, smells, touches, and factors of existence, all have the aspect of a city of celestial musicians, resembling mirages and dreams."[28] Candrakīrti glosses the term 'kevala' as "merely imaginary (parikalpitamātra)" and as "lacking a nature of its own (niḥsvabhāva)."[29] Candrakīrti's gloss on the term 'kevala' brings to the first line of this verse a Mahāyānist interpretation not present in the Theravāda Suttanipāta, which states simply that the entire corpus of sense objects from the visual organ's objects to those of the mental organ (manas) are pleasurable as long as they last; the implication is that these objects' existence and that of the pleasures they invoke is brief. Nāgārjuna's verse goes a step further; these objects' existence is deceptive, he implies, just like mirages and dreams.

The use of images such as mirages and dreams to depict something as insubstantial is not limited to the Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras. In Saṃyutta, III, the section on the aggregates (khandhavagga), the Buddha says: "This body is like a mass of foam; sensation is like a bubble;

perception (*saññā*) is unsubstantial like a mirage; conditioned forces lack a core, just like the trunk of a banana tree; and consciousness is like a phantom."[30] In describing the body and the mental aggregates as insubstantial, the Buddha aims to rid his disciples of the mistaken notion of an 'I' and all that pertains to an 'I'. Nāgārjuna concurs with this point of view, but extends in MMK XVII.33 the ascription 'nonsubstantial' to action and its results: "Affliction (*kleśa*), action, and bodies, both agents and effects, have the aspect of a city of celestial musicians, resembling mirages and dreams."[31]

When the Buddha states that someone who contemplates the body and analyzes its form by means of extensive insight (*bhuripañña*) will perceive it as empty (*suñña*),[32] he means that the body is empty of a self (*atta*) and all that belongs to a self (*attaniya*).[33] The insight that the body and the mental aggregates are empty results from meditation. In *Saṃyutta*, IV, the Buddha declares that the path that leads to the unconditioned, i.e., Nirvāṇa, is concentration that is empty, signless (*animitta*), and wishless (*apraṇihita*).[34] For Nāgārjuna also insight into emptiness leads to the realization of the path. However, emptiness is not just insight into the non-substantiality of the self, but for Nāgārjuna this insight into emptiness involves the realization of its equation with interdependent

origination. He says in MMK XXIV.18: "We declare that what is interdependent origination is emptiness; it is a dependent designation (prajñaptir upādāya); it is in fact the middle path."[35]

But just as Nāgārjuna in the MMK reinterprets one central teaching of early Buddhism, viz., the notion of non-substantiality, similarly he reinterprets a second central teaching, viz., interdependent origination. Interdependent origination, according to Nāgārjuna, does not mean that one factor of existence originates from its dependence on another as its cause. He says in MMK I.10: "Because entities without a nature of their own have no [real] existence, that [assertion] 'when that exists, this comes into existence' is not in fact possible."[36] This reinterpretation of interdependent origination, the realization that the entities that appear to originate in dependence upon causes and conditions are in fact empty of any real nature of their own, defines the middle path. Nāgārjuna avoids the extreme position of nihilism by accepting that on the surface entities do originate in interdependence, and he avoids the extreme position of eternalism by pointing out that entities that are dependent have no real nature of their own and are not existent from the ultimate point of view. He concludes his chapter on the four truths with the observation (MMK XXIV.40): "Whoever sees interdependent

origination sees this: suffering, origination, cessation, and the path."[37] The first line of this verse quotes the Mahahattipadopamasutta from Majjhima I, which begins with a discussion of the four truths and ends with the Buddha's statement: "Whoever sees interdependent origination sees the Dhamma, whoever sees the Dhamma sees interdependent origination."[38]

These citations and references in the MMK and in his other works to the statements of the Buddha indicate that Nāgārjuna was familar with some early version of the Tripiṭaka However, he quotes from the Tripiṭaka selectively, and it would be misleading to conclude that he is in agreement with all the implications of the early Buddhist teachings. In a number of instances he cites or refers to only part of a quotation from the early Buddhist Tripiṭaka and adds to the quotation, often in the second line of his own verse, an interpretation that is distinctly Mahāyānist in its implications.

Nāgārjuna also seems to quote from one of the Mahāyāna sūtras, the Kāśyapaparivarta of the Ratnakūṭa collection, in MMK XIII.8: "The Conquerors have proclaimed that emptiness is the getting rid of (niḥsaraṇa) all speculative views. But they say that those who hold emptiness as a speculative view are incurable."[39] The Kāśyapaparivarta uses the same analogy of illness and treatment in its discussion of emptiness and speculative

views: "Kāśyapa, emptiness is the getting rid of all speculative views; and indeed, Kāśyapa, I call him incurable for whom emptiness is a speculative view."[40] This Ratnakūṭa sūtra describes the true investigation of factors of existence as being the middle path, and this investigation reveals that factors of existence are empty, signless, wishless, non-manufactured (anabhisaṃskṛta), unproduced (anutpāda), unborn (ajāta), ungraspable (agrāhya), undefiled (anāśrava), and without own-nature (asvabhāva).[41] Moreover, the Kāśyapaparivarta states that "what has no own-nature has no origination, what has no origination has no cessation, what has no cessation has no coming, and what has no coming has no going." Nāgārjuna in the verse dedicated to the Buddha at the beginning of MMK I similarly speaks of factors of existence that have originated in interdependence as marked by "non-origination, non-cessation, non-annihilation, non-eternal, non-identical, non-different, non-coming, and non-going."[42] His analysis of the nature of factors of existence denies the applicability of each set of these opposed concepts; the construction of these dichotomous concepts ceases through a realization of interdependent origination as emptiness and the middle path. The middle path, according to the Kāśyapaparivarta and Nāgārjuna, avoids all extreme positions based on the notion of duality. The central teachings of Nāgārjuna's philosophy,

viz., his views on emptiness, interdependent origination, and the middle path have much in common with Kāśyapaparivarta. These similarities suggest that he was familiar with some of the early Mahāyāna sutras in the Ratnakūṭa collection and that they had some influence on the development of his thought.

Buddhist tradition associates Nāgārjuna with another group of early Mahāyāna sutras whose views are similar to those in the Ratnakūṭa collection, the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras. The Aṣṭa, for example, describes the factors of existence in terms similar to those used by the Kāśyapaparivarta: empty, signless, wishless, unmanufactured, unproduced, unceased, undefiled, and unpurified.[43] But unlike the case of the Kāśyapaparivarta, there is no internal evidence in the MMK to indicate that Nāgārjuna quoted or directly referred to the Aṣṭa or any other Prajñāpāramita sūtra.

Robinson found numerous parallels between the Aṣṭa and the MMK in their treatment of such topics as interdependent origination, the Tathāgata, and Nirvāṇa.[44] The Aṣṭa states that a Bodhisattva should understand that interdependent origination rejects the duality of the extreme positions (antadvayavarjita); this also is Nāgārjuna's view. The Aṣṭa claims that the suchness (tathatā) of the world is that of the Tathāgata; similarly, Nāgārjuna in MMK XXII.16 asserts that the own-nature of

the Tathāgata is that of the world. The _Aṣṭa_ has the Buddha proclaim that form (_rūpa_) is neither bound nor free, because form has no own-nature; in MMK XVI.8 Nāgārjuna declares that what is bound is not liberated and what is not bound is not liberated, the implication being that between the own-nature of bondage and liberation no distinction can be made. While Robinson notes these and other parallels, he is aware also that the _Aṣṭa_ and the MMK employ different terminology. Several important terms in the _Aṣṭa_, e.g., insight (_prajñā_), suchness (_tathatā_), non-duality (_advaya_), the two bodies of the Buddha (_dharmakāya_, _rūpakāya_), the perfections (_paramitā_), the stages (_bhūmi_), the intention of awakening (_bodhicitta_), compassion (_karuṇā_), and skilful means (_upāya_) do not occur in the MMK. He argues that Nāgārjuna did not employ these terms because he was disputing the views of Hindu philosophers and non-Mahāyānists based on reasoning acceptable to both sides. Nonetheless, Robinson argues, Nāgārjuna indicates his acceptance of the _Prajñāpāramitā's_ views on emptiness when he quotes certain similies that are "distinctly Śūnyavādin." These similies include comparisons with illusions, mirages, city of celestial musicians, phantoms, dreams, and reflections.[45] However, contrary to Robinson's assertion, these similies are not "distinctly Śūnyavādin" if he means by this prase that they occur

only in the _Prajñāpāramitā_ and other Mahāyāna sūtras; these similies all occur in _Saṃyutta_, III, 139-142, in a discussion of the non-substantiality of the aggregates.

What is distinctive is not the fact that Nāgārjuna uses these similies, but the context in which he uses them. In MMK VII.34 he compares the three marks 'origination', 'cessation', and 'duration' to illusions, etc.; in MMK XVII.31,33 he compares agents, e.g., afflictions and action, and their effects, e.g., the body, to mirages, etc.; and in MMK XXIII.8 he compares the objects of the six faculties to mirages, etc. In all these cases he states that something which his non-Mahāyānist opponents hold to exist is deceptive, just a mental fiction. By claiming that the factors of existence, their marks, and operation of cause and effect have no real existence Nāgārjuna indicates his agreement with the philosophy of emptiness expressed in the _Prajñāparamitā_ _sūtras_.

The evidence for Nāgārjuna as being one of the earliest and most important contributors to the development of the Mahāyāna is strengthened if the _Ratnāvalī_ is accepted as his composition. This treastise of five hundred verses counsels an unnamed Indian king on how to rule his kingdom in accordance with the Buddha's teachings. Nāgārjuna advises the king to follow a middle path in his actions, avoiding the extremes of severe

asceticism (I.11) and sensual indulgence (II.46-70), and in his beliefs, avoiding the extreme views of eternalism and nihilism (I.38-62). Much of the counsel offered in the Ratnāvalī is common to both the schools of early Buddhism and the schools of the new Mahāyāna movement. And while Nāgārjuna supports the Mahāyāna over the vehicle of the auditors (śrāvakayāna), he does not see irreconcilable differences between the two systems. He says (IV.86): "In the Mahāyāna emptiness is non-production; for others it is extinction (kṣaya). Accept from the ultimate point of view the oneness of both extinction and non-production."[46]

He suggests (IV.87) that if wise people use reason (yukti) to consider emptiness and the greatness of the Buddha, they will accept the teachings of the Mahāyāna. Fear and ignorance motivate unwise people to reject the Buddha's profound teaching on emptiness. However, since it is difficult to ascertain what the Buddhas have said implicitly (abhisaṃdhyokta), one should protect oneself by adopting an impartial equanimity (upekṣā) towards the question of one vehicle or three; no demerit (apuṇya) results from impartial equanimity, while evil (pāpa) is the consequence of aversion (IV.88-89). The Mahāyāna, according to Nāgārjuna, differs from the vehicle of the auditors in its explanation of the vow (praṇidhi) and the Bodhisattva's career (IV.90,93).

Nāgārjuna mentions the Bodhisattva's career just once in MMK XXIV.32 "According to you, someone who is not a Buddha by virtue of own-nature, even though striving for awakening, will not attain awakening in the Bodhisattva's career."[47] There is nothing overtly Mahāyānist in this reference to the Bodhisattva's career; Nāgārjuna's statement could refer to the early Buddhist notion of the Bodhisattva's career as applying only to the activities of the Buddha in his lives prior to his awakening. But in the Ratnāvalī Mahāyāna terminology is used in the discussion of the Bodhisattva's career. Nāgārjuna urges the king to follow the Buddha's precepts and achieve for himself and his people the highest awakening (anuttarabodhi) (II.74, V.99). Of the basis for this awakening he says: (II.75) "Its roots are the intention of awakening (bodhicitta) that is as firm as Meru, the king of mountains, compassion (karuṇā) that extends in all directions, and knowledge that does not rely on duality (advayaniśritajñāna)."[48] The cultivation of compassion and the six perfections, generosity, moral conduct, patience, energy, meditation, and insight, epitomize the Mahāyāna; these perfections benefit both oneself and others and lead to liberation (IV.80-82). Through the cultivation of compassion and these six perfections, a Bodhisattva advances on the ten stages that culminate in the inconceivable stage of Buddhahood (V.40-64).

In contrast to the vehicle of the auditors, Nāgārjuna says that the Mahāyāna explains the inconceivable greatness of the Buddha (IV.84-85). According to the Mahāyāna scriptures, the thirty-two major and eighty minor marks of a Buddha arise from an incomprehensible quantity of merit heaped up over millions of eons (II.99-III.1). The two collections of merit and knowledge that accumulate from the cultivation of the Bodhisattva's career produce the form-body (rūpakāya) and the ultimate-body (dharmakāya), respectively (III.12).

In conclusion, Nāgārjuna's treatment of the nature of the Buddha, the career of the Bodhisattva, and his advocacy of the profound philosophy of emptiness in the Ratnāvalī clearly indicate his acceptance of the new Mahāyāna movement. But neither in the Ratnāvalī nor in his other works does he advocate a complete break with those Buddhists who follow the vehicle of the auditors. In these texts he encourages the auditors to use reason in examining the teachings of the Mahāyāna; he follows here the example of the Buddha who urged his disciples to critically investigate his teachings and decide for themselves what to accept: "The wise should realize the teaching by themselves (paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi)."[49]

By pointing out the inadequacies and inconsistancies in the theories held by the early Buddhists, Nāgārjuna in the MMK, the Ratnāvalī, and his other treatises uses

logical arguments to persuade his opponents to accept the philosophy of emptiness. But in the Ratnāvalī he emphasizes less the rational arguments against the speculative theories advanced by the Abhidharma specialists among the early Buddhist schools; in this treatise he is more concerned with rational arguments for Mahāyāna practices. He notes that the Buddha taught various precepts in accordance with the capabilities of his disciples and urges that the wise extinguish their hatred for the Mahāyāna and replace it with faith (śraddhā). (IV.94-98); faith, he says, precedes insight (prajñā) and through insight one realizes the ultimate truth (I.5.).

When Nāgārjuna asserts in his works that the profound teaching of emptiness is the word of the Buddha, he may have in mind, as Murti suggests,[50] the following passage from the Saṃyutta, in which the Buddha spoke about the future of the monastic community. The Buddha used the analogy of a drum that began to split; each time it was mended with new material until the original drumhead had vanished, with only the repairs remaining: "Those discourses proclaimed by the Tathāgata, profound, profound in meaning, reaching beyond the world, concerned with emptiness (suññatāpaṭisaṃyutta); when these are proclaimed, the monks will not listen, will not hear, will not understand."[51] Nāgārjuna in bringing to the forefront the

profound teaching of the Buddha on emptiness undoubtedly believes that he is cutting away at the unwarranted repairs made by the Ābhidharmikas to the Buddha's true teachings and restoring these teachings to their original form.

Āryadeva, as will be shown in subsequent chapters of this study, follows his master's example in upholding the philosophy of emptiness and in advocating the practices of the Bodhisattva. Both Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva flourished at a time (ca.200 C.E.) when the teachings of early Buddhism began to undergo reinterpretation and reform. Certain views of the Mahāsāṅghika sects concerning this supramundane nature of the Buddha, the two levels of discourse, and the career of the Bodhisattva were developed further in the early Mahāyāna sūtras. The early Mahāyāna treatises of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, influenced by these views, supported them through rational argument. The treatises of these two early Madhyamaka masters, like the teachings of the Ratnakūṭa sūtras, whose views on emptiness, the middle path, and the career of the Bodhisattva, they most closely resemble, belong to an early period in the development of Mahāyāna. As more texts from this period are edited, translated, and studied more will become known about the relationship between the early Mahāyāna sūtras and the early Mahāyāna treatises.

CHAPTER I

NOTES

[1]*Dīgha*, II, p.154: '*Siyā kho pan' Ānanda tumhākaṃ evaṃ assa*: "*Atītasatthukaṃ pāvacanaṃ n'atthi no Satthā*" *ti. Na kho pan' etaṃ Ānanda evaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yo vo Ānanda mayā Dhammo ca Vinayo ca desito paññatto, so vo mam' accayena Satthā*.

[2]Traditional accounts of the council can be found in the *Skandhaka* section of each school's *Vinaya*. A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), p.202 notes that the Sthaviravāda and Mahāsāṅghika accounts to not mention the recitation of the *Abhidharma*.

On comtemporary studies of the councils see the references cited by Étienne Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien, des origines à l'ère Śaka* (Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1958, reprint 1967), p. 136, and Charles Prebish, "A Review of Scholarship on the Buddhist Councils," JAS 33 (1974), pp. 239-54.

[3]The *Kathāvatthu* has been translated by S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys-David, *Points of Controversy* (London: Pali Text Society, 1915); Buddhaghosa's commentary on the *Kathāvatthu* also has been translated by B. C. Law, *The Debates Commentary* (London: Pali Text Society, 1940).

[4]On the Vibhajyavādins see André Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques*, pp.167-180.

[5]Many scholars trace the origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism to the south of India. See for example, Edward Conze, Buddhism: Its Essence and Development (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959), pp. 119-124; Nalinaksha Dutt, Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna (London: Luzac & Co., 1930), pp. 28-43; and Warder, Indian Buddhism, pp. 352-353. But Etienne Lamotte, "Sur la formation du Mahāyāna" in Asiatia, Festschrift F. Weller, (Leipzig, 1954), pp. 386-396, places its origins in the northwest.

[6]On the views of the various Mahāsāṅghika sects see Bareau, Les Sectes Bouddhique, pp. 55-109.

[7]Ibid., p. 77.

[8]Ibid., p. 76.

[9]Ibid., p. 82.

[10]Ibid., pp. 82, 92.

[11]Warder, Indian Buddhism, pp. 357-358.

[12]See Edward Conze, The Prajñāpāramitā Literature, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: The Reiyukai, 1978), p. 19.

[13]PPp.548: avināśam anatpannam dharmadhātusamaṃ jagat/ sattvadhātum ca deśeti eṣā lokānuvartanā // cf. MA p.134 (cited by LVP n.3): zhig pa cing skye med la / chos dbyings dang mnyam par gyur kyang / sreg pa'i bskal pa brjod mdzad pa / 'di ni 'jig rten mthun 'jug yin //

[14]See Andrew Rawlinson. "The Position of the Aṣṭasāhaśrikāprajñāpāramitā in the Development of Early Mahāyāna," in Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems, ed.

Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, no. 1, Lewis Lancaster, (Berkeley, 1977), pp.15-19, 32-33, nn.151, 155, 157.

[15] A. K. Warder, "Is Nāgārjuna a Mahāyānist?", pp. 78 - 87 in M. Sprung, ed., The problem of two truths in Buddhism and Vedānta (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973).

[16] MMK XV.7 :

kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam /
pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhavinā / /

[17] MMK XII.1:

svayaṃ kṛtaṃ parakṛtaṃ dvābhyāṃ kṛtaṃ ahetukam /
duḥkham ity eka icchanti tac ca kāryaṃ na yujyate //

[18] See N. Dutt, "The Brahmajālasutta in the light of Nāgārjuna's exposition, "IHQ 8 (1932), pp.706-732, and Jacques May, Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959), p. 277 n. 1015.

[19] MMK XII.10:

na kevalaṃ hi duḥkhasya cāturvidhyaṃ na vidyate /
bāhyānāṃ api bhāvānāṃ cāturvidhyaṃ na vidyate //

[20] MMK XV.10:

astīti śāśvatagrāho nastīty ucchedadarśanam /
tasmād astitvanāstitve nāśrītyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ //

[21] MMK XXVII.30:

sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat /
anukampām upādāya taṃ namasyāmi gautamam //

[22] Warder, "Is Nāgārjuna a Mahāyānist," p. 81.

[23] Ibid., p. 80. See also T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.: 1955), p.50.

[24] MMK XIII.1:

tan mṛṣā moṣadharma yad bhagavān ity abhāṣata /
sarve ca moṣadharmāṇaḥ saṃskārās tena te mṛṣā //

[25] See *Suttanipāta*, ed. Dines Anderson and Helmer Smith (London: Pali Text Society, 1965), pp. 147-148.

[26] MMK XIII.2:

tan mṛṣā moṣadharma yad yadi kim tatra muṣyate /
etat tūktam bhagavatā śūnyatāparidīpakam //

[27] *Suttanipāta*, v. 759, p.148:

rūpā saddā rasā gandhā phassā dhammā ca kevalā
itthā kantā manāpā ca yāvat' 'atthīti' vuccati.

[28] MMK XXIII.8:

rūpasabdarasasparśā gandhā dharmāś ca kevalāḥ /
gandharvanagarākāra marīcisvapnasaṃnibhāḥ //

[29] PP p.457: *kevalā iti parikalpitamātrā niḥsvabhāvā ity arthaḥ* // See also May, *Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti,* pp.187, n.611.

[30] *Saṃyutta*, III. p. 142:

Pheṇapiṇḍūpamaṃ rūpaṃ // *vedanā bubbuḷūpamā* //
Marīcikūpamā saññā // *saṅkhārā kadalūpamā* //
Māyūpamañca viññāṇaṃ //

[31]MMK XVII.33:

klésāh karmāni dehāś ca kartāraś ca phalāni ca /

gandharvanagarākārā marīcisvapnasamnibhāh //

[32]Ibid., p. 143.

[33]See Samyutta, IV, p.54: rūpa suñña attena vā attaniyena vā //// "Form is empty of self and what pertains to self."

[34]Samyutta, IV, p.360: Katamo ca bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmi maggo // // Suññato samādhi animitto samādhi appanihito samādhi // ayam vuccati bhikkhave asaṅkhatagāmi maggo // // "Monks, What path leads to the unconditioned? The concentration on emptiness, the concentration on the signless, and the concentration on the wishless--this, monks, is the path that leads to the unconditioned." These concentrations are cited also in Dīgha, II. p.219.

[35]MMK XXIV.18:

yah pratītyasamutpādah śūnyatām tām pracaksmahe /

sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā //

See David Seyfort Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), p.17 n.39 on this verse.

[36]MMK I.10:

bhāvānām nihsvabhāvānām na sattā vidyate yatah /

satīdam asmin bhavatīty etan naivopapadyate //

[37]MMK XXIV.40:

yaḥ pratityasamutpādaṃ paśyatīdaṃ sa paśyati /
duḥkhaṃ samudayaṃ caiva nirodhaṃ mārgaṃ eva ca //

[38]*Majjhima*, I, pp.190-191: *Yo paṭiccasamuppādam passati so dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppadam passatīti.*

[39]MMK XIII.8:

śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ /
yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire //

[40]*Kāśyapaparivarta*, ed. A. von Staël-Holstein (Tokyo: Meicho-Fukyu-kai, 1977), pp. 95-97: ...*Kāśyapa sarvadṛṣṭigatānāṃ śūnyatāniḥsaraṇaṃ yasya khalu punaḥ Kāśyapa śūnyatādṛṣṭis tam aham acikitsyam iti vadāmi.*

[41]Ibid., p.149.

[42]*anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam* / *anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam* /

[43]*Aṣṭasahaśrikāprajñāpāramitā*, ed. P. L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960), p.135.

[44]Richard Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 177-180.

[45]Ibid., pp. 63-64.

[46]*Ratnāvalī* IV.86:

anutpādo mahāyāne pareṣāṃ śūnyatā kṣayaḥ /
kṣayānutpādāyoś caikyam arthataḥ kṣamyatām //

[47]MMK XXIV.32:

yaś cābuddhaḥ svabhāvena sa bodhāya ghaṭann api /
na bodhisattvacaryāyāṃ bodhiṃ te 'dhigamiṣyati //

[48]*Ratnāvalī* II.75:

de yi rtsa ba byang chub sems //
ri dbang rgyal po ltar brtan dang //
phyogs mthas gtugs pa'i snying rje dang //
gnyis la mi brten ye shes lags //

[49]*Aṅguttara* II, p.56:

...*dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhīti*.

[50]Murti, *Central Philosophy*, pp.50-51.

[51]*Saṃyutta*, II, p.267:

Ye te suttantā tathāgatabhāsitā gambhīrā gambhīratthā lokuttarā suññatāpaṭisaṃyutta // *tesu bhaññamānesu na sussusissanti* // *na sotaṃ odahissanti* // *na aññacittaṃ upaṭṭhāpessanti* //

CHAPTER II

THE LIFE OF ĀRYADEVA

1. The date of Āryadeva

Chinese and Tibetan sources agree in naming Āryadeva as a direct disciple of Nāgārjuna and as his immediate successor in the Madhyamaka lineage. These sources concur also in attributing to him great skill in debate and credit him with the successful defense of the Madhyamaka philosophy against numerous Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents. But these sources differ in their discussions of the date of Āryadeva's birth, his birthplace, the length of his life, and on other biographical details.

Comtemporary scholarship, based in part upon these early Chinese and Tibetan sources, reflects this divergence of opinion in the matter of Āryadeva's date. The problem of determining Āryadeva's date is linked with the difficulties in arriving at an accurate date for his teacher Nāgārjuna. Much has been written over the years on the date of Nāgārjuna, with various scholars placing his birth at the end of the first century C.E., in the second century C.E., and in the third century C.E.[1]

Bailey proposes the following dates for Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, and Mātṛceṭa:[2]

A.D.	70:	Birth of Nāgārjuna
A.D.	90:	Birth of Āryadeva
A.D.	105:	Birth of Mātṛceṭa
A.D.	128:	Accession of Kaniṣka I -- Suhṛllekha of Nāgārjuna.
A.D.	145:	Conversion of Mātṛceṭa

Lamotte rejects Bailey's association of Nāgārjuna's Suhṛllekha with King Kaniṣka I.[3] In an earlier work Lamotte notes without comment the suggestion that the unnamed Indian monarch to whom Nāgārjuna's letter was addressed was King Yajñaśrī, of the South Indian imperial dynasty, the Āndhra Sātavāhanas:

> La balustrade extérieure du stūpa d'Amarāvatī parte les incriptions de deux rois de la dynastie Andhra, Puḷumāyī et Yajñaśrī et d'après certaines auteurs, c'est à ce dernier que Nāgārjuna aurait dédié l'épître Suhṛllekha.[4]

Citing the same archeological evidence, Warder identifies the Sātavāhana king in question with Puḷumāyī II and concludes that Nāgārjuna flourished in the second century C.E.[5] Lamotte, however, proposes a third century C.E. date, based upon Chinese sources. He uses Kumārajīva's date of 637 B.C.E. for the Buddha's Nirvāṇa as the basis for calculating the following dates for Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Harivarman:[6]

637 B.C.E.	The Buddha's Nirvāṇa
287 B.C.E.	Birth of Aśvaghoṣa
243 C.E.	Birth of Nāgārjuna; followed by Āryadeva
253 C.E.	Composition of Harivarman's Tattva/Satyasiddhi.

Lamotte cites as evidence for the dating of Nāgārjuna's activity between the years 243-300 C.E. a Chinese

catalogue that lists the translation of the Daśabhūmikaśāstra, attributed to Nāgārjuna, by Dharmarakṣa between the years 265 and 313; but, as de Jong points out, even assuming the attribution of this work to Nāgārjuna is correct:

> Hikata, from whom L. has taken this indication, argues that the Daśabhūmika must have reached Tun-huang before 265 (the date of Dharmaraksa's departure) and that the text must have come into existence by 250 at the latest. In that case Nāgārjuna would have written the text at the age of seven at the latest![7]

Lamotte also in another publication expresses his own reservations about this chronology: "On n'échappe pas à l'impression que les datations relèvent de vues théoriques sur les étapes successives de la Bonne Loi et que, en chronologie absolue, leur valeur est plutot faible."[8]

Moreover, Harivarman's Tattva/Satyasiddhi quotes a verse from Āryadeva's CŚ,[9] which makes the dating of the Tattva/Satyasiddhi at 253 C.E. incompatible with a date of 243 C.E. for Nāgārjuna's birth, and an even later date suggested for Āryadeva's birth. Assuming that Harivarman flourished in the middle of the third century C.E., Āryadeva most likely was active somewhat earlier, circa the end of the second century C.E. to the beginning of the third century C.E. If we accept that Kumārajīva's information on the date of Harivarman is accurate, why

should his information on the dates of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva be less reliable? A possible answer to this question lies in the fact Harivarman was a Kashmiri scholar and Kumārjīva had studied in Kashmir around the middle of the fourth century. The recollections of Harivarman, who had died less than a century earlier, presumably were still fresh in the minds of Kumārajīva's teachers. On the other hand, information about Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, who flourished in the south of India during an earlier period of time, may well have been inaccurate.

Ui, who uses the same date of 637 B.C.E. as the date of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa and the statement of Seng chao in his preface to Āryadeva's Śatakaśāstra that Āryadeva lived eight hundred or more years after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, concludes that Āryadeva must have flourished circa 163 to 263 C.E. He places Nāgārjuna's activity fifty years earlier and Harivarman circa 260 or 270 C.E.[10] Although there is some evidence suggesting that Āryadeva began his studies with Nāgārjuna when the teacher was already advanced in age, a fifty year age gap is too great; the same evidence also suggests that Āryadeva was a mature scholar when he met Nāgārjuna.[11]

Robinson questions the accuracy of Kumārajīva's date for the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, but does not reject the claim outright. He finds that the dates Ui assigns to Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, based upon the 637 date, as "consonant with

the supposition that the biography of Nāgārjuna translated by Kumārajīva was written during the first half of the fourth century, as it mentions the existence of shrines to Nāgārjuna one hundred years after his death."[12] Lamotte notes that Kumārajīva, the putative author of this biography, the Lung shu p'u sa chuan (Taishō 2047), states that more than one hundred years have passed since Nāgārjuna's death and the present time. Lamotte, favoring an early fifth century date for this biography, concludes that Nāgārjuna's death occured towards the end of the third century C.E.[13] But the statement that more than one hundred years have elapsed since the death of Nāgārjuna and the present time could indicate an earlier date, particularly if this biography is not the work of Kumārajīva, but his translation of an earlier Indian biography. Robinson refers to Seng jui's mention of an earlier Indian biography in his preface to the Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise and to Hui yuan's summary of this biography in his preface to the Great Perfection of Wisdom Treastise.[14]

In conclusion, the testimony of Kumārajīva's disciple, Seng chao that Āryadeva lived eight hundred years or more after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa (637 B.C.E.) and the testimony of Hui yuan that Nāgārjuna lived in the ninth century A.N. place the activity of both Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva in the mid-second to third centuries C.E.

This information, along with the probable association of Nāgārjuna with one of the Sātavāhana kings, whose dynastic rule came to a close in the mid-third century C.E.,[15] favors the hypothesis of the dating 150-250 C.E. for Nāgārjuna and 170-270 C.E. for Āryadeva.

2. The place of Āryadeva's birth

Candrakīrti in a brief biographical note on Āryadeva in the ĆSṬ says:

> The master Āryadeva was born on the island of Siṃhala as the son of the Siṃhala king. Finally he gave up [his position as] crown prince and entered the religious life. Then he came south and became the student of the master Nāgārjuna.[16]

Bhattacarya, who quotes this passage from the ĆSṬ in the introduction to his edition of the ĆS,[17] argues against the position of Nalinaksha Dutt, who sought the location of Siṃhapura in northern India: "In view of the fact that there is no mention of Jambudvīpa, and that the direction of Southern India with reference to Ceylon should be uttaradik, is it not justifiable to look for Āryadeva's home somewhere in Northern India?"[18] Bhattacarya points out that from the perspective of Candrakīrti, who lived in the north at the monastic complex Nālandā, both Ceylon and the Deccan lie to the south. "So Candrakīrti naturally writes that Āryadeva, a native of Ceylon, came to India following the Southern direction," he concludes.[19]

Other scholars also accept this identification of the island Siṃhala with the island of Ceylon or Śrī Laṅkā, as the island is now known. Some in fact suggest that Āryadeva may be the elder (thera) Deva mentioned in the Sinhalese chronicles, the Mahāvaṃsa and the Dīpavaṃsa. The author of the Mahāvaṃsa reports (XXXVI.29) that King Voharikastissa "listened to the teaching in the presence of the elder Deva, who resided at Kappukagama, and repaired five residences."[20] The Dīpavaṃsa's author mentions this elder Deva promulgating Buddhist teachings to Voharikatissa's successors, Abhayatissa and Saṅghatissa (XXII.41, 50):

> After he heard the Gilāna suttanta preached by the elder Deva, he [Abhayatissa] gave medicines to the sick and five excellent residences.
>
> After Saṅghatissa heard the Andakavinsuttanta preached by the elder Deva, the conquerer of enemies provided for the constant distribution of rice gruel at the four gates [of the city] .[21]

Yamakami admits that he has no direct proof that the elder Deva of the Singhalese chronicles and the Bodhisattva Deva, whose works the Chinese scholars translated, studied, and commented upon, were the same person. But he assumes that if the elder Deva, a learned monk who preached to the Singhalese kings, had lived out his life in Śrī Laṅkā, the chronicles might have had more to say about him. Their scant mention of him suggests that he may have left Śrī Laṅkā and spent the remainder of his

life in India. "If our assumption is correct," Yamakami says, "he was a learned man who lived in Ceylon at the beginning of the 3rd century (the reign of King Vohara Tissa A.D. 215 or Abhaya Tissa A.D. 237 or Saṅgha Tissa A.D. 248), and after that he came and died in India."[22]

Lamotte is less hesitant than Yamakami in identifying Āryadeva with the elder Deva of the Singhalese chronicles. These chronicles, he says, "font mention d'un mahāthera Deva qui vécut à Ceylon au moment où l'hérésie du Vetullavāda, c'est-à-dire du Mahāyāna, se répandait dans l'île."[23] Lamotte cites different regnal periods for the kings Voharikatissa (260-282 C.E.) and Saṅghatissa (293-297 C.E.) and places Āryadeva in Śrī Laṅka during the latter half of the third century C.E. He refers to Hsüan tsang's descriptions of Āryadeva's journey from Śrī Laṅka to India; he went to Srughna, near the source of the Gaṅgā, to Prayāga, at the confluence of the rivers Yamunā and Gaṅgā, to Pāṭaliputra, where he met Nāgārjuna and accepted "les idées du vieillard et devint un mādhyamika convaincu."[24]

Other scholars do not accept Śrī Laṅkā as Āryadeva's birthplace. Bechert in a study of the early spread of Mahāyāna Buddhism in Śrī Laṅkā claims that the Singhalese sources do not support the tradition that Āryadeva was born, studied in, or visited Śrī Laṅkā. Bechert does not mention that Mahāvaṃsa verse which associates the

elder Deva with King Voharikatissa; he does mention that this king (215-237 C.E.), instigated by the monks of the Mahāvihāra monastery, suppressed the Vetullavāda.[25] Perhaps the end of a period which was "open-minded towards innovations" prompted this elder Deva to leave Śrī Laṅkā and seek out innovative teachers in India. There is no conclusive evidence to support or disprove the supposition of the identity of the elder Deva with the Madhyamaka master Āryadeva. But the Chinese and Tibetan traditions that locate Āryadeva's birthplace in Śrī Laṅkā and state that he came to south India to study with Nāgārjuna should not be ruled out.

P.S. Sastri believes that the Mahāvaṃsa does refer to Āryadeva, but he asserts that Āryadeva went to preach in Śrī Laṇkā from his birthplace in the Andhra region of southern India. He criticizes Hsüan tsang's knowledge of Indian geography and argues that Āryadeva traveled south from his birthplace north of Nāgārjunakoṇḍa to meet Nāgārjuna; Śrī Parvata, was another name for Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, where excavations in 1938 uncovered relics believed to be those of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.[26] However, H. Sarkar and B. N. Misra report that the archeological finds and literary evidence fail to establish any connection between Nāgārjuna and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, but one pillar inscription in the Brahmi script of the third century C.E., dated in sixth regnal year of

the Sātavāhana king Gautamīputra Vijaya Sātakarṇa, attests to the presence of a Buddhist community. Later inscriptions show that a Buddhist community, including members of various Mahāsāṅghika sects and the Mahāvihāravāsins from Śrī Laṅkā, prospered at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa.[27]

The evidence cited by Sastri and others to link Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva with the Andhra region and the Sātavāhana dynasty suggests, but does not definitively establish, that these two early Mādhyamikas at some period during their lives resided, and perhaps died, in this area of India. Sastri's claim for Andhra as Āryadeva's birthplace is weak; he did not cite the Chinese translation of Aryadeva's biography, the T'i p'o p'u - sa chuan, which states that Āryadeva was a native of south India, but this account also may indicate only that the author of the biography was familiar with Āryadeva's activity in southern India, and assumed that this region was his place of birth.

3. Traditional sources on Āryadeva's life

a. Chinese sources

The Chinese sources refer to Āryadeva as the Bodhisattva Deva (T'i p'o p'u sa). The earliest of these sources, the biography, T'i p'o p'u sa chuan (Taishō 2048) relates that Āryadeva was born in south India, studied with Nāgārjuna, secured from a south Indian king permission to debate publically the heretical teachers in his land

and defeated them all. He retired to the forest with his many disciples, and composed the Śatakaśāstra and the Catuḥśataka. A student of one of the defeated teachers took revenge and attacked Āryadeva at his forest retreat, but before he died Āryadeva forgave his attacker, advised him on an escape route, and converted him by teachings on suffering, attachment, and the truth of emptiness. Finally, the dying teacher told his disciples that ultimately there is neither a subject that kills nor an object killed and that all their grief comes from delusion.[28]

This biography also relates a curious study to explain Āryadeva's epithet 'one-eyed' (kāṇa): He plucked out an eye from a golden statue of Maheśvara to demonstrate to the assembled crowd the impotence of the god, but when he returned to the temple the next morning with an offering of sweets, the god demanded Āryadeva's left eye. Āryadeva offered up the eye and was praised for his generosity by Maheśvara.[29]

Hsüan tsang's record of his journey to India, the Ta T'ang Hsi yu chi also contains several accounts of episodes in Āryadeva's life. Hsüan tsang reports that a Bodhisattva named Deva, who understood the true nature of all things, lived on the island of Siṃhala. Motivated by compassion, he came to India to guide ignorant people in the right course. He encountered people who believed

that the river Gaṅgā could wash away their sins; he attempted to divert the water and when questioned replied that he intended to send the water to quench the thirst of his relatives in Siṃhala. The non-Buddhist protested the foolishness of such an action, but Āryadeva countered: If water can benefit sinners in hell, surely, it can reach my relations in Siṃhala! His reasoning convinced many to renounce their erroneous views and become his disciples.[30]

Hsüan tsang tells that Deva had come from south India to Prayāga and composed the Śataśāstra vaipulya near an old stūpa built by King Aśoka. A brahmin skilled in the use of language attempted to defeat him:

> "Pray, what is your name?" Deva said, "They call me Deva." The heretic rejoined, "Who is Deva?" He answered, "I am." The heretic said, "And 'I' what is that?" Deva answered, "A dog." The heretic said, "And who is a dog?" Deva said, "You." The heretic answered, "And 'you' what is that?" Deva said, "Deva."....And so they went on till the heretic understood; from that time on he greatly reverenced the brillant reputation of Deva.[31]

Āryadeva's skill in debate surpassed even the talents of his fellow Buddhists. Hsüan tsang reports an encounter with an arhat named Uttara. When this arhat could not reply to Āryadeva's questions, he used his special powers (abhijñā) to contact the Bodhisattva Maitreya, who predicted that Āryadeva would become a Buddha.[32]

According to Hsüan tsang, Āryadeva once defeated Nāgārjuna in debate. The monks at Vaiśālī had lost debates to heretics for twelve years and as a penalty were prohibited from ringing a gong to summon the community. Āryadeva resolved to silence the heretics; Nāgārjuna aided him by taking the part of the heretics in debate, and after seven days conceded defeat. The fame of Āryadeva had preceded him and the heretics persuaded the king to forbid entrance to Vaiśālī to any foreign monk. Āryadeva entered the city in disguise, concealing his monastic robes. Once inside the city gates, he put on his robes, sounded the gong, and summoned the community. After the king gave his permission for a debate, Āryadeva refuted all the heretics in less than an hour.[33]

The initial meeting between Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna, Hsüan tsang reports, took place in the land of the Sātavāhana kings. Nāgārjuna tested Āryadeva by placing before him a bowl of water. Āryadeva silently dropped a needle into the water. When the bewildered disciple returned to Nāgārjuna the bowl he had set before Āryadeva, Nāgārjuna explained that the bowl of water symbolized his own knowledge and that Āryadeva's action indicated that he had penetrated that knowledge. The aging Nāgārjuna then accepted Āryadeva as a student and entrusted to him the tradition of the Buddha's true teachings.[34]

b. The Tibetan sources

The Tibetan historians Bu ston and Tāranātha use Candrakīrti's biographical note on Āryadeva and the oral traditions passed on by their Indian and Tibetan comtemporaries. These traditions identify the early Madhyamaka master Āryadeva with a Vajrayāna master of the same name. Abhayadatta's Caturśītisiddhapravṛtti, a late eleventh or early twelfth century collection of the biographies of eighty-four Tantric masters (siddha), relates the following stories about the master Karṇaripa: He was born miraculously, became head of Nālandā, and left to journey south to study with Nāgārjuna. While on his way, the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī appeared to him in the guise of a fisherman and directed him to Nāgārjuna's forest retreat. Nāgārjuna accepted him as a student and passed on to him the teachings of the Guhyasamāja Tantra. This source tells a different version of how Āryadeva became known as one-eyed: A woman paid hommage to him and requested an eye; Āryadeva then removed his right eye and donated it to her. This biography concludes with his ascent to the heavens in a shower of flowers.[35]

Bu ston's Chos 'byung relates that Āryadeva was miraculously born inside a lotus on the island of Siṃhala and adopted by the king. When he grew up, he studied with Nāgārjuna, and mastered all the teachings of Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. A heretic named Mātṛceṭa had

propitiated the god Maheśvara and received the boon that no one born naturally could defeat him in debate. He won over many to his views and when he arrived in Nālandā, the monks sent a message for help to Nāgārjuna at Śrī Parvata. Āryadeva consented to go and defeat Mātṛceṭa. While traveling north, he met a tree goddess who requested one of his eyes. He gave her an eye and continued on to Nālandā, where he triumphed over Mātṛceṭa. After the debate, when he was asked about his identity, he replied: Although Śiva has three eyes, he cannot see the truth; although Indra has one thousand eyes, he cannot see the truth; Āryadeva who has one eye sees the truth of all three worlds.[36]

Tāranātha's rGya gar chos 'byung is much richer in detail than Bu ston's account. He recounts that a son endowed with auspicious marks was born to the Siṃhala king Pañcaśṛṅga. After the child reached maturity, even though he was heir to the throne, he desired admission to the Buddhist community. Ordained by the monk Hemadeva, he went on to master the entire Tripiṭaka. He went on pilgrimage to India to see temples and stūpas and there met Nāgārjuna and became his student at Śrī Parvata. Nāgārjuna passed on to him the essential teachings and after his master's death, Āryadeva continued to teach and erect Mahāyāna centers in the south and in adjacent regions. When the monks at Nālandā were unable to defeat the

heretic Durdharṣakāla, they sent for his assistance. While on the journey, he gave one of his eyes to a woman who needed the eye of a learned monk to complete the requisite material for the performance of a particular magic power (siddhi). He reached Nālandā and with the aid of an immodest layman, a cat, and a jar of oil, and by encircling the debating area with rags, Āryadeva prevented Maheśvara from receiving any assistance in the debate and soon defeated him. Mātṛceṭa converted to Buddhism; Āryadeva returned to the south, where he passed on the teachings to Rahulabhadra before he died near Kañcī.[37]

These traditional accounts of Āryadeva's life all depict the details of his life differently. But certain patterns emerge: his high status birth, the renunciation of this status for life as a Buddhist monk, his impressive intellectual abilities, his skill in debate, and his lack of one eye, explained by various tales of his exceptional generosity.

In all accounts Āryadeva is well-born. The T'i p'o - p'u sa chuan reports his birth into a brahmin family; the other sources say he was born into a royal family. Bu ston, drawing upon the legends of Vajrayāna master Karṇaripa, describes Āryadeva's birth as miraculous, but Tāranātha rejects this account in favor of Candrakīrti's version of Āryadeva's birth. Yet even this brief note,

written several hundred years after Āryadeva's death, seems suspect. The portrait of Āryadeva as a prince who renounced his royal duties for life as a wandering ascetic bears a striking resemblance to the traditional accounts of the Buddha's early life.

Hsüan tsang's and Tāranātha's accounts indicate that even before Āryadeva came to India he had mastered the Buddhist teachings. He was already renowned as a learned teacher before he became Nāgārjuna's disciple and received from the aging master instruction in Madhyamaka. All the Chinese and Tibetan sources emphasize his remarkable skill in debate. They speak of his compassion in freeing others from heterodox views and his ingenuity in devising schemes to overcome obstacles that would prevent his success in debate. The details of the methods used by Āryadeva to conquer his adversaries vary, and some, e.g., the use of magic, are of no historical merit. However, Hsüan tsang's description of Āryadeva utilizing the methods of his opponents to defeat them rings true. The CŚ contains numerous instances of Āryadeva turning his opponent's own line of reasoning against him. The CŚ also displays Āryadeva's vast knowledge of the philosophical views of non-Buddhist and Buddhist schools; and it is probable that Āryadeva engaged in public debates, as well as literary ones, thus converting many to the Buddha's teachings.

The traditional sources on Āryadeva's life portray him as a compassionate figure, willing to use any means to introduce others to the truth of the Buddha's teachings; this portrait conforms to Āryadeva's own views on the Bodhisattva's career. He recommends (CŚ V.19) the practice of generosity and the stories the accounts give to explain his loss of an eye all emphasize his generosity in donating the eye--they disagree as to whether it was the right eye or the left---to anyone who requests it. While it is possible that these sources preserve a true fact about Āryadeva's physical appearance, the stories' explanations of that fact are fabricated to show that, as a Bodhisattva, he practices the perfection of generosity and unselfishly gives whatever is requested of him.

CHAPTER II

NOTES

[1]See the extensive bibliography on this topic in Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School, pp.4-5 n.11. To the list of articles cited by Ruegg add: Jan Yun-hua, "Nāgārjuna, One or Many?: A New Interpretation of Buddhist Hagiography: History of Religions 10 (1970) pp.139-154.

[2]D. R. Schackleton Bailey, The Śatapañcaśataka of Mātṛceṭa, Cambridge, 1951, p.9.

[3]Étienne Lamotte, L'Enseignment de Vimalakīrti, Louvain, 1962, p.72.

On the date of Kaniṣka and Nāgārjuna's supposed relationship with him see Sylvain Levi, "Kaniṣka et Sātavāhana," JA 1936: 61-121; A. K. Warder, "The Possible Dates of Pārśva, Vasumitra (II), Caraka and Mātṛceṭa," pp.328-331, 334-336; and Friedrich Wilhelm, "Kaṇika and Kaniṣka--Aśvaghoṣa and Mātṛceṭa," pp.342-343 in A. L. Basham, ed. Papers on the Date of Kaniṣka (1960), Leiden, 1968.

[4]Étienne Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna, I, Louvain, 1949, p. xiii.

[5]Warder, "The Possible Dates of Pārśva, Vasumitra (II), Caraka and Mātṛceṭa," p.332. See also Warder, Indian Buddhism, p.375 and p.390 n.1; he places the period of Nāgārjuna's activity circa 125-160 C.E.

[6]Lamotte, Vimalakīrti, pp.72-76.

[7]J. W. de Jong review of Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna, vol. III, in Asia Minor, n.s. 17 (1971), p.107.

[8]Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna vol. III, Louvain, 1970, p.lii.

[9]Harivarman's Tattva/Satyasiddhi, chapter cv quotes ĆS II.8. See the Sanskrit translation by N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Baroda, 1975, p.252.

[10]Hakuju Ui, The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, London, Royal Asiatic Society, 1917, p.42.

[11]See Hsüan tsang, Si Yu Ki, translated by Samuel Beal, Buddhist Records of the Western World, London: Trubner & Co., 1889, pp.209-212.

[12]Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p.22.

[13]Lamotte, Vimalakīrti, p.76.

[14]Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p.22.

[15]The chronology of the Sātavāhana kings is still uncertain. See K. Gopalachari, chap. 10, "The Sātavāhana Empire," in K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, A Comprehensive History of India, vol. II: The Mauryas and Sātavāhanas (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1957), p.295, and K. Gopalachari, Early History of the Āndhra Country, (Madras: University of Madras, 1941), pp.28-29. See also Warder, Indian Buddhism, pp.326-327,392-394.

[16] CṠṬ (D f.31b, P f.34b): '<u>di ltar slob dpon 'phags pa lha ni siṅgala'i gling du 'khrungs pa siṅgala'i rgyal po'i sras zhig te mthar rgyal tshab bor nas de nyid du rab du byung shing / de nas lho phyogs kyi rgyud du ltar 'ongs te slob dpon klu sgrub pa kyi nye gnas nyid du'gyur cing</u> /

[17] Bhattacarya, <u>Catuḥśataka</u>, p.xix.

[18] Nalinaksha Dutt, review of Bhattacarya, The <u>Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva</u>, in IHQ 9 (1933), p.660. See also N. Dutt, "The Birthplace of Āryadeva" in IHQ 10 (1934), pp. 137-142.

[19] Vidhusekhara Bhattacarya, "Āryadeva" IHQ 10 (1934), p. 978.

[20] <u>Extended Mahāvaṃsa</u>, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, Royal Asiatic Society, 1937, p.346:
<u>Kappukagāmavasissa Devattherassa santike dhammam sutvā paṭikammaṃ pañcavase akārayi</u>.

[21] <u>Dīpavaṃsa</u>, <u>The Chronicle of the Island of Ceylon</u>, ed. Bimala Churn Law, <u>Ceylon Historical Journal</u>, vol VII (1957-1958), p.123:

41. <u>Sutvā gilānasuttantaṃ Devatherassa bhāsato</u>
<u>adāsi gilānabhesajjaṃ pañcāvāsaṃ varuttham</u>.

50. <u>Andakavindasuttantaṃ Devatherassa bhāsato</u>
<u>catudvāra dhuvayāguṃ paṭṭhapesi arindamo</u>.

Law, p. 258 identifies the <u>Andakavindasuttanta</u> with <u>Saṃyutta</u>, I, 154.

[22]Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddhistic Thought, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1912), pp. 190-191.

[23]Lamotte, Traité, III, p. 1373 n.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Heinz Bechert, "Mahāyāna Literature in Śrī Laṅkā: The Early Phase," p.366 in Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems.

[26]P. S. Sastri, "Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva," IHQ 31 (1955), pp. 195-198.

[27]H. Sarkar and B. N. Misra, Nāgārjunakoṇḍa (New Delhi: Archeological Survey of India, 2nd ed., 1972), pp. 3, 13, 31, 74. See also the references in Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School, p.5 n.11.

[28]See the short summary of this biography in Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p. 27 and the excerpts translated in Yamakami, Systems of Buddhistic Thought, pp. 187-194.

[29]Ibid., pp. 191-192.

[30]Beal, Buddhist Records of the Western World, I, pp. 188-189, cf. Thomas Watters, On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1904-1905).

[31]Beal, Buddhist Records of the Western World, I, p.231.

[32]Ibid., II, pp. 227-228 Cf. Watters, On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, II, pp. 224-225.

[33]Beal, Buddhist Records of the Western World, II, pp. 97-99; Watters, On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, II, pp. 100-101.

[34]Beal, Buddhist Records of the Western World, II, pp. 209-212; Cf. Watters, On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, II, p.202.

See also the account of Āryadeva's life in The Blue Cliff Records, vol. I, trans. Thomas and J. C. Cleary (Boulder: Shambhala, 1977), pp. 88-89.

[35]See James B. Robinson, Buddha's Lions: The Lives of Eighty-Four Siddhas (Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1979), pp. 86-89.

On this Vajrayāna master named Āryadeva see Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School, pp. 105-106 and the references cited in nn. 335, 336.

[36]Bu ston, Chos 'byung (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1971) ff. 834-835. Cf. History of Buddhism by Bu ston. Part II: The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet, trans. E. Obermiller, Heidelberg, 1932, pp. 130.

[37]Taranathae Doctrine Buddhicae in India Propagatione, ed. A. Schiefner, St. Petersburg, 1868, pp. 66-68. See Anton Schiefner, trans., Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhimus in Indien (St. Petersburg, 1869), pp. 83-84, and Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya, Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970).

CHAPTER III

THE WORKS OF ĀRYADEVA

The second major figure in the early development of the Madhyamaka school is Nāgārjuna's student Āryadeva. Traditional accounts of the Madhyamaka lineage and comtemporary scholarship credit Āryadeva with the continuation of Nāgārjuna's ideas and methods. Both traditional sources on the life of Āryadeva and his own surviving treatises attest to his skill in argument against adversaries from within the Buddhist community and heterodox 'outsiders'. Modern scholars in agreement with Candrakīrti's judgement in the CŚṬ that there is no fundamental difference between Nāgārjuna's philosophy in the MMK and Āryadeva's point of view in the CŚ, depict Āryadeva as the defender of Madhyamaka philosophy, rather than with the formulation of its basic tenets. Consequently the CŚ is an important source of information of the views of early Buddhist Abhidharma masters and on the early doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, and Jaina schools.

The eminent position Nāgārjuna holds in the development of the Madhyamaka school, though well-deserved, has overshadowed the contributions of Āryadeva. His major contribution to the continuation of the Madhyamaka philosophy is the CŚ. This treatise, as were most

philosophical treatises of its time, was composed in verse. It contains four hundred stanzas, in the śloka meter of sixteen syllables per line; these verses are divided equally into sixteen chapters. Both the Tibetan canon, which preserves the entirety of the CŚ, and the Chinese canon, which contains only the latter half of the CŚ, concur in naming Āryadeva's as its author. They disagree, however, on other texts authored by Āryadeva.

With the exception of the fragmentary remains of the CŚ and the Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa, none of the many works attributed to Āryadeva in the Chinese and Tibetan canons survive in Sanskrit. The Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa is the work of a second Āryadeva, a Vajrayāna master, who bears the name of the earlier Madhyamaka philosopher.[1] The Tohoku catalogue of the Tibetan bsTan 'gyur does not distinquish between these two Āryadevas; all of the Vajrayāna texts attributed to Āryadeva are the work of this later author. Apart from the treatises on Tantra, the Tohoku catalogue lists the following works of Āryadeva:

1. Hastavālaprakaraṇa (3844), translated by Śraddhakaravarma and Rin chen bzang po: Hastavālaprakaraṇakārikā (3848), translated by dPal brtsegs.

2. Hastavālaprakaraṇavṛtti (3845), translated by Śraddhakaravarma and Rin chen bzang po: Hastavālavṛtti (3849), translated by Dānaśīla, dPal 'byor snying po, and dPal brtsegs.

3. <u>Catuḥśatakaśāstrakārikanāma</u> (3846), translated by Sūkṣmajāna and Pa tsab Nyi ma grags.

4. <u>Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhināma</u> (3847), translated by dPal brtsegs.

5. <u>Madhyamakabhramaghātanāma</u> (3850), translated by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and Tshul khrims rgyal ba.

6. <u>Jñānasārasamuccayanāma</u> (3851), translated by Kṛṣṇa pa and Chos kyi shes rab.

Nanjio's catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka ascribes the following works to Āryadeva:

1. <u>Śataśāstra</u> (1188), translated by Kumārajīva; <u>Śataśāstravaipulya</u> (1189), translated by Hsüan-tsang, and the <u>Śataśāstravaipulya</u> (1198), also translated by Hsüan-tsang.

The first work contains a commentary by Vasu; the latter work contains a commentary by Dharmapāla on the last eight chapters of the CŚ.

2. <u>Akṣaraśataka</u> (1254), translated by Bodhiruci.

3. <u>Mahāpuruṣaśāstra</u> (1242), translated by Tao thai.

4. <u>Śāstra on the refutation of the four theses of the Tīrthikas and the Hīnayānists in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra</u> (1259), translated by Bodhiruci.

A commentary on the MMK, translated by Kumārajīva (1174) and by Prabhākaramitra (1185), is attributed to Āryadeva by those who identify him with the Indian master Pin-lo-chieh.

In part, the disagreement over the ascription of texts to Āryadeva results from the other names under which Āryadeva is known, e.g., Kāṇadeva, Karṇaripa, Nīlanetra, Piṅgalakṣa, and so forth. The Chinese and Tibetan sources on the life of Āryadeva both accept Kāṇadeva as another name of this Madhyamaka master. The Tibetan biographical sources differ on the acceptance of the name Karṇaripa; Tāranātha rejects the identification of Āryadeva with the Vajrayāna adept Karṇaripa.[2] The Sanskrit reconstruction of the name of the author of the Chung Lun (Madhyamaka Śāstra) commentary on the MMK, Ch'ing Mu ("Blue Eyes") has resulted in the suggestions Piṅgalakṣa, Piṅgalanetra, Nīlakṣa, and Nilanetra. Robinson proposes to resolve one of the difficulties in the Sanskrit reconstruction of this author's name, i.e., the fact that blue eyes would have been a rare physical trait for an Indian master, by supposing that ch'ing 青 (blue, green, azure) is an orthographic error for another Chinese character (ch'ing 淸 (clear, pure). He favors the reconstruction Vimalakṣa, and believes that the Chung Lun was the work of this otherwise unknown Indian master.[3]

Lamotte, on the other hand, accepts the identification of Āryadeva with Pin-lo-chieh.[4] de Jong questions the attribution; he notes that Walleser found CŚ VII.9 quoted in the Chung Lun and concludes that this commentary must be the work of a later writer familiar with Āryadeva's

writings.[5] This quotation from the CŚ need not indicate that Āryadeva is not the author of the Chung Lun commentary; he may have quoted from his own works, as Candrakīrti has done in his commentary on the MMK. Nontheless, Pin-lo-chieh and the Chung Lun commentary probably belong to the period, a century or so after the close of Nāgārjuna's and Āryadeva's activity, about which little is known. These fourth century Mādhyamikas seem to have written few commentaries or independent treatises equal to the early work of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva or to the later work of Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka. Also belonging to this period is the encyclopediac compilation of Madhyamaka philosophy, the Ta chih tu lun, which quotes from the MMK, the CŚ, and other Madhyamaka works in commenting upon the Pañcaviṃśatisāhaśrikāprajñāpāramitā.[6] The translation of the Chung Lun and the Ta chih tu lun by Kumārajīva early in the fifth century C. E. indicates a continuing interest in the Madhyamaka philosophy, especially in the northwestern region of India and in Central Asia, areas from which Kumārajīva gathered these texts and others for translation.

Another of the Madhyamaka texts translated by Kumārajīva is the Śatakaśāstra (ŚŚ), ascribed to Āryadeva. Some scholars question the authenticity of this text; de Jong suggests that Āryadeva did not compose both a Śataka and a Catuḥśataka. He states that nine of the

seventeen quotations from Āryadeva in Chinese Buddhist scriptures identified by Ui were from the CŚ; none were from the ŚŚ. Moreover, the fact that Candrakīrti sometimes quotes the CŚ under the abbreviated form '*Śataka*' is further evidence, he contends, that the two were not separate treatises.[7]

In the CŚṬ (D f.31b, P f.34b) Candrakīrti observes that the term '*catuḥ*' should be retained in order to clear up misconceptions that might arise from omitting it. If there were not some other text with which the CŚ could become confused, then why should Candrakīrti call attention to the possibility of misconceptions resulting from the omission of the '*catuḥ*' before '*śataka*'? In the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (MA), written before the *Prasannapadā* (PP) commentary on the MMK, Candrakīrti does cite the CŚ without omitting the '*catuḥ*' from the citation. Unfortunately he does not give his reasons for failing to cite the full title when quoting the CŚ in the PP. Perhaps the quotations were so well-known that he felt it unnecessary to provide the full citation. Assuming that Candrakīrti composed the CŚṬ after the PP, criticism of the abbreviated citations of the CŚ in the PP may have prompted his remarks in the CŚṬ on the desirability of avoiding confusion by not omitting the '*catuḥ*' before '*śataka*'.

Candrakīrti also states in the CŚṬ (D f.31b, P.f.34a) that he has not divided the CŚ into two parts, one concerned with the teaching of good practices (dharma) and the other concerned with the quelling of disputation (vigraha), as Dharmapāla had done. Hsüan-tsang, who translated both the CŚ and Dharmapāla's commentary on it into Chinese, follows Dharmapāla's example and provides a translation only of the last eight chapters of the CŚ. The Chinese translators did not consider it always useful to translate an entire work into Chinese. One of Kumārajīva's students observes that Kumārajīva translated only half of the ŚŚ: "The treatise consists of twenty chapters altogether, each with five verses. Because [Kumārajīva] did not think that the last ten were of any use to this country he did not translate them."[8] What Kumārajīva and Hsüan-tsang chose to translate were the sections in each text that treated Madhyamaka philosophy; the untranslated section of the CŚ, and presumably also of the ŚŚ, dealt with more general matters, such as the practices conducive to the Bodhisattva's career.

Since we do not posses the entire ŚŚ, a comparison between the fifty verses of Kumārajīva's translation and the four hundred verses of the CŚ is difficult. The two works do investigate similar topics and treat them much in the same way. But these texts, as they now stand, are by no means identical. They differ in terms of the number

of verses alloted to a given topic; and these verses' arguments against the opponents' treatment of a particular topic differ.

Kumārajīva's translation of the ŚŚ covers the following topics, with one chapter devoted to each: I. merit and demerit; II. the self (ātman); III. unity; IV. multiplicity; V. sense perception; VI. sense objects; VII. the existence of the effect in the cause (satkārya); VIII. the non-existence of the effect in the cause (asatkārya); IX. permanence; and X. emptiness (śūnyatā). The last eight chapters of the CŚ treat these topics: IX. permanent entities; X. the self; XI. time; XII. speculative views about eternalism and annihilationism; XIII. sense faculties (indriya) and their objects (artha); XIV. extreme views, e.g., unity versus multiplicity, identity versus difference; XV. conditioned things (saṃskṛta); and XVI. emptiness. Tucci, who has translated both the Chinese translations of the CŚ and the ŚŚ, found the following correlations between the two: ŚŚ V and VI correspond to CŚ XI and XII; ŚŚ IX corresponds to parts of CŚ IX and X; and ŚŚ X corresponds to CŚ XVI.[9]

None of the chapters in the ŚŚ corresponds entirely to any of the chapters in the CŚ. In part, this results from the difference in the number of verses each text devotes to any topic; a chapter in the ŚŚ has five verses in contrast to the twenty-five verses of a chapter in the

CŚ. Nevertheless, there are additional correlations between the chapters of these two works.

In the first chapter of the ŚŚ, Āryadeva discusses meritorious and demeritorious practices. There are some similarities between this chapter and the treatment of meritorious practices in the first eight chapters of the CŚ. The ŚŚ explains that "impure gifts" are those which are given in the expectation of some reward and compares this kind of giving to the trade that takes place in the market. Āryadeva in CŚ V.20 similarly points out that the anticipation of a great result from giving makes giving and receiving seem like profiting in trade. Another of the verses in this chapter of the ŚŚ resembles closely CŚ VIII.14. The ŚŚ states: " [The Buddha] teaches low, middle, and high nature people giving, moral conduct, and insight [respectively] "; CŚ VIII.14 states: "Giving is spoken of to low nature people, moral conduct to middle nature people, and tranquility to high nature people."[10]

Both ŚŚ II and CŚ X reject Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya views on the nature of the self. The rejection in the ŚŚ (pp. 20-22) of the Sāṃkhya notion of the self as characterized by consciousness (caitanya) parallels CŚ X.10-12; the rejection of the Vaiśeṣika notion of knowledge (jñāna) uniting with the self in ŚŚ (pp. 25-28) similarly is discussed in CŚ X.8-9. Also the rejection of the self as being the agent of the body in ŚŚ (pp. 29-31)

corresponds to CŚ X.5, and rejection of the claim that a permanent self exists because of the memory of past lives in ŚŚ (p.34) corresponds to CŚ X.7.

In ŚŚ III and IV and in CŚ XIV, Āryadeva refutes the positions of identity and difference as they pertain to the relations between an entity and its constituents. Chapter III of the ŚŚ repudiates the notion that an entity, e.g., a pot, and its marks (<u>lakṣaṇa</u>), e.g., 'existence', 'one', etc., are identical (pp. 37-42); a similar repudiation of this view occurs in CŚ XIV. 2a, 3, 4, and 7. Chapter IV repudiates the alternative, namely that the pot and its marks are different; CŚ XIV repudiates this same view in verses 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7.

Various theories on sense perception come under examination in chapter V of the ŚŚ and CŚ XIII. The ŚŚ (p. 58) questions whether the cognition of some object arises prior to the perceptive of its visible form, after the perception, or simultaneously with the perception. In CŚ XIII.12 Āryadeva denies that the cognition (<u>jñāna</u>) arises prior to the perception (<u>darśana</u>), or afterwards; he refuses to admit the third alternative, e.g., that both the cognition and perception of the object arise simultaneously. The ŚŚ (pp. 51-52) rejects the views of those opponents who assert that the eye goes out to make contact with its object, or that perception of the object takes place without the eye's movement, or that the eye

by its very nature is involved in perception; the CŚ similarly rejects these three theories in XIII. 13, 14, 16.

The position that when a part of the pot, e.g., its visible form, is perceived, then the entire pot is perceived is rejected in both ŚŚ VI (pp. 54-55) and CŚ XIV.11. The position that the pot as a collection of its parts can be apprehended by the faculty of touch is attacked in ŚŚ (pp. 56-57) and CŚ XIV.8.

The beginning verses of ŚŚ VII repudiate the Sāṃkhya position that the effect pre-exists in its cause (pp. 61-62); CŚ XI.15 similarly denies that the effect pre-exists in its cause, using an example not found in the ŚŚ: if the effect pre-existed in the cause, then it is not necessary to adorn the house with pillars, since these should already exist! Later verses of ŚŚ VII concern certain Ābhidharmika positions on the relation between an entity and its marks; the ŚŚ (p.64) denies that the marks 'origination', 'duration', and cessation' exist in a series. The same view is rejected in CŚ XV.11. The ŚŚ concludes this chapter with a verse that states: "Because of continuity, there is no annihilation, because of destruction, there is no permanence;" the same conclusion is found in CŚ X.25: "Since an entity continues, consequently annihilation does not occur, since an entity ceases, consequently permanence does not occur."[11]

Chapter VIII of the ŚŚ rejects the alternative view that the effect does not pre-exist in the cause, as does CŚ XI.15, which points out that if the effect, e.g., pillars, does not exist, then pillars will never adorn the house! Later in this chapter the ŚŚ (pp. 65-71) examines how entities originate and argues against the Ābhidharmikas that neither the mark 'origination' nor the process of origination (utpādyamāna) ever came into existence; furthermore, the marks 'origination', etc., neither exist in a gradual series, nor at the same time. This discussion of the three marks parallels CŚ XV.14-16, and in CŚ XV.11 we find the same statement that these marks neither come into existence in a gradual series nor simultaneously. The ŚŚ concludes this chapter with a verse that is identical to CŚ XV.14ac: "An existent thing (bhāva) does not produce a non-existent thing; a non-existent thing (abhāva) does not produce a non-existent thing;" but while CŚ XV.14bd denies also that non-existent things produce existent things, the ŚŚ limits its consideration to the position that a cause and its effect must be similar.

The treatment in ŚŚ IX and CŚ IX of permanent entities such as space (ākāśa), direction (dik), and atoms is similar (cf. ŚŚ pp. 73, 78-80 with CŚ IX.4-6). The latter verses of both texts examine the view that Nirvāṇa is permanent. Both texts refuse to characterize Nirvāṇa as a place that an individual can reach (cf. ŚŚ pp. 80-81 and CŚ IX .20-21). The final chapters of the ŚŚ and the CŚ

respond to objections to the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness. Āryadeva criticizes those who take emptiness as another speculative view (<u>dṛṣṭi</u>). In both the ŚŚ (pp. 83-88) and in CŚ XVI.4, 14, he denies that the refutation of an opponent's thesis establishes one's own thesis. These chapters both conclude that bondage results from false conceptual constructions (cf. ŚŚ p. 87 and CŚ XVI.23). The final verse of the ŚŚ states that the renunciation of the self brings about liberation; the same point of view occurs in CŚ IX.24.

This brief survey of the topics which are treated the ŚŚ indicates many of these topics are dealt with in a similar manner in the CŚ and that some of the verses are identical or nearly so; yet the arrangement of the topics and some of the arguments advanced against the opponents' positions are different. Moreover, the ŚŚ contains material that cannot be found in the CŚ. The discussion in the first chapter of the ŚŚ on the Buddha's teaching as characterized by the cessation of evil (<u>pāpa</u>) and the cultivation of meritorious actions, on meritorious actions as being conducive to good results, and on the ultimate renunciation of the results of both evil and meritorious actions has no direct parallels in the CŚ. Most of the examples (<u>dṛṣṭānta</u>) and reasons (<u>hetu</u>) employed in this chapter of the ŚŚ, and in later chapters, do not occur in the CŚ.[12] The frequent use of examples

may reflect Kumārajīva's editing of the ŚS to make it more intelligible to a Chinese audience unfamiliar with Indian philosophical arguments. However, the extent to which Kumārajīva altered the wording of the original Sanskrit verses or added onto them explanatory material cannot be determined in the absence of the original Sanskrit manuscript.[13] The ŚS and the CŚ, on the basis of the surviving translations and fragments of the Sanskrit text, are separate works.

Whether the two texts were always separate works or whether the ŚS is a rearranged and abridged version of the CŚ cannot be answered with certainty. The T'i p'o p'u - sa chuan, which was in Kumārajīva's hands at the beginning of the fifth century, clearly states that Āryadeva wrote two separate works: "He composed the Hundred Treatise in twenty chapters and the Four Hundred Treatise to destroy heterodox views."[14] This biography's testimony that Āryadeva composed both treatises may be confirmed by an entry in an ancient Tibetan catalogue of Buddhist texts. Lalou translated a text from the bsTan 'gyur, mDo, 'grel, volume CXXVII, the lDan dkar ma catalogue, which lists Tibetan translations of canonical works extant during the reign of King Khri srong lde brtsan (775-797). The cataloguers, dPal brtsegs and Nam mkha'i snying po, in a section entitled "miscellaneous Mahāyāna treatises (theg pa chen po'i bstan bcos sna tshogs)," seem to list

a translation of the *Śatakaśāstra*; "The *Hundred Verses* was composed by Āryadeva; [it contains] one hundred *ślokas*."[15] Unfortunately this text was not among the texts collected and incorporated into the Tibetan canon and no longer survives.

Among the texts preserved in this collection is the *Akṣaraśataka* (AŚ), which Tibetan tradition attributes, along with its commentary, to Nāgārjuna. But the Chinese tradition and the Tun huang Tibetan translation of this text indicate that Āryadeva is the author of the AŚ. The opening verse of the Chinese translation, and in the Tibetan translation Chos 'grub made from a Chinese original, pays hommage to Āryadeva and suggests, as Gokhale points out, that another unnamed individual composed the commentary.[16] The topics treated in the AŚ follow the same organization as those in chapters two through ten of the ŚŚ. The brief text of the AŚ outlines positions which the commentary considers in greater detail. The AŚ begins with the statement that things are neither identical nor different. The commentator explains that Āryadeva directs his criticism against opponents from the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika schools. The commentator then raises objections to these (*pratijñā*) and reasons (*hetu*) which these opponents use to establish, through inference (*anumāna*), the existence of things and their marks, identity, etc. Things cannot be established from causes that either

pre-exist in their effects or do not exist in their effects; nor do things arise without some cause, for things exist in a relation of dependence, the AŚ asserts. Furthermore, it is inappropriate, the AŚ advises, to cite the tenets of one's own school as proof.

The AŚ next attacks the notion that the five sense cognitions (vijñāna) apprehend their respective objects. Because visible form exists nominally, perception has no real nature of its own, the AŚ contends. No conditioned thing (saṃskṛta) has a real nature of its own, claims the AŚ, now concerned with the views of the Ābhidharmikas. The commentator explains that the three marks of conditioned things, e.g., origination, duration, and cessation, neither come into existence in a gradual series, or simultaneously. The AŚ treats unconditioned things in the same manner; space (ākāśa) also has no nature of its own. Because all things are like dreams, the AŚ concludes, their marks have no real nature of their own.

The subject matter of the AŚ and manner in which topics, such as identity and difference, are treated so strongly resembles Āryadeva's work in the ŚŚ and the CŚ that the Chinese tradition's ascription of the text to Āryadeva is certain to be correct. The Tibetan tradition's attribution of the commentary on the AŚ to Nāgārjuna also should be rejected. The commentary appears to be the work

of a later author familiar with Āryadeva's work and with the commentary of Vasu on the ŚŚ. Both the organization of the topics covered and the specific objections raised and the responses provided in commentary to the AŚ indicate either that the author was well acquainted with Vasu's commentary or that both commentaries are the work of the same individual, since many of the same objections and responses occur in both texts, following the same ordering of topics.

The similarities in ideas and the treatment of the material discussed in the CŚ, the ŚŚ, and the AŚ argue in favor of Āryadeva as the author of all three works. But Gokhale's hypothesis that there is "a chronological sequence among these works: (*Catuḥśataka*, *Śataka* and *Akṣaraśataka*, where beginning from the *Catuḥśataka* the logical arguments become more and more systematic and pointed"[17] is difficult to prove. The AŚ probably was written after the ŚŚ, since its terse summation of Madhyamaka arguments on identity and difference seem to reflect the logic and order of the similar treatment of the same topic in the ŚŚ. The relation between the ŚŚ and the CŚ is more complicated, in part because of the missing half of the ŚŚ. The ŚŚ, for example, devotes two chapters to arguments against the positions of identity and difference; the treatment of the same topic in the CŚ is more concise and hence "more systematic and

pointed" than in the ŚS. Consequently the suggestion that the ŚS is a later abbreviated treatment of topics first discussed in the CŚ cannot be accepted.

The Chinese and Tibetan traditions differ also on the authorship of the Hastavālaprakaraṇa and its commentary. The Chinese canon lists the text as the work of Dignāga; the Tibetan canon gives Āryadeva as its author. This short treatise is concerned with epistemological issues, primarily with the reasons for erroneous cognition (bhrāntajñāna), such as the erroneous cognition of a snake imputed upon a coiled rope. The Hastavālaprakaraṇa's interest in this topic suggests that it is more likely to be the work of Dignāga, who treats this subject in more detail in his Pramāṇasamuccaya, than of Āryadeva.[18]

Two other short treatises attributed to Āryadeva by the Tibetan tradition, the Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi[19] and the Madhyamakabhramaghāta are questioned as authentic works of Āryadeva by Yamaguchi.[20] A third treatise, the Jñānasārasamuccaya, which has much in common with the Sugatamatavibhaṅga of the ninth century author, Jitāri (or Jetāri), if the ascription to Āryadeva is correct, must be the work of the Vajrayāna master.[21]

The Chinese canon ascribes to Āryadeva two short treatises on the views of heterodox teachers mentioned in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, translated by Bodhiruci in the first half of the sixth century, but this ascription has

been questioned.[22] Takasaki, however, claims that the <u>Laṅkāvatārasūtra's</u> discussion on the twenty heterodox teacher's views on Nirvāṇa is the same in content as the treatise attributed to Āryadeva and is a later addition to this sūtra.[23] While it is possible that Āryadeva was acquainted with an early version of the <u>Laṅkāvatārasūtra</u>, now lost and supplanted by the expanded versions now extant, and composed the two commentaries on the <u>Laṅkāvatārasūtra</u>, the association of this sūtra and Āryadeva with the island of Śrī Laṅkā may have led some Chinese scholars to assume his familiarity with the sūtra and attribute to him commentaries on it that were the work of an otherwise unknown Buddhist writer.

Of all the works credited to Āryadeva by the Chinese and Tibetan collections of Buddhist scriptures, the CŚ is recognized by both traditions as his major work. The content of the CŚ will be examined in the next two chapters. Correspondances between the CŚ and the two smaller related treatises, the ŚŚ and the AŚ, will be noted in the annotation to the translation of the CŚ in part two. The several other works variously attributed to Āryadeva in the Chinese and Tibetan canons, whose authorship is less certain, will not be mentioned in the annotation.

CHAPTER III

NOTES

[1]See Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School, pp. 104-106 for information on the links between the Mādhyamikas and the Vajrayānists.

The Sanskrit text of the Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa has been edited by P. Patel, Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa of Āryadeva, Visvabharati Studies 8, Santiniketan, 1949. Cf. Haraprasad Shastri, JASB 67 (1898): 175-184 and Bhaskar, Catuḥśatakam, pp. 161-169. On Āryadeva's authorship of this work see Patel's introduction to his edition of the text, and Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "À propos du Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa d'Āryadeva," BSOAS 6 (1931): 411-413.

For a list of other works by this second Āryadeva see Robinson, Buddha's Lions, pp. 297-298.

[2]Taranathae Doctrine Buddhicae in India Propagatione, p. 66; Schiefner, Tāranātha's Geschichte des Buddhimus in Indien, p. 83; and Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, p. 123.

[3]Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China, pp. 29-30.

[4]Lamotte, Traité, III, p. 1373.

[5]de Jong, AM 17 (1971), p. 109.

[6]Ibid, pp. 107-108. de Jong argues against Lamotte's opinion that the Ta Chih tu lun quotes from the tenth

chapter of the CŚ. Lamotte responds to de Jong's comments in <u>Traité</u>, IV, p.xiii, and notes, pp. xiv-xv, that Christian Lindtner and Per Sorensen have identified in the <u>Ta chih tu lun</u> quotations of CŚ XIII.13 and 17.

7 Ibid., p. 110. Cf. R. A. Gard, "On the Authenticity of the Pai-lun and the Shih-erh-men-lun," IBK II, no. 2 (1954) : 751-747.

8 Seng-chao, <u>Preface to the Hundred Treatise</u>, translated by Robinson, <u>Early Mādhyamika in India and China</u>, p. 211.

9 Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p. 523.

10 ŚS (Taishō 1569, 169b): 下中上人 施戒智

CŚ VIII. 14abc:

<u>spyin pa dman pa la gsungs shing</u> //
<u>'bring la tshul khrims gsungs pa ste</u> //
<u>mchog la zhi ba gsungs gyur pa</u> //

11 ŚS (Taishō 1569, 178a): 續故不斷．壞故不常

CŚ X.25:

<u>yasmāt pravartate bhāvas tenocchedo na jāyate</u> /
<u>yasmān nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jāyate</u> /

12 Robinson, <u>Early Mādhyamika in India and China</u> lists these examples on p. 34.

13 Ibid., pp. 77-88, discusses Kumārajīva's translation methods.

[14] T'i p'o p'u sa chuan (Taisho 2048, 187c):
造百論二十品．又造四百論以破邪見

[15] See Marcelle Lalou, "Les textes Bouddhiques au temps du roi Khri sroṅ lde bcan," JA CCLXI (1953): 335: chigs su bčad pa brgya pa / slob dpon 'phags pa'i lhas mjad pa // 100 çl //

[16] V. V. Gokhale, Akṣara-Çatakam (the Hundred Letters), Materialien zue Kunde des Buddhimus xiv, (Heidelberg, 1930), p. 2.

[17] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[18] The Hastavālaprakaraṇa has been translated by F. W. Thomas and H. Ui, "The Hand Treatise, a Work of Āryadeva," in JRAS 1918: 267-310. Thomas, p. 272 suggests that the verses are by Āryadeva; Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 94 concurs. Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 47 (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 7, credits Dignāga with the composition of both the verses and the commentary, as does E. Frauwallner, "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung," WZKSO 3 (1959): 128-130.

[19] Robert W. Clark and Lozang Jamspal, "The Dialectic which Refutes Errors Establishing Logical Reasons," Tibet Journal 4 no. 2 (1979): 29-50 have translated this text into English.

[20] Susumu Yamaguchi, Chugan Bukkyo Ronko ("Studies on Mādhyamika Buddhism") (Tokyo, 1944), pp. 345-348.

[21] See Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School, pp. 100 n. 312 and 106.

[22] Hajime Nakamura, "Upaniṣadic Tradition and the Early School of Vedānta," HJAS 18 (1955) : 94.

[23] Jikido Takasaki, "Analysis of the Laṅkāvatāra" in Indianisme et bouddhisme. Mélanges offerts à Mgr. Étienne Lamotte (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1980), p. 346. Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p. 528 n.2 suggests that CŚ IX.20 may refer to one of the verses in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra.

CHAPTER IV

ĀRYADEVA ON THE CULTIVATION OF MERIT

Āryadeva in the CŚ advocates conduct (*caryā*) that leads to enlightenment; he encourages the cultivation of meritorious practices and of insight into the philosophical ideas of the Madhyamaka school. As an introduction to the practices of a Bodhisattva's career, the CŚ prepares the ground for Śantideva's later (ca. eighth century C. E.) treatment of the same topic in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*.

In the CŚ Āryadeva shows the conscientious student how to acquire the requisite equipment (*sambhāra*) for enlightenment. The first eight chapters concentrate on the accumulation of merit (*puṇya*); the latter eight, on the accumulation of knowledge (*jñāna*). These two collections, as Āryadeva's own teacher indicates in *Ratnāvalī* III.13, bring about the attainment of Buddhahood.

He begins the CŚ with advice on methods for removing the obstacles to the accumulation of merit. The first four chapters concern various ways of eliminating the four erroneous conceptions (*viparyāsa*) which prevent a person from engaging in meritorious practices of a Bodhisattva. These erroneous conceptions involve accepting as true the reverse of what is actually the case, namely,

(1) taking some thing as permanent (nitya) which in fact is not permanent (anitya); (2) taking some thing as pleasant (sukha) which in fact is painful (duḥkha); (3) taking some thing as pure (śuci) which in fact is not pure (aśuci); and (4) taking some thing or things as an enduring self (ātman) which in fact cannot be such a self (anātman). Error consists in superimposing upon the true nature of things qualities which they do not actually possess. Āryadeva in these four chapters explains the true nature of these things so that all attachment to them will cease.

He attacks in chapter one the position that some things are permanent. In particular he opposes the tendency people have to think of themselves and their relations as continuing to live on indefinately. The proper antidote for this erroneous view is mindfulness of death (maraṇānusmṛti). In the first verse he calls attention to the existence and power of the Lord of Death: "Were someone for whom there exists the Lord of Death himself, the ruler of the three worlds, who acts independently, to sleep relaxedly, what else could be more wrong than that?"[1] Neither the Buddha, who has triumphed over the Lord of Death, nor those who follow his path, fear death. But fear of death is appropriate for people who remain attached to worldly things and thus fail to escape the bonds of the cycle of death and rebirth

(saṃsāra). This first verse and the second, in which Āryadeva emphasizes that whatever comes into existence proceeds inevitably towards death, indicate that all impermanent and conditioned things have death as their very nature: death prevails over life. Because of birth, the conditions of illness and old age occur; and these conditions lead people moment by moment into the presence of the Lord of Death.

Moreover, Āryadeva in verse three points out that death is not the last illness that people must overcome. It occurs without fail when a person finally yields to illness or old age. Unlike illness and old age, there is no cure or treatment for death, and consequently people should fear death. He warns in verse seven that uncertainty over the time of death is not a sufficient reason for people to think of themselves as immortal; for at some time in the future the Lord of Death will come.

The envitability of death should motivate people to cultivate meritorious actions. Āryadeva wonders why (vv. 8-9) anyone would purse wealth or fame instead. The preceeding nine verses of the CŚ, according to the outlines of the Tibetan commentators, concern "gross impermanence" (rags pa'i mi rtag pa) but the tenth concerns "subtle impermanence" (phra ba'i mi rtag pa). In this verse Āryadeva explains that any living being is nothing more

than a single moment of consciousness (vijñāna); knowledge about the self is rare because ordinary people fail to understand this fact. People who do not know that all conditioned things are momentary wrongly imagine that life will persist for a long time and consequently engage in demeritorious actions, in place of meritorious actions.

The first half of chapter one discusses the need for awareness of one's own forthcoming death. Much of the second half focuses on another troubling aspect of death: grief at the death of others. Āryadeva in verse twelve criticizes someone who mourns a child's death at a time when he or she is not liberated from the Lord of Death's power. Grief is inappropriate even when a child appears to die unexpectedly, for death should not have been unexpected. Ignorance, Āryadeva contends in verse fourteen, prevents people from recognizing that aging is a sign of impending death. Furthermore, mourning the death in conformity with worldly customs is a hypocritical act, he says (v.18), that has no merit.

Āryadeva discourages people from seeking pleasurable encounters with friends and relatives, since the eventual separation only increases the amount of pain (vv. 20-21). In the last three verses of this chapter, which suggest the beneficial results of the awareness of death and impermanence, Āryadeva advises householders to leave family

and friends behind. He condemns as a fool anyone who would wait for the death of family members and friends to occur before adopting the homeless life of a monk or nun. He concludes this chapter with the observation that fear will not arise if people eliminate all attachment: "Surely, where is there fear, even of the Lord of Death, for someone who reflects 'I am mortal', since attachment has been abandoned completely."[2] Attachment to family and friends binds one to the cycle of death and rebirth and thus prevents liberation. The greater the attachment, the more likely it is that the quality of the next life will be even less satisfactory than that of the present. But through cultivating mindfulness of death, knowledge of the truth of impermanence develops. When impermanence is understood, attachment lessens. Āryadeva, himself a monk, believes that this knowledge should motivate people to give up the householder's life and become members of the religious community.

Āryadeva in chapter one demonstrates his skill in identifying and clarifying the psychological obstacles that foster people's discomfort when confronted with the painful truth of death and impermanence. He directs the ordinary person's fear of death towards the accomplishment of meritorious actions, such as the meditation on death.

In the second chapter of the CŚ, Āryadeva recommends meditation on the truth of suffering as the means to

counteract the erroneous apprehension of things as being pleasant. While he emphasizes in this chapter that the body is a major source of suffering, he counsels against the practice of harsh asceticism in the first verse: "Although the body is perceived as an enemy, even so it must be cared for. The virtuous person who lives for a long time produces much merit from it."[3] By avoiding the extremes of asceticism and sensual indulgence, the person who lives a long and virtuous life accumulates much merit.

Āryadeva explains that suffering is difficult to avoid, since it prevails even when people seek out pleasure (vv. 3-5). Everyday, he points out in verse eight, both physical and mental suffering afflict those who live in this world. No pleasurable sensation can prevail over pain; these pleasurable sensations, he says (v.9), are the result of imaginative constructions (<u>kalpanā</u>) and since the experience of pain swiftly destroys any momentary pleasure, suffering dominates. Moreover, suffering increases as one ages and people experience illness and other causes of pain to a much greater extent than they experience pleasure (vv. 10-11). Even actions that initially yield pleasurable sensations, such as riding a horse (v.20), eventually bring pain.

All beings that have bodies undergo the pain of hunger, hard work, and death; even the elements that combine to form what is conventionally called "the body"

cause pain because of their mutually incompatible nature, he notes (vv. 14-19). Pain, Āryadeva, contends is the very nature of the body and pleasurable sensations are experienced as "something foreign" (v. 10).

In the final two verses of this chapter, Āryadeva returns to the topic of impermanence. He finds support for the pervasiveness of suffering in the following words of the Buddha: "Arising and ceasing are suffering," which he quotes in verse twenty-two. He concludes in the final verse that suffering encompasses all impermanent things: "Certainly what is impermanent is harmful, and what is harmful is not pleasant; consequently all that is impermanent is called 'suffering'."[4]

Āryadeva devotes chapter two to an analysis of the three different aspects of suffering: (1) ordinary physical and mental suffering (duḥkhaduḥkhatā), (2) the suffering brought on from the transformation of pleasure into pain (vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā), and (3) the suffering inherent in the very nature of conditioned things (saṃskāraduḥkhatā).[5] He speaks of suffering not only as the physical pain of hunger and illness, but as the mental frustration brought about by people's pursuit of pleasure. However, the most pervasive aspect of suffering is the third, the suffering characteristic of all conditioned dharmas--mental and physical-- that constitute the individual and the world in which he operates. It is

this suffering which Āryadeva has in mind when he asks in verse five: "Why do you not fear what is plentiful?" Fear of pain, he implies, ought to motivate people to cease their incessant craving for pleasure and turn instead to adopting a path that leads beyond the painful cycle of death and rebirth.

The cessation of suffering comes about through understanding its cause, the craving (tṛṣṇā) for sensual pleasures. In the third chapter of the CŚ, Āryadeva advises people to give up their vain pursuit of sensual pleasure. Āryadeva, in common with the authors of numerous early Buddhist texts, sees human beings trapped in cyclic existence by an insatiable appetite for sensual pleasures. The theme of liberation from the bondage of desire dominates the works of many Buddhist monks. The use of women's bodies as metaphors for sensual desire derives from the example set in the accounts of the Buddha's life, for the event that decisively turns the young prince's mind away from sensual pleasures and towards the religious life is the sight of female musicians and dancers slobbering, snoring, and revealing the nakedness of their bodies as they slept. Voluptuous women again confront him on the eve of his enlightenment; but Delight, Discontent, and Desire, the daughters of Māra, also fail to distract him for the pursuit of truth. These tales of nocturnal temptation influence all later

negative appraisals of the charms of women's bodies. Āryadeva draws upon this theme of women as sensual, seductive, and capable of entrapping others in the cycle of death and rebirth in chapter three. He uses the impure nature of a woman's body as an example of a thing that is erroneously considered to be pure.

Āryadeva points out in the first verse that all efforts to indulge one's sensual desires are ineffectual, for the objects of desire are endless. He goes on to compare people who are addicted to sensual pleasures to worms that feed on filth. This analogy between eating the earth and enjoying sensual pleasures comes from an early Buddhist myth in the Aggañña sutta.[6] According to this myth of the fall, the divine realm of self-luminous and incorporeal beings, who fed only on bliss, began to change. Earth formed a scum on the surface of the waters; and when the beings ate that earth, they lost their luminosity and acquired corporeal bodies. Soon after they ate this early food, sexual differences appeared on their bodies, and following on these sexual differences, came lust and sexual intercourse. These beings' desire for earth (paṭhavī, a noun feminine in gender) and their enjoyment of her substance brought about sexual differences. The desire and enjoyment that the awareness of these differences generated further accelerated the downfall. Tasting the earth (the feminine) culminated in the present

degenerate condition of humanity. Āryadeva and other Buddhist writers advocate the renunciation of sensual pleasures as a means of weakening the ties that bind people to the lower realm of sensual desire (kāmadhātu)

Āryadeva condemns the bestial practice of sexual intercourse. He reviles men who lust after beautiful women as fools, who are no better than dogs (v.4). Moreover, he claims in verse five that the attachment men have for a beautiful woman vanishes once they discover that she has been sexually intimate with others. He denies that a woman will remain faithful to her husband after his death in verse eight: "She is yours as long as she does not know anyone else."[7] But he criticizes the possessive attitude that men adopt toward their wives (v.11) and argues that the attachment and jealousy men display towards women is as senseless as if they were directed towards a privy (v.16)!

About the impurity of a woman's body he says in verse seventeen: "Although it is reasonable that confusion and anger arise in regard to something that is impure, it is entirely unreasonable that desire should arise."[8] Candrakīrti's commentary (CŚṬ D f.71a, P ff.76b-77a) develops the analogy between women's bodies and filth. He explains that if someone stepped in a pile of manure at night, then it is reasonable to assume that the confusion resulted from the darkness. The implication is that men

who are influenced by confusion or ignorance might succumb to the pleasures of women's bodies (=manure). Anger might also occur, he notes, because of the bad smell. The bad smell and impurity of women's bodies can be covered up with flowers, etc., Āryadeva points out (vv. 19,23), but these adornments can never remove the inner impurity of a woman's body (vv. 20-21). He compares the condition of the human embryo in the filthy enclosure of the womb, feeding off the nourishment provided by the mother's body, to the situation of worms that fed on manure (v. 20). He concludes in verse twenty-four that it is erroneous to consider a woman's body pure; the body should serve as a focus for the cultivation of detachment (vairāgya).

The desire for sexual intercourse that men indulge while in the prime of life is not permanent; he observes (vv. 9-11) that old men and those who are liberated do not share this inclination for sensual pleasure; the wise renounce all attachment to sensual pleasures and constantly turn their minds away from desire. Āryadeva contends that people who cannot see the faults of sensual desire resemble lepers who endeavor to relieve their pain by scratching their sores (v. 14); in both instances attachment prevents them from seeing the futility of their actions.

He concludes that the antidote to all four errors can be found in observing the body "In brief, impermanence, impurity, suffering, and the absence of a self, all four, exist in one."[9] Meditation on the body reveals that it is impermanent; a corpse, in particular, undergoes a number of unpleasant changes which display its impure nature. Because the body is impermanent, attachment to it results in suffering. Finally, the body, being impermanent, impure, and subject to pain, cannot be identified with any permanent, pure, and blissful self.

In chapter four Āryadeva examines the last of these four errors, namely, the view that there is a real substantial self. He attacks the notion that ordinary people have regarding a self, an 'I' that appropriates and posseses things. He addresses his remarks to an unnamed Indian monarch. Āryadeva warns this king that his inordinate pride in his position and his possessions will lead him to engage in evil actions that will result in his rebirth in hell. He encourages the king to acquire merit by sharing his wealth and serving as an example to his subjects of virtuous conduct.

One finds reflected in this advice two implicit principles which Clifford Geertz calls "The Doctrine of the Exemplary Center" and "The Doctrine of Graded Spirituality;" by the first principle he means that the king's court, with the king at its center, represents the ideal paradigm upon which the entire kingdom should model

itself. The second principle refers to the notion that spirituality is not distributed equally among the people at large, but apportioned according to a gradated sociopolitical scale, which has the king at its apex.[10] Consequently, given the temporal and spiritual power and influence attributed to the monarch, it is not surprising that Āryadeva should strive to ensure royal support for Buddhist teachings.

He reminds the king that as he is supported by the taxes on the people's harvest only the good will of the people will keep him in power (v.2). Why, he asks in verse five, should the king be proud of his role as protector of his subjects and not lose his pride when he is reminded that he, too, must be protected? Āryadeva does on to attack the king's pride in his duty from another angle, viz., his lack of compassion. In verse eight he asks: "Thinking, 'protection depends upon me', and receiving wages from the people, he himself also commits evil; who equals him in lacking mercy?"[11] When the king receives the people's taxes, he is obligated to protect them and in doing so he engages in evil actions, such as beating and executing criminals. Āryadeva advises the king that if he has no mercy for criminals, then all his subjects are in peril (v.9). Moreover, no scriptural authority that the king might cite as proof of his duty

to punish criminals can destroy the demerit which results from his merciless actions (v.10).

Āryadeva praises the virtue of the ancient kings who protected their subjects as they would a beloved son, but notes (v.15) that now kings rely on the law of a degenerate age (kalidharma). Perhaps he has in mind the legends of the universal monarchs whose just reign was attested to by the presence of a wheel in the sky; the disappearance of the wheel marked the rule of injustice, during which poverty, theft, murder, and deceit became widespread. The virtuous kings ruled according to the law and not by the sword. Consequently, Āryadeva informs the king that his action in attacking the weaknesses of his enemies in war has no more merit than the action of a thief who takes advantage of the weaknesses of those he robs (v.16). Moreover, the king's willingness to sacrifice his life in battle, he says in verse seventeen, is no more worthy of respect than the willingness of someone to impoverish himself to purchase liquor.

Āryadeva criticizes the pride that the king has in his royal birth. Merit, not birth as a member of the royal class (kṣatriya), produces a king (v. 20). Moreover, "royal class" is just a term that indicates one's livelihood, he notes (v. 21). Candrakirti (CŚṬ D ff 86b - 87a, Pf. 94a-b) retells the Aggañña sutta's account of the origins of the royal class in his commentary to this

verse: when the need arose to protect the fields from thieves, the people appointed to do this work became known as members of the royal class. Finally Āryadeva attacks the king's pride in his class by pointing out that since women's minds are fickle, the king can't be certain that his father was a member of the royal class (v.22); he implies that the king can't be sure he knows who his biological father was.

Āryadeva concludes the chapter with the warning that, although the king may share his wealth and power with others, no one else shares in the demerit that he acquires from engaging in evil actions (v.24). He alone must suffer from the results of this bad karma in his next life. However, an intelligent king will lose all pride in his sovereign power after he has seen others who have equal or superior power (v.25). In the next chapter Āryadeva indicates that the power he has in mind is the "inconceivable power" of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

The fifth chapter begins with a verse extolling the activity of the Buddhas: "It is said that there is not any activity of the Buddhas that is causeless; even breathing arises for the sake benefiting sentient beings."[12] Throughout this chapter on the Bodhisattva's career, Āryadeva emphasizes the Bodhisattva's resolution to work for the benefit of all sentient beings. Knowledge of this motivation is of great importance in understanding the

Bodhisattva's actions, for as Āryadeva says in verse four, "without understanding the motivation the merit in [any action] going, etc., is not perceived."[13] Even the action of taking life may be virtuous, if a Bodhisattva undertakes it with the proper motivation. Candrakīrti cites (CŚṬ D ff. 93b-94a, Pff. 102-b-103a) the example of the ship captain who, under the influence of great compassion, kills a thief in order to prevent him from murdering five hundred other passengers; this Bodhisattva knew that the thief would suffer in hell for many eons if he were not prevented from carrying out this action. The vast store of merit that the Bodhisattva accumulates over a long period of time---Āryadeva remarks in verse sixteen that the Bodhisattva remains in the world as long as there are sentient beings--has the effect of canceling out the maturation of any negative action (v.21).

The CŚ, in accord with the Daśabhūmikasūtra, considers the beginning of the Bodhisattva's career as the generation of the intention to work for the benefit of all sentient beings.[14] After the completion of this initial action, the aspiring Bodhisattva attains the first stage of the ten stage path to Buddhahood, and is now properly designated as a Bodhisattva, according to Candrakīrti (CŚṬ D f.94b, Pf. 103b). The generation of this intention produces a vast quantity of merit. Āryadeva says in verse

six: "Far superior to the merit of all people on earth and those who become universal monarchs is [the merit of] a Bodhisattva's initial intention."[15]

The store of merit that has culminated in the Bodhisattva's attainment of the first stage of the path is sufficient to enable him to be reborn continuously as a great monarch. The Bodhisattva's control over mind, Āryadeva suggests (v.23), allows him to be reborn as a world ruler in whom temporal and spiritual power coalesce. Someone who rules as a powerful monarch is in a position to make generous donations to his subjects, and throughout a Bodhisattva's career, especially on the first stage, he is encouraged to give. Āryadeva emphasizes the importance of this activity in verse nineteen: "The word 'giving' illumines death, the teaching, and other existences. Consequently, the word 'giving' continually pleases a Bodhisattva."[16] Candrakīrti comments (CŚṬ Df. 102a-b, Pf. 112b), that the word 'giving' illumes death because all one's future births will be influenced by actions done in the present life; a generous donor will be rewarded with prosperity in the next life. Furthermore, the word 'giving' epitomizes the Buddha's teaching since the three types of giving encompass all six perfections (pāramitā). Giving material goods is linked with the perfection of giving; giving security, to the perfection of moral conduct and patience; and giving

teachings, to the perfections of meditation and insight. All three types of giving involve the perfection of vigor. But the merit of giving material goods is far surpassed by the merit that accrues from giving instructions in the Buddha's teachings. "Someone may build a stūpa made of jewels as high as the world," Āryadeva says in verse seventeen, but "It is said that better than that is [the merit of] someone who trains a single sentient being [to produce the intention of enlightenment]."[17]

Throughout this chapter Āryadeva stresses the Bodhisattva's active involvement in the teaching and training of others. If someone should incur a bad rebirth because a Bodhisattva had failed to inspire him, the Bodhisattva is to blame, Āryadeva notes in verse fourteen. But a Bodhisattva may voluntarily be born in the lower realms in order to teach others, since he has the special knowledge (abhijñā) that facilitates this action (v.17). As part of this special knowledge, the Bodhisattva acquires the ability to discern the thought of others. This knowledge helps him to adapt the teachings to the capabilities and needs of each student. Initially great care must be exercised in examining a prospective student, "for someone who is weak is never a fit vessels for the pure teaching,"[18] Āryadeva points out in verse ten.

He portrays the Bodhisattva also as a skilled diagnostician who provides the proper medication based on his diagnosis of the various illnesses that afflict sentient beings. Āryadeva utilizes this analogy of illness and treatment several times in describing the actions of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. He says in verse nine: "Just as a physician is not disturbed by someone who is possessed by a demon, even though he is angry [at the physician], the Sage sees the afflictions (kleśa) as enemy, but not the individual who has the afflictions."[19] He remarks also that it is as rare for a Bodhisattva who has acquired the skill to train students not to attract them as it is for a skilled physician not to have patients (v.13).

In addition to employing skillful means (upāya) to liberate sentient beings from cyclic existence, the Bodhisattva must possess compassion and love, especially for those sentient beings that abuse him, since they are ignorant of his motivation. In stressing this point, Āryadeva uses a mother's love for a sick child as an analogy for the Bodhisattva's love for lesser beings (v.11). A Bodhisattva remains in this world to help these lesser beings; the pain of cyclic existence does not harm him since he has a "powerful mind." Candrakīrti explains (CŚṬ Df. 103b, Pf. 113b) that a powerful mind is characterized by the property of non-regression. On the eighth

stage of the path, which the <u>Daśabhūmikasūtra</u> refers to a "irreversible" the Bodhisattva no longer regresses to the level of an ordinary person.[20] Unlike ordinary people, he is not troubled by the pain of birth, old age and death and consequently, as Āryadeva indicates in verse twenty-two, "to him there is no difference between cyclic existence and Nirvāṇa."[21] This chapter concludes with the advice that people should recognize the inconceivable power of the Buddha and not fear his profound teachings (vv. 24-25).

Āryadeva's conception of the Bodhisattva's career emphasizes the cultivation of active virtues. He exhorts the Bodhisattva to teach, to be patient with those who are ignorant and afflicted with illness, and to pursue energetically the task of leading all sentient beings to enlightenment. He compares the Bodhisattva to a teacher and to a physician to illustrate his point that both skillful means and compassion are necessary to rescue beings who are trapped in the cycle of death and rebirth. There is little evidence in this early treatment of the Bodhisattva's career to support Luis Gomez's assertion that "the cultivation of compassion is primarily and necessarily a comtemplative discipline."[22] According to Āryadeva, compassion entails the giving of gifts--material goods, security, or instruction in the Buddha's teachings--to those who need protection (v.15). The best

of these gifts is to actively encourage others to generate the intention of enlightenment and to pursue a Bodhisattva's career themselves.

Since the afflictions of desire, hatred, and confusion impede the meritorious practices of a Bodhisattva's career, Āryadeva examines in chapter six how these arise. He first identifies the actions that are characteristic of each affliction in verse two: "The action of desire is accumulation; the action of hatred is discord; and the action of confusion sustains both."[23] Each engenders pain and should be eliminated. Desire is painful when one is separated from what one wants; hatred is painful when one lacks power; and confusion is painful, he says (v.3) because of a lack of understanding. By identifying which of these afflictions most typifies a student's behavior, a skilled teacher is then able to apply the proper antidote. People inclined towards desire, Āryadeva notes in verse twelve, have the tendency of kings to seek out pleasure in good food, fine clothing, and handsome dwellings; all of these things these people should give up and remain near a teacher (v.13). The teacher should treat people influenced by desire harshly, but be gentle towards people influenced by hatred (v.5).

Āryadeva claims that impotent people express their anger by frowns and scowls, but powerful people are far worse (v.14), since they can kill. Harsh words, though,

are the fruition of demeritorious actions committed earlier (v.15). Consequently it is wrong to be angry at someone who exposes one's faults, he points out in verse eighteen. These words may be unpleasant to hear, but they are not harmful by nature (v.16) , and the anger that arises in response to them is just due to the operation of one's own conceptual constructions. Patience, he advises in verse twenty one, is the proper response to an abusive person. Patience creates much merit and only fools would impede the exercise of patience. "You should cultivate patience towards someone who is angry," Āryadeva counsels, "it is just foolhardy for you to fear a situation for [accumulating] virtuous qualities."[24] Moreover, as it is impossible to quell all the abuse and criticism that comes one's way, it is far better to patiently endure this censure than to retaliate (v.24).

Each of these afflictions daily affect sentient beings (v.6), but Āryadeva especially cautions people to guard against desire, since it has a deceptively friendly appearance, and advises them to fear and repudiate desire as an enemy (v.7). Hatred also should be repudiated, he notes in verse nine, since people engage in demeritorious actions under its influence. Nonetheless, the most important affliction to conquer is confusion, since this affliction underlies both of the others; and once it is eliminated, the other two will cease he says in verse ten.

Confusion or ignorance Candrakīrti explains (CŚṬ D ff. 112b-113a, P ff. 124b-125a) constructs and superimposes such distinctions as 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' upon things that are empty of any real nature of their own. An understanding of the operations of interdependent origination, Āryadeva suggests in verse eleven, is the antidote for confusion.

The chapter concludes with his observation that afflictions never persist in the mind of someone who understands correctly the abiding, etc., of consciousness. Candrakīrti explains (CŚṬ D ff. 119b-120a, Pf. 132b-133a) that since the three marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing have no real nature of their own, consciousness also has no real nature and thus resembles a magic illusion (māyā). Implicit in this Madhyamaka argument of Āryadeva and Candrakīrti is a fifth error, namely, taking something to have a real substantial nature of its own (svabhāva) when in fact all things are empty of such a nature.[25] Through confusion, the root of the other two afflictions, people fail to perceive things as they really are and erroneously apprehend false distinctions, e.g., 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant'.

In chapter seven Āryadeva describes how one eliminates attachment to the deceptively attractive sense objects, for these objects cause the afflictions to arise. He begins by indicating the disadvantages of cyclic existence.

Why he asks in the first verse of this chapter aren't people afraid of this endless ocean of suffering? One may be young now but youth will soon pass (v.2). No one is reborn willingly and no intelligent person remains unafraid under another's control, he points out in verse three, returning again to the topic he explored in the first chapter of the CŚ: fear of death as a motive for rejecting the bonds of cyclic existence.

The cycle of death and rebirth continues due to the operations of the three afflictions and karma. But it is possible to escape this cycle. Āryadeva advises that one should act in such a way that one will not be reborn (v.4). The ripening of demeritorious actions is harmful, he notes in verse seven, and "therefore the wise perceive cyclic existence as similar to a place of execution."[26] Ordinary people fail to discern the insanity of remaining trapped in the cycle of death and rebirth, but "an intelligent person," he says in verse nine, "directs the mind towards the exhaustion of all karma."[27]

He emphasizes again that cyclic existence should be feared, since no one can see all the operations of karma. "When the initial cause (ādikaraṇa) of even one effect is not perceived," he argues in verse ten, "then after seeing the extent of one [effect] who wouldn't be frightened?"[28] Even a good rebirth in heaven frightens the wise in precisely the same way as hell does (v.14);

and moreover it is difficult to proceed from one good rebirth to another, he says in verse sixteen, quoting the Buddha as his authority.

He opposes the notion that meritorious actions should be done for the sake of acquiring a good rebirth in the next life. He criticizes in verse seventeen someone who would turn away from sense objects in this life with the expectation of enjoying the divine pleasures of heaven. It is equally wrong to accumulate merit in the hope of being reborn into a wealthy family (v.18). The enjoyment of pleasurable objects and wealth, although acquired through the performance of meritorious actions, should not be the goal of Buddhist practice, for "what is the point of acquiring something that is better to reject?"[29] he asks in verse twenty. Moreover, to engage in meritorious actions with the sole motive of acquiring a future reward is not wise. "If you become attached to the teaching after seeing the future result," Āryadeva says, "then why aren't you afraid after seeing an end to the future [result] ?"[30] The consequence of attachment to the result, Candrakīrti points out (CŚṬ Df. 130b, Pf. 145b), is a bad rebirth. Āryadeva concludes that the wise neither find pleasure in divine sense objects nor in the objects of this world. Attachment to sense objects prolongs one's bondage in the cycle of death and rebirth,

the wise apprehend this cycle as characterized by suffering and reject all attachment.

Āryadeva begins in chapter eight, entitled "the preparation of a student," a transition from advocating the practice of meritorious actions to advocating the right point of view. The preparation that the student has received through practicing generosity, etc., makes that student a proper vessel for the Buddha's profound teachings on non-substantiality (nairātmya) and emptiness. A student ready to receive these teachings has eradicated the afflictions and exhausted all actions that result in involuntary rebirth.

Āryadeva begins this chapter with the observation that these afflictions can be eradicated. Desire will cease once the faults in sense objects are understood, he says in the first verse. He points out that in regard to any object some people will be attracted to it, others will be repelled by it, and still others confused by it (v.2). Common experience thus demonstrates that different people under different circumstances perceive the same object in quite different ways. Consequently he concludes that the desire that arises in response to some object has no independent nature of its own. "The existence of desire," Āryadeva asserts in verse three, "is not found apart from conceptual construction."[31] Each of the three afflictions depends upon conceptual construction; Nāgārjuna

makes the same point in MMK XXIII.1: "It is said that desire, hatred, and confusion arise from conceptual construction; in fact they arise in dependence upon errors (viparyaya) involving what is pleasant and unpleasant." Candrakīrti glosses conceptual construction as discursive reasoning (vitarka) (PPp.451.11). Discursive reasoning characterizes the mental organ's initial reflection on a sense object. Conceptual construction also has another function; it hypostatizes both a percipient subject (grāhaka) and a perceived object (grāhya). On the basis of this constructed dichotomy, the mental organ operates, erroneously attributing pleasant qualities to some objects and unpleasant qualities to others.

Analysis of the interdependent nature of the constructed subject and its objects will remove the errors that give rise to the afflictions, but Āryadeva notes in verse five that most people are not even willing to doubt the profound teachings of the Buddha: "Mere doubt would shatter cyclic existence."[32] He sees doubt as the antithesis of certain belief, which permits no critical thinking about the teachings of the Buddha. To question whether or not a specific teaching is true may lead to an understanding of the truth about cyclic existence.

Āryadeva observes that it is difficult for people to escape cyclic existence as it is for them to leave their

own homes (v.12). He urges people to renounce their ties to family and friends. "How," he asks, "can someone who is not disgusted by this world have respect (bhakti) for tranquility?"[33] The merit-generating action of renunciation becomes a preliminary step on the path towards the realization of the calm state of Nirvāṇa.

The Buddha's teachings, Āryadeva says in verse fourteen, address the needs of each individual and his capacity for understanding: "Giving is spoken of to low nature people; moral conduct, to middle nature people; and tranquility, to high nature people."[34] This teaching is gradual. First one must reject demeritorious practices (v.15). "The Tathāgatas," he notes in verse seventeen, "speak about attachment to good practices to those who desire heaven."[35] Attachment to good practices such as generosity, is most appropriate for those people who wish to accumulate merit, since the merit acquired in this life will bring happiness in the next. Nevertheless, he criticizes this practice of merit-making for the sake of a good rebirth when he talks with people who are intent on liberation.

Moreover, someone who desires the merit derived from giving the gift of instruction in the Buddha's teachings should bear in mind the audience. "Someone who desires merit should not speak about emptiness at all times,"[36]

he advises in verse eighteen. The Buddha's profound teachings on emptiness are not suited for those who are not prepared to accept them.

In conclusion, much of what Āryadeva has to say in the first eight chapters of the CŚ follows the Buddha's own gradated discourses (anupubbikathā) on generosity, moral conduct, heaven, the disadvantages of sensual pleasure and the advantages of renunciation.[37] He advises the laity to gain merit through generosity and moral conduct; in particular, he urges the king to be generous towards his subjects and serve as a model of good conduct through his actions. Although Āryadeva encourages the laity to do actions that will enable them to accumulate merit and receive in the next life the rewards of meritorious actions, he emphasizes also the dangers of becoming attached to the results of merit. Those who are reborn in heaven and delight in divine pleasures will eventually reap the painful fruits of this attachment, for the divine realms still remain within the cycle of death and rebirth.

Throughout these first eight chapters of the CŚ, Āryadeva stresses the disadvantages of sensual pleasures and the advantages of renunciation. He argues repeatedly against the deceptive attractiveness of sensual pleasures. Laymen should not succumb to the charms of their wives but ought to repudiate all familial ties. He reminds the laity that death will separate them from their loved

ones eventually and that it is far better to make the separation now and enter the religious life. He plays upon people's fears of suffering and death as a means of inducing them to renounce worldly pleasures.

Āryadeva admits that people gain merit from generous actions in support of religion, such as building a _stūpa_, but even more meritorious is the practice of a person committed to the career of a Bodhisattva. This person works for the benefit of all sentient beings without the expectation of any reward from generous actions. And the most meritorious of all the Bodhisattva's generous actions is the encouragement given to others to follow the Buddha's path.

CHAPTER IV

NOTES

[1]CŚ I:1 *gang la 'jig rten gsum mnga' bdag* //
rang nyid 'chi bdag byed po med //
yod des rnal bzhin gnyid log na //
de las ma rungs gzhan ci yod //

[2]CŚ I:25 *niyamād vidyate yasya martyo 'ham iti bhāvanā* /
tasya saṅghaparityāgād mṛtyor api ⟨*bhayam ku*⟩*taḥ* //

[3]CŚ II:1 *lus ni dgra ltar mthong mod kyi* //
de lta na yang de bsrung bya //
khrims ldan yun ring 'tsho ba ni //
de las bsod nams chen po byed //

[4]CŚ II:25 *anityasya dhruvā pīḍā pīḍā yasya na tat sukham* /
tasmād anityaṃ yat sarvaṃ duḥkhaṃ tad iti jāyate //

[5]Walpola Rahula discusses these three aspects of suffering in *What the Buddha Taught* (New York: Grove Press, 1974), pp. 19-20. See also May, *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 207 n.694.

[6]*Agaññasuttanta*, *Dīgha*, III, pp. 84-89.

[7]CŚ III.8ab: *ji srid gzhan shes ma gyur pa* //
de srid de ni khyod la 'dug //

[8]CŚ III:17 *mi gtsang ba la gti mug ni* //
'byung zhing khro ba 'byung rigs kyi //
rnam pa kun tu 'dod chags ni //
'byung bar rigs pa ma yin no //

[9]CŚ III:25 *anityam aśubham duḥkham anātmeti catuṣṭayam* /
ekasminn eva sarvāṇi sambhavanti samāsataḥ //

[10]Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 36-37.

[11]CŚ IV:8 *bsrung ba nga la rag las zhes* //
'jig rten las ni gla len zhing //
rang nyid kyis kyang sdig byed na //
de mtshungs brtse med su zhig yod //

[12]CŚ V:1 *na ceṣṭā kila buddhānām asti kā cid akāraṇā* /
niḥsvāso 'pi hitāyaiva prāṇinām sampravartate //

[13]CŚ V:4ab *sems ma rtogs par 'gro sogs la* //
gang phyir bsod nams la sogs pa //

[14]*Daśabhūmikasūtra*, ed. Johannes Rahder (Louvain: J.B. Istas, 1926), p.12.

[15]CŚ V:6 *byang chub sems dpa' dang po* //
sa steng skye bo thams cad ni //
'khor los sgyur ba nyid 'gyur ba //
de dag bsod nams las khyad 'phags //

[16]CŚ V:19 *'chi dang chos dang srid pa gzhan* //
sbyin pa'i sgra yis gsal byed pa //
de phyir byang chub sems dpa' la //
sbyin pa'i sgra ni rtag tu snyan //

[17]CŚ V:7 *rin chen rang bzhin mchog rten ni* //
'jig rten snyed mtho 'gas byas pa
de bas sems can gcig 'dul po //
mchog tu bkrabs par brjod pa yin //

[18]CŚ V:10cd *nyams par gyur pa dam chos kyi* //
snod ni cis kyang ma yin no //

[19]CŚ V:9 *khro yang 'byung pos bzung pa la* //
sman pa 'khrug pa min pa ltar //
thub pa nyon mongs dgrar gzigs kyi //
nyon mongs dang 'grel gang zag min //

[20]*Daśabhūmikasūtra*, p. 71.

[21]CŚ V:22cd *des na de la srid pa dang* //
mya ngan 'das la khyad par med //

[22]Luis Gomez, "Karuṇābhāvanā: Notes on the Meaning of Buddhist Compassion," *The Tibet Journal* 3, no. 2 (1978) :39.

[23]CŚ VI:2 *'dod chags las ni sdud pa ste* //
khro ba'i las ni rtsod pa' o //
'byung ba kun la rlung bzhin du //
gti mug las ni gsos 'debs pa' o //

[24]CŚ VI:23 *gang zhig khro gnas la bzod pa* //
de la bsgom pa skye bar 'gyur //
yon tan gnas la 'jigs shes pa //
khyod kyi blun pa 'ba' zhig yin //

[25]On this fifth error see Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1967), pp. 204-205.

[26]CŚ VII:7cd des na srid pa gsod gnas dang //
mtshungs par dam pa rnams la snang //

[27]CŚ VII:9cd sarvakarmakṣaye tena karoti matimān matim //

[28]CŚ VII:10 yadaikasyāpi kāryasya dṛśyate nādikāraṇam /
tadā kasya bhayaṃ na syād dṛṣṭvaikasyāpi vistaram //

[29]CŚ VII:20cd śreyān yasya parityāgo niṣpannenāpi tena kim //

[30]CŚ VII:22 ma 'ongs pa yi 'bras mthong nas //
chos 'dod chags pas khyod chags na //
ma 'ongs mtha' nyid mthong gyur nas //
'jigs pa med dam ci zhig byed //

[31]CŚ VIII:3ab vinā kalpanayāstitvaṃ rāgādīnāṃ na vidyate /

[32]CŚ VIII:5cd bhavaḥ saṃdehamātreṇa jāyate jarjarīkṛtaḥ /

[33]CŚ VIII:12ab: udvego yasya nāstīha bhaktis tasya kutaḥ śive /

[34]CŚ VIIIabc sbyin pa dman pa la gsungs shing //
'bring la tshul khrims gsungs pa ste //
mchog la zhi ba gsungs gyur pa //

[35]CŚ VIII:17ab chos chags de bzhin gshegs rnams kyis //
mtho ris 'dod pa rnams la gsungs //

[36]CŚ VIII:18ab bsod nams 'dod pas stong pa nyid //
kun tshe brjod par bya min te //

[37]See Dīgha, I, p.110; II, p.41: and Majjhima, I, p.379.

CHAPTER V

ĀRYADEVA ON THE CULTIVATION OF KNOWLEDGE

"In the same way as it is impossible to make a barbarian understand in a different language," Āryadeva says, "it is impossible to make wordly people understand [the truth] without reference to worldly things."[1] In this verse from the eighth chapter, he emphasizes the necessity for expressing the Buddha's teachings in terms that ordinary people can understand. Both the language and the methods of instruction, if they are to be effective in releasing human beings from the obstacles, moral and intellectual (kleśāvaraṇa, jñeyāvaraṇa), that prevent an understanding of the truth, must conform to the needs and capabilities of those who are to be taught. He advises teachers to examine carefully each student's weaknesses and to adjust the methods of instruction accordingly. The instruction is progressive, beginning with the encouragement to engage in meritorious practices and to reject all demeritorious practices and culminating in the rejection of all factors of existence (dharma) as having a nature of their own and in the realization of the calm state of Nirvāṇa (VIII.14-15).

Āryadeva, in agreement with the distinction made by the Mahāsāṅghika school between the Buddha's teaching on

mundane and supramundane matters, identifies two levels of the Buddha's discourse. "Worldly activity (pravṛtti) is proclaimed where there is teaching that relates to the world (laukikī deśanā)," he says; "withdrawal from activity (nivṛtti) is proclaimed where there is the ultimate teaching (paramārtha kathā)."[2] This progressive method of instruction begins with teachings that are concerned with the worldly activity of the cycle of death and rebirth. First, as Āryadeva notes in VIII.15, the student must reject all demeritorious actions that arise from the afflictions of desire, hatred, and confusion. All attachment to one's family and one's self, which perpetuates cyclic existence, must cease. The second stage of instruction involves the rejection of the self. On the mundane level it may be preferable to accept the self, Āryadeva admits (IX.25, XII.12). Candrakīrti, commenting on XII.12 (HPS p.496, CŚṬ D f.190a, P f.214a), explains that for inferior people who are attached to the self the teaching that self exists can be beneficial, since it may induce these people to repudiate demeritorious actions in favor of meritorious actions. But on the ultimate level neither the self nor anything else exists. The third and final stage of the instruction imparts knowledge of the right view: the non-substantiality of individual and the factors of existence.

The rejection of the self and the acceptance of the Buddha's teaching on non-substantiality distinguishes superior people from inferiors. Ordinary people do not understand the teaching of non-substantiality and retreat from it. "The practice of a teaching that involves activity is exclusively for childish people," Āryadeva says (XII.9); "they fear a teaching that involves withdrawal from activity because they lack constant practice."[3] Although he does not discuss specific techniques for withdrawing from worldly activity, he differentiates in VIII.21 between people who perceive things correctly and thus attain the highest state and those who perceive just a little of the truth and so gain a good rebirth and advises: "Therefore intelligent people always direct ahd mind towards inner comtemplation (adhyātamacintā)."[4] Buddhist cosmology admits three realms of existence; the realm of sensual desire (kāma-dhātu) is the lowest of these.[5] Release from the bondage of cyclic existence entails a withdrawal from the sensual realm into the realm of contemplation. This withdrawal begins with turning the mind away from sensual desire towards contemplation. In the practice of contemplation, the mind's attention is directed away from the sensual realm through gradually diminishing the impact of the senses' external stimulation until a mental state of calm prevails.

"Buddhist meditation," Robert Gimello explains, "is a discipline which one begins by first stilling or calming the mind and body."[6] The techniques that contribute to 'calming' included prescribed postures for meditation, e.g., the familiar cross-legged 'lotus position', the restriction of the senses, the regulation of the breathing, and the focusing of sensory and mental attention on such objects of contemplation as the ten 'devices' (kṛstnāyatana) as a means of gradually ascending through stages of meditative trance (dhyāna).[7] Progress through these trance states is accomplished by passing beyond increasing more subtle states of consciousness. The suppression of discursive thought (vitarka, vicāra) marks the transition from the first trance state into the second. Next enthusiasm, characteristic of the two previous states, is eliminated prior to entering into the third. Finally even the sensation of pleasure is discarded before attaining the fourth state. All the activities of body, speech, and mind are reduced to a bare minimum in this fourth trance state. Only motionless insight (aniñjyaprajñā) remains.[8] This cultivation of calm, as Gimello points out, is "the necessary prelude to an analytical discernment of the 'truths' of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpadā) and impermanence (anitya) as they apply to the psychosomatic 'self'."[9] In the latter half of the CŚ, Āryadeva focuses on this analytical

discernment of truth; the titles of the chapters include the term 'meditative realization' (bhāvanā), absent from the titles of the eight earlier chapters.[10]

Confusion (moha) prevents ordinary people from discerning the truth of the Buddha's teachings. Ignorance induces them to erroneously impute a permanent nature upon things which are not permanent and which are ultimately non-existent. "Ordinary people conceive space (ākāśa), etc., as permanent," Āryadeva notes (IX.5) but "intelligent people do not perceive a real object among these, even on the worldly level (laukikena)."[11] While ordinary people understand that such things as the circle made by a whirling firebrand are unreal, they do not know that "cyclic existence is the same as a firebrand's circle, a magical creation, a dream, an illusion, a moon in water, vapor, an echo, a mirage, or a cloud."[12] Intelligent people, free of the affliction of confusion, understand the interdependent nature of all factors of existence and they know that these are as empty of any real substantial existence as any magical illusion. About these people Āryadeva says, "those who see the world, which resembles a collection of machines (yantra), to be like illusory beings (māyāpuruṣa) clearly attain the highest level."[13] The saints (ārya) repudiate what appears to be real to ordinary people because the practice of meditation has enabled them to discern the truth about worldly things.

Āryadeva's Ābhidharmika opponents also distinguish between real and conventional existence. The aggregates and the base of visible form (rūpayātana) have real existence (dravyasat) but the things which are designated in dependence upon them, e.g., the individual, a pot, have only a conventional existence (saṃvṛtisat). They describe the pot as conventionally existent since when it breaks into its constituent parts, the potsherds, etc., the cognition 'pot' disappears.[14]

Āryadeva denies both the real existence of the designation 'pot' and the elements (bhūta) and derived matter (bhautika) that are the basis for the designation. The pot cannot exist independently of its visible form and its visible form cannot exist independently of the elements (XIV.15). He contends that it is incorrect to assert that the pot does not really exist but that its atomic constituents do really exist. "It is said 'one exists, the other doesn't exist'; this is neither ultimate truth nor worldly usage," he claims (XVI.24).[15] In commenting upon this verse, Candrakīrti (CŚṬ D f.238a-b, P f.272b) indicates that when discussing worldly things it is appropriate to talk about the existence of the aggregates but in discussing ultimate truth the saints know that these are no more real than pots, for they also are empty of own nature.

Āryadeva's discrimination between two levels of discourse and between ultimate truth and worldly usage demonstrates his acceptance of Nāgārjuna's position that "without relying upon conventional expressions, the ultimate cannot be indicated, without comprehending the ultimate, Nirvāṇa cannot be realized."[16] Ordinary language has a practical value in that it indicates the direction in which one must proceed to attain the final goal. But ultimate truth lies outside the boundaries of ordinary language and discursive thought remains accessible to the saints through personal realization (pratyātmavedya) of the Buddha's teachings.

The ultimate teaching on withdrawal from activity leads to the realization of Nirvāṇa. The right point of view, namely, the Buddha's teaching on the non-substantiality of the individual and the factors of existence enables those who possess this knowledge to realize Nirvāṇa (XII.12). Āryadeva emphasizes in the CŚ that it is knowledge of the non-substantial and empty nature of all things, rather than the performance of any meritorious action, that brings about the attainment of Nirvāṇa. Meritorious actions result in a good rebirth, not in the realization of the calm state of Nirvāṇa (VIII.11). The importance of holding to the right view is underlined in XII.11 where he states that it is better to retreat from the practice of moral conduct than to retreat from the

right view. Candrakīrti explains (HPS pp.495-496, CŚṬ D ff.189b-190a, P f. 213a-b) that people who offend against moral conduct will, in accordance with the severity of the offence, undergo a bad rebirth as a hungry ghost (preta), an animal, or in hell, but even the slightest retreat from the right view will be far worse, for not even over hundreds of thousands of incalculable eons can someone who has regressed from the right view attain equal status with those who regress from moral conduct. But someone who holds the right view will attain the highest state, a goal far more worthy than heaven.

Most people fear the teaching of non-substantiality. "You are frightened, thinging 'What will I do? Everything is non-existent'," Āryadeva says, yet "if there were something that must be done, then this teaching would not be conducive to a withdrawal from activity."[17] In his opinion the emphasis placed upon an 'I' that engages in various activities that result in the attainment of Nirvāṇa is an incorrect view (VIII.7). Belief in an 'I' is a view that is the major obstacle to the realization of Nirvāṇa. "If the so-called 'I' exists," he contends, "then either it is wrong to think 'I do not exist' or it is false to think 'Someone who knows the truth surely attains Nirvāṇa'."[18] Both of these assertions cannot be correct. Either the opponent's belief in a

real, permanent self (ātman) is correct or the Buddhist tenet that all factors of existence are characteristically lacking such a self (anātman) is correct. Āryadeva argues in favor of the latter assertion.

In chapter ten he refutes various opposing theories on the nature of the self. He denies that the self provides the identity that connects a series of rebirths. He denies also that the self--whether it is conscious in nature as his Sāṃkhya opponents maintain or unconscious in nature as his Vaiśeṣika opponents maintain--can instigate an individual's actions and experience the results. Āryadeva argues that if the self experiences the results of action, then it should change from one birth to another in the same way as the body changes; and if the self does change, then it, just like the body, is not permanent (X.4). Furthermore, if the opponent objects that the self is permanent because the self is needed to account for the memory of previous births, then why, he asks, isn't the body considered to be permanent because of the experience of a previous wound (X.7)? Āryadeva implies in this verse that if the past mental impressions establish that the self is permanent, then by the same line of reasoning a physical impression, e.g., a previous scar, ought to make the body impermanent, which is an absurd conclusion. A Vaiśeṣika opponent claims that the self remembers previous births because of

its connection with consciousness, but Āryadeva responds that if this unconscious self becomes conscious, then it undergoes change and is therefore not permanent (X.8). On the other hand, to the Sāṃkhya opponent who claims that the self is conscious, he responds that if that if the self is conscious by nature, then the eye as an instrument of cognition serves no useful function (X.10). When the opponent modifies his position and claims now that the Puruṣa has the potential (śakti) to become conscious, he replies that if the Puruṣa is potentially conscious at one point and actually conscious at another point, then it changes and therefore is not permanent (X.12).

Employing a different line of argument against a permanent self, Āryadeva questions the need for practicing non-harming (ahiṃsa) and other meritorious actions if the self is permanent (X.6). He implies that a permanent self should never need the protection from the pain of a bad rebirth provided by the performance of meritorious actions. Moreover, how is it possible to harm something that is permanent, he asks? And how can liberation occur without harm? Therefore he concludes that liberation is impossible for someone who maintains that the self is permanent (X.19). The pain and harm that people incur in the cycle of death and rebirth motivate

them to seek liberation. Disgust for the cycle should arise prior to the development of respect for the calm state of Nirvāṇa (VIII.12).

Āryadeva, like Nāgārjuna, does not consider 'liberation' and 'bondage' separate things: "If liberation were a different thing from bondage, the thing bound, and the method, then nothing could arise from it."[19] Knowledge of the right view that all things are ultimately non-substantial and empty of a nature of their own counteracts any tendency of the mind to construct artificial dichotomies, e.g., bondage and liberation, cyclic existence and Nirvāṇa. Āryadeva rejects the earlier Buddhist position that there is a real difference between Nirvāṇa as an unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) thing and all the conditioned things that are included within the cycle of existence. There is no difference between the cycle of existence and Nirvāṇa, Āryadeva says, for the Bodhisattva who has a powerful mind (V.22). The disciplined calming of the mind confers the power to realize Nirvāṇa in the present life. Nirvāṇa is never absent in this life, he says, but those people who are disciplined (yukta) and liberated are rare (VIII.23). But even if Nirvāṇa is not realized in this life, knowledge of the truth inevitably leads to the realization of Nirvāṇa in the next life, in accordance with the law of karma (VIII.22).

Nirvāṇa for Āryadeva is a liberated state of mind. In this state the conceptual constructs 'the self' and 'the aggregates' have no place. "In Nirvāṇa the aggregates do not exist and the individual is not possible. Insofar as the place in which Nirvāṇa has occured is not perceived, then what Nirvāṇa is there?" he asks.[20] Nirvāṇa is not some thing that is superimposed upon a substratum, the five aggregates or the individual, Candrakīrti comments (CŚṬ D f.155b, P. f.174b). This recalls Nāgārjuna's statement that ultimately "there is no superimposition (samāropa) of Nirvāṇa no removal (apakarṣana) of cyclic existence."[21]

Nirvāṇa and cyclic existence cannot be differentiated since the mark 'empty' applies to both of them. In fact this mark characterizes all factors of existence. "The emptiness of one," Āryadeva states, "is precisely the emptiness of all."[22] The term emptiness describes the real nature of these factors of existence and is a term that refers to ultimate truth, although as a designation it belongs to the level of conventional truth.[23] As a true description of reality "emptiness is in fact Nirvāṇa (śūnyatām eva nirvāṇam)," Āryadeva declares.

In the early Buddhist scriptures the assertion that something was empty meant that it was empty of the self or anything that pertained to the self (suññam attena vā attaniyena vā). This significance of emptiness has not

disappeared in the CŚ. Emptiness and non-substantiality are related teachings. Both frighten people who do not understand them (XII.8, 13-14). The early Buddhist scriptures spoke of emptiness as being one of three doors to liberation (vimokṣamukha); Āryadeva describes non-substantiality as "the door to tranquility" (XII.13). He emphasizes again the importance of non-substantiality in XIV.25: "the seed of existence is consciousness (vijñāna); sense objects are the sphere of its activity. Were non-substantiality perceived in the sense objects, the seed of existence will cease."[24] Release from the cycle of death and rebirth comes from the analytical discernment of non-substantiality in the objects of thought and from the calming of the activity of the mind and the other sense faculties.

The Ta chih tu lun compendium on Madhyamaka philosophy notes two points of view on the defining characteristics of emptiness. Some maintain that emptiness is defined by discerning the absence of a self or anything that pertains to a self in the five aggregates. Others hold that the concentration on emptiness (śūnyatāsāmadhi) reveals the true mark of all factors of existence as being that they are completely empty (atyantaśūnya).[25] In this concentration the mind's attention near Nirvāṇa. The mind enters a state of equanimity and immobility. In this concentration, the Ta chih tu lun reports, "c'est l'absolu

(paramārtha), le bien réel (bhūtārtha), capable d'atteindre les portes du Nirvāṇa" that predominates and for this reason it is one of the doors to liberation.[26]

Emptiness for Āryadeva involves not only discerning the absence of an independent, permanent self in the five aggregates but also the knowledge that the absence of own nature is the mark of these aggregates and all other factors of existence. When asked what advantage there is in understanding emptiness, he responds that own nature is perceived in things because of conceptual construction and that the bondage of conceptual construction must be refuted (XVI.23). He states that the chapters of the CŚ were written in order to refute the erroneous views of his opponents who perceive what is empty as if it were not empty (XVI.1). While he admits that the Buddha's teachings on non-substantiality and emptiness were not proclaimed for the sake of debate, nevertheless, they destroy other positions in the same way as fire destroys fuel (XII.15).

Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva present their philosophy as a middle path between the extreme philosophical positions their opponents. In adopting a middle position, they support the middle path which the Buddha declared the way to avoid extremes in both practice and in philosophical theories. In the Dhammacakkappavattanasutta the Buddha advises his former companions is asceticism that two

extreme practices should be avoided: the extreme of sensual indulgence (kāmasukkhallika) and the extreme of self-torture (attakilamatha). The practice of sensual indulgence is vulgar and the practice of self-torture is painful; both are unprofitable, the Buddha says.[27] Āryadeva critizes both of these extreme practices. He devotes chapter III of the CŚ to the censure of sensual indulgence. Men who lust after women engage in behavior that is bestial and defiling. He has less to say about asceticism. He remarks in VI.1 that the pursuit of asceticism results in pain. Using the Jains as an example of those who practice self-torture, he condemns their practices as stupid (XII.20). Some people pity the Jains because of the pain their practices embrace, but this pursuit of pain is not the basis for good teaching, he argues (XII.21-22), since pain results from the maturation of karma.

In other discourses the Buddha speaks of the extremes as philosophical theories that should be repudiated. In the Kaccānasutta he proclaims: "That all exists, Kaccāna, this is one extreme. That all does not exist, this is the other extreme."[28] Nāgārjuna quotes this passage in MMK XV.7 and identifies the assertion 'It is' (asti) with the position of eternalism (śāśvatagrāha) and the assertion 'It is not' (nāsti) with the position of annihilationism (ucchedadarśana). In the Ratnāvalī

he defines the annihilist view (<u>nāstitādṛṣṭi</u>) as the position that an action (<u>karman</u>) has no effect; this position is demeritorious, conducive to a bad rebirth, and is censured as false (I.43). The view of existence (<u>astitādṛṣṭi</u>), on the other hand, he considers a meritorious position since it accepts the moral teaching of the Buddha on the effects of action; this position is conducive to a good rebirth and, in contrast to the annihilatist view, is seen as correct (I.44). But neither position is the middle position that leads to awakening and Nirvāṇa. The view of existence is a step in the right direction since its acceptance encourages people to reject demerit and cultivate merit. Nonetheless, Nāgārjuna points out that it is in knowledge (<u>jñāna</u>) that the calming of both views comes about; liberation transcends demerit and merit and bad and good rebirths (I.45).

Āryadeva also considers the extreme of the position of existence preferable to the extreme of non-existence. The belief that the self exists and is subject to the law of karma is better than the annihilist rejection of the self as the agent and recipient of karma and its results. Still he values the right point of view, i.e., the rejection of a substantial, permanent self, above meritorious conduct, since the teaching of non-substantiality leads to the calm, supreme state of Nirvāṇa

(XII.11-12). Why, he asks (XII.17), should anyone who knows that non-substantiality is the truth (tattva) delight in existence or fear non-existence?

Existence and non-existence are two of the opposed concepts that Āryadeva perceives as extreme views. He considers the philosophical positions of the Sāṃkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas as examples of these extremes. He criticizes both the Sāṃkhya position that the effect is pre-existent in the cause and the Vaiśeṣika position that the effect is non-existent in the cause in XI.15: "The adornment of pillars, etc., for a house is useless for someone who holds that the effect is pre-existent and for someone who holds that the effect is non-existent."[29] He suggests that if the effect already exists, then the adornment of the house with pillars is unnecessary, since the house (=cause) should already possess the pillars (=effect). On the other hand, if the effect is non-existent, then an existent house will never possess the pillars, since a relationship between dissimilar things is impossible.

He argues also (XV.2) that "the effect destroys the cause; for this reason the non-existent does not arise. There is no establishment of something that is established, for this reason the existent also does not arise."[30] The Vaiśeṣika claims that from the destruction of one thing another arises. For example, when the milk is destroyed,

curd arises. Āryadeva counters that if the effect destroys the cause, then how will this cause produce an effect? But if some thing already exists, then it is absurd to claim that it is produced as an effect. According to the Sāṃkhya position, not only must the effect exist in the cause, since some thing that is non-existent cannot arise, but the effect must be identical in nature with the cause, which transforms itself and thus produces the effect. For example, the transformation of milk produces the curds. Āryadeva denies (XV.4) that a thing either arises from something that is identical in nature with itself or that a thing arises from something that is different in nature from itself. He repudiates both of these theories on causation in XV.14:

> An existent thing does not arise from an existent thing. An existent thing does not arise from a non-existent thing. A non-existent thing does not arise from a non-existent thing. A non-existent thing does not arise from an existent thing.[31]

He rejects also these opponents' position that causes are permanent. Given the supposition that a cause and its effect must be similar, a permanent cause should produce a permanent effect. However, experience shows that things which are produced are not permanent. The effects are impermanent and if cause and effect are similar, the cause also should be impermanent, he suggests

(IX.3,11). He questions the Vaiśeṣika theory on the production of impermanent things from permanent atoms, since cause and effect do not share similar characteristics; for example, the cause's spherical demension is not seen in the effect (IX.13).

Āryadeva argues from the evidence provided by ordinary experience. From his experience of observing the progress of a sprout's growth from a seed, he infers that other created, impermanent things develop along the same lines. "In the same way as a created seed produces a created sprout," he says (X.24), "all impermanent things arise from other impermanent things."[32] He concludes that an impermanent effect never arises from a permanent cause because of the mutual incompatibility of the attributes 'permanent' and 'impermanent'. Nonetheless, one should not equate impermanence with annihilation. Once again using everyday experience as the basis for his argument, he asks an opponent: "If what is impermanent were annihilated, then how could grass, etc., still exists."[33] His observation of things that are present in the world demonstrates that both the extreme position of eternalism and the extreme position of annihilationism are incorrect. "Since a thing continues, consequently annihilation (uccheda) does not occur; since a thing ceases, the eternal (nitya) does not occur,"[34] he concludes in the final verse of chapter ten. Candrakīrti explains

(CŚṬ D ff.170b-171a, P ff.191b-192a) that since a sprout continues to develop from a seed, the seed therefore is not annihilated; the seed is annihilated only if fire completely destroys it. But since the seed ceases to exist unchanged after the sprout has begun to develop from it, the seed therefore cannot be permanent.

Āryadeva's conception of change is related to his views on causation. "A cause, while undergoing change, becomes the cause of something else," he asserts (IX.9); "whatever undergoes change is not permanent."[35] The Vaiśeṣikas speak of time has a permanent substance that is inferred as the cause of the concepts of priority and posteriority. Moreover, things that change and pass through successive states and modifications are supposed to be directly connected with time. Time is inferred as the cause of change, such as the physical changes the body undergoes in the process of aging.[36] Āryadeva maintains that it is incorrect for the Vaiśeṣikas to consider something that is permanent as a cause, since the cause changes in the course of producing an effect.

He criticizes also the Ābhidharmikas' views on the existence of past, present, and future time. He argues that the concept 'future time' depends upon the related concepts of 'past time' and 'present time'; consequently 'future time' has no independent reality and therefore

does not exist (XI.1-3). He applies the same reasoning to the supposed existence of 'past time' and 'present time'. Since these three times do not exist, they play no role in the production of any thing (XV.9). He sets forth a similar argument against the three marks, 'origination', 'duration', and 'cessation', which his Ābhidharmika opponents assert are the marks that characterize all conditioned factors of existence. "Origination, duration, and cessation do not come into existence at the same time," he argues in XV.11, "nor do they come into existence sequentially."[37] Because the marks 'origination', 'duration', and 'cessation' are mutually incompatible, they cannot come into existence at the same time; neither can they come into existence in a series, since the existence of each mark is dependent upon the existence of the other two.

Āryadeva uses this incompatibility between opposed concepts to argue against the existence of a permanent self. Against the Vaiśeṣikas he argues that if the unconscious self becomes conscious through its connection with the quality of consciousness, then it must undergo change and is therefore not permanent (X.8). On the other hand, if the self is conscious by nature, as the Sāṃkhyas claim, then the eye and the other instruments (karaṇa) of cognition serve no useful purpose (X.10). And if the opponent then suggests that the self has the

potential (*śakti*) to become conscious, then he replies that since the self would be potentially conscious at one point and actually conscious at another, it must undergo change and is therefore not permanent (X.12). His opponents perceive the self as a permanent thing, he contends, because they erroneously perceive permanence where there is in fact only a continuum (*saṃtāna*) of changing states of consciousness (XIV.22).

Two other extreme views which Āryadeva criticizes are identity and difference in regard to the relation existing between a thing and its characterizing marks. He examines the relations that his opponents predicate of a pot and its visible form (*rūpa*). Visible form is twofold: shape (*saṃsthāna*) and color (*varṇa*). In XIII.7 he questions whether or not these two components of visible form are themselves identical or different in nature: "If the shape is different from the color, then how is it apprehended? But if it is not different, then wouldn't the body also apprehend color?"[38] If color and shape were different, then the eye should apprehend the shape independently of the color, but it does not. Yet another sense faculty, touch, can apprehend shape but not color. Consequently these two components of visible form are neither different nor identical. He draws the same conclusion when considering the various relations that might exist between visible form and a pot in XIV.2:

> That there is identity (aikya), viz., the color (rūpa) itself being the pot is not so; nor is the pot that possesses the color different [from the color]. The color does not exist in the pot and the pot does not exist in the color.[39]

He rejects first the possibility of identity between the pot and its color. If the two were identical, Candrakīrti points out (HPS p.504, CŚṬ D f.209b, P f.237a) then if one is destroyed, the other also will be destroyed. This results in the absurd consequence (prasaṅga) that when the dark color of a pot is destroyed in the firing process, the pot also will be destroyed. On the other hand, if the pot is different from its color, then it should be perceived independently of its color, which is contrary to experience. Finally, since the pot and its color cannot be established independently of each other, the relation of locus-located (adharādheya) does not apply, for if two things are not clearly differentiated from one another, then it is impossible to determine that either one is located in the other.

The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that a pot is the locus for qualities, such as color, and that the pot as a whole is different from its parts, the various qualities. Āryadeva argues that because the substance pot and its qualities, color, etc. are different, there is no real connection between them (XIV.4). He rejects also the Vaibhāṣika position that the whole and its parts are identical, for

if the pot and its color, etc., are inseparable, then it cannot be determined whether or not one is identical with the other(s) (XIV.7). Āryadeva's own view is that the pot and its visible form cannot exist independently of one another; both are interrelated in the same way as the derived form (bhautika) is dependent for its existence upon the four great elements (bhūta) (XIV.15).

Things, such as the pot, come into existence in dependence upon a combination of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī); and if this combination of causes and conditions is perceived in the wrong way, then one might suppose that a thing exists independently (XIV.22). In fact there is never any existent thing that is not dependent in some way upon something else (IX.2, XIV.1). Āryadeva concludes (XIV.23): "Whatever has arisen in dependence is not independent (svatantra). This all lacks independent reality; consequently self- [nature] does not exist."[40] For something to have a nature of its own and to exist independently by itself it must be unconnected with anything else (X.21).

Āryadeva accepts the early Buddhist position that all things arise in interdependence. However, he interprets the fact of their interdependent origination to signify that these things also lack a nature of their own (niḥsvabhāva). The characterization of these things as lacking independent nature of their own expresses also

the fact that these things are empty. Emptiness, according to Āryadeva (VIII.16) is the mark that should be perceived in all things.

The tenets of interdependent origination and emptiness form a middle path between the extreme positions of existence/non-existence, eternalism/annihilationism, and identity/difference. Āryadeva avoids one set of extremes by accepting interdependent origination. Things existing in the world, observed from the perspective of conventional truth, arise and cease; one thing is related to another by an interdependent series of causes and conditions. He avoids the second set of extremes by accepting emptiness, a fact that relates to ultimate truth. These interdependent things are neither eternal nor ultimately existent; they are constructed by the dichotomizing operation of the mind and are ultimately non-dual.[41]

Knowledge of emptiness is the proper means for cancelling out all extreme positions, thus breaking the bondage of ignorance. Yet the Mādhyamikas do not consider emptiness to be an additional philosophical position that somehow mediates between the extremes. In the opening verse of the last chapter of the CŚ, Āryadeva states that his intention in composing the work is the refutation of all his opponents' wrong views, which have in common the error of perceiving things that are empty

as if they were not empty. The right view is the perception of these things as being characterized as non-substantial and empty. Nevertheless, the fact that things are rightly understood as being empty is not a thesis (pratijñā) that Āryadeva advances in debating his opponents. In fact there is no 'empty thing'; the terms 'empty' and 'non-empty' are a pair of interdependent concepts. "How would the empty arise without the non-empty;" he asks in XIV.7; "without the other how would [its] opposite (pratipakṣa) arise?"[42] Nāgārjuna underscores the same point in MMK XIII.7 and goes on in the next verse to quote a passage from the Ratnakūṭasūtra:

> The Victorious Ones have proclaimed that emptiness is that which gets rid of (nihsarana) all speculative views. But they call incurable (asādhya) those who hold emptiness as a speculative view.[43]

Emptiness is not a speculative view or a thesis that could be counteracted by an opposing thesis, but a therapeutic philosophy that functions as a potent antidote to the ill effects of all speculative views.

Āryadeva's rejection of his opponents' theses does not imply his acceptance of an opposing thesis. He looks upon each of the four theses of the catuṣkoṭi as potential medicine to cure the afflictions brought about by attachment to wrong views. He notes that each of the four alternative positions of the catuṣkoṭi, viz., (1) x exists, (2) x does not exist, (3) x both exists and does

not exist, and (4) x neither exists nor does not exist, is taught by the Buddha and asks: "Doesn't each one become what is called medicine according to the illness?"[44] Candrakīrti's commentary on this verse emphasizes both the progressive and the individualized character of the Buddha's teaching. First the Buddha taught some disciples that things existed in order to counteract the error of the nihilist position. The Buddha taught other disciples that things do not exist as a means of helping them to eliminate their conceptual attachment to things. To remove attachment to both views he taught that things both exist and do not exist. Finally, Candrakīrti explains (HPS p.478, ĆṬ D f.141b, P f.158b), the Buddha taught disciples that things neither exist nor do not exist in order to destroy all conceptual proliferation (prapañca).

Āryadeva makes the point that each of these four positions is an antidote for an opposing position, but after each position's therapeutic function has been completed, the position should be rejected. Because the last of these four positions opposes the development of all discursive thought, it brings the disciple closer to the realization of ultimate truth than any of the preceeding three. However, Āryadeva considers this position also as a mere expedient device (upāya) that is to be abandoned when its purpose in leading sentient beings towards enlightenment is accomplished.

The adoption of any of the four positions of the catuṣkoṭi might prove a fruitful strategy in combating the wrong views of an opponent. In arguing against opponents, Āryadeva accepts the evidence provided by perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). That some thesis is incompatible with the evidence of ordinary perception is grounds for its rejection. He rejects the annihilationist position, for example, because perception demonstrates the continual renewal of created things such as grass. But in rejecting another opponent's position that sense objects, e.g., a pot, are real on the grounds that they are perceived, he argues that they are not perceived and concludes (XIII.5) that "it is not logically possible to establish the thing to be established (sādhya) by means of [something else] that is to be established."[45] Since the reason, the fact of being perceived, must itself be established, on logical grounds Āryadeva rejects the opponent's argument. When arguing against the positions of fellow Buddhists, Āryadeva employs the scriptural authority (āgama) of Buddhist texts to establish that their views are inconsistent with the Buddha's own statements. The testimony of all three of these valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) operates only on the level of conventional truth.

Āryadeva employs also the reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga) method of argumentation to expose the absurd

consequence that would ensue if the opponent's position is carried out to its logical conclusion. He does not advance an independent argument but uses the same line of reasoning employed by the opponent to reject his thesis. For example, in rejecting the eternalist position on the self, he argues that if the opponent claims that the inner self is eternal because it bears the impression of a previous life, then by this same line of reasoning the body, the outer self, should be eternal because it bears the impression of a previous scar. That conclusion is clearly absurd and unacceptable to the opponent.

He concludes the CŚ with the observation that no criticism can succeed against someone who does not advance any thesis. "Even after a long period of time, one cannot criticize someone for whom there are no theses, viz., 'existing', 'non-existing', 'both existing and non-existing'," he says.[46] He admits that people are partial to their own positions but he advises against this partiality; a wise person accepts what is best even from opponents (XII.24-25). He counsels his opponent: "You are partial to your own position and dislike someone else's position. You will not attain Nirvāṇa while there is no rest from quarreling!" Āryadeva urges others to repudiate the divisiveness of sectarian disputes, since the calm of Nirvāṇa eludes those who suffer under the afflictions

of attachment and aversion. Nāgārjuna shares this point of view and in the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā (vv.46-59) associates the rise of the afflictions with dogmatic disputes (vivāda); the wise who avoid the positing of any thesis understand that the objects of dispute are illusory and thus attain Nirvāṇa.[47] The ultimate triumph over the bondage of cyclic existence is a far more worthy goal than the temporary pleasure acquired from defeating one's opponents in debate.

The Mādhyamikas use logic and the techniques of argumentation to expose the limitations of their opponents' theories. Their critique of other philosophical positions is intended to demonstrate the inability of language to express ultimate truth, not to supplant one thesis by another.

CHAPTER V

NOTES

[1]CŚ VIII.19: *nānyayā bhāṣayā mlecchaḥ śakyo grāhayituṃ yathā / na laukikam ṛte lokaḥ śakyo grāhayituṃ tathā* //

[2]CŚ VIII.8: *laukikī deśanā yatra pravṛttis tatra varṇyate* / *paramārthakathā yatra nivṛttis tatra varṇyate* //

[3]CŚ XII.9: *ekāntenaiva bālānāṃ dharme 'bhyāsaḥ pravartake* / *dharmān nivartakat teṣāṃ anabhyāsatayā bhayam* //

[4]CŚ VIII.9cd: *tasmād adhyātmacintāyāṃ kāryā nityaṃ matir budhaiḥ* //

[5]Richard F. Gombrich, "Ancient Indian Cosmology" in *Ancient Cosmologies*, ed. Carmen Blacker and Michael Loewe (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1975), pp. 110-142.

[6]Robert M. Gimello, "Mysticism and Meditation" in *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Stephen T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 181.

[7]Ibid., pp. 181-182.

[8] Lamotte, *Traité*, II, pp. 1023-1032.

[9] Gimello "Mysticism and Meditation," p.181.

[10]The title of chapter sixteen also lacks the term '*bhāvanā*' but it is included in the chapter title of CŚṬ.

11 CŚ IX.5: *ākāśādīni kalpyante nityānīti pṛthagjanaiḥ* / *laukikenāpi teṣv arthān na paśyanti vicakṣaṇaḥ* //

12 CŚ XIII.25: *ālatacakranirmāṇasvapnamāyāmbhucandrakaiḥ* / *dhūmikāntaḥpratiśrukāmarīcyabhraiḥ samo bhavaḥ* //

13 CŚ VII.24: *jagad yantrasamūhābham māyāpuruṣasannibham* / *ye paśyaṃs te vyaktaraṃ gacchanti padam uttamam* //

14 See *Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācharya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārtha commentary of Ācharya Yaśomitra*, III, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Bauddha Bharati Series 7 (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1972), pp.889-890. Hereafter abbreviated AK and AKV. See also Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, IV, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques XVI (Brussels: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1971), p.140. La Vallée Poussin is abbreviated hereafter as LVP and *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* as *Kośa*.

15 CŚ XVI.24ab: *gcig yod gcig med ces bya ba* // *de nyid min 'jig rten pa'ang min*

16 MMK XXIV.10: *vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate* / *paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇam nādhigamyate* //

17 CŚ VIII.9: *kim kariṣyāmy asat sarvam iti te jāyate bhayam* / *vidyate yadi kartavyam nāyam dharmo nivartakaḥ* //

[18]CŚ X.20: gal te bdag ces bya yod na //
bdag med snyam pa mi rigs shing //
de nyid rig pa nges pa las //
mya ngan 'das gyur zhes bya'ang brdzun //

[19]CŚ IX.20: 'cing dang bcings dang thabs las gzhan //
thar pa gal te yod na ni //
de las ci yang mi skye ste //
des na de thar shes mi brjod //

[20]CŚ IX.21: mya ngan 'das la phung po rnams //
yod min gang zag srid ma yin //
gang du mya ngan 'das gyur pa //
ma mthong der myang 'das gang zhig //

[21]MMK XVI.10ab: na nirvāṇasamāropo na saṃsārapakarṣaṇam /

[22]CŚ VIII.16cd: ekasya śūnyatā yaiva saiva sarvasya śūnyatā //

[23]See Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School, pp.44-45.

[24]CŚ XIV.25: srid pa'i sa bon rnam shes te /
yul rnams de yi spyod yul lo //
yul la bdag med mthong na ni //
srid pa'i sa bon 'gag par 'gyur //

[25]Lamotte, Traité, I, pp. 322-323.

[26]Ibid., p. 323.

[27]Saṃyutta, V, p. 420ff.

[28]Saṃyutta, III, p. 135.

[29]CŚ XI.15: stambhādīnām alaṃkāro gṛhasyārthe nirarthakaḥ /
satkāryam eva yasyeṣṭaṃ yasyāsatkāryam eva ca //

[30] CŚ XV.2: 'bras bu yis ni rgyu bshig pa //
des na med pa skye mi 'gyur //
grub pa las sgrub yod ma yin //
de phyir yod pa'ang mi skye'o //

[31] CŚ XV.14: na bhavāj jāyate bhāvo bhāvo 'bhāvān na jāyate /
nabhavāj jāyate 'bhāvo 'bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate //

[32] CŚ X.24: ji ltar sa bon byas pa las //
myu gu byas pa skye 'gyur ba //
de bzhin mi rtag thams cad ni //
mi rtag dag las 'byung bar 'gyur //

[33] CŚ X.22ab: gal te mi rtag chad na ni //
da dung rtswa sogs ci ste yod //

[34] CŚ X.25: yasmāt pravartate bhāvas tenocchedo na jāyate /
yasmān nivartate bhāvas teno nityo na jāyate //

[35] CŚ IX.9 rgyu ni rnam par 'gyur ba na //
gzhan gyi rgyu ru 'gyur ba ste //
gang la rnam par 'gyur yod pa //
de ni rtag ces byar yod min //

[36] Sanananda Bhaduri, Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1975), pp. 189-190.

[37] CŚ XV.11: utpādasthitibhaṅgānām yugapan nāsti sambhavaḥ /
kramaśaḥ sambhavo nāsti sambhavo vidyate kadā //

[38] CŚ XIII.7: gal te mdog las dbyibs gzhan na //
ji ltar bur na dbyibs 'dzin 'gyur //
'on te gzhan min na lus kyis //
mdog kyang ci ste 'dzin mi 'gyur //

[39]CŚ XIV.2: rūpam eva ghaṭo naikyaṃ ghaṭo nānyo
'sti rūpavān / na vidyate ghaṭe rūpaṃ na
rūpe vidyate ghaṭaḥ //

[40]CŚ XIV.23: gang la brten nas 'gyung yod pa //
de na rang dbang mi 'gyur ro //
'di kun rang dbang med pa ste //
des na bdag ni yod ma yin //

[41]See Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School, pp.16-17, 44-45.

[42]CŚ XVI.7: mi stong med par stong pa ni //
gang las byung ba nyid du 'gyur //
ji lta bur na cig shos ni //
med par gnyen po 'byung bar 'gyur //

[43]MMK XIII.8: śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ
jinaiḥ / yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān
babhāṣire //

[44]CŚ VIII.20: sad asat sadasac ceti nobhayaṃ ceti kathyate /
nanu vyādhivaśāt sarvam auṣadhaṃ nāma jāyate //

[45]CŚ XIII.5cd: de phyir bsgrub par bya yis //
bsgrub bya 'grub par mi thad do //

Kamaleswar Bhattacarya, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978) discusses this verse pp.22-23 n.3.

[46]CŚ XVI.25: sad asat sadasac ceti yasya pakṣo na
vidyate / upālambhaś cireṇāpi tasya
vaktuṃ na śakyate //

[47] This same advice against disputation occurs in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* section of the *Suttanipāta*. Cf. vv.796, 824-825, 832-834. For additional references see Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana*, p.115 n.50.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The quotation of verses by Āryadeva in the works of later Mādhyamikas that cannot be accounted for in his surviving treatises suggests that some of his contributions to the development of the Mahayana tradition are now lost. Despite this loss, the CŚ has survived largely because of translations into Chinese and Tibetan. It remains an important work on Mādhyamika thought. This text and the ŚŚ, translated respectively by Nyi ma grags and Kumārajīva, introduced the ideas of Āryadeva to an audience beyond the boundaries of India. These two texts formed a major part of the curriculum of Mādhyamika studies developed by Nyi ma grags and Kumārajīva for their students.

Neither the place nor the date of the composition of the CŚ can be determined with precision. However, both the accounts of Āryadeva's life and internal evidence from the themes addressed in the CŚ suggest that he flourished circa the second to third centuries C.E. in the Andhra region. The Āndhra Mahāsāṅghikas seem to have composed early versions of the Prajñāpāramitā and Ratnakūṭa sūtras; the ideas presented in these sūtras on the transcendent nature of the Buddha, the career of the Bodhisattva, the non-substantial and empty nature of both persons and factors of existence, and the two levels of truth may well have influenced the composition of the treatises of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.

The limited information we have on the various Mahāsāṅghika groups in the Andhra region in the _Kathāvatthu_ and its commentary depicts these groups as holding views that may have influenced Āryadeva. For example, the controversy in the _Kathāvatthu_, discussed at greater length in the _Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā_ XIII.4 (p.163), over the Pubbaseliyas' and Aparaseliyas' ascription of 'certainty' (_niyāma_) to the Bodhisattva may have been familiar to Āryadeva. These Mahāsāṅghikas maintain that the Bodhisattva's accumulation of merit renders him capable of understanding the truth in his last birth and makes his attainment of Nirvāṇa certain. Āryadeva in X.20 speaks of someone who knows the truth as attaining Nirvāṇa because of 'certainty' (_niyāmāt_); in VIII.22 he states that someone who knows the truth assuredly will attain Nirvāṇa in the next birth, if not in the present one, in accordance with the results of meritorious karma.

The CŚ is concerned with demonstrating how a Bodhisattva can accumulate the equipment of merit and knowledge (_puṇyasambhāra_, _jñānasambhāra_) required for Buddhahood. The first eight chapters encourage people to renounce the lay life and enter the religious life, to follow the path prepared by the Buddha. These chapters stress the benefits of such meritorious actions as generosity (_dāna_), moral conduct (_śīla_), and patience (_kṣānti_). These three

are virtues that, according to the Mahāyāna literature on the path, a Bodhisattva must perfect. Meditation on death, on the truth of suffering, and on the impurity of the body are among the meritorious practices recommended in the CŚ. A skilled teacher prescribes appropriate meditational practices and helps heal the afflictions of lust, hatred, and confusion that impede progress on the path. Chapter five describes the Bodhisattva's role as a healer of these afflictions and as a teacher of the truth that frees sentient beings from the cycle of death and rebirth. This chapter portrays the Buddha's teachings as progressive--first concerned with merit and culminating in the knowledge of emptiness--and as adapted to the needs and capacities of the individual student.

The latter eight chapters of the CŚ critically analyze the defects of the philosophical systems of Āryadeva's opponents, both Ābhidharmikas and advocates of Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika. His arguments are intended to establish his opponents' theories as logically inconsistent or as incompatible with everyday experience. He characterizes their views as representative of the extreme views of eternalism and annihilationism.

Like his teacher Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva considers the teachings of interdependent origination and emptiness to constitute a philosophical middle path. He sanctions the use of any of the other alternatives of the _catuṣkoṭi_

in debate; each can be an expedient device (upāya) for attacking wrong views. The Mādhyamikas, however, support none of these four alternative positions. They overcome the negative effects of attachment or aversion to speculative views. Through an understanding of emptiness, considered to be of therapeutic value, as it is the Ratnakūṭa sūtra and MMK XIII.8.

Āryadeva's work clearly shows the influence of Nāgārjuna. Much of what he says in the CŚ parallels Nāgārjuna's epistles, the Ratnāvalī and the Suhṛllekha, and his logical works, especially the MMK, VV, YṢ and ŚS. Āryadeva defends the Madhyamaka philosophy against its detractors; both the biographical accounts and his surviving treatises attest to Āryadeva's skill in debate.

The conservative nature of Āryadeva's philosophy is shown not only in his reliance upon Nāgārjuna's works, but also in his quotations and references to the texts of the Nikāyas of early Buddhism. There are numerous parallels also the verses of the Dhammapada and Udānavarga collections. Āryadeva sums up the Buddha's teachings in XII.23: good practice (dharma) is exemplified by non-harming (ahiṃsa) and other meritorious actions that lead to a good rebirth and emptiness is the right view that leads to Nirvāṇa. As a guide for aspirants for enlightenment, the CŚ prepared the way for later manuals on Bodhisattva practice, such as Śantideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra.

PART TWO: TRANSLATION OF THE CATUḤŚATAKA

CHAPTER I

SHOWING THE METHOD FOR ABANDONING BELIEF IN PERMANENCE

Āryadeva in the first chapter of the CŚ is concerned with the first of the four errors (viparyāsa) which plague ordinary people, namely, the mistaken belief that things which are in fact impermanent (anitya) are permanent (nitya). Impermanence ranks first among the three marks (lakṣaṇa) that characterize all things which come into being, for from the notion that things which arise must also cease follow the related notions of things as being painful (duḥkha and insubstantial (anātman), the topics which Āryadeva investigates in the following chapters of the CŚ. Here he uses the individual as an example of something that inevitably will cease. Oneself, one's children, and one's relatives are all subject to death.

In the first verse, Āryadeva draws attention to the presence and power of the Lord of Death:[1]

> 1. Were one for whom there exists the Lord of Death himself, the ruler of the three worlds,[2] who act independently, to sleep relaxedly, what else could be more wrong than that?

Neither the Buddha, who has triumphed over Māra, nor those people who follow his noble path fear death. However, fear

of the Lord of Death's power is appropriate for someone who remains attached to worldly things and thus fails to escape the bonds of the three realms. Instead of the unconcerned (pramāda) action of sleeping while still under the Lord of Death's control, concerned (apramāda) action should be undertaken (CŚṬ D f.32b, P f.35a-b).[3]

When someone objects that even if the Lord of Death rules the three worlds, nevertheless, there need not be any fear of death so long as life persists (CŚṬ D f.33a, P f.35a).[4] Āryadeva responds by pointing out that death predominates:

> 2. One is born in order to die and endowed
> with a nature that preceeds towards death
> under the power of another. It appears that
> death is obligatory and life is not obligatory.[5]

Because of birth, the conditions of illness and old age occur, and they lead moment by moment in the direction of death (CŚṬ D f.33b, P f.36a-b).[6]

The opponent tries a different line of argument. The human life span is one hundred years. If sixteen years pass by, eighty four years will remain in the future. Thus, someone may enjoy the delights of sensual pleasures for a short time and later still have the time to try to ward off the Lord of Death. Therefore because long lifespans are observed, it is appropriate to hope for long life (CŚṬ D f.34a, P ff.36b-37a). Āryadeva replies:

> 3. You see the past as short and the future differently. You consider equals as if unequal;[7] that is clearly analogous to a cry of fear.

Long and short are mutually related terms. Because there is no certainty about the length of any given individual's lifespan, it is impossible to determine whether the time that has passed up to this point is short or long since this determination is dependent upon whether or not the time yet to pass is short or long. Consequently, because neither past nor future can be judged long or short with respect to one another, they should be seen as equals. To consider the time that has passed as being short and the time that has yet to pass as being long indicates a fear of death (CŚṬ D f.34a, P f.37a).

The opponent concedes that it is wrong to expect the future to be long, but argues that since death is something that all people have in common, fear does not arise (CŚṬ D f.34b, P f.37b). Āryadeva replies:

> 4. Because it is common to others also, you have no fear of death. Does that which has harmed someone produce pain through envy?

The expected answer to this question is no. Envy may produce pain, but the pain that is produced by death is not due to envy. It is the very nature of death to cause pain; consequently, fear of death is proper (CŚṬ D f.35a, P ff. 37b-38a).

Since medicines and life-prolonging elixirs counteract the pain of illness and old age, the opponent argues, one need not fear death (CṢ́T D f.35a, P f.38a). Āryadeva counters that death is not the final disease to be cured:

5. Illness can be cured; old age can be treated. Consequently you may not fear them. Because there is no cure for the final punishment,[8] clearly you fear it more!

While people cannot avoid death the opponent agrees, nonetheless, since the certainty of death has not yet been experienced directly, there is no reason to fear it (CṢ́T D f.36a, P ff.38b-39a). Āryadeva reminds his opponent that death is not exclusively a private event. People do experience the deaths of other sentient beings:

6. Like cattle about to be slaughtered, death is common to all.[9] Moreover, when you see death, why do you not fear the Lord of Death?

The opponent admits that death may be a public event, but claims that since the time of one's own death is uncertain, there is no fear (CST D f.26b, P f.39a-b). Āryadeva warns:

7. Although you think "I am eternal" because the time is not certain, at some time the Lord of Death will harm you.[10]

Only cowards fear death, the opponent retorts, not heroes. Heroes seek fame and fortune, unafraid of death in battle (CŚṬ D f.36b, P f.39b).[11] Āryadeva's response questions the intelligence of someone who would trade life for future advantages, trying to achieve immortality through such actions:

8. Looking towards future advantages and
not towards a diminished life, one sells
oneself [for fame and fortune]. What wise
person call this compassionate?[12]

The opponent argues in return that if expanding one's life in the pursuit of wealth and fame is censured, then it should be permissible to commit evil actions for the sake of preserving one's life (CŚṬ D f.37a, P f.40a). Āryadeva replies, suggesting ironically that such actions indicate, to the contrary, a detached attitude towards oneself:

9. Why, placing yourself in pawn, engage
in evil actions? Surely, like the wise,
you are completely without attachment to
yourself!

Attachment to the illusory things of this world leads people to commit evil actions, which place them in pawn, under the power of others, and subject to the severe suffering of the hells in the future (CŚṬ D f.37a-b, P f.40a-b).[13]

Āryadeva underscores the opponent's ignorance in the following verse:

> 10. Anyone at all called "alive" is nothing
> other than a moment of consciousness (vijñāna).[14]
> An ordinary person is certainly ignorant of
> this; consequently self-knowledge is rare.[15]

The nature of all things that come into being, such as a moment of consciousness, is to perish. The wise understand that the term "self" (ātman) is superimposed upon different moments of consciousness (CŚṬ D f.38a-b, P f.41a-b).

The opponent is willing to concede that life is momentary, but claims that since the continuum does not cease for a long time, attachment to life is still appropriate (CŚṬ D f.38b, P f.41b). Āryadeva points out the absurdity of this position by reminding his opponent that the long life which he hopes for is not possible without the unwanted consequence of aging:

> 11. You delight in long life, but you
> dislike old age. Alas! Your conduct seems
> good to a person like [you] .

After admitting that no one desires old age and death because they both cause pain, the opponent then shifts the discussion to the topic of grief. He contends that it is proper for people to mourn the death of their children (CŚṬ D f.39a, P f.42a). Āryadeva disagrees, suggesting that one's own death ought to be of greater significance

for one than the death of someone else:

> 12. Mourning your own death [is appropriate], but you mourn on account of a son, etc. How will someone who laments [another's death], himself the object of [the Lord of Death's] threat, not be criticized?[16]

The opponent insists that even though concern for one's own impending death is appropriate, grief still arises when a son dies unexpectedly (CŚṬ D f.39b, P f.42b). Āryadeva replies:

> 13. It is not wrong when someone, without being requested, has become [your] son voluntarily; then, without asking [your permission],[17] dies.[18]

Moreover, his death should not have been unexpected, for the signs of death were present:

> 14. Because of ignorance, there was no conception of the son [showing the signs of dying].[19] Aging indicates precisely his proceeding to die.

Despite the fact that aging signifies death, the opponent argues that the father's great affection for his son causes him to grieve (CŚṬ D f.40a, P f.43a). Āryadeva emphasizes the inequality of this affection:

> 15. A son does not love [a father] in the same way as a father loves him. People sink

lower; consequently even heaven is difficult
to attain.

People succumb to lower states of rebirth (gati) because of attachment to their children. The father's great affection for his child will prevent him from attaining a higher rebirth, so that heaven--not to mention liberation--will be difficult to achieve (CŚṬ D f.40a-b, P f.43b).

Furthermore, Āryadeva doubts whether this affection extends to a disagreeable child:

16. When there is disagreement, there
is nothing called "love." Affection, then
is produced only like trade.

The opponent denies that the firm affection that a father has for his child is dependent upon the child's agreeable behavior (CŚṬ D f.40b, P f.43b). Āryadeva responds:

17. Pain that is produced by separation
is removed quickly from people's hearts.
You ought to see that affection also is not
firm, as is indicated by separation from pain.

If the bonds of affection were not lax, then the pain that affection produces would never be alleviated, which is contrary to experience (CŚṬ D f.40b, P f.44a).

The opponent admits that while it may be wrong to afflict oneself with grief over the separation from one's child, it is still necessary to mourn death in accordance

with the customs prevalent in the world (CŚṬ D f.41b, P f.44b). Āryadeva criticizes this hypocritical conduct:

> 18. Even though you have afflicted [yourself], you know that to be of no value. That [e.g., tearing one's hair as a sign of grief] is a hypocritical act for you; also that is inappropriate for you.

Although afflicting oneself as an indication of grief is of no value, the opponent concedes, because of the desire to maintain people's affection, mourning is not abandoned (CŚṬ D f.42a, P f.45a). Āryadeva replies:

> 19. As suffering increases, people revolve [in the cycle of birth and death]. What is the use of increasing suffering for a person who suffers already?

All people, reborn as a result of previous actions (<u>karman</u>) and afflictions (<u>kleśa</u>), experience the pain of birth, aging, illness, and death. Seeking to encounter friends and relatives is like pouring salt on a wound, for the eventual separation from them will increase one's suffering (CŚṬ D f.42a, P f.45a).

The opponent agrees that no one desires separation because that produces pain; yet people seek to encounter others because this is a source of pleasure (CŚṬ D f.42a-b, P f.45b). Āryadeva asks:

20. Why is the separation from those whom
one delights in encountering not pleasant?
Does it not appear that the encounter and
the separation go together?[20]

Separation is of negligible importance, the opponent argues, since friendship persists for a long time (CŚṬ D f.43a, P f.46a). Āryadeva responds:

21. The past has no beginning and the future
has no end. Why do you see the encounter and
not the separation, even though it is long?

The cycle of birth and death has neither a beginning nor an end for someone who is under the influence of ignorance. Such a person fails to recognize the while friendship is of short duration and will soon cease, the separation of friends, which was lengthy in the past, will be so again in the future (CŚṬ D f.43a, P f.46b).

Even though the separation is lengthy, the opponent says, the length of time of the separation is of little importance. The quality of the time, rather than its quantity, is what counts. For example, people take pleasure in the best times of the seasons (CŚṬ D f.43a, P f.46b).[21] Āryadeva contends that all moments of time should be seen as enemies:

22. Time, a moment, etc.,[22] certainly becomes
like an enemy. Consequently you ought never
be attached to what becomes an enemy.

The seasons gradually change with the passage of each succeeding moment of time. People's lives also are affected by the passage of time. Each moment brings one nearer to death.[23] For this reason, time should be considered as an enemy who robs people of their lives (CŚṬ D f.43b, P f.47a).

This may be true, but the opponent stresses the fact that fear of separation from one's friends and family make it difficult for someone to leave them behind and adopt instead the ways of a person who has left home to dwell in the forest (CŚṬ D f.44a, P f.47a). Āryadeva retorts that the Lord of Death will bring about this separation and condemns as a fool anyone who would wait for death to occur before embarking on the homeless life:

23. Fool! You do not leave the house from fear of separation. Surely, what wise person would do what must be done because of the Lord of Death's punishment?[24]

The opponent responds that although separation will occur, it is possible to go to the forest even after one has completed the duties of a householder (CŚṬ D f.44a, P f.47b). Āryadeva replies:

24. Although you think "I will certainly go to the forest after I have done this," what is worthwhile in having done something that ought to be rejected?

The opponent concedes that it is best to adopt the homeless life, but points out that someone who is attached to the self and what belongs to the self (ātmīya) is afraid of taking such an action (CŚṬ D f.44a, P f.48a).[25] Āryadeva concludes this chapter with the observation that fear to the self through a reflection on mortality:

> 25. Surely, where is there fear, even of
> the Lord of Death, for someone who reflects
> "I am mortal," since attachment has been
> abandoned completely?[26]

Someone endowed with insight (prajñā) understands that the self will die. When attachment to life is abandoned, how can there be any fear of death, or fear of adopting the homeless life? Therefore one should meditate on death (CŚṬ D ff.44b-45a, P ff.48b-49a).[27]

CHAPTER I

NOTES

[1]'chi bdag. For other epithets of Yama see Alex Wayman, "Studies in Yama and Māra" in IIJ 3 (1959): 44.

[2]Candrakīrti in CŚṬ (D f.32a-b, P f.35a) provides two alternative interpretations of the three worlds: the desire (kāma), form (rūpa), and formless (arūpya) worlds, and the naga, human, and god worlds. Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.6 and rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, p.10 refer to the second alternative as "the world beneath the earth, on the surface of the earth, and above the earth" (sa 'og sa steng sa bla 'am).

[3]See the Buddha's response to Māra, who rebuked him for sleeping. Saṃyutta, I, p.107: Yassa jālinī visattikā // taṇhā n-atthi kuhiñci netave // sabbūpadhinam parikkhayā budho // soppati kin-tavettha Mārā ti // "He whom desire with nets and poison does not lead, who has exhausted all attachments , who has awakened , sleeps--what, Māra, is there for you here?"
Cf. Dhammapada v.180.

For those who have not yet escaped Māra's control, Candrakīrti, CŚṬ D f.33a, P f.36a, and mDo sngags, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i tshig don rnam par bshad pa klu dbang dgongs rgyan, p.12 cite Suhṛllekha 13 ab:

bag yod bdud rtsi'i gnas te bag med pa //

'chi ba'i gnas su thub pas bka' stsal te //

"The Sage has said, 'Concern is the ground of immortality; unconcern is the ground of death.'"
Cf. Udānavarga IV.1, Dhammapada v.21, and Gāndhārī Dhammapada v.115.

rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, p.11 urges the concerned practice of meditation on impermanence: mi rtag pa yang dang yang du bsgoms nas 'dal 'byor gyi rten la snying po len la 'bad par bya'o // "Meditating again and again on impermanence, one should endeavor to take it to heart as the basis for favorable conditions for rebirth."

[4]Cf. gZhan dga', dBu ma bzhi brgya pa mchan 'grel, f.3a: 'jig rten gsum kyi mnga' bdag 'chi ba de yod mod kyi / de bas ches sngar de zlog par byed pa gson pa yod pas de'i bar du 'chi bdag la mi 'jigs te skyes pa tsam la 'chi ba mi srid pa'i phyir ro // "Death may be master of the three worlds, but life, which drives it away, exists much earlier than that. In the meantime, death is not feared because death is impossible while one is still alive."

[5]See Saṃyutta, I, p.97: sabbe sattā marissanti // maraṇantaṃ hi jīvitaṃ // "All sentient beings will die, for life ends in death." Cf. Udānavarga I.22d, 23d, 34d, and Dhammapada v.148.

[6]Cf. Udānavarga I.17, Dhammapada v.135, and Gāndhārī Dhammapada v.148

[7]Or "Whether you consider them equal or unequal." See Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.9 and rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, p.14: de bas na khyod 'das pa dang ma 'ongs pa'i tshe ring thung mnyam pa'am / 'on te 'das pa thung zhing ma 'ongs pa ring bas mi mnyam pa ltar sems pa de ni gsal bar 'chi bas 'jigs par ston pa kho na yin te / "Therefore whether you consider the time that has passed and the time that has yet to come as equally long or short or whether you consider them as unequal, the time that has passed as short and the time that has yet to come as long, that clearly indicates a fear of death."

[8]See Suttanipāta v.575:

> na hi upakkam atthi yena jātā na miyyare /
> jaram pi patvā maraṇaṃ evaṃdhammā hi pāṇino //

"There is no means by which what is born does not die. Even while one ages, death must be reached; such is the norm for living beings."

[9]See Aṅguttara, IV, p.138: Seyyathāpi brāhmaṇa gāvī vajjhā āghātanaṃ nīyamānā yañ ñad eva pādam uddharati santike'va hoti vadhassa santike'vamaraṇasssa, evam eva kho brāhmaṇa govajjhūpamaṃ jīvitaṃ manussānaṃ.

"Brāhmaṇa, just as a cow about to be slaughtered, being led to the slaughterhouse, is closer to slaughter, closer

death, each time she raises a food, so also, Brāhamaṇa, is the life of human beings like a cow about to be slaughtered." Cf. Suttanipāta, v.580.

[10]See Saṃyutta, V. p.217: Yo pi vassasataṃ jīve so pi maccuparāyaṇo. "Even though someone might live for one hundred years, he ends in death." Cf. Gāndhārī Dhammapada v.141, and Suttanipāta v.804.

[11]Cf. Bhagavad Gīta II.31-37 in which Kṛṣṇa tries to persuade a reluctant Arjuna to fight by appealing to his sense of royal duty and honor. He concludes his plea by noting that the good fortune of paradise awaits those who die in battle and that the spoils of the earth accrue to those who live on after victory. Compare the advice to Bodhisattvas in Kāśyapaparivarta 15: lābhasatkārārthiko bhavati na dharmārthikaḥ kīrtiśabdaślokārthiko bhavati na guṇārthikaḥ. "One who strives for profit and honor does not strive for the Dharma. One who strives for renown, title, or fame does not strive for good qualities." On this latter point, see also Aṣṭasāhaśrikā Prajñāpāramitā, XVII, p.332.

[12]Or, following the variant reading rnam dpyod ldan zhes su zhig smra in the Cone and sDe dge editions of the CŚ, "What person would call this intelligent?" The sNar thang and Peking editions may have preserved the reading of the earlier Tibetan redactions of the CŚ and CŚṬ, for rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po,

p.16: acknowledges that the version of the CŚṬ available to him has the reading byams ldan, but he prefers the reading dpyod ldan: byams ldan zhes 'don pa 'grel pa'i don min no / "The commentary reads 'byams ldan', but it is not the sense of the commentary." Later redactors of the CŚ may have emended the text to read dpyod ldan. The other Tibetan commentators, Red mda' ba, gZhan dga', and mDo sngags also cite the reading dpyod ldan in their commentaries.

[13]See Ratnāvalī, II.44

[14]See Mahāniddesa v.42:

> jīvitaṃ attabhava ca sukhadukkhā ca kevalā /
> ekacittasamāyuttā lahuso vattate khaṇo //

"Life, a person, pleasure, and pain alone unite in one conscious moment that quickly passes on."

[15]Cf. Mdo sngags, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i tshig don rnam par bshad pa klu dbang dgongs rgyan, p.18: sems can su la'ang gson pa zhes bya ba ni phra ba sems kyi skad cig ma gcig tsam las rtag pa zhes bya ba gzhan ci yang med mod kyi / 'on kyang so so'i skye bo'i rjes dpag gis de ma nges shing mngon sum du mi rig pa des na rtag par phyin ci log tu rtog pa las ji ltar mi rtag pa'i bdag nyid du shes pa dkon par snang ngo // "Any sentient being called 'alive' is indeed not something other than a mere single moment of subtle consciousness called 'permanent.' However, this is not ascertained through an ordinary person's

inference, and it is not known in direct perception. Therefore, it appears that knowledge of the self as being impermanent is rare because of the misconception that it is permanent."

[16]Cf. the *Piyajātikasutta*, *Majjhima*, II, p.106.

[17]See rGyal tshab, *bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po*, p.22: *pha rol tu 'gro'o zhes pha la dri pa ma byas*..."Without having asked the father 'May I go to the next world?'"

[18]Cf. *Suttanipāta* vv.578-579:

daharā ca mahantā ca ye bālā ye paṇḍitā /
sabbe maccuvasaṃ yanti sabbe maccuparāyanā //
tesaṃ maccuparetānaṃ gacchataṃ paralokato /
na pitā tāyate puttaṃ ñātī vā pana ñātake //

"The young and the old, the foolish and the wise, all proceed under the power of death, all end in death." "When overcome by death, they proceed to the next world, a father cannot save a son, nor a relative save a relation." See also *Therīgāthā* vv.127-129

[19]See rGyal tshab, *bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po*, p.22: *bu yi ni pha rol tu 'gro ba'i mtshan ma bstan pa na rnam par rtog pa med par zad pa yin te* / "When the signs of the son proceeding to the next world appeared, he did not comprehend."

[20]See *Udānavarga* I.22c: *saṃyogaviprayogāntā*. "The encounter ends in death." See also *Mahāvastu*, III, pp.152, 183. Compare *Udānavarga* V.7.

[21]The best of times, according to Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.15 and rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, p.26, occur when the flowers blossom in the spring and the moon shines in autumn.

[22]On the various divisions of time and their length see Samuel Beal, Buddhist Records of the Western World, pp. 71-73.

[23]Cf. Saṃyutta, I, p.109: Nāccayanti ahorattā // jīvitaṃ n-uparujjhati // "As the days and the nights pass, so life is destroyed." Cf. also Udānavarga I.18, and Mahāniddesa, I, p.119.

[24]Cf. Suttanipāta v.804 and Udānavarga I.28.

[25]See Aṅguttara, II, pp.172-173.

[26]See the Maraṇasatisutta, Aṅguttara, III, pp.303-306. 316-319. A version of this sūtra is quoted in Lamotte, Traité, III, pp.1424-1425 and in the Satyasiddhi I, pp.452-453, II, p.428.

[27]Cf. Udānavarga XXXI. 35-38 and Dhammapada v.40.

CHAPTER II

SHOWING THE METHOD FOR ADBANDONING BELIEF IN PLEASURE

In chapter two Āryadeva discusses the second of the four errors, namely, the mistaken belief that things which are in fact painful (*duḥkha*) in nature are pleasant (*sukha*). He utilizes the body as an example of something that ordinary people suppose to be a source of pleasurable sensations, but which, when examined properly, is shown to be the source of much suffering. A thorough examination of the situations in which people imagine themselves to be happy only reveals the extent and diversity of suffering.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the body itself is rightly seen as inimical to pleasure, Āryadeva, perhaps mindful of the Buddha's counsel to avoid the two extremes of overindulging the body and tormenting it with austerities,[1] urges that proper care be taken of the body so that in the course of a long life much merit may be accumulated.[2] He says:

> 1. Although the body is perceived as an enemy,[3] even so it must be cared for. The virtuous person who lives for a long time produces much merit from it.

His attack on the body as something which can produce pleasure begins in verse two. He questions the value that people place upon the body, which is only effective in producing pain. Other things, food, drink, etc., produce pleasure. If someone should object that if the body is well cared for, attachment to it will occur, (CŚṬ D f.45b, P f.49a) Āryadeva replies:

2. When people's suffering is produced from
the body and pleasure from something else,
why do you value the body, which is the vessel
for all suffering?[4]

The opponent then claims that one need not fear suffering because pain can be mitigated. Consequently the power of suffering is weak and the power of pleasure is strong (CŚṬ D f.46a, P f.49b).[5] Āryadeva responds:

3. When pleasure does not predominate for
people, as suffering does, then do you think
that much suffering is minute?

He emphasizes in the following verse the difficulty of avoiding suffering, even when one's intention is to seek out pleasure:

4. People incline toward pleasure,[6] but
those who are happy are difficult to find.
Consequently it seems that a person in this
[condition of] destruction pursues suffering.[7]

Moreover, he asks:

5. Although suffering is acquired by desire, where is happiness acquired by desire? Why do you value what is scarce, and why do you not fear what is plentiful?

Āryadeva uses once again the analogy between the body and the enemy. Both are alike in that they cause pain:

6. A body that enjoyed pleasure becomes the vessel for suffering. Consequently these two--valuing the body and valuing an enemy--are seen to be the same.

However long the body may enjoy pleasurable sensations, its very nature is painful. Āryadeva concludes:

7. Even over a very long period of time, the body does not itself become pleasant. It is unreasonable to say that its own-nature is overcome by something else.[8]

The opponent raises another objection. Because some people, namely, the elite, are not observed to suffer, how can it be said that the body's own nature is painful (CŚṬ D f.48a-b, P f.52a)? Āryadeva replies:

8. Mental (<u>mānasa</u>) suffering arises for the elite; physical suffering arises for the common people. Everyday both types of suffering afflict this world.[9]

The opponent now argues that even if these two types of suffering exist, the power of pleasure still is able to overpower them (CŚṬ D f.49a, P f.52b). Āryadeva answers:

> 9. Pleasure is under the control of conceptual construction (kalpanā).[10] The conceptual construction [of pleasure] is under the control of suffering. Therefore there is nothing at all that has greater power then suffering.

Āryadeva's point seems to be first of all that pleasurable sensations are the result of one's own imagination. Also, he contends that the experience of pain easily cancels out the imagination of pleasurable sensations. Consequently suffering should be seen as much more powerful than any experience of pleasure (HPS p.457).

The opponent objects that even if the sensation of pleasure is weak, nevertheless, because it is not harmful to the body, it is the nature of the body and the sensation of pain is foreign to the body because it is harmful (HPS p.457). Āryadeva replies:

> 10. Suffering increases as time passes.[11] Consequently pleasure is experienced as something foreign to the body.

As one passes from childhood to old age suffering increases, while pleasures abate (HPS p.457).

The opponent is willing to concede that the body has a painful nature, but insists that since the causes for pleasure can counteract pain, it is not necessary to feel disgust for the body (HPS p.457). Āryadeva reminds his opponent that:

11. The causes for people's pleasure are not experienced to the same extent as are sickness and the other causes for suffering.[12]

The opponent responds by noting that if pleasure did not exist, it would be impossible to account for the observation of its increase (HPS p.458). Āryadeva replies:

12. There is no cessation of increasing pain in the same way as one experiences a cessation of increasing pleasure.

Moreover, he points out:

13. One experiences a cessation of pleasure along with its conditions, but there is no cessation of pain along with its conditions.

Even sensations which initially produce pleasure eventually become painful. For example, the sensation of heat is pleasurable when one is chilled, but it soon becomes painful when prolonged. In contrast, sensations which produce pain, when prolonged, only result in the intensification of pain, and not in its cessation (ĆṬ D ff.50b-51a, P ff.54b-55a).

The opponent then argues that if pleasure were non-existent, it would not be possible to say that Devadatta is happy (CŚṬ D f.51a, P f.55a). Āryadeva denies that Devadatta really experiences pleasure:

14. While you are dying, time has passed,
is passing, and will pass. It is entirely
unreasonable to say that dying is pleasant.[13]

All conditioned things bear the nature of perishing from one moment to the next, and each moment brings death closer. There is a much closer connection with death than with pleasure, consequently the expression "possessed of pleasure" is inappropriate (CŚṬ D f.51a-b, P f.55a-b). Āryadeva adds:

15. Embodied beings continually are tormented
by hunger, etc.[14] It is entirely unreasonable
to say that being tormented is pleasant.

The opponent agrees that pleasure may not exist by virtue of its own nature, but claims that it exists by virtue of the body's existence (CŚṬ D f.52a, P f.56a). Āryadeva counters:

16. While each element lacks the ability,
when they arise [together] they are called
"the body."[15] It is entirely unreasonable
to say that conflicting things are pleasant.

While pleasure and pain depend upon the body, the body itself arises from the combination of the elements, earth,

etc. However, the elements themselves are mutually incompatible. For example, water extinguishes fire, and fire dries up water. Because these elements conflict with one another, they produce pain in the body (CŚṬ D f.52a-b, P f.56a-b).

The opponent objects that even if these mutually antagonistic elements produce pain in the body, there are remedies for this suffering (CŚṬ D f.52b, P ff.56b-57a). Āryadeva answers:

> 17. A remedy for the cold, etc., is not
> permanent. It is entirely unreasonable
> to say that being destroyed is pleasant.

A person can put on clothing and by doing so put an end to the unpleasant sensation of the cold, but this countermeasure is not itself pleasure. If it were, then it would produce pleasure at all times, which is contrary to experience (CŚṬ D ff.52b-53a, P f.57a).

The opponent then suggests that since in common usage (vyavahāra) there are statements such as "Devadatta sleeps pleasantly," pleasure must exist (CŚṬ D f.53a, P f.57a). Āryadeva replies:

> 18. There is nothing on the surface of
> earth called "activity" that is without
> exertion. It is entirely unreasonable
> to say that working is pleasant.

Everyday activities, sleeping, etc., are not undertaken for pleasure, but to sustain the body. Furthermore, people who are engagers in hard work have no opportunity to experience pleasure (CŚṬ D f.53a-b, P f.57b).

Since people are willing to endure pain in order to experience pleasure, the opponent argues, pleasure must exist (CŚṬ D f.53b, P f.57b). Āryadeva points out the folly of committing evil actions for the sake of a little pleasure:

> 19. One ought to protect oneself constantly
> from evil in this world and in the next. It
> is entirely unreasonable to say that having
> a bad rebirth is pleasant.[16]

The opponent cites a situation in which people are acknowledged to experience pleasure. People find pleasure in riding after they have previously experienced the pain of walking (CŚṬ D f.54a, P ff. 57b-58a). Riding is pleasant at first, Āryadeva concedes, but that pleasure eventually changes to pain:

> 20. The pleasure that people have in riding,
> etc., is not permanent.[17] Where is there
> an increase [of suffering] in the end for
> someone who does not start in the first place?

The opponent contends that pleasure exists inasmuch as it is the relief of pain (CŚṬ D f.54b, P f.58b).

Āryadeva responds:

> 21. In the same way as some become happy
> while vomiting in a golden vessel, some
> think that the relief of pain is pleasant.[18]

A rich person is proud because he has a golden vessel in which to vomit when he is ill. In fact, the misery of vomiting in either a golden vessel or a clay pot ought not to be construed as pleasant. Similarly, ordinary people erroneously imagine that the relief of pain must be pleasant (CŚṬ D f.54b, P ff.58b-59a).

The opponent then cites a second situation in which pleasure occurs: the shifting of a burden from one shoulder to the other (CŚṬ D f.54b, P f.59a). Āryadeva asks:

> 22. Were the arising [of much suffering]
> to cease by having begun [a little suffering],
> even so, what pleasure is there in beginning
> suffering?[19] Therefore consider what the
> Sage has said: "Arising and ceasing are
> suffering."[20]

It is possible to alleviate the pain in one shoulder by shifting the burden onto the other shoulder. However, by shifting the burden to the other shoulder, a small amount of pain ensues. Therefore it is not appropriate to speak of the cessation of intense pain and the subsequent arising of a lesser degree of pain as being pleasant.

The imagination of pleasure derives from error, for when the situation is analyzed properly, there will not be even a small amount of pleasure (CŚṬ D f.55a, P f.59a).[21]

Suffering may exist, the opponent concedes, but it is obscured by pleasure (CŚṬ D f.55a, P f.59a). Āryadeva replies:

> 23. The ordinary person does not experience suffering as camouflaged by pleasure. There is nothing called "pleasure" that obscures suffering.

The opponent objects that if suffering is established by its very nature, then why is it necessary to teach about it (CŚṬ D f.56a, P f.60a)? Āryadeva answers:

> 24. The ordinary person ought to be instructed: "You are not free from attachment to pleasure." Consequently the Tathāgatas have said that ignorance (moha) is the worst of all.[22]

Because of their ignorance, ordinary people do not understand, it is necessary to instruct them by informing them that they are not free of attachment to the body (CŚṬ D f.56a, P f.60a-b).

The final objection that the opponent raises is the claim that even though the body is impermanent, it is still pleasant (CŚṬ D f.56a, P f.60b). Āryadeva concludes this chapter with a verse that indicates that things

which are impermanent should also be considered as painful:

25. Certainly what is impermanent is harmful, what is harmful is not pleasant; consequently all that is impermanent is called "suffering."[23]

CHAPTER II

NOTES

[1]Dhammacakkapavattanasutta, Saṃyutta, V, p.42:
Dve 'me bhikkave antā pabbajitena na sevitabba //
Katama dve // // Yo cāyam kāmesu kamasu kallikānuyogo
hīno gammo puthujjanīko anariyo anatthasaṃhito //
Yo cāyam attakilamathānuyogo dukkho anariyo anatthasaṃhito // //
"Monks, these two extremes should not be practiced by any one who has left the household life, viz., this attachment to sensual pleasure, which is base, common, vulgar, ignoble, and unprofitable; and this attachment to self-torture, which is painful, ignoble, and unprofitable."
See also Saṃyutta, IV, p.330, Majjhima, I, p.15, and Mahavagga, I, p.17. Cf. Suhṛlleka v38 and Lamotte, Traité, III, p.1157.

[2]See Majjhima, III, p.169 and Saṃyutta, V, p.455. Cf. Suhṛlleka vv. 59-60 on the rarity of obtaining a human body and Ratnāvalī V.89.

[3]Candrakīrti in CŚṬ (D f.45a-b, P f.48a-b) stresses that the body is susceptible to hundreds of illnesses, both internal and external, and thus ought to be seen as an enemy.

[4]Lamotte, Traité, III, p.1156 points out that the body is the birthplace (upapatti-sthāna) of all suffering. Cf. Satyasiddhi, I, pp.188-190, II, pp.158-161.

[5]Candrakīrti in CŚṬ (D f.46b, P f.50a) cites the example of Devadatta, whose delight in the pleasures of his senses--colors, sounds, tastes, smells, etc.--vanished after he had been stung by a bee; and he notes how quickly pain overcomes pleasure. Cf. Lamotte, Traité, III, p.1264.

[6]Cf. Majjhima, I, p.309: Yebhuyyena bhikkave sattā evaṃkāmā evaṃchandā evaṃdhippāyā: aho vata anitthā akantā amanāpā dhammā parihāyeyyuṃ, itthā kantā manāpā dhammā abhivaddheyyuñ ti. "For the most part, monks, sentient beings desire in this way, wish in this way, think in this way: May undesired, unenjoyable, and unpleasant things decrease, and may desired, enjoyable, and pleasant things increase." See Lamotte, Traité, III, p.1158, note 1 for additional references to Pali canonical sources on this topic. Cf. Udānavarga, III.6-7, and Dhammapada v.342.

[7]Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.20 and rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chapter two, p.4: des na so so skye bo skad cig gis 'jig cing mi rtag pa 'di la sdug bsngal la bros su zin kyang / sdug bsngal ni skyes bu la grib ma rjes su snyeg pa dang 'dra bar sdug bsngal rjes su 'brang bas spang bar dka'o //

"Therefore the ordinary person perishes each moment; and even though he has fled the misery in this impermanence,

because suffering pursues people, like a shadow, it is difficult to leave behind."

[8]The five 'aggregates' (skandha) that comprise the individual person are all said to be painful and unsatisfactory in nature. See Saṃyutta, V, p.421, Saṃyutta, III, p.158, and Majjhima, III, pp.19-20. Cf. MMK XXVI. 8-9, 12, and pp. 475. 11-13 and 556.4ff.

[9]Cf. Ratnāvalī III.22-24 in which Nāgārjuna discusses two types of suffering are mentioned and IV.46 in which pleasure also is classified according to these two types. Cf. also Satyasiddhi, I, p.190, II, p.161, and Lamotte, Traité, III, p.1440.

Pali canonical sources also distinguish between physical (kāyika) and mental (cetasika) pain and pleasure. See Saṃyutta, IV, pp.206-207, 232, and Dīgha, II, p.306.

[10]On the term kalpanā see May, Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, pp.64-65, note 64.

Cf. Ratnāvalī IV.47.

duḥkhapratikriyāmātraṃ śarīraṃ vedanāsukham /
saṃjñāmayaṃ mānasaṃ tu kevalaṃ kalpanākṛtam //

"Physical sensations of pleasure are merely the relief of pain, but mental ones, which consist in [false] conceptions, are only constructed by the imagination."

[11]Time also is considered an enemy. See below CŚ I.22.

[12]Cf. Lamotte, Traité, III, p.1156.

[13]Cf. Udānavarga I.5 and Dhammapada v.149.

[14]Cf. Udānavarga XXVI.7ab and Dhammapada v.203ab.

[15]See Ratnāvalī I.80, Lamotte, Traité, III, p.1217, and Lamotte, L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti, p.228.

[16]Majjhima, III, pp.165-169, Suhṛllekha vv.77-96 and Ratnāvalī, I.14-18 recount the miseries of a bad rebirth.

[17]Cf. Lamotte, Traité, III, p.1445.

[18]Cf. Ratnāvalī, IV.47-48, and Satyasiddhi, I, p.190 II, p.161. The image of a fool using a golden pot to vomit in occurs also in Suhṛllekha v.60.

[19]Cf. Ratnāvalī IV.62.

[20]See Saṃyutta, II, p.17: dukkham eva uppajjamānam uppajjati dukkhaṃ nirujjhamānaṃ nirujjhati.

[21]Cf. Udānavarga XXX.32 and Saṃyutta, III, pp.25-26 where the burden is used as a metaphor for the five skandhas.

[22]See Majjhima, I, p.433. On the term moha and its relation to avidyā see May, Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, p.181, n.586.

[23]This verse is cited in the PP p.460.9-10, and again on p.506.6-8.

CHAPTER III

SHOWING THE METHOD OF ABANDONING BELIEF IN PURITY

Āryadeva considers in chapter three the third of the four errors, namely, the mistaken belief that things which are rightly seen as being impure (aśuci) by their very nature (svabhāva) are pure (śuci). The preceeding Chapter revealed the body as a source of great suffering; this chapter focuses on the body as a repository of impurities. In particular, Āryadeva emphasizes the impurity of women's bodies and criticizes sharply those who indulge their lust through sexual intercourse.

An objector argues that even though conditioned things are painful in nature, people acquire pleasure through satisfying their enjoyment of sensual objects (CŚṬ D f.63a, P f.68a). Āryadeva draws an analogy in this reply to this objection between the efforts of an incompetent physician to cure illness and the efforts of someone who attempts to satisfy a lust for sensual objects through indulgence in sensual pleasures: both will be unsuccessful.

> 1. Even over a long period of time, there is no end to [the desired] objects.[1] Like bad physician ['s exertion] in regard to your body, [your] exertion will have no effect.

The opponent then puts forth his own analogy. In the same way as a person quenches thirst with water, he argues, a person sated with sensual pleasures will no longer desire them (CŚṬ D f.63a, P f.68a). Āryadeva's response compares those who crave sensual pleasures to worms who crave dirt.

2. In the same way as the craving for dirt
cannot be stopped in some who are addicted,
the desire for sensual pleasures also increases
in people who are addicted.[3]

While a man may be able to give up his desire for an ordinary women, the opponent agrees, how is he able to give up the desire for an extraordinarily beautiful woman (CŚṬ D f.63b, P f.68b)? Āryadeva replies:

3. There is not the slightest difference
among all women in sexual intercourse. As
beauty is enjoyable for others also, what
is the use of the best women to you?

The imputation (<u>samāropa</u>) "best" is untrue, for the object in question is inferior in nature and should generate only disgust. All women's bodies contain impure substances, foul smells, etc. Furthermore, beauty is not exclusively enjoyed, but is something which anyone with eyes--including dogs and vultures--can enjoy. It is unreasonable to be attached to such an ordinary thing as a woman's body (CŚṬ D f.64a, P ff.68b-69a). Āryadeva continues his attack

on attachment to women's bodies:

> 4. Whoever is attracted to her imagines that he is satisfied by her. Fool! Why do you have desire, since that is common even among dogs, etc.?

The opponent still insists that attachment to beautiful women is appropriate, for it is a wonder to find a woman whose every limb delights the mind (CŚṬ D f.64b, P f.69b). Āryadeva's response questions the firmness of this attachment. He suggests that this attachment vanishes when a husband discovers that his wife was sexually intimate with others in the past.

> 5. On discovering that she whose every limb was lovely to you previously was common to all, why, then, is she not wonderful to you?[4]

The opponent argues that we observe that people become attracted to human beings who have virtuous qualities. Therefore it is not unreasonable for someone to be attracted to a woman who has virtuous qualities (CŚṬ D f.65a, P f.70a-b). Āryadeva doubts that these virtuous qualities remain constant.

> 6. When experiencing love for someone endowed with virtuous qualities and the reverse [i.e., hatred] for the opposite, as there is no constancy, which--former or latter--is true?

Women with virtuous qualities are loved; women with faults are hated. However, there is no certainty that either virtuous qualities or faults will persist unchanged, for gradually faults, as well as virtuous qualities, will appear in the same woman. The appearance of faults contradicts the claim that virtuous qualities exist, and likewise the claim that faults exist is contradicted by the presence of the woman's virtuous qualities. Since there is no truth to either claim, it is inappropriate that either love or hatred should arise (CŚṬ D f.65b, P f.70b).

The opponent then modifies his argument. No one becomes attracted to those women who lack virtuous qualities, since that would lead to discord. But for the sake of harmony, men become attracted to women who have virtuous qualities (CŚṬ D ff.65b-66a, P f.71a). Āryadeva points out that the opponent's assertion that a woman's possession of virtuous qualities is the cause which excites a man's desire is contrary to experience. Fools desire women, regardless of whether they possess virtuous qualities.

7. A fool's desire does not arise solely
for someone who has virtuous qualities.
Where is there a cessation [of desire] on
account of a cause for those who begin
without a cause?

It is proper, the opponent argues, for a husband to be attached to a woman who will commit suicide after his death (CŚṬ D f.66b, P f.71b). Āryadeva denies that a woman will remain faithful to her husband.

> 8. She is yours[5] as long as she does not know anyone else. A woman must be protected constantly from the occurence [of someone else] , as if from a bad disease.[6]

A woman's fidelity to her husband continues only as long as she has no experience with anyone else. But should she experience pleasure with another man, she will no longer love her husband. Since women's minds are fickle, therefore they need to be protected from the opportunity of meeting other men, just as they ought to be protected from serious illness (CŚṬ D f.66b, P f.71a-b).

The opponent objects that people are taught that men should desire women (CŚṬ D ff.66b-67a, P f.72a).[7] Āryadeva replies:

> 9. What was done willingly in the prime of life an old man does not desire. Why is it that those who are liberated do not greatly long for it?

There are those who, like dogs, indulge their lust for women's impure bodies, while in the prime of life. However, after they grow older, and their faculties

weaker, when they analyze their past behavior, they understand the suffering of their previous actions. Those who are liberated from the bondage of affliction (kleśa) also understand that such behavior produces pain, not pleasure (CŚṬ D f.67a, P f.72a).[8]

The ultimate pleasure that men experience in the world of sensual desire (kāmadhātu), the opponent asserts, is the pleasure that arises from sexual intercourse with women. Hence it is reasonable to enjoy women for this reason (CŚṬ D f.67b, P 72b). Āryadeva responds:

> 10. Someone who lacks attachment has no pleasure [in sexual intercourse]; and also someone who is not a fool does not have it. What kind of pleasure is there for someone who constantly turns the mind back [from desire]?[9]

Furthermore, he criticizes the opponent's possessive attitude towards women:

> 11. You cannot have permanently sexual intercourse with women, following your inclination. To say "she is mine; she is not someone else's"--what is the use of this possessiveness?[10]

The opponent argues that people commonly call desire "pleasure," and since this does not occur without sexual intercourse with women, therefore it is reasonable to

desire women as the necessary means of incurring this pleasure (CŚṬ D ff.68b-69a, P f.74a). Āryadeva replies that if desire itself yielded pleasure, women would not be necessary. He distinguishes also between desire and pleasure; unlike desire, pleasure need not be rejected.

12. If desire were pleasure, women would be useless. Also, how is it that pleasure is not considered something that should be repudiated?[11]

The opponent restates his position. Pleasure arises through sexual intercourse, and women are its cause (CŚṬ D f.69a, P f.74b). Āryadeva disagrees:

13. Even in sexual intercourse with a woman, pleasure arises from something else. Who--except a fool--would maintain that the cause is just a female companion?

Sexual intercourse with women is not the cause of pleasure. Incorrect attention (ayoniśomanasikāra) causes people to regard the impure as pure and what is painful as pleasant. Consequently the pleasure that occurs in sexual intercourse arises from conceptual construction (saṃkalpa) (CŚṬ D f.69b, P ff.74b-75a).

If desire is so deserving of criticism, the opponent asks, why do people repeatedly indulge their sensual desires? The answer, he suggests, is that people do so because this produces pleasure (CŚṬ D f.69b, P f.75a).

Āryadeva's reply compares those who fail to see the disadvantages of sensual desire to a leper who tries to relieve his pain through scratching:

> 14. A leper does not see the fault of desire while scratching, since he is blinded by attachment. Those who are free of attachment see those who have attachment as endowed with pain, like the leper.[12]

Although desire is impure, the opponent concedes, nevertheless, pleasure arises from the many activities that result from desire (CŚṬ D f.70a, P f.75b). Āryadeva denies that these activities are pleasurable:

> 15. Whatever happens in a famine to the protectorless who are pained by hunger [e.g., humiliation, abuse] -- that is the course for all impassioned[13] men when in contact with a woman.

In the same way as poor people must endure repeated abuse and humiliations at the hands of those rich people from whom they beg food, those who are driven by their lust for women must tolerate abuse and humiliation, such as being spat at and beaten. They have no self-respect and seem blind in their expectations of pleasure (CŚṬ D f.70b), P ff.75b-76a).[14]

Women are a source of pleasure, the opponent claims, because we observe that others become jealous (CŚṬ D f.70b, P f.76a). Āryadeva retorts:

16. Out of pride, some develop attachment
even for a privy! Some develop attachment
to certain women, and some develop jealousy.

Some rich people become attached to their own privies and jealously refuse to let anyone else use them. In the same way, attachment to women will produce jealousy; it will not bring about pleasure (CŚṬ D ff.70b-71a, P f.76a-b).

Even though we know that the body is impure, the opponent says, it is not unreasonable to be attached to it because it is pleasurable (CŚṬ D f.71a, P f.76b). Āryadeva does not agree:

17. Although it is reasonable that confusion
(moha) and anger arise in regard to something
that is impure, it is entirely unreasonable
that desire should arise.

If someone stepped in something filthy at night, is it reasonable that confusion might have occurred because the darkness obscured it.[15] Also, it is reasonable that anger might have occurred because of the bad smell, but it is not at all reasonable that desire would arise (CŚṬ D f.71a, P ff. 76b-77a)!

The body is impure, the opponent concedes, but since people regard it as faultless, we should not criticize it

(CŚṬ D f.71b, P f.77a). Āryadeva replies:

18. Excluding human beings, an impure vessel would be denounced. Why is it not thought to denounce whatever is impure?[16]

The opponent claims that people become attracted by pure things. Therefore women's bodies ought to be considered pure (CŚṬ D f.72a, P f.77a-b). Āryadeva asks:

19. What person who is not a fool calls pure that [i.e., the body] on which the least of all pure things [e.g., flowers] is seen.[17]

All pure things, for example, flowers and scents, become impure through this contact with the body.[18] Intelligent people understand that all human bodies are equally impure, and therefore it is wrong to say that women's bodies are pure (CŚṬ D f.72a, P f.77b).

People take pride in pure things, the opponent argues, if the body is not pure, pride in it would not arise (CŚṬ D f.72a, P f.77b). Āryadeva's reply reminds the opponent that the condition of the human embryo, subsisting on the nourishment provided by a woman's impure body, is analogous to that of an insect living off filth.

20. Pride arises out of ignorance in someone who was inside a filthy enclosure and who could not live without it, like an unclean worm.[19]

The opponent claims that the body can be made pure by washing away all its impurities (CŚṬ D f.72b, P f.78a-b). Āryadeva denies that the body can ever be made pure:

> 21. Whatever the method, the body's inner
> parts will never become pure. You should
> make an effort [to purify] inside. In this
> way, [no effort is needed] outside.[20]

The body is impure by its very nature. All kinds of impurities ooze from it.[21] Such methods as the application of water or ointments are not able to make it pure (CŚṬ D ff.72b-73a, P ff.78b-79a).

The opponent argues that even though women's bodies contain urine, since even great ascetics seek the pleasures of women,[22] these pleasures should not be rejected (CŚṬ D f.73a, P f.79a). Āryadeva's reply ignores the inclinations of ascetics and focuses instead on impurity. He draws a parallel between the impurity of containing urine and the impurity of lepers. Even though lepers are a common sight, they can still be avoided, but no one can avoid containing urine.

> 22. If containing urine were not common
> to all, like a leper, then all people
> would avoid someone containing urine,
> like a leper.

Flowers, scents, etc. counteract the impurity of a woman's body the opponent contends (CŚṬ D f.74a, P ff.79b-80a). Āryadeva regards this remedy as unsatisfactory:

> 23. Someone who has lost a part [of the body] may be satisfied with a substitute for a nose.[23] In the same way, a desire for flowers, etc., is considered a remedy for [the body's] impurity.[24]

The opponent argues that flowers, scents, etc., cause people to be attracted to women's bodies (CŚṬ D f.74b, P f.80b). Āryadeva denies that these things cause desire:

> 24. It is unreasonable to call that [body] --where detachment (vairāgya)[25] develops-- "pure." Certainly that thing which is the cause of desire does not exist anywhere.

Finally the opponent asks if it is possible that all four misconceptions exist in regard to a single thing (CŚṬ D f.75a, P 81a). Āryadeva answers:

> 25. In brief, impermanence, impurity, suffering, and absence of self (anātman), all four, exist in one.[26]

Whatever is conditioned and has arisen in interdependence (pratītyasamutpanna) is impermanent because it is momentary. Whatever is impermanent is impure because it produces aversion. Whatever is impure is painful because it is harmful. Whatever is painful is nonsubstantial because it lacks independence (CŚṬ D f.75a-b, P f.81a-b).

CHAPTER III

NOTES

[1]Cf. Udānavarga II.13ab:

yāvat kāmān anasaraṃ na tṛptiṃ manaso 'dhyagāt /

"As long as one pursues sensual desires, one does not attain mental satisfaction." See also Udānavarga II.14, 17 and Dhammapada vv.186-187.

[2]or following the reading of CD yul la "with respect to the objects" the exertion will be ineffective.

[3]Cf. Udānavarga III.1:

vitarkapramathitasya jantunas tīvrarāgasya śubhadarsinaḥ /
bhūyas tṛṣṇā pravardhate gāḍhaṃ hy eṣa karoti bandhaṃ //

"Desire further increases for a person distressed by discursive thought, whose lust is strong, who pursues what is pleasant, for this makes bondage firm." Cf. Dhammapada v.349.

The comparison between men who indulge in sensual pleasures and worms who eat filth occurs also in the Udayanavatsarājaparipṛccha in Śikṣāsamuccaya, p.81:

āsāvadasaṃjñino gṛddhā mīḍhasthāne yathā krimiḥ //

"Those who lust, thinking about enjoyment, are like a worm on a dungheap." See also Lalitavistara XIII. 73, XV.40.

[4]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chapter III, p.4 has the reading yin instead of min: khyod la yang lag kun mdzes pa'i mo gang yin pa de khyod

dang phrad pa'i sngar skye bo kun la thun mong pa yin na thun mong de rnyed pas khyod la ngo mtshar ltar ji ltar yang ni 'gyur ba yin par thal lo // "Since you have discovered that she whose every limb was lovely to you was common to all men prior to meeting you, how does it follow that she is like a wonder to you?"

[5]or following CD khyo la sdug "loves a husband."

[6]Women's sexual desires were considered stronger than men's. For example, see Aṅguttara, I, p.78: Divannaṃ dhammānam bhikkave atitto appaṭivāno mātugamo kalaṃ karoti. Katamesaṃ divannam? Methunasamāpattiya ca vijayanassa ca. "Monks, women die insatiable and indefatigable in respect to two things. Which two? Sexual intercourse and giving birth."

Vinaya, III, p.139, Majjhima, I, p.286, Majjhima, III, p.46, Aṅguttara, V, p.264, and Lamotte, Traité, II, pp.799-800 list the protectors of women. Compare Mānava Dharmasastra IX. 2-16.

[7]Hindu doctrine requires men to have sexual intercourse with their wives during the times in their menstrual cycles when conception is likely to occur. See Manusmṛti III.45-48, IX.4, and Mahābharata VII.18.32.

[8]Cf. Udānavarga II.3, III.10, Dhammapada vv.213-216, 336 the Ugradattaparipṛcchā in Śikṣāsamuccaya p.78: ekāntaduḥkhāḥ kāmā ityabhīkṣṇaṃ manasikāraprayuktena / yadāpy asya svadareṣu kāmavitarka utpadyeta tadāpi tena svadāreṣu aśubhānudarśinā uttrasamanasā kleśavaśatayā

kāmāḥ pratisevitavyaḥ / "With the concentration of his attention constantly on 'sensual desires are entirely painful,' even if the thought of sensual desire should arise for his own wives, even then he should indulge in sensual pleasures with the consideration of unpleasantness in respect to his own wives, with his mind frightened because of the power of the afflictions."

[9]gZhan dga', dBu ma bzhi brgya pa mchan 'grel, f.13a considers the latter hemistich to refer to those who are not fools (blun po min) "whose mind at all times is directed away from desire" (gang gi yid dus rtag tu 'dod pa las phyir phyogs). Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel, p.34 interprets the hemistich differently: blun po gang yid rtag tu gnas lugs la phyir phyogs pa de yi yang dag pa'i bde ba ci 'dra zhig rig par gyur te / "What kind of pleasure does the fool, whose mind is always directed away from the real situation, know?" Cf. rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad legs bshad snying po, chapter III, pp. 6-7: bud med de la chags pa gang gi yid rtag tu gnas lugs kyi don la phyir phyogs pa de'i bde ba mchog tu gyur pa ci 'dra zhig yin bde ba mchog min pa thal / "What kind of supreme pleasure exists for someone attached to women, whose mind is always directed away from the significance of the real situation? It follows that it is not supreme pleasure," and mDo sngags, dBu ma bzhi brgya

pa'i tshig don, pp.46-47: *rmong pa gang gi yid 'phrul 'khor gyis rmongs par byas pa'i mi ltar yul tshul bzhin yang dag par mthong ba las rtag tu phyir phyogs pa'i chags can de yi bde ba ni ci 'dra zhig ste* / "What kind of pleasure is there for that impassioned person whose mind is confused, always turned away from perceiving objects in the right way, like a man bewildered by machinery."

[10]See *Majjhima*, II, pp.223-224.

[11]*Saṃyutta*, IV, pp.235-237 describes three varieties of pleasure: one which is carnal (*sāmisa*) and derived from the objects of the five senses (*kāmaguṇa*), one which is spiritual (*nirāmisa*) and derived from the cultivation of meditative trance (*jhāna*), and one which is still more spiritual (*nirāmisatara*) and derived from the destruction of the defilements (*āsava*).

[12]Cf. *Majjhima*, I, pp.506-508, *Suhṛllekha* v.26, and *Ratnāvalī* II.69, all of which make this same comparison between lepers scratching sores and impassioned people.

[13]or following CD: *sems can* "sentient beings."

[14]Cf. *Udayanavatsarājaparipṛcchā* in *Śikṣāsamuccaya* p.82: *sa tatra raktaḥ samānaḥ strīparibhāṣitāni sahate tarjanāvalokananirbhartsanām api sahate* / *sa mātṛgrāmeṇa tarjitaḥ puruṣaḥ saṃsīdati visīdati sukham cāsyā avalokayati* / *kāmahetoḥ kāmanidānam ca vaśagato bhavati* / *ayam mahārāja kāmalolupasya puruṣasyoccārasukhaparamasyāśucau ratasyāsaṃprajanyacāriṇo doṣaḥ* / "Therefore all

impassioned men endure women's reprimands and also endure their threats, glances and reproaches. A man threatened by women becomes despondent, depressed, and looks upon her pleasure. Because of sensual desire, absorbed in sensual desire, he becomes subject to her will. This, O King, is the disadvantage of a man who is unaware of what he does, attached to impurity, intent upon pleasure that is like excrement, ardently longing for sensual desire."

[15]Ibid., p.81:

avidyāpidhitā bālās te tamaḥskandhena āvṛtāḥ /

strīṣu saktās tathā mūḍha amedhya iva vāsyasāḥ. //

"Fools ensconced in ignorance, enveloped in a mass of darkness, are attached to women, and, so deluded, are like crows attached to carrion."

[16]See Ratnāvalī II.62:

mi gtsang gang ba'i bum pa ni //

phyi rol la bkra yang smad pa yin //

mi gtsang ba yi rang bzhin lus //

mi gtsang gang ba cis mi smad //

"A pot that is impure is denounced, even though it is beautiful on the outside. Why is the body, which is impure by its own-nature, not denounced as something which is impure?"

See also Ratnāvalī II.49-67 for an extended treatment of the impure nature of the body.

[17]Cf. Udānavarga XXVII.21-22, and Ratnāvalī II.51, 63.

[18]See Ratnāvalī II.63.

[19]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chapter III, p.12 comments: mngal las skyes bzhin pa gang zhig ma'i mngal du pho dang long ka gnyis par bshang khang dang 'dra ba'i nang na 'dug cing bshang pa'i nying khus gnas par byas pa de med par ni mi gnas mi gtsang ba'i srin bu ltar bu ..."Anyone who was born from a womb was inside a mother's womb--which is inbetween the stomach and the intestines and like a privy--and lived on the essence of bodily wastes, unable to live without that, like an unclean worm."

[20]gZhan dga', dBu ma bzhi brgya pa mchan 'grel, f.14a comments: khyod ni lus kyi nang dag pa la 'bad par byed par rigs kyi / de ltar phyi rol la 'bad dgos pa ma yin no // "It is necessary that you make an effort to purify inside of the body, and in this way it will not be necessary to make an effort on the outside."

Cf. Udānavarga XXXIII.6

kiṃ te jaṭābhir durbuddhe kiṃ cāpy ajinaśāṭibhiḥ / abhyantaraṃ te gahanaṃ bāhyakaṃ parimārjasi // "Fool! What use is matted hair to you, and what use to you are antelope skin garments? Inside you is impenetrable darkness, but you clean outside!" Cf. the Tibetan version of Udānavarga XXXIII.9

blo ngan khyod kyi ral pa ci //
khyod kyi g.yang gzhi gyon pa ci //

khyod nang dri ma ldan bzhin du //

phyi rol legs par byi dor byed //

"Fool! What use to you is long hair? What use to you are antelope skin garments? While you possess impurity inside, you clean well the outside!" Cf. Dhammapada v.394 and see also Udānavarga XXXIII.11 and Ratnāvalī II.66.

[21]See Lamotte, Traité, III, p.1154 where the distinction is made between the impurity of own-nature (svabhāvaśuci) and the impurity of own-mark (svalakṣaṇāśuci).

[22]See Aṅguttara, IV, 53-54.

[23]Wendy O'Flaherty, Women, Androgynes and Other Mythical Beasts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p.84: "Śūrpanakhā's nose is cut off to punish her for making sexual advances."

[24]Cf. Udānavarga Vl.16-18 and Dhammapada vv.54-56.

[25]See Lamotte, Traité, III, p.1321: "Quand le yogin utilise les neuf notions pour s'opposer aux passions (kleśapratiṣedhāya) il ya vairāgyasaṃjñā 'notion de detachment'." For canonical references on the nine reflections on the repulsive nature of the body see pp. 1311-1313.

Cf. also Suhṛllekha v.25 and Ratnāvalī II.52.

[26]Ibid.: "Etant impur (aśuci), impermanent (anitya), douloureux (duḥkha) et impersonnel (anātman), il est anabhirata 'objet de deplaisir'. Telle est la meditation sur le corps (kāyabhāvanā)."

See also _Suhṛllekha_ v.48ab:

mi ni yang dag nyid du mi bde zhing //

mi rtag bdag med mi gtsang rig par bgyi //

"Understand correctly that human beings are unhappy, impermanent, lacking a self, and impure."

CHAPTER IV

SHOWING THE METHOD FOR ABANDONING BELIEF IN A SELF

In chapter four Āryadeva treats the last of the four errors, namely, the mistaken belief that there exists within a person a substantial and unchanging entity, a self or a soul (ātman), when in fact there is no self (anātman) and various impermanent components make up the individual personality. This chapter analyzes the notions of 'I' and 'mine' that ordinary people hold. (Chapter ten considers Jaina, Sāṃkhya, and Vaiśeṣika philosophical positions on the nature and form of the self.) Āryadeva addresses his remarks to a king and attacks the pride which he has in his position and all his royal possessions.

Since the methods for abandoning the three previous misconceptions have all been stated, Āryadeva is urged to discuss the method for abandoning the fourth (HPS p.461, CŚṬ D f.75b, P f.81b). Āryadeva in his response questions the intelligence of someone who is proud of himself and his possessions.

1. What wise person has pride in thinking "I" and "mine,"[1] since all objects in the world are the same to all embodied beings?

Since he has authority over other people, the king argues that it is appropriate for him to be proud (HPS

p.461, CŚṬ D f.75b, P f.82b). Āryadeva reminds the king that his welfare depends upon his subjects and questions the reason for his pride.

> 2. Supported by one sixth [of the harvest, etc.][2] of the subject masses, what pride do you have? On every occasion [your] work depends upon being appointed [by the people].

The king now contends that he is proud because he donates his wealth to the people (CŚṬ D f.77a, P f.83a). Āryadeva says:

> 3. Just as the subjects, when receiving donations think of the king as the donor, similarly, after he has donated to the recipients, the king takes pride in thinking "I am the donor."[3]

When the king gives back the wealth that he has received from his people, both he and his subjects consider him a donor. However, pride is inappropriate after he has donated wealth that ought to be returned (CŚṬ D f.77, P f.83b).

A king is proud, the king argues, because he is able to enjoy whatever objects he desires (CŚṬ D f.77a, P f.83b). Āryadeva points out to the king that other people see the experiences which he considers to be pleasant in just the opposite manner: as painful.

4. Others think of you in the opposite way, as a source of pain. What produces pleasure for you, who earn a living by working for others?

Those whose senses are controlled (saṃyatendriya)[4] explain that sensual desires for women, etc., are the source of much pain. Moreover, people who must work for others create pain for themselves that no one else can equal (CŚṬ D f.77b, P f.83b).

The king asserts that because he is the protector of his people he has pride[5] (CŚṬ D f.77b, P f.84a). Āryadeva reiterates his position that the king's welfare depends upon his subjects, for without their protection his reign would not last long,[6] and again he questions the king's claim to pride.

5. The king is the protector of the people, but it seems that the king must be protected. Why is there pride because of one and not a loss of pride because of the other?

The king clarifies his position. When a king protects his people in the same way as he would a son, he argues, his reign will be successful. He will then receive one sixth of the merit from the virtuous actions of his subjects who perform the duties appropriate to their caste.[7] Therefore pride is proper for the king, since he receives

the best of both his own and his subjects' merit (CŚṬ D f.78a, P f.84a). Āryadeva doubts the virtue of the king's subjects:

> 6. It is difficult to find among all
> the castes those who remain contented
> with their own work. If you possess
> demerit, a good rebirth (<u>sugati</u>), therefore, will be rare for you.

It is very difficult to find in this age of the five degenerations (<u>kaṣāya</u>)[8] people who follow the duties of their caste and who are satisfied with their work. Much of the time, their actions lack merit; and if the king receives one sixth of his subject's merit, likewise he receives one sixth of their demerit. First of all, it is not possible for a king to obtain a good rebirth because of his own demeritorious actions. Why should it be necessary to speak about his not obtaining a good rebirth due to the demeritorious actions of his subjects? A fool will bring about his own decline (CŚṬ D f.78a-b, P f.84b)!

Because a king is the lord of his people and acts independently, the king asserts, his pride is natural for someone of his class (CŚṬ D f.78b, P f.84b). Āryadeva denies that a king acts independently, as others must advise him on what should be done.[9] Again he emphasizes the king's dependence on other people.

7. Whoever acts after being exhorted by
others is called a fool here on earth.
There is no one else equal to you in
being dependent upon others.

The king remains unwilling to concede his own dependence. He argues that the people's protection depends upon a king, and therefore his pride is appropriate (CŚṬ D ff.78b-79a), P f.85a). Āryadeva calls attention to the merciless nature of the king's role as protector.

8. Thinking "protection depends upon me"
and receiving wages from the people, he
himself also commits evil. Who equals
him in lacking mercy?

When the king receives wages from the people, he is obligated to serve as their protector, but in order to protect the people he commits cruel and evil actions, such as beating and killing those who engage in wrongful activities (CŚṬ D f.79a, P f.85a-b).

The king defends his actions by arguing that a king must not show mercy to evil doers, for if he does not punish them, all the people will weaken. Therefore a king must punish evil-doers in order to protect his subjects[10] (CŚṬ D f.79b, P f.85b). Āryadeva disagrees:

9. If there is no mercy for people
who do evil, then all the foolish

ordinary people will not be
protected.[11]

If someone does not become an object of mercy by committing some evil action, then no one will become an object of mercy. Since no one is shown any mercy, all the foolish ordinary people who might commit an evil action will not be protected (CŚṬ D f.79b, P f.86a).

The king contends that when a king punishes the wicked with the intention of protecting his people, he does not commit an evil action, since this is done only to benefit the virtuous people (CŚṬ D f.80a, P f.87a). Āryadeva challenges the king's reason for committing demeritorious actions.

10. A reason for making oneself happy
does not exist anywhere. Reasons, such
as scriptural authority [of brahmanical
treatises][12] never destroy demerit.

Even those who kill fish and butcher hogs take pleasure in their work, considering their actions as suitable for someone of their caste. Neither their actions nor the king's are meritorious; both result in a bad rebirth (durgati). To take some treatise's advice as authoritative and commit evil actions will have unpleasant results (CŚṬ D f.80a-b, P ff.86b-87a).

The king emphatically denies that his actions will result in a bad rebirth. Protecting the people is the

duty of a king; and this activity alone will bring about his rebirth in heaven.[13] The king claims that he need not do anything else (CŚṬ D f.80b, P f.87a). Āryadeva asks:

11. If what is called "providing proper protection" is the duty (dharma) of a king, why is it not the duty also of those who cause afflictions [by manufacturing weapons] ?

In the same way as those artisans who manufacture weapons for wages receive no merit from their work, the king whose duty is to provide protection for his subjects in return for wages also will receive no merit from his work (CŚṬ D f.81a, P f.87b).

The king desires to put an end to all this criticism of his profession. Since all the people depend upon the king, he says, therefore they should not censure him (CŚṬ D f.81a, P f.87b). Āryadeva replies:

12. The people depend upon the king, but the king is censured. Similarly, in the opinion of the wise, the mother of all people is the craving for existence (bhavatṛṣṇā) [which deserves censure].

Even though the king protects all the people, householders and ascetics alike, nevertheless, he is still the object of censure. The wise will censure the king in the

same way as they censure the craving for existence by which people prolong their imprisonment within the cycle of birth and death[14] (CŚṬ D f.81a-b, P ff.87b-88a).

The king asserts that an intelligent and merciful king will protect his subjects properly (CŚṬ D f.81b, P f.88a). Āryadeva disagrees:

13. Someone who is not a fool does not
obtain a kingdom; and a fool has no mercy.
Even though he is a protector, duty does
not last for a merciless king.

The king now begins to defend his actions and his pride by citing scriptural authority. According to the duties which the sages (ṛṣi) prescribe for the royal class, even though a king may harm someone in the pursuit of his duty, this will not be a demeritorious action for him HPS p.462, CŚṬ D f.82a, P f.89a). Āryadeva responds:

14. An intelligent person would not
undertake every activity of the sages,
since inferior, middling, and superior
types are found even among them.[15]

The king argues that since the ancient kings protected their subjects by relying upon the authority of certain treatises, these treatises should be regarded as authoritative (pramāṇa) HPS p.462, CŚṬ D f.83a, P f.90a). Āryadeva answers that the times have changed:

15. The people were protected like a son by the ancient virtuous kings. Now they are made [scarce] like deer in the wilderness[16] by those who rely on the law of an age of discord (kalidharma).

Prior to this age of discord, the ancient virtuous kings ruled according to the law (dharma), made lawful treatises authoritative, and rejected what was contrary to the law. They protected their subjects as they would a beloved son.[17] But now the kings of this age of discord, intent upon their own wicked affairs, make unlawful treatises authoritative, and reject what is lawful. These kings who lack compassion destroy the people, like deer in the wilderness (HPS p.463, CŚṬ, D f.83a-b, P f.90a-b).

It is not wrong for the king to attack his enemies' weak points, the king argues, because of the fact that the treatises teach this[18] (HPS p.463, CŚṬ, D f.83b, P f.90b). Āryadeva responds that if the king's action in attacking his enemies' weaknesses is not wrong, then the same conclusion could apply in the case of a thief who attacks the weaknesses of the people he robs.

16. If a king who has attacked the [enemies'] weak points lacks evil, then others also, e.g., thieves, lack it even more so!

A king has the satisfaction of conquering his enemies in battle, and procures their wealth through his courage and valor. Or, the king adds, if he should die in battle, then, as a result of giving up life, he goes to heaven[19] (HPS p.464, CŚṬ D f.84a, P f.91a). Āryadeva compares the action of giving up life on the battlefield to giving up all one possesses for liquor: neither action has any merit or is worthy of respect.

> 17. Giving up all of one's possessions for
> the sake of liquor, etc., is not respected.[20]
> Why is it thought that giving up oneself in
> battle is respected?[21]

The king claims that he is happy because he is the lord of his people (CŚṬ D f.85a, P f.92a). Āryadeva denies that the king's position as lord leads to happiness:

> 18. The king is lord of the people, but
> you have no lord. Without liberating
> himself, who would be happy because of
> the fact of being a lord?

The people have a lord to encourage them to act properly and therefore they shun impropriety. However, a king has no lord over him. How will he do what is proper without guidance? If he remains unconcerned, he will accumulate sorrow, rather than satisfaction (CŚṬ D f.85a-b, P f.92b).

A king who does not employ harsh punishments will not become renowned, the king argues, and therefore it is necessary to punish harshly (CŚṬ D f.85b, P f.92b). Āryadeva replies:

19. No virtuous qualities arise from notoriety, even for a king who has died. You have no virtuous qualities, but has not a dog-cooker (*śvapaca*)[22] great notoriety.

There are no virtuous qualities that are produced through acting in a merciless manner. The evil that accumulates through such behavior will only cause a bad rebirth. Furthermore, the notoriety that ensues from such harsh actions is unable to wash away the stain of evil, just as notoriety cannot cleanse the actions of dog-cookers (CŚṬ D ff.85b-86a, P f.93a).

No one but a prince of the royal class is worthy of ruling a kingdom, and therefore, the king argues, it is proper for him to be proud (CŚṬ D f.86a, P f.93b). Āryadeva replies that merit, not class, produces kings.

20. When merit has produced that very sovereignty for all, then one does not find it said that this [human being] is not the receptacle for sovereignty.[23]

Any person who engages in meritorious actions will attain sovereignty; this kind of action is not limited to a

single individual. Therefore pride in the sovereignty is inappropriate, since merit is the reason that any human being becomes a receptacle of sovereign power (CŚṬ D f.86a-b, P f.93b).

Because the treatises teach that the duty of protecting the people belongs only to the royal class, not to the three other classes,[24] the king argues that since only the royal class may rule the kingdom, therefore it is proper for a king to be proud (CŚṬ D f.86a-b, P f.93b). Āryadeva responds:

> 21. All methods of livelihood among the
> people are called "caste." Therefore
> there is no [natural] distinction among
> all sentient beings that is due to caste.

The self-luminous and asexual beings of the first eon (kalpa) had no need for food. At this time no distinctions of caste were possible. Later the people began to eat coarse food and plant crops. Some people began to steal food. The need arose for other people to protect the fields from thieves. The people who were appointed to this task became known as "royal class" (kṣatriya). Other people who left the towns for the woods and practiced asceticism became known as "priestly class" (brāhmaṇa). Others served the royal class and were known as "peasant class" (vaiśya). Still others engage in inferior actions and were considered the "inferior class" (śūdra).[25]

Distinctions in class came from these distinctions in work. Since these class distinctions are artificially created, therefore there are not any real distinctions among people that are due to class or caste (CŚṬ D ff.86b-87a, P f.94a-b).

However, the king contends that since these four class distinctions were made, there are differences among people based upon them (CŚṬ D f.87a, P f.94b). Āryadeva responds that the time when these distinctions were established is long past and that no one can be certain about the accuracy of these class distinctions.

22. The past is far gone, and women's
minds are fickle. Therefore the so-called
"royal class" is never due to class.

It is difficult to designate any individual as a member of the royal lineage with certainty because women are deceptive. Since their minds are fickle, they may engage in sexual intercourse with men of other classes. The sons that are born from these unions are not regarded as "royal class" (CŚṬ D f.87a, P f.94b).

If one does not become a member of the royal class by birth, the king argues, it is still possible to attain this status through the action of protecting the people (CŚṬ D f.87b, P f.95b). Āryadeva asks:

23. If even a low class person (<u>śūdra</u>)
becomes royal class through his actions,

then I wonder why a low caste person does
not become a priest through action also?[26]

The king asserts that it is appropriate that a king desire great power, which he may share with his subjects (CṢT D f.88a, P f.95b). Āryadeva replies:

24. O King, there is no sharing of evil
in the same way as power. What intelligent
person would destroy [his own] future for
the sake of someone else?[27]

While it is true that the king acquires great power and is able to share this with his subjects, he is not able to reign without oppressing people and consequently he incurs great evil. He alone must experience the suffering which that evil brings about[27] (HPS p.465, CṢT, D f.88a-b, P f.96a).

Finally, the king claims that a king has great pride because of his great power (CṢT D f.88b, P f.96b). Āryadeva indicates the final method for abandoning this great pride in the final verse of this chapter:

25. After seeing others who are endowed
with equal or superior power, the pride
that is produced by power will not remain
in the heart of an intelligent person.

CHAPTER IV

NOTES

[1]Compares Ratnāvalī V.10.

[2]See Manusmṛti VII.130-132.

[3]In Saṃyutta, I, p.99 the Buddha advises King Pasendi on what he ought to donate. Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī III.40ff. enlarges on this passage.

[4]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chapter IV, p.3 adds: "and endowed with discriminative understanding (so sor rtog pa'i shes rab)."

[5]The Manusmṛti frequently mentions the king's duty to protect his subjects. See VII.2-3, 35, 88, 142, 144; VII.172, 303-309; IX.253; and X.80.

[6]Ibid, VII.174-175.

[7]Ibid, VII.304:

sarvato dharmaṣaḍbhāgo rājño bhavati rakṣataḥ /
adharmād api ṣaḍbhāgo bhavaty asya hy arakṣitaḥ //

"One sixth of the merit from all belongs to the king who protects [his people]. Also, one sixth of the demerit belongs to the king who does not protect."

A king is responsible for knowing the duties appropriate to each caste and ruling accordingly (See VII.41,46). He protects all the castes, oversees the performance of their duties (See VII.24,35, VIII.172), and whatever meritorious actions these subjects perform under his protection will increase his own life-span and wealth (See VII.136).

[8]In the Udānavarga XXIX 7-8, Dhammapada vv.9-10, Gāndhārī Dhammapada XII.11-12, and Kāśyapaparivarta 117 kaṣāya (Pali: kasāva) has the sense of impurity, something which the ascetic who adheres to moral conduct (śīla) cleanses himself of. Later texts, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra p.43 and the Bodhisattvabhūmi, p.173 provide a list of five impurities or degenerations: the degeneration of life-span (āyuḥkaṣāya), the degeneration of views (dṛṣṭikaṣaya), the degeneration of afflictions (kleśakaṣāya), the degeneration of beings (sattvakaṣāya), and the degeneration of the age (kalpakaṣāya). For other references see Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine, p.337, n.90.

[9]See Manusmṛti VII.56-59.

[10]Ibid., See VII.14ff and VIII.310ff.

[11]See Ratnāvalī IV.30-35.

[12]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chapter IV, p.7 identifies these treatises "the evil treatises of brahmins (bram je'i bstan bcos ngan pa."

[13]See Manusmṛti IX.253:

rakṣaṇād āryavṛttānām kaṇṭakānām ca śodhanāt /
narendras tridivam yānti prajāpālanatatparāḥ //

"The kings who are intent upon protecting their people go to heaven by virtue of safeguarding those who act nobly and by virtue of punishing those who are troublesome."

See also VIII.386.

[14]See *Saṃyutta*, I, p.37:

kiṃsu janeti purisaṃ // *kiṃsu tassa vidhāvati* //
kiṃsu saṃsāraṃ āpādi // *kiṃsu tassa mahabbhayan-ti* //
taṇhā janeti purisaṃ // *cittaṃ assa vidhavati* //
satto saṃsaram apadi // *dukkham assa mahabbhayan-ti* //

"What causes a person to be born? What does he have that runs about? What undergoes the cycle of birth and death? What is his greatest fear? Desire causes a person to be born. His mind runs about. A being undergoes the cycle of birth and death. Suffering is his greatest fear."

[15]mDo sngags, *dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i tshig don*, p.65 comments: *drang srongs rnams kyi spyod pa kun ni mkhas pa rjes su slob par byed pa ma yin te* / *gang gi phyir na de dag la spyod pa chos dang chos min pa sna tshogs yod pa'i phyir te* / *ji ltar na* / *'tshe ba chos su smra ba dman pa'i spyod pa dang* / *de la the tshom za ba 'bring dang* / *de nyid chos min du bstan pa khyad par 'phags pa'i spyod pa rnams yod pa'i phyir ro* // "A wise person does not teach all the activities of the sages because there are various meritorious and nonmeritorious activities among them. In what way? Those whose activities are inferior speak of harm as meritorious, those whose activities are middling cast doubts on that, and those whose activities are superior teach that this is not meritorious."

[16]Cf. the *Nivāpasutta* in *Majjhima*, I, p.150 ff.

[18]See _Manusmṛti_ VII.86ff. and _Satyasiddhi_, I, p.266 and II, p.238.

[19]See _Manusmṛti_ VII.89:

āhaveṣu mitho'nyonyaṃ jighāṃsanto mahīkṣitāḥ /

yudhyamānāḥ paraṃ śaktyā svargaṃ yānty aparāṅmukhāḥ //

"Kings desiring to kill one another in battle, fighting with great energy, faces not averted, go to heaven."

[20]See _Manusmṛti_ XI.93 ff.

[21]Cf. _Suhṛllekha_ v.24:

gang dag dbang po drug yul rnams la ni //

rtag tu mi brtan g.yo dang gang dag cig //

g.yul ngor dgra tshogs las rgyal de dag las //

mkhas rnams dang po dpa' rab lags par 'tshal //

"Someone conquers the six sense objects, and someone conquers the enemies' armies in battle. The wise understand that the first is a hero."

[22]_Manusmṛti_ X.19 identifies a _śvapaca_ as the son of a _kṣattṛ_ father (the son of a _śūdra_ father and a _kṣatriya_ mother according to X.11) and an _ugra_ mother (the daughter of a _kṣatriya_ father and a _śūdra_ mother). _Śvapacas_ and caṇḍalas live outside villages, keep dogs and asses, and wear the clothing of the dead (X.51-56).

[23]mDo sngags, _dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i tshig don_, p.68 comments: _gang gi tshe kun gyi dbang phyug nyid du gyur pa ni bsod nams kyis bskyed pa yin pa de yi tshe rgyu bsod nams 'di ni dbang phyug gi rten yin no zhes rigs_

tsam rgyal thabs kyi dbang phyug tu 'os pa'i rten yin no snyam du brjod pa rnyed pa ma yin no // "When merit has produced sovereignty for all, then it is said that the cause, this merit, is the basis for sovereignty. One does not find it said that class alone is a suitable basis for sovereignty over a kingdom."

[24] See Manusmṛti I.89-91.

[25] Cf. the Aggaññasuttanta in Dīgha, II, p.85ff.

[26] Manusmṛti IV.61 mentions śūdra kings, but IV.99 forbids them to recite the Vedas.

[27] See Udānavarga XXVII.11ab:

ātmanā hi kṛte pāpe tv ātmanā kliśyate sadā /

"For when evil is done by oneself, oneself always suffers."

Cf. Dhammapada v.165ab. Suhṛllekha v.30 makes the same point:

khyod kyis bram ze dge slong lha dang ni /
mgron dang yab yum sras dang btsun mo dang /
'khor gyi slad du'ang sdig pa mi bgyi ste /
dmyal ba'i rnam smin skal nod 'ga' ma mchis //

"You should not do evil even for the sake of brahmins, monks, gods, guests, parents, sons, queens, or attendants; for no one else will share the result of hell."

CHAPTER V

SHOWING THE BODHISATTVA'S PRACTICE

In the four previous chapters Āryadeva indicates how someone might eliminate the four errors, since the mind must be free of those errors prior to the generation of the intention (cittotpāda) to attain enlightenment. Generating this intention signals the beginning of a Bodhisattva's career. It produces an immense quantity of merit and prevents the maturation of previously created bad karma, both powerful incentives for an individual to undertake the Bodhisattva's career.

However, in chapter five Āryadeva emphasizes the altruistic side of the intention: the desire to benefit all sentient beings. He encourages the Bodhisattva to impart the gift of teaching Buddhist doctrine, to have patience in working with those who are ignorant and afflicted by illness, and to pursue vigorously the task of leading all sentient beings to Nirvāṇa.

Someone asks where a reason for abandoning attachment can be found (CŚṬ D f.89a, P f.97a).[1] Āryadeva replies that the compassionate activity of the Buddhas provides a reason:

> 1. It is said that there is no any
> activity (ceṣṭā) of the Buddhas that
> lacks a cause. Even their breathing

arises for the benefit of sentient
beings.

As the Buddhas' breath passes over the hells, it brings cooling rain to soothe the suffering of beings in hell. These beings rejoice at the sight of a Buddha. Their trust (_śraddhā_) in the Buddha diminishes the accumulation of their non-virtuous karma and enables them to acquire virtuous karma, which will bring about their liberation. Therefore intelligent people should place their trust in the Buddha. Moreover, those who honor the Buddha triumph over all the pain which fear of death causes. (CŚṬ D. ff. 89b-90a, P ff.97b-98a).

Āryadeva says:

2. Just as the phrase "Lord of Death"
terrifies all people, so the phrase
"All-Knowing One" terrifies even the
Lord of Death!

Those who follow the Buddha's path will pass beyond the Lord of Death's realm. Even hearing the name of a Tathāgata produces virtuous roots, seeds for pursuing the Buddha's path to Nirvāṇa (CŚṬ D f.90b, P ff.98b-99a).

The questioner then asks about the Buddha's omniscience, citing his refusal to respond to the fourteen unexplained points (_caturdaśavyākṛtavastūni_)[2] (CST D f.91a, P f.99b). Āryadeva denies that this proves that the Buddha was not omniscient.

> 3. The Sage has power over what should be done and what should not be done, and what should be said and not said. Therefore what reason is there for saying that the All-Knowing One is not omniscient?

Actions that should be done lead to sentient beings' liberation or to a good rebirth. Actions that harm others should not be done. Similarly, things that benefit others should be said, not things that harm others. The Buddha knew that the people who asked about these fourteen points would be unable to understand the profound meaning of his reply, and therefore he did not respond. He teaches his profound doctrine only to those who have a strong inclination (adhimukti) for it, since they will benefit from hearing it. Not teaching the profound doctrine to someone who is incapable of comprehending it is in fact a reason that supports the Buddha's omniscience (CŚṬ D f.91b, P ff.99b-100a).

Āryadeva explains that the motivation behind any action's performance will determine whether or not the action is meritorious.

> 4. Since without understanding the motivation, the merit, etc., in going, etc., is not perceived, therefore one must realize that mind is foremost in all actions.[4]

Furthermore,

> 5. Because of the intention [to benefit others], everything--whether virtuous or non-virtuous [for someone else] is only good for a Bodhisattva, since mind if under control.

If performed with the intention of benefiting others, even the heinous action of taking life is good. For example, a ship captain, a Bodhisattva named "Great Compassion," knew that if a man on his ship were to carry out a plan to kill five hundred other passengers, merchants who were also Bodhisattvas, and steal their wares, he would suffer bad rebirths for one hundred eons as a result. The Bodhisattva, motivated by his great compassion, takes this man's life (CŚṬ D ff.93ḃ-94a, P ff.102b-103a).[5]

What do Bodhisattvas apprehend, the questioner asks, that results in their being called "Bodhisattvas?" (CŚṬ D f.94b, P f.103b). Āryadeva replies that the Bodhisattva's initial intention and the merit that it produces distinguishes Bodhisattvas from all others.

> 6. Far superior to the merit of all people on earth and those who become universal monarchs (cakravartin) is [the merit of] a Bodhisattva's initial intention.[6]

After generating the intention to aid all sentient beings, those who seek enlightenment attain the first stage (bhūmi) of the path to Buddhahood and are then designated as "Bodhisattvas'[7] (CŚṬ D f.94b, P 103b).

The questioner asks: What merit is there in encouraging others to generate the intention of enlightenment? (CŚṬ D f.95b, P f.64a-b). Āryadeva reponds that the merit which results from instructing others in how to produce the intention of enlightenment far exceeds even the merit someone may receive from erecting a jeweled stūpa.

> 7. Someone may build a stūpa made of jewels as high as the universe. It is said that better than that is [the merit of] someone who trains a single sentient being [to produce the intention of enlightenment].[8]

Someone who guides a single sentient being towards enlightenment is more highly honored than a person who builds a jeweled stūpa for the Buddha's relics that reaches up to the Akaniṣṭha heaven,[9] since the merit involved is far greater[10] (CŚṬ D f.95b, P f.104b).

How, the questioner asks, does a Bodhisattva benefit other sentient beings? (CŚṬ D f.96a, P f.105a). In the following verses Āryadeva answers this question by pointing out that a Bodhisattva employs both skill in the methods for

liberation (*upāya*) and compassion (*karuṇā*) to benefit others. He compares the Bodhisattva to a skillful teacher and to a compassionate healer. The Bodhisattva assists sentient beings first of all by teaching them in accordance with their capacities for understanding Buddhist doctrine. Because the students initially are unaware of the benefits to be had from the instruction, the teacher must guide them with great care and patience. Āryadeva says:

> 8. The teacher who desires to benefit
> him must pay attention to a student.[11]
> Since he does not understand the benefit,
> therefore he is called "a student."

Several times Āryadeva utilizes the analogy of illness and treatment in describing the actions of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. He says:

> 9. Just as a physician is not disturbed
> by someone who is possessed by a demon,
> even though he is angry [at the physician],
> the Sage sees the affliction (*kleśa*) as
> the enemy, not the individual who has the
> affliction.

Moreover, in the same way as a physician carefully makes his diagnosis of a patient's illness, a Bodhisattva must investigate the character of a prospective student.

Āryadeva says:

> 10. He must examine first whatever someone takes pleasure in. Someone who is weak is never a vessel for the pure teaching.[12]

A teacher ought to tailor the instruction to fit the needs and capabilities of each student. For example, those who are afflicted by greed will dislike teachings on generosity (dāna). They should be taught instead moral conduct (śīla).[13] A teacher gradually introduces the student to the Buddha's teachings, and he imparts the most profound of these teachings only after he is certain that the student is able to comprehend them (CŚṬ D f.97a, P f.106a).

Āryadeva encourages the Bodhisattva to equal a mother's love and compassion for a sick child when engaged in teaching those who are less intelligent. He says:

> 11. In the same way as a mother especially feels pain for a child tormented by illness, a Bodhisattva's love exists especially for those who are inferior.

Compassion takes the form of removing the suffering of others. Bodhisattvas surpass all others in this activity, since they possess great compassion (mahākaruṇā) for sentient beings who suffer the pains of defilement (saṃkleśa) and bad rebirths (CŚṬ D f.97b, P f.106b).

Āryadeva in the next verse reiterates his belief that a Bodhisattva must use various methods for liberation, each adapted to the individual student's situation. He says:

12. One becomes someone's student; one becomes someone's teacher. By various methods, sentient beings who do not understand [the truth] are made to understand.

Moreover,

13. Just as it is rare for a skilled physician not to cure patients, it is very rare for a Bodhisattva who has acquired the power [for training] not to have disciples.

The Bodhisattva who increases his skill in the methods for liberation, in the ways of attracting (saṃgrahavastu)[14] students, and also understands the higher and lower faculties (indriyaparāparajñānatā)[15] of others rarely lacks disciples (CŚṬ D f.98a-b, P f.107b).

Āryadeva stresses also the importance of a Bodhisattva's energetic activity in encouraging other sentient beings to seek enlightenment. He says:

14. If someone within a Bodhisattva's realm, without being inspired, were to go to a bad rebirth, then other intelligent people would blame him.[16]

If a Bodhisattva's encouragement prevents people from incurring bad rebirths, then whenever a Bodhisattva, who has taken a vow to benefit all sentient beings, fails to inspire others, he weakens his vow. Other Bodhisattvas will censure him (CŚṬ D f.98b, P f.108a).

In the following verse Āryadeva once again exhorts the Bodhisattva to be loving and compassionate towards others. He asks:

> 15. How does someone who does not
> acknowledge that compassion towards
> others, who are oppressed, is good give
> gifts with love to the protectorless?

Then the questioner asks: What about those who are made ill by pain and become angry at Bodhisattvas? (CŚṬ D f.99a, P f.109a). Āryadeva answers:

> 16. If those who are indifferent
> (madhyastha) to someone who remains as
> long as the world exists, for the purpose
> of benefiting sentient beings, incur
> misfortune, how much more so for those
> who are angry!

Those who are indifferent to Bodhisattvas--who are fields for merit and who enable all sentient beings to attain the sphere of Nirvāṇa without substratum (nirupādhiśeṣa)[17]--and consequently do not accumulate merit by honoring and giving gifts to them, will be destroyed. Why even bother

to speak of those who become angry at Bodhisattvas? They will certainly incur great misfortune! (CŚṬ D f.99b, P f.109a).

What, the questioner asks, is the most difficult thing to do for these Bodhisattvas who possess both merit and knowledge? (CŚṬ D f.100a-b, P f.110a). Āryadeva replies that it is difficult for a Bodhisattva to be reborn in one of the inferior realms. He says:

17. Someone who has all five super-
knowledges (abhijñā)[18] in all births
and in an inferior one has an existence
seen as inferior [i.e., as a dog][19]--
this is very difficult to do.

In the next verse Āryadeva speaks about the vast amount of merit that a Bodhisattva acquires over the years. He says:

18. The Tathāgata has said that even the
omniscient can not measure that merit
which has accumulated over a very long
time through [skill in] the methods for
liberation.

Aided by their skill in the methods for liberation, Bodhisattvas effortlessly accomplish things that are difficult to do. Because the merit that has piled up over countless eons through their skill in the methods for liberation is as vast as the sky, even the omniscient are unable to measure it (CŚṬ D f.102, P f.112a).

The questioner asks: Why in such texts as the Birth Stories (Jātaka) is talk of generosity more pleasing to a Bodhisattva than anything else? (CŚṬ D f.102a, P f.112a). Āryadeva replies:

19. The word "giving" illumines death,
the teaching and other existences.
Therefore the word "giving" continually
pleases a Bodhisattva.[20]

Talk about "giving" illumines death, since an individual's future birth follows as a direct result of actions undertaken in the present life. The action of giving epitomizes Buddhist doctrine, for the three types of giving encompass all six perfections (pāramitā). The gift of material things is associated with the perfection of generosity; the gift of security is associated with the perfection of moral conduct and the perfection of patience (kṣānti); and the gift of teaching the doctrine is associated with the perfections of meditation (dhyāna) and insight (prajñā).[21] All three involve the perfection of vigor (vīrya) (CŚṬ D f.102a-b, P f.112b).

The questioner points out that while the generosity of a Bodhisattva may be limitless, this is not true of other people (CŚṬ D f.102b, P f.113a). Āryadeva criticizes people whose generosity is motivated by the anticipation of rewards in future existences:

20. When it has been said that a great
result will occur from giving a gift,[22]
receiving and giving will be criticized
as similar to profiting through trade.

The merit that a Bodhisattva builds up over time through generous and altruistic actions cancels out the maturation of past non-virtuous actions. It does not in any way hinder a Bodhisattva in his efforts to help sentient beings. Āryadeva says:

21. It should not be said that someone
who has virtuous karma will not accomplish
[benefits for others], for although evil
committed earlier still exists, it does
not [mature].[23]

In the same way as an ounce of salt has no effect on the taste of water from the river Ganges, a small amount of bad karma can not counteract the great power of vast roots of virtue (CŚṬ D f.103a-b, P f.113b).[24]

If the Bodhisattva does not regress because of his virtue, the questioner asks, why does he not enter Nirvāṇa? (CŚṬ D f.103b, P f.113b). Āryadeva responds:

22. There is no harm for someone who
has a powerful mind, even in this world.[25]
Therefore there is no difference between
cyclic existence and Nirvāṇa for him.[26]

A powerful mind is one which has the property of not

regressing (avaivartika). Moreover, since neither the suffering which the afflictions bring about nor the pains of birth, old age, sickness, and death harm a Bodhisattva, he finds no difference between cyclic existence and Nirvāṇa. (CŚṬ D f.103b, P f.113b).

The questioner asks: After acquiring the initial intention, why do Bodhisattvas usually appear as powerful persons? (CŚṬ D ff.103b-104a, P f.114a). In response Āryadeva poses the following rhetorical question:

> 23. Why shouldn't someone who in
> all lifetimes is born precisely on
> account of control over mind become
> a ruler over the entire world?[27]

Moreover, he argues:

> 24. Even in this world some superior
> beings appear greater than [other]
> superior beings. Therefore you ought
> to understand that the Tathagata's
> inconceivable power certainly exists.

Just as the brahmin is considered the best of all the castes, the state of neither conception nor non-conception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana)[28] is considered the best place of birth, Meru is held as the best of all mountains, and the universal monarch as the best of all kings, omniscience therefore is thought to be the best of all types of knowledge. Furthermore, from the best of causes comes the

best of effects. From the great deeds of the Bodhisattvas come the Tathāgatas (CŚṬ D f.105a-b, P f.116).[29]

A few questions remain after this lengthy discussion of the Bodhisattva's career. Why, the questioner asks, do sentient beings primarily fear the Mahāyāna, and why do they not respect those distinguished by the powers just mentioned? (CŚṬ D ff.105b-106a, P f.116b). Āryadeva categorizes those who fear the Mahāyāna as weak and as fools. He concludes this chapter by saying:

> 25. Just as fools fear the very profound
> teaching, so the weak greatly fear the
> most excellent teaching.[30]

CHAPTER V

NOTES

[1]Cf. rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs snying po, chapter 5, p.1: dman pa'i rigs can rnams 'khor ba la skyo nas thar pa don du gnyer zhig / theg pa chen po'i rigs can rnams snying rje chen po bskyed de sangs rgyas don du dnyer ba'i rgyu 'di dag gang las rnyed ce na / "Someone asks: Where can reasons be found for those who have an inferior lineage to become disgusted with cyclic existence and seek liberation and for those who have the Mahāyāna lineage to produce great compassion and seek to become a Buddha?"

[2]The fourteen unexplained points (caturdaśavyākṛtavastūni) consist of the four positions of the tetralemma being applied to the question of coupling the world with the description 'eternal' or 'finite', the Tathāgata with 'existence after death,' and reducing the relationship between 'life-force' (jīva) and 'body' to terms of identity or difference.

In the Pali canon see Dīgha, I, pp.187-188; Majjhima, I, pp.157, 426, 484; Saṃyutta, III, pp.213-216, 258; Saṃyutta, IV, pp.286, 391-392; Saṃyutta, V, p.418.

Cf. Ratnāvalī, II, v.6, vv.8-15 and MMK XXVII v.1, vv.15-20 on eternality and the individual, v.2, vv.21-28 on finiteness and the world, XXII vv.13-16 on the Tathāgata's

existence after death, and XXVII vv.4-8 on the identity or difference between the self and appropriation (upādāna).

Cf. also Lamotte Traité, I, pp.154-158, 421-423, 529; Traité, III, pp.1682-1683. Traité, I, p.154 note 1 provides additional references.

[3]Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.54 adds: dri ba po rnams zab mo'i snod ma yin pas rtag chag dang bral ba'i stong pa nyid kyang ston par mi mdzad do / "Because the questioners were not vessels for the profound [teaching], he did not teach Emptiness, which is free from the extreme views, eternalism and nihilism." He cites a passage from the Ratnāvalī in support of this position:

'jig rten mtha' dang ldan nam zhes //
zhus nas rgyal ba mi gsung bzhungs //
gang phyir de ltar zab mo'i chos //
stod min 'gro la mi gsung ba //

"After he was asked if the world had an end, the Jina did not speak, since he does not talk about the profound doctrine to sentient beings who are not [fit] vessels." The passage which Red mda' ba cites corresponds to VV. 73cd and 74cd in Tucci's edition of the Sanskirt text:

nivṛtes tena lokasya nopaity ūnatvam arthataḥ /
antavān iti lokaś ca pṛṣṭas tūṣṇīṃ jino 'bhavat //
sarvajña iti sarvajño budhais tenaiva gamyate /
yenaitad dharmagāmbhīryaṃ novācābhājane loke //

"Consequently the depletion of the world is actually implied because of the cessation of activity. And when asked whether the world had an end, the Jina was silent. Since he did not speak about this profound doctrine to people who were not [fit] vessels, therefore the wise know that the All-Knowing One is omniscient."

Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna take the position that although the Buddha was omniscient and knew the answers, he did not respond to his questioners because he knew that a reply would not help them attain liberation. This is one interpretation of the Buddha's silence that Jayatilleke discusses in Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp.470-476. For other interpretations see Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp.36-65, Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy, pp.40-41, 80., 153-161, and Robinson, "Some methodological approaches to the unexplained points" in PEW 22 (1972):309-323.

[4]Cf. Ratnāvalī IV.73ab:

manaḥ pūrvaṅgamā dharmā manaḥśreṣṭhā iti śruteḥ /

"According to scripture it is said that 'things are preceded by mind and mind is foremost'."

The quotation is from Udānavarga XXXI 24ab:

manaḥ pūrvaṅgamā dharmā manaḥśreṣṭhā manojavāḥ //

Cf. Dhammapada V.2ab and Gāndhārī Dhammapada XIII.2.

[5]The example comes from the Upāyakauśala Sūtra. See Mark Tatz, "Candragomin and the Bodhisattva Vow" (Ph.D.

dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1978), pp.387-391 on the use of this example and other examples of skill in the techniques for liberation in Indian and Tibetan literature.

See also Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule (Louvain: Bureau du Museon, 1938), p.42*.

[6]Nāgārjuna in the Ratnāvalī, after enumerating all the actions which generate the merit that produces the thirty-two major marks of a universal monarch (II, vv.77-95), says in the first verse of chapter three that all the merit that produces these marks is insufficient to produce a Buddha's marks, for they arise from "inconceivable merit" (bsod nams bsam gyi mi khyab).

[7]This agrees with the stages given in the Daśabhūmika Sūtra, p.12 Cf. MA I.4cd-5ab.

[8]N and P have: sems can gcig 'dul po "someone who trains a single sentient being," but C and D have a variant reading: sems bskyed bcug "make someone produce the intention." All the editions of CŚṬ favor the reading of N and P: yang gang zhig sems can gzhan gcig pu byang chub kyi phyir 'dul bar byed cing..."And someone who trains just one other sentient being for enlightenment..." Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.58 gives sems bskyed bcug as a gloss on 'dul bar byed: 'ga' zhig gis byang chub kyi don du sems can gcig pu zhig sems bskyed du bcug ste 'dul bar byed na / "Someone trains a single sentient being for

the purpose of enlightenment, i.e., makes him produce the intention."

[9] Akaniṣṭha (Pali: Akaniṭṭha) is the fifth and highest of the pure realms (śuddhāvāsa) in the sphere of subtle matter (rūpaloka). See Dīgha, III, p.237. The Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, II, p.527 says: tasmād ūrdhvaṃ na punaḥ sthānam asti / ata eva jyeṣṭhabhūtvād akaniṣṭha ucyate / "There are no realms above it. For that very reason, and because it is the best, it is called 'none-lower' (akaniṣṭha).

[10] Cf. Aṣṭa, pp.62-70.

[11] Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.58 offers the following suggestions to prospective teachers: dang por rang la dad par bya ba'i phyir slob ma la sbyin pa snyan par smra pa la sogs pa yis sri zhu bya zhing / dad par gyur pa na phyis skal pa dang 'tshams pa'i gdams pa dang rjes su gzung bar bya ste / "At first he must indulge the student with gifts and kind words, etc., in order to create trust in himself. Once trust exists, he must help him with advice and instruction appropriate for his mental capacity."

[12] See Saṃyutta, I, p.136; Majjhima, I, p.487, and compare Ratnāvalī I.74-77, II.18-20.

According to the Śikṣāsamuccaya (p.67) teaching the doctrine of emptiness to those who are unprepared to receive it is a great sin (mūlāpatti).

[13]Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga (III, p.87ff.) offers similar advice.

[14]The saṃgrahavastūni include generosity (dāna), gentle speech (priyavacanam), service for others' benefit (arthacaryā), and striving for a common goal (samānārthatā). See Ratnāvalī II.33.

Dīgha, III, p.152 links the Tathāgata's use of these ways of attracting followers with two of thirty-two marks: webbed hands and feet (jālahatthapāda) and soft and tender hands and feet (mudutaluṇahatthapāda). However, Ratnāvalī II.79 links them with only the first:

sbyin dang snyan pa'i tshig dang ni /
phan dang don gcig spyod pa yis /
dpal ldan phyag sor dra ba yis /
'brel ba'i phyag ris can du 'gyur /

"Through gifts, gentle words, beneficial uniform conduct, one will have hands whose splendid fingers are connected by webs."

The Pañcaviṃśati also includes a discussion of the saṃgrahavastūni in its treatment of the thirty-two marks (Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, pp.578-580, 586, 664-665).

[15]Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, p.176 n.3 says: This cognition is mentioned on p.210 as the fifth of the powers of a Tathāgata. Through it the Tathāgata, and also to a lesser degree the Bodhisattva, knows to what extent a

a person's spiritual faculties, or organs, are developed, whether they are dull or keen, and which one of them predominates. This knowledge helps him to save beings."

[16]Cf. Aṣṭa pp.234-235 and Pañcaviṃśati, pp.40-42.

[17]The elimination of the substratum for continued existence (upadhi, Pali: upādi), i.e., the aggregates, characterizes Nirvāṇa without substratum (nirupadhiśeṣa, anupadhiśeṣa). See Aṅguttara, IV, p.118, Dīgha, II, p.140.

Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy, p.70ff. examines the Pali canon's account of the two aspects of Nirvāṇa. Candrakīrti in PP 519.6-520.9 (Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, pp.183-185; Sprung, Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way, pp.247-248) presents his views on this distinction between Nirvāṇa with substratum and without substratum. According to PP 497.4-8 the proper apprehension of emptiness brings about Nirvāṇa without substratum.

May, Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, p.232 n.812 cites additional references.

[18]The five superknowledges (abhijñā, Pali: abiññā) are: magic powers (ṛddhi), the divine eye (divyacakṣus), the divine ear (divyaśrotas), knowledge of others' thoughts (paracittajñāna), and remembrance of past births (pūrvanivāsānusmṛti).

Cf. Lamotte Traité, I, pp.238-333, and IV, p.1809ff. For additional references see Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, pp.107-108.

Ratnāvalī V.81 also associates possession of the five superknowledges with helping sentient beings:

tshe rabs kun tu rjes 'brang ba'i //
mngon shes lnga po thob par shog //
sems can kun la rnam kun tu //
rtag tu phan bde bgyid par shog //

"May I obtain the five superknowledges throughout all lifetimes. May I always provide benefits and happiness in every way to all sentient beings."

[19]Candrakīrti's commentary (D f.101a-b, P f.110a-b) cites an abbreviated version of the Kukkura Jātaka (Fausbøll, pp.175-178). The Bodhisattva, reborn as a dog, prevents an angry king from slaughtering all the city dogs and instructs the king in Buddhist teaching so that henceforth the king protects the lives of all sentient beings within his kingdom.

While the Pali version of the Kukkara Jātaka attributes the Bodhisattva's birth as a dog to the maturation of his past karma, Candrakīrti says: byang chub sems dpa' 'ga' zhig tu khyi rnams la ma 'ongs pa'i gnod pa dag rig par byas nas khyi'i skyes gnas su zhus so // "Once the Bodhisattva knew that in the future harm would come to dogs, and he was reborn as a dog."

[20]A Bodhisattva practices generosity throughout all the stages of his career, but Daśabhūmika Sūtra, p.20 and

Ratnāvalī V.42 especially recommend the practice of generosity to a Bodhisattva on the first stage of the path. See also Lamotte, Traité, V, p.2388.

21 See Lamotte, Traité, II, pp.697-698 on the gift of teaching, pp.698-700 on the gift of material goods, and p.700 on the gift of security. On the relation of giving to the other five perfections, see p.750ff.

22 Dīgha, III, pp.258-259 lists the eight bases for giving and the eight rebirths that result from giving gifts. See also Ratnāvalī I.17 and 19, and Suhṛllekha v.6.

Compare MA I.11 and commentary in which Candrakīrti compares people who give only because it is in their own best interest to traders, and ŚS and Vasu's commentary, p.13.

23 Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.64 explains: de ltar bsod nams kyi phung po mtha' yas pa nye bar bsags pa'i byang chub sems dpa' gang la sngar so so skye bo'i gnas skabs su byas pa'i sdig pa cung zad yod pa nyid kyang dge ba stobs chen pos zil gyi mnan pas 'bras bu 'byin nas su yod pa ma yin te / "Although there is a small amount of evil that had been committed earlier when the Bodhisattva--who has [now] accumulated an unlimited quantity of merit--was an ordinary person, it is unable to produce any effect, since the great power of his virtue overwhelms it."

24 Candrakīrti's commentary (D f.103b, P f.113b) quotes Suhṛllekha v.43 with a variant reading of cd:

lan tsa srang 'gas chu ni nyung ngu zhig //
ro sgyur bgyid kyi gaṅgā'i rlung min ltar //
de bzhin sdig pa'i las kyang dge ba yi //
rtsa ba chung dang che yangs la mkhyen bgyi //

"Understand that just as an ounce of salt will change the taste of a little water, but not the river Ganges, bad karma will not affect small or vast roots of virtue."

Cf. Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.64:

de bzhin sdig pa'i las ni chung ngu yang //
dge ba'i rtsa ba yangs la mkhyen par mdzod //

"So understand that even a small amount of bad karma does not affect vast virtuous roots."

This quotation of 43cd agrees with the version contained in the Cone and Peking editions of this text.

[25]See Ratnāvalī III.21-26 in which Nagarjuna suggests that a Bodhisattva's equipment of merit (puṇyasambhāra) and knowledge (jñānasambhāra) enable him to remain in the world without experiencing physical or mental pain.

[26]Cf. Ratnāvalī I.64 and MK XXV.19-20.

[27]The Daśabhūmika Sūtra (pp.21-22) reports that a Bodhisattva on the first stage of the path usually becomes a powerful king who protects Buddhist doctrine. The fifth chapter of the Ratnāvalī (vv.41-60) also, in tracing the ascension of a Bodhisattva's career through the stages of the path, depicts him as becoming an increasingly more powerful and influential monarch in the divine spheres.

[28]The sphere of neither conception or non-conception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana, Pali: nevasaññānāsaññāyatana) is the fourth sphere of the gods who dwell in the formless realm (arūpāvacara). See Dīgha, III, p.224, 262; Majjhima, I, pp.41, 160; III, pp.28, 44. See also AKV, I, pp.152-153 (Kośa, I, pp.220-221) and AKV, IV, p.1138 (Kośa, V, pp.143-144).

[29]Candrakīrti mentions this origination of Tathāgatas from Bodhisattvas in greater detail in MA (pp.3-6).

[30]Cf. Ratnāvalī I.39-40, 76-77, 79.

CHAPTER VI

SHOWING THE METHOD FOR ABANDONING THE AFFLICTIONS

In chapter six Āryadeva addresses the problem of eliminating the three poisons (trivișa): desire (rāga), hatred (dveșa), and confusion (moha). He considers these three afflictions (kleśa) as impediments to the Bodhisattva's career, since they prevent people not only from doing what is in their own best interest, but from benefiting others as well. In this chapter Āryadeva exposes the harmful and pervasive nature of these afflictions, which are the root of all non-virtuous (akuśala) actions, and offers his own advice on the proper antidote for each of these poisons.

A Bodhisattva must endeavor to rescue all sentient beings from the cycle of birth and death. What is the reason for rebirth? The afflictions and karma bring about rebirth. For this reason those who undergo religious training (vineya) must prepare to cut off completely afflictions and karma. If this is so, someone objects, then why allow people who adopt the religious life (pravrājaka) the enjoyment of fine dwellings, food and clothing? These things all give rise to pleasure, and desire will increase because of pleasure. Therefore people who adopt the religious life should follow an

arduous path, as do the Jains. We think of the Jains as ascetics (tapasvin) because they expose themselves to the wind and sun, to heat and cold, and they endure the pain of plucking out all the hairs of the body, and so forth[1] (CŚṬ D ff.106b-107a, P ff.117b-118a).

Āryadeva agrees that pleasure will increase desire, but he doubts that severe asceticism is the proper path to take. He suggests that it will lead only to pain and anger. He says:

> 1. Desire increases because of pleasure,
> and hatred increases because of pain.
> Why is a happy person not an ascetic,
> and why is an unhappy person an ascetic?[2]

Since pleasure increases desire, and if we repudiate all sources for experiencing pleasure, then why shouldn't we repudiate all sources for experiencing pain, inasmuch as they increase hatred? Why don't ascetics experience pleasure, and why do they experience only pain? The flames of both afflictions, desire and hatred, torment ascetics. The superimposition (adhyāropa) of the characteristics 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' produces desire or hatred. Though we experience sense objects as pleasant or painful, it is not logically possible that desire arises in reality, for it would follow then that it would arise even in those who are free of desires (vairāgya).

The Buddha taught the qualities of asceticism (dhūtaguṇa)[3] and penance (saṃlekha)[4] so that people whose dispositions are influenced by desire might counteract their enjoyment of pleasurable experiences. But he allowed people whose dispositions are influenced by hatred to enjoy fine dwellings, etc., as a means of overcoming their hatred. We consider the Buddha an ascetic, since he has the power to subdue all these afflictions through his skill in the methods for liberation. However, these afflictions constantly torture non-Buddhists, and therefore they are not true ascetics (CŚṬ D f.107a-b, P f.118a-b).

Āryadeva identifies the actions that are associated with each of these afflictions:

2. The action of desire is accumulation;
the action of hatred is discord. The
action of confusion sustains [both],[5]
just as wind sustains all the elements.

The opponent concedes that there are methods for removing the afflictions, but why, he asks, must they be removed (CŚṬ D f.109a, P f.120 a)? Āryadeva replies that these afflictions cause pain:

3. Desire is pain on account of
separation [from the desired object].
Hatred is pain on account of a lack
of power.[6] Confusion is pain on account
of a lack of understanding.

Desire becomes painful when the desired objects cannot be acquired. Hatred becomes painful when one cannot triumph over someone else who is more powerful. Ignorance becomes painful when the subtleties of things (dharma) are not understood (CŚṬ D f.109a, P f.120a).

The opponent inquires: Is there any connection between desire and hatred in the same way as we observe a connection between confusion and both desire and hatred (CŚṬ D f.109b, P f.120b)? Āryadeva responds that desire and hatred are mutually incompatible:

> 4. In the same way as we observe that
> there is no connection between phlegm
> and bile, we observe that there is no
> connection between desire and hatred.

Both desire and hatred may characterize a student's disposition. Āryadeva suggests that an experienced teacher will recognize which character trait dominates and will then apply the appropriate countermeasure so that its malign influence will cease. He says:

> 5. [A student under the influence of]
> desire should be treated like a servant,
> since harshness is an antidote to it.
> [A student under the influence of]
> hatred should be treated like a king,
> since kindness is an antidote to it.

Students whose dispositions incline towards desire should be bound into service like slaves, since harshness is an antidote to desire. If they are treated unkindly, there will be no occasion for desire to arise. On the other hand, students whose dispositions incline towards hatred should be treated like lords, since kindness is an antidote to hatred. If they are given abundant food and clothing, there will be no occasion for hatred to arise (CŚṬ D f.110a, P f.121a-b).

Each affliction may torment a single individual in the course of a day. Āryadeva says:

> 6. At first confusion arises, in the middle hatred arises, and in the end desire arises. Gradually throughout the day all three arise.

Early in the morning, while people are still sleepy, ignorance predominates. In the middle of the day, the cycle of pain that hatred sets in motion operates, for the pain of hunger and thirst provokes anger. Later in the evening, after fatigue has passed, and the senses have been appeased, desire arises (CŚṬ D f.110b, P ff. 121b-122a).

Āryadeva warns of the deceptive nature of desire:

> 7. Desire--which is an enemy--[7] appears as a friend. Consequently you do not fear it. But shouldn't people especially repudiate a harmful friend?

People perceive each of the three afflictions differently. Desire, hatred, and confusion appear as a friend, an enemy, and a neutral party, respectively. Hatred approaches people as an enemy, and because it is appropriate for hatred to seem harmful, it is easy to protect ourselves from it. Confusion approaches people in a neutral manner, and because the mind has no confidence in it, it is easy to protect ourselves from ignorance. However, desire--which is not a friend--approaches people as if it were a friend. Because desire damages a virtuous life-faculty (jivendriya)[8], and because it is so harmful, it is necessary especially to protect ourselves from it (CŚṬ D f.111a, P f.122b).

How, the opponent asks, does desire arise (CŚṬ D f.111b, P f.123a)? Āryadeva replies:

> 8. Desire arises from causes (hetu) and
> conditions (pratyaya). The desire that
> arises from conditions is easy to suppress;
> the other is not.

Desire that arises from a cause has an identity inherited from past births, and the nature of its cause is a habitual tendency (anuśaya)[9] towards desire. Someone inclines towards desire in this present life because a cause had been created in a past lifetime. Furthermore, the karma produced by someone who inclines towards desire in this present life will continue to exist even after the termination of his current lifespan. However, someone

may be inclined towards desire because of the influence of a bad friend. This desire has arisen from a particular condition, and when the condition no longer exists, the desire also will not arise. But the other kind of desire is difficult to remove, since its root is deep. Consequently, great effort is necessary to eradicate it (CŚṬ D f.111b, P f.123a-b).

The same distinctions apply to hatred also. Āryadeva says:

> 9. Certainly, great evil is done
> while [someone is] steadfast in hatred.
> So through understanding the differences
> in kind in each case, the afflictions
> will cease.

Now the opponent requests an explanation of the characteristics of ignorance (CŚṬ D f.112b, P f.124b). Āryadeva replies:

> 10. In the same way as the bodily
> sense faculty (kāyendriya) dwells in
> the body, confusion dwells in all.
> Therefore by conquering confusion all
> the afflictions will be conquered.

Things that have originated in interdependence (pratītyasamutpanna) are empty (śūnya) because of the fact that they lack a nature of their own. The delusion that arises from conceiving these things to be real is the result of superimposing a real own nature on these things. Confusion

constructs and superimposes such distinctions as 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' on the nature of things. Desire and hatred differ from confusion, but they arise in dependence upon it. In the same way as the visual sense faculty (caksurindriya), etc., while different from the bodily sense faculty, arises in dependence upon it, all other afflictions arise in dependence on confusion. All the other faculties will weaken when the bodily sense faculty weakens. Similarly, meditation on interdependent origination removes confusion, and without this as their basis all the other afflictions will cease[10] (CŚṬ D ff.112b-113a, P ff.124b-125a).

How is ignorance to be abandoned the opponent asks (CŚṬ D f.113a, P f.125a)? Āryadeva answers:

> 11. If interdependent origination
> were understood, ignorance would not
> arise. Therefore with every effort
> the very teaching here should be
> proclaimed.

Just as if a sprout were to exist by its own nature, it would not be dependent upon conditions, similarly, if karmic constructions (saṃskāra) were to exist by their own nature, they would not be dependent upon the aggregation of causes and conditions, namely, a seed and ignorance respectively. Consequently, when interdependent origination is perceived correctly, ignorance will cease.

When ignorance ceases, then desire, which depends upon it, will also cease (CŚṬ D f.113a-b, P f.125a-b).

You talk about the method for removing desire, but how, the opponent asks, can we recognize which sentient beings are inclined towards desire (CŚṬ D f.113b, P f.125b)? Āryadeva replies:

12. We perceive in a person who has
desire characteristics such as these:
someone who resembles a king, always
enjoying himself, a donor, a gourmand,
and immaculate [in dress].[11]

Now that you have described the characteristics of people who are inclined towards desire, the opponent says, you ought to speak about the method for disciplining these people (CŚṬ D f.114a, P f.126a). Āryadeva says in reply:

13. The Buddhas say to someone who has
desire: "Everyone should abandon fine
food, clothing, and dwellings, and
remain constantly in the presence of
a teacher."

The Buddha prescribed twelve ascetic practices (dhūtaguṇa) for people who are influenced by desire. As an antidote for attachment to fine dwellings, he recommended living in the forest (āraṇyaka), living under a tree (vṛkṣamūlika), living in the open air, (ābhyavakāśika), or living in a

cemetary (*śmāśānika*). He recommended sleeping in a seated position (*naiṣadhika*) or being content with any available mat (*yāthāsaṃstanika*) as antidotes for attachment to fine beds. Begging for alms (*paiṇḍapātīka*), eating at one sitting (*aikāsanika*), and not eating food after the time to cease (*khalu paścad bhaktika*) are all antidotes for attachment to food. He advises people who are attached to fine clothing to wear only three robes (*traicīvarika*), robes from a dust heap (*pāṃśukūlika*), or felt robes (*nāmatika*). By following this advice students will find themselves inclined towards Nirvāṇa. Moreover, anyone who is under the influence of desire should remain near a teacher, since aided by a teacher's constant encouragement, he will curb his desires (CŚṬ D f.114a-b, P f.126a-b).

In the next few verses Āryadeva discusses hatred. He says:

> 14. It is said that someone who lacks
> the power [to harm others] can only
> make an ugly face when angry, but someone
> who has the power, and is merciless, is
> far worse!

Someone who has no power to harm others may frown when angry. However, someone who has the power to harm others, and is also merciless, is far worse, since taking life does far more damage (CŚṬ D f.115a, P f.127a).

Āryadeva reminds the opponent of the benefits of hearing abusive language:

15. It is said that harsh words bring evil done earlier to an end. But while deluded, no one desires to purge his own sins.[13]

You become angry at hearing harsh words, but your anger towards someone else is the wrong attitude, since even hearing harsh words will bring bad karma that has been accumulated in the past to fruition. The exhaustion of bad karma leads to purity (CŚṬ D f.115b, P f.127a).

Moreover:

16. What is unpleasant to hear does no harm by its own nature. Therefore what has arisen from conceptual construction is supposed to have arisen from something else.

Harsh words do no harm by their own nature. If they were harmful by their very nature, wouldn't they then also harm the people who utter them? The harm arises from conceptual construction, for example, you say "He criticizes me." Therefore the harm exists in your very own conceptual construction, so why be angry at someone else (CŚṬ D f.115b, P f.127b)?

The opponent now argues that treatises on social mores sanction the punishment of abusive people (CŚṬ D f.115b,

P f.128a).[14] Āryadeva turns the question back at the opponent:

17. In the same way as it is said that an abusive person will be punished,[15] why won't someone who speaks kindly be honored?

The opponent tries a different approach. Why, he asks, shouldn't we be angry at someone who reveals his criticism of us to another person (CŚṬ D f.116a, P f.128a)? Āryadeva responds:

18. Even though you do not mention [your] faults,[16] if someone else knows, it is wrong to be angry at the person who spoke [about them]. How much more so about talk that is incorrect!

Even if such disparaging remarks as 'blind' or 'lame' are not made, others will know about these defects. If someone speaks the truth, it is wrong to be angry at him. It is even worse to be angry at someone who tells lies, for this person will harm himself (CŚṬ D f.116a, P f.128b).[17]

The opponent concedes that that may be true, but asks: Why shouldn't someone be angry at hearing abusive language from someone who is inferior to him (CŚṬ D f.116b, P f.129a)? Āryadeva answers:

19. There is no escaping the so-called abuse from an inferior.

Therefore view whatever comes from
an inferior as isolated and petty.

There is no way to avoid hearing abusive language from people who delight in tormenting others. Everything that you might do would be in vain. If this person is content just to use abusive language, and not to beat or kill, you should be glad. Why resort to anger (CŚṬ D f.116b, P f.129a)?

Why is is wrong, the opponent objects, to punish someone who abuses an innocent person (CŚṬ D f.117a, P f.129b)? Āryadeva denies that harming others is justified in this case. He attacks the opponent for even suggesting that inflicting punishment could be a virtuous action:

20. Oneself does not have even the
slightest virtuous quality because of
harming others. Your admiration for
an angry person who lacks virtuous
qualities is just attachment.[18]

The opponent raises another objection. What intelligent person, he asks, would be patient with others who are abusive and are devoid of any virtuous qualities (CŚṬ D f.117b, P f.130a)? Āryadeva questions the intelligence of anyone who would denigrate the virtues of patience. He says:

21. If great merit were obtained
effortlessly through patience,[19]

and if someone were to create an impediment to that, what fool is his equal?

Furthermore:

22. Anger is not generated towards those who are powerful and superior. Therefore why do you admire someone who is angry and oppresses others?[20]

Now the opponent retorts that people will take advantage of a patient person, for they will assume that he would not retaliate. Therefore in order to avoid being held in contempt by other people, he argues, if the situation calls for an angry response, anger is then appropriate (CŚṬ D f.118b, P f.131a). Āryadeva disagrees:

23. You should cultivate patience towards someone who is angry. It is just foolhardy for you to fear a situation for [accumulating] virtuous qualities.

Patience is the proper antidote for anger. By concentrating on a situation that might provoke anger and cultivating love (<u>maitrī</u>) instead, a meditator will acquire eight virtuous qualities: Gods and humans will be fond of him, gods will protect him, he will experience great pleasure, neither poison nor weapons will affect his body, his wealth will increase effortlessly, and after

his death he will be reborn in the heaven of Brahmā[21] (CŚṬ D f.118b, P f.131b).

Nonetheless, the opponent points out, it is difficult for powerful persons to tolerate contempt from their inferiors, and consequently it is appropriate for them to inflict punishment (CŚṬ D f.119a, P f.132a). Āryadeva replies that it is useless to attempt to quell all criticism. He advises his opponent that it would be better to ignore it. He says:

> 24. Who, after putting an end to all
> contempt, goes on to the next world?[22]
> Therefore you should consider that
> [enduring] scorn is better than
> [retaliating with] evil.[23]

Āryadeva concludes this chapter by indicating the proper method for removing the afflictions:

> 25. Afflictions never persist in the
> mind of someone who understands correctly
> the abiding, etc., of consciousness.[24]

Consciousness depends upon the conditions of arising, abiding, and ceasing. However, because these three conditions have no nature of their own, consciousness also lacks a nature of its own and is thus like a magic illusion (māyā). All three worlds, furthermore, are conceptual constructions and are empty. This is the knowledge that destroys the afflictions (CŚṬ D ff.119b-120a, P f.132b-133a).

CHAPTER VI

NOTES

[1]Compare the ascetic practices given in Dīgha, I, p.166; Majjhima, I, p.342; Aṅguttara, I, p.295, II, p.206. The Buddha in Majjhima, I, pp.77-78 says that prior to his enlightenment he also followed some of these practices.

[2]See the discussion between the Jain ascetic and the Buddha on this topic in Majjhima, I, pp.93-94. The Visuddhimagga, p.48ff. enumerates thirteen ascetic practices which meditators might undertake to acquire such qualities as having few desires and contentment (appicchatāsantuṭṭhitādi): wearing robes from the dust heap (paṃsukūla), wearing three robes (tecīvarika), begging for alms (piṇḍapātika) begging without interruption from one house to the next (sapadānacarika), eating at one sitting (ekasanika), eating alms from one bowl (pattapiṇḍika), not eating after the appointed time (khalupacchābhattika), living in the forest (araññika), living under a tree (rukkamūlika), living in the open air (abhokāsika), living in a cemetary (susānika), accepting whatever mat is available (yathāsanthatika), and sleeping in a seated position (nesajjika). This same motive for practicing asceticism and the same thirteen practices occur in the Vimuttimagga (The Path of Freedom, trans. N. R. Ehara, Soma Thera, and Kheminda

Thera, [Colombo: Weesuria, 1961] , pp.27-28). However, the sixth chapter of the *Milindapañha* gives the attainment of the six superknowledges (*abhijñā*) as the motivation for undertaking these practices (p.359).

The *Suttas* mention these thirteen ascetic practices, but never together in the same passage. *Aṅguttara*, III, pp.219-220 cites ten of these practices omitting only *tecīvarika*, *piṇḍapātika*, and *sapadānacarika*, and notes that the best motivation for engaging in these practices is to have few desires, etc. Cf. *Aṅguttara*, I p.38; *Majjhima*, I, pp.282-282, II, p.7 and III, pp.41-42.

See also note 12 below.

[4]Cf. the *Candrapradīpasūtra*, quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p.354:

yadi duḥśīlān pasyesi pariṣāyāṃ bahūn sthitān /
saṃlekhaṃ mā prabhāṣes tvaṃ varṇaṃ dānasya kīrtayeḥ //
bhaveyur yadi cālpeccaḥ śuddhāḥ śīle pratiṣṭhitāḥ /
maitraṃ cittaṃ janitvā tvaṃ kuryāḥ sāṃlekhikīṃ kāthaṃ //

"If you see many immoral people standing in the assembly, you should not speak about penance. You should speak in praise of generosity. If there are people who desires are few, who are pure, and firmly grounded in moral conduct, then after generating benevolent thoughts, you should talk about penance."

[5]Cf. *Satyasiddhi*, I, pp.303-304, II, pp.282-282.

[6]CPN and P all read spungs 'heap'; however in this instance, I've followed the commentaries of Red mda' ba, rGyal tshab, gZhan dga', and mDo sngags in reading dpung "army." The Sanskirt original of the CŚ likely had the term "bala," which has the dual sense of "army" and "power," a double meaning that the one-sided translation of dpung fails to convey. In Pali also bala has this double meaning. Dhammapada v.399 plays on both senses:

khantibalaṃ balānikaṃ taṃ ahaṃ brūmi brāhmaṇam //
"I call him a brahmin whose strength is patience, whose army is strength."

[7]See Aṅguttara, IV, p.145. This passage names lust as one of the enemies that someone must slay prior to becoming known as an arahant. Cf. Visuddhimagga p.163: yasmā rāgādisaṅkhātā sabbe pi arayo hatā paññāsatthena Nāthena tasma pi arahan mato ti. Since the Lord slew all the enemies, beginning with desire, with the sword of insight, therefore he is considered an arahant. Lamotte, Traité, I, p.127 also explains the etymology of arhat as being derived from slaying (han) the enemies (ari), and identifies the enemies as the afflictions.

[8]jivendriya (Pali: jīvitindriya) is the faculty that sustains an individual's life from the moment of birth to the moment of death. This faculty is mentioned briefly in Saṃyutta, V, p.204 and its function described

in some detail in the Dhammasaṅgāṇi, p.19 (trans. Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychological Ethics, London: PTS, 3rd edition, 1974 p.16).

See also AK II 10a which associates this faculty with the maturation of karma and AKV pp.151-154 (trans. LVP, Kośa, I, pp.120-124).

[9]sensual desire (kāmarāga) ranks first among seven habitual tendancies. See Dīgha, III, 254, 282; Aṅguttara, IV, p.9; Saṃyutta, V, p.60. See also Traité, I, p.113.

The Visuddhimagga describes the habitual tendency of sensual desire in much the same manner as Candrakīrti's CŚṬ, p.587: te hi thāmagatatta punappunan kāmarāgādīnām uppattihetubhāvena anusenti yevā ti anusayā. "These are known as habitual tendencies, for because of their steadfastness, they tend to recur again and again by being the cause for the arising of sensual desire, etc."

[10]mDo sngags, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i tshig don, pp. 93-94: bye brag dbye na gang zag tu bden par 'dzin pa'i rmongs pa ni nyon sgrib kyi rtsa bar 'gyur ba dang / chos su bden par 'dzin pa'i rmongs pa ni shes sgrib kyi rtsa bar 'jog pa'i tshul gzhung lugs chen po'i dgongs pa yin pas des chog par sems so // "Specifically, since the main intention of the text is to demonstrate how to put an end to ignorance which apprehends the individual as real, which is the root of the obscuration concerning the afflictions (kleśāvaraṇa), and the ignorance which apprehends things

(dharma) as real, which is the root of the obscuration concerning objects of knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa), this [namely, removing only ignorance] is considered sufficient."

[11]Cf. Satyasiddhi, I, p.296, II, p.273.

[12]The same twelve ascetic practices occur in Aṣṭa p.387. See Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine, pp.134-138 for for additional references.

[13]Cf. Satyasiddhi, I, p.296, II, p.273; Ratnāvalī III.71.

[14]See, for example, Manu Smṛti, VIII.267-278.

[15]Cf. Aṅguttara, II, p.3, V, p.171; Saṃyutta, I, p.149, Udānavarga, VII.1ff., and Suttanipāta, v.657 ff.

[16]Or following the commentaries of Red mda'ba, rGyal tshab, gZhan dga', and mDo sngags "Even though your faults are not mentioned" (khyod kyi smad bya ma smras kyang).

[17]Cf. Satyasiddhi, I, p.301, II, p.278.

[18]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap. 6, p.20 explains: "attachment to error" (phyin ci log la zhen pa).

[19]Lamotte Traité, II, p.865 says: "Le Bodhisattva qui exerce la patience à l'endroit des êtres obtient un mérite immense (apramāṇyapuṇya)."

[20]Or following the commentaries of gZhan dga' and mDo sngags "oppresses the weak (zhan)." Red mda' ba's and rGyal tshab's commentaries both read zhen pa, which makes little sense in this context and is likely an error for zhan pa.

[21]Cf. Ratnavālī. III.84-85.

lha mi dga' bar 'gyur ba dang //
de dag kyang ni bsrung ba dang //
yid bde ba dang bde mang dang //
dug dang mtshon gyis mi tshugs dang //
'bad med par don 'thob dang //
tshang pa'i 'jig rten skye 'gyur te //
gal te grol bar ma gyur kyang //
byams chos yon tan brgyad 'thob bo //

"Even if liberation does not occur,
Love will secure eight qualities : gods
and men will be benevolent; they will
offer protection; much mental and physical
pleasure will come about; poison and
weapons will do no harm; wealth will be
obtained effortlessly; and one will be
reborn in the heaven of Brahmā."

Cf. Aṅguttara, V, p.342, which lists eleven advantages gained by cultivating love (metta).

[22]Cf. Udānavarga XXIX.45:

nindanti tūṣṇīm āsīnaṃ nindanti bahubhāṣiṇaṃ /
alpabhāṇiṃ ca nindanti nāsti lokeṣv aninditaḥ //

"They criticize someone who remains silent. They criticize someone who speaks too much. They criticize someone who speaks too little. There is no one among the people

who is not criticized." Cf. Dhammapada XVII.7, Gāndhārī Dhammapada XIV.4.

[23]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap.6, p.15 says: gnod lan byas pas sdig pa bsags nas ngan 'gror 'gro bas bdag ni / dgra 'dul ba sdig pa bsags pa las brnyas pa legs so snyam tu sems pas brnyas pa bzod par bya ste / "One ought to endure contempt because it is considered better for oneself [to endure] contempt than to accumulate evil by subduing enemies, since after evil has been accumulated by doing harm in retaliation, one will undergo a bad rebirth."

[24]Āryadeva discusses these three marks in Chapter fifteen of the CŚ.

CHAPTER VII

SHOWING THE METHOD FOR ABANDONING ATTACHMENT TO THE SENSUAL PLEASURES PEOPLE DESIRE

In chapter seven Āryadeva draws attention to the suffering which people caught up in the cycle of birth and death repeatedly experience. Their attachment to the pleasures of sense objects, he points out, serves only to lengthen the period of bondage. He describes bondage in cyclic existence as a state of utter dependence and degradation, which human beings bring upon themselves through actions done in ignorance. In the previous chapter Āryadeva examined the role that the afflictions (kleśa) play in rebirth. In this chapter he focuses on the operations of karma for both afflictions and karma work together to keep this cycle of birth and death in motion.

Āryadeva opens his discussion of cyclic existence by pointedly asking his opponent why he remains unafraid of this cycle of birth and death:[1]

1. Fool! If there is no end at all to
this ocean of suffering, why are you--
who are caught up in it--not afraid?[2]

This vast ocean of suffering stretches out in all ten directions from beginningless time.[3] The combined force of the fetters (saṃyojana)[4] of ignorance, pride, and

desire allow it to persist unchecked. The sixty-two false views[5] disturb the ocean's surface, and it contains many whirlpools of birth and death. Why isn't someone who is trapped in this boundless and unfathomable ocean of suffering afraid (CŚṬ D f.120b, P ff.133b-134a)?

Someone who is infatuated with youth, etc., the opponent replies, does not fear cyclic existence (CŚṬ D f.121a, P f.134a).[6] Āryadeva reminds his opponent that youth is part of a recurring cycle:

> 2. After it has passed, youth will again
> come to the forefront. People perceive
> even existing in this world as a struggle.

We perceive that the period of youth in this present lifetime is brief, and consequently it is wrong to take pride in youth or to become infatuated with it. Youth, old age, and death each form part of a continual struggle. Birth and death supersede one another in a cycle that constantly repeats itself[7] (CŚṬ D f.121a, P f.134b).

The opponent concedes that people come into the world because it is in their nature to do so, but even so, he argues, since this coming and going is natural, why fear it (CŚṬ D f.121a, P f.134b)? Āryadeva replies:

> 3. You never go willingly into cyclic
> existence. What intelligent person is
> under another's control and is not afraid?

At no time does anyone pass through the cycle of existence

and become reborn as a human being or as a god voluntarily. One proceeds through this cycle in dependence upon karma and the afflictions (CŚṬ D f.121b, P f.135a).

Because of attachment to sensual pleasures in this present lifetime, the opponent suggests, someone may be unable to stop this passage. However, he may try to detach himself from this cycle in his next lifetime (CŚṬ D f.121b, P f.135a). Āryadeva disagrees. He insists that it is necessary to stop the operations of karma and the afflictions now, since they brought about birth in the past and will do so continuously if not checked.

> 4. The future has no end; and as in the
> past you were an ordinary person in all
> lives, so you ought to act in such a
> way that this will not happen again.

Is there an end to cyclic existence, the opponent asks, or not? If there is an end, he argues, then since it will cease automatically without any effort, any effort will be ineffective. But if there is no end, then since even if an effort is made, cyclic existence will not cease, so in this case also any effort will be ineffective. (CŚṬ D f.122a-b, P f.136a). Āryadeva denies that it is useless to try to put an end to cyclic existence. He asserts that when the conditions are right for imparting the teachings that will cause cyclic existence to cease, then it will cease. Otherwise it will continue. He says:

> 5. It is very difficult to find occuring
> the listener, the teaching, and the teacher.[8]
> Therefore, in brief, cyclic existence neither
> has an end, nor has not.

The listener is that rare individual who has the good fortune of a favorable birth (ksaṇasampad).[9] Rare also is that teaching which concurs with the experience of truth. Even if these two conditions are present, the teacher's presence, upon which they depend, is still rarer. The Buddha appears in the world as rarely as an udumbara flower.[10] When the Three Jewels--The Buddha, his community, and his teaching--are all present, it is possible to say that cyclic existence has an end, since then its end is seen. But when the Three Jewels are not present, it is impossible to say that cyclic existence has an end, since its end is not seen then (CŚṬ D f.123a, P ff.136b-137a).[11]

If both the teaching and teachers exist, then why, the opponent asks, doesn't an audience also exist (CŚṬ D f.123a, P f.137a)?[12] Āryadeva answers that, despite the persistance of Buddhist teachings and teachers, most people still maintain the wrong views and will have to suffer the consequences.[13]

He says:

> 6. People usually maintain the wrong
> positions. Consequently most ordinary
> people certainly proceed to a bad rebirth.

The opponent admits that a bad rebirth provides no occasion for pleasure, since in a bad rebirth there is no leisure time, and there is much suffering. However, merit produces a good rebirth, and people enjoy a good rebirth because they are not subject to harm. Therefore he argues that no one should reject a good rebirth (ŚṬ D f.123b, P f.137b). Āryadeva denies that a good rebirth is desirable and that harm does not occur. He says:

7. One experiences the maturation of
evil on the earth as being only injurious.
Therefore the wise see cyclic existence
as similar to a place of execution.

Even people born on earth or in heaven--both considered good rebirths--experience the maturation of bad karma. They may be born with defective limbs or in extreme poverty (CŚṬ D f.123b, P f.137b).

If the wise compare cyclic existence to a slaughter-house, the opponent says, then why don't ordinary people abhor it (CŚṬ D f.124a, P f.138a). Āryadeva responds that people who remain in cyclic existence are unable to discern the insanity of their actions. He says:

8. If someone is insane because his mind
is unstable, then what intelligent person
would say that someone who remains in cyclic
existence is not insane?

How do people stop the cycle of existence the opponent asks (CŚṬ D f.125a, P f.138b)? Āryadeva replies:

9. After seeing the pain diminished when
going, etc, has stopped, therefore an
intelligent person directs the mind
towards the exhaustion of all karma.

In the same way as the pain produced by the action of going ceases when someone stops walking, since the continuing force (āvedha) of that past action has been exhausted, all pain will cease once all karma has been destroyed. Therefore the wise seek to exhaust all karma and thereby attain Nirvāṇa (HPS p.468, CŚṬ D f.125a, P f.139a-b).

Āryadeva informs his opponent that he should turn away in fear from cyclic existence, since all the casual operations of karma are never perceived. He says:

10. When the initial cause (ādikāraṇa)
of even one effect is not perceived, then
after seeing the extent of one [effect]
who wouldn't be frightened?

When the initial cause of an effect--whether material (bhautika) or mental (caitasika)[14]--is not perceived because of the fact that the world's activity (pravṛtti) has no beginning,[15] then after seeing the extent of a single effect what person would not be afraid (HPS p.468, CŚṬ D f.125b, P f.140a)?

Moreover:

11. Every effect is not necessarily completed. But there is necessarily an end to the result. Why exert yourself on that account?

Every effect that has begun necessarily ends in success or does not. But every effect that has been successful invariably is destroyed. Why does a fool exert himself for the sake of a result that invariably is destroyed soon. Therefore one ought not get caught in the net of cyclic existence, but rather strive for its destruction (HPS p.469, CŚṬ D f.126a, P f.140a-b).

Also:

12. Action is undertaken with effort, but the result is destroyed effortlessly. Even though this is true, you are still not free of attachment to action.

Even if action is destroyed effortlessly, nevertheless, because it provides pleasure, the opponent argues, we are not free of attachment to it (HPS p.469, CŚṬ D f.126a-b, P f.141a). Āryadeva replies that all efforts to achieve such pleasure are in vain. He says:

13. There was no pleasure in the past, and there will be none in the future. The present, too, is passing by. Why is there this exertion of yours?

First of all, there is no pleasure in a past cognition (vijñāna) because it has already passed; nor is there any pleasure in a future one because it has not yet come into contact with pleasure. There is none also in the present because the present does not endure. Therefore all your exertion is in vain (HPS p.469, CŚṬ D f.126b, P f.141a).

That may be so, the opponent concedes, but surely we ought to do good deeds for the sake of enjoying heavenly pleasures (HPS p.470, CŚṬ D f.126b, P f.141a-b). Āryadeva retorts:

> 14. Even heaven frightens the wise in the same way as hell.[16] Rare is the existence that does not frighten them!

Because of the fact that it produces various kinds of defilement (saṃkleśa), because of the fact that beings experience there the blazing fire of the afflictions, which originate because of sense objects, and also because of the fact that ignorance (moha) is present there, the wise shun heaven. It frightens them as much as hell does (HPS p.470, CŚṬ D ff.126b-127a, P f.141b)! Āryadeva describes the pain of cyclic existence as overwhelming:

> 15. If even a fool completely understood the pain of cyclic existence, then simultaneously with that thought he would be destroyed utterly!

The saints (ārya) abhor cyclic existence because it is painful. If ordinary people (pṛthagjana) were able to understand this pain, then in that very instant their hearts would shatter into a hundred pieces. But because they do not understand this, they delight in cyclic existence. For the saints the pain of cyclic existence--which they bear because of their firm intention (abhiprāya) to benefit sentient beings through gratitude (kṛtajñatā) and great compassion--is no cause for anxiety; and therefore it cannot destroy them. However, because ordinary people cling to the view of individuality (satkāyadṛṣṭi) and because they are incompetent in meditation, which is its antidote, they certainly would shatter into infinitesimal pieces if they were ever to comprehend fully the pain of cyclic existence[17] (HPS p.470, CŚṬ D f.127a, P f.142a-b)!

Furthermore, Āryadeva indicates the difficulty of passing from one good rebirth to another, for both pride and a lack of compassion will bring about a bad rebirth. He says:

> 16. A sentient being who is not proud
> is rare. No proud person is compassionate.
> Therefore it is said that it is extremely
> rare to proceed from light to light.[18]

A proud person who engages in evil actions deserves our contempt, the opponent agrees, but what about a person

who is not proud and who follows the teachings in order to attain the pleasures of heaven (HPS p.471, CŚṬ D f.128a, P f.143a)? Āryadeva replies:

17. It is said that someone who has
turned away from sense objects in this
world apprehends sense objects [in
heaven]. For some reason this erroneous
teaching is upheld.

It is said that someone who repudiates sense objects in this world will be reborn after death in heaven in the gods' families and will once again experience pleasurable sense objects--that is a false doctrine[19] (HPS p.471, CŚṬ D f.128a-b, P f.143a-b).

Āryadeva also criticizes people who amass merit so that they may be reborn into wealthy families:

18. Wealth is the result of merit, but
it must be protected constantly from others.
Surely, how is something that must be
protected constantly from others one's own?

Moreover it is inadvisable to follow laws that are based on local or family customs.[20] He says:

19. The law conforms to whatever is the
established custom among the people. There-
fore it seems that the people are more
powerful than the law.

The law concurs with whatever customs are well established among the people, for example, customs concerned with the marriage of a daughter. However, these customs vary at different times and in different places. They are not established through any nature of their own, and therefore it is wrong to place trust in them (HPS p.472, CŚṬ D f.129a, P f.144a).

No one experiences a pleasurable sensation without encountering a desirable sense object. Because people who do meritorious actions experience desirable sense objects as a result, therefore, the opponent argues, someone who desires sense objects should practice good conduct (HPS p.472, CŚṬ D f.129a, P f.144b). Āryadeva says:

> 20. Though a sense object is desirable
> because of its acquisition by virtue,
> that sense object is condemned. What
> is the point of acquiring something that
> is better to reject?

A desirable sense object has the nature of the five desirable qualities (kāmaguṇa), namely, form, sound, smell, taste, and touch, and is acquired through virtuous action.[21] Sentient beings who seek liberation will vilify this sense object as if it were smeared with excrement. It is pointless to acquire something that is better to reject because of the fact that it is a source of harm, because of the fact that it is impermanent, impure, and

non-substantial, because of the fact that it does not lead to cessation (nivṛtti), because of the fact that it produces such afflictions as desire, and because of the fact that it prolongs carelessness (pramāda) (HPS p.472, CŚṬ D f.129a-b, P f.144b).

Even if sense objects are condemned because a doctrine that sets up sense objects as its goal is useless, nevertheless since a kingdom brings pleasure to those who enjoy the taste of power, the opponent claims, one should accumulate merit in order to procure royal power (HPS p.472, CŚṬ D f.129b, P f.145a). Āryadeva replies that those who desire liberation have no need for temporal power.

21. The law is useless for someone who
has no need for power, and someone who
strives only for power the people call
a fool![22]

The opponent then restates his argument for following good conduct. After seeing that rebirth in heaven and wealth and power result from practicing good conduct, then what intelligent person who desires such rewards in the future would not do meritorious actions (CŚṬ D f.130a, P f.145b)? Āryadeva responds:

22. If you become attached to the
teaching after seeing the future result,
then why are you not afraid after seeing
an end to the future [result]?

The consequence of attachment to the result is a bad rebirth. For this reason all attachment to the teaching with the intention of acquiring rewards in the future should be rejected. Surely, without attachment either to the teaching or its results one will attain Parinirvāṇa (CŚṬ D f.130b, P f.145b).

Moreover,

23. Merit is in all respects like a
worker's wages. How could those who
do not desire even what is good do evil?

A person who engages in such meritorious actions as giving, desiring to enjoy the effects of the merit in the future, is just like a laborer who works only for wages. The wise are not attached to the result even of virtuous actions which benefit both themselves and others. How could they do evil actions which would harm both themselves and others (CŚṬ D f.130b, P ff.145b-146a).

In the concluding verses Āryadeva indicates that those who turn away from desirable sense objects and see all things as empty of any substantial nature of their own will escape the cycle of birth and death. He says:

24. Those who see the world, which
resembles a collection of machines (yantra),
to be like illusory beings (māyāpuruṣa)[24]
clearly attain the highest level.

Things such as a phantom woman conjured up by a magician, which cause defilement for ignorant people, the wise perceive as empty of own-nature (svabhāvaśūnya). Because they understand interdependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), they see sentient beings as having no real nature of their own, like machines or phantom beings. The wise escape cyclic existence, which originates from error (viparyāsa), and arrive at the city of Nirvāṇa, which transcends virtuous and non-virtuous karma (CŚṬ D f.131a, P ff.146b-147a).

Furthermore:

> 25. It is altogether impossible that
> those who are not delighted even with
> divine sense objects in the cycle of
> existence would delight in this world.[25]

Attachment to sense objects causes fools to remain in the cycle of existence. But the wise are not attached to cyclic existence and delight neither in human nor in divine sense objects. Since they have analyzed well the own nature of things, they find no pleasure at all in cyclic existence. They see it as characterized by birth, old age, sickness, and death (CŚṬ D f.131b, P f.147a-b).

CHAPTER VII

NOTES

[1]See Bhattacarya, "The Catuhśataka of Āryadeva" pp.867-870 and Bhaskar, Catuhśatakam, pp.171-173 for translations into English and Hindi, respectively.

[2]bLo bzang sbyin pa quotes this verse in his commentary on the Suhṛllekha, bShes pa'i springs yi gi rnam bshad 'phags pa'i dgongs pa kun gsal (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1971), p.64. See also Nāgārjuna's Letter to King Gautamīputra, trans. Lo zang Jamspal, Ngawang Samten Chopel, and Peter Della Santina (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), p.39.

[3]Cf. Saṃyutta, II, p.178:
namataggāyaṃ bhikkave saṃsāro pubbākoṭi na paññāyati avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhāsaṃyojanānaṃ sandhāvataṃ saṃsarataṃ / "Monks, the beginning of cyclic existence is inconceivable, the point of its beginning is unknown to beings, obstructed by ignorance, bound by desire, who run on and wander about in the cycle of existence."
Cf. PP 218.4-6 and May, Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, p.170 n.536.

[4]These bonds (saṃyojana) include: the view of individuality (satkāyadṛṣṭi), doubt (vicikitsā), attachment to rules and ritual (śīlavrataparāmarśa), a sensuous desire (kāmarāga), hatred (vyāpāda), desire for the world of

form (rūparāga), desire for the formless world (arūparāga), pride (māna), excitability (auddhatya), and ignorance (avidyā). The first five, called the 'lower ones' (avarabhāgīya) bind beings to the lower sensual realm; the latter five, called the 'higher ones' (ūrdhvabhāgīya), bind beings to the two higher realms.

See Pañcaviṃśati p.79 (Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, pp.77-78); Satyasiddhi, I, pp.332-333,339, II, pp.313-314, 319-320; PTSD s.v.; BHSD s.v.

[5]The Brahmajālasutta, Dīgha, I, p.1ff., discusses these sixty-two views.

[6]Red mda'ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.79 and rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chapter seven, p.2 add "even though the faults of cyclic existence are many:" ('khor ba'i nye dmigs mang yang).

[7]Cf. Aṅguttara, III, p.72 on the pride of youth and its antidote, the comtemplation of old age, disease, and death.

[8]Cf. Ratnāvalī II.41:

durlabhāḥ pathyavaktāraḥ śrotāras tv atidurlabhāḥ /
tebhyo 'tidurlabhatamā ye pathyasyāśu kāriṇaḥ //

"Rare are those who speak about what is beneficial, rarer are those who listen to them, but rarest are those who immediately do what is beneficial." The Tibetan version of 41cd differs slightly:

de dag bas kyang mi snyan yang //
phan pa myur du byed pa dkon //

"Even rarer than those is someone who immediately does what is beneficial, even though it is unpleasant."

[9]According to Aṅguttara, IV, p.227 the sole favorable birth is to be born at a time when a Buddha appears in the world and teaches the doctrine. A person must be born in the central regions and intelligent enough to discern whether something is poorly stated or well stated. Aṅguttara, IV, pp.225-227 lists eight unfavorable births: birth in hell, as an animal, as a hungry ghost, as a long-lived god, in barbarian regions, among people who hold wrong views, as a fool, or at a time when no Buddha appears in the world.

See also Suhṛllekha v.63. Additional references to favorable and unfavorable births in Sanskrit and Tibetan literature occur in sGam po pa, Dam chos yid bzhin nor bu thar pa rin po che'i rgyan (Rumtek:n.p., 1972) f.8aff. See also Herbert V. Guenther, trans., The Jewel Ornament of Liberation (Berkeley: Shambhala Publications, 1971), pp.14-29.

[10]Cf. Mahāvastu I, pp.233-234:

udumbarasya yathā puṣpaṃ dullabhaṃ
kadācid utpadyati loke mānava
evaṃ eva buddhāna mahāyaśāna
kadācid utpādaṃ tathāgatānām.

"O Brahmin youth, just as the udumbara flower rarely appears in the world, so indeed is the appearance of the greatly renowned Buddhas and Tathāgatas." See also the discussion on this analogy for the rarity of Buddhas in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra p.230 (Suzuki, The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, p.199).

[11]Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.81 quotes MMK XXV.22ab:

dngos po thams cad stong pa la //
mtha' yod ci zhig mtha' med ci //

"When all things are empty, why [speak of] not possessing an end or possessing an end?"

[12]According to Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.81 and rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chapter seven, p.5, the opponent says: gal te gsung rab gnas pa de srid du dge ba'i bshes gnyen dang / de'i lung 'bogs pa yod pas skye ba gzhan du srid pa zad pa la 'bad do zhe na / "If as long as the Buddhist teaching remains, a spiritual friend and his instruction exist, then one can strive to exhaust cyclic existence in another life."

[13]The Buddha specifically mentions two bad rebirths which result from holding wrong views in Majjhima, I, p.389: Miccādiṭṭhithassa kho ahaṃ Seniya dvinnaṃ gatīnaṃ aññataraṃ gatiṃ vadāmi nirayaṃ vā tiracchānayoniṃ vā. "Seniya, I say that there exists one of two rebirths for someone who holds wrong views: either hell or an animal."

[14]Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.83 has: "whether a material or a non-material effect" (gzugs can dang gzugs can ma yin pa'i 'bras bu).

[15]Cf. Visuddhimagga p.517:

Evaṃ kamme vipāke ca vattamāne sahetuke, bījarukkādikānaṃ va pubbā koṭi na nāyati, anāgate pi saṃsāre appavattaṃ na dissati.

"Thus while karma and [its] maturation proceed along with their causes, as in the case of the seed and the tree, no beginning is known, nor in the future cycle of existence is cessation seen."

[16]Gods, too, are caught up in the cycle of existence and will fall from heaven once their merit is exhausted. See Dīgha, I, p.17ff. and Suhṛllekha vv.69-75.

[17]Cf. Suhṛllekha v.83:

snang nas snang ba'i mthar thug mun pa nas //
mun pa'i mthar thung snang nas mun mthar thug //
mun nas snang ba'i mthar thug gang zag ni //
bzhi ste de dag rnams kyi dang po mdzod //

"There are four types of individual: those who proceed from light to light, those who proceed from dark to dark, those who proceed from light to dark, and those who proceed from dark to light. Be the first of these."

The Buddha explains this classification in Saṃyutta, I, p.96:

Daliddo puriso rāja // assaddho hoti maccharī //
kadariyo pāpasaṅkappo//miccādidiṭṭhi anādaro //
samaṇe brāhmaṇe vā pi // aññe vā pi vanibbake //
akkosati paribhāsati//natthiko hoti rosako //
dadamānaṃ nivāreti // yācamānānaṃ bhojanaṃ //
tādiso puriso rāja // mīyamāno janādhipa //
upeti nirayaṃ ghoraṃ tamo-tama-parāyano // //
Daliddo puriso rāja // saddho hoti amaccharī //
dadāti seṭṭha-saṅkappo // abyaggamanaso naro //
samaṇe brāhmaṇe vā pi // aññe vā pi vanibakke //
uṭṭhāya abhivādeti // samacariyāya sikkhati //
tādiso puriso rāja // mīyamāno janādhipa //
upeti tidivaṃ ṭhānaṃ // tamo-joti-parāyano // //
Aḍḍho ve puriso rāja // assaddho hoti maccharī //
kadariyo pāpasaṅkappo // micchādidiṭṭhi anādaro //
samaṇe brāhmaṇe vā pi //aññe vā pi vanibakke //
akkosati paribhāsati // natthiko hoti rosako //
dadamānaṃ nivāreti // yācamānānaṃ bhojanaṃ //
tādiso puriso rāja // mīyamāno janādhipa //
upeti nirayaṃ ghoraṃ // joti-tama-parāyano // //
Aḍḍho ve puriso rāja // saddho hoti amaccharī //
dadāti seṭṭha-saṅkappo//abyaggamanasa naro //
samaṇe brāhmaṇe vā pi // aññā vā pi vanibakke //
uṭṭhāya abhivādeti // samacariyāya sikkhati // //
dadamānaṃ na vāreti // yācamānānaṃ bhojanaṃ //
tādiso puriso rāja // mīyamāno janādhipa //
upeti tidivaṃ ṭhānaṃ//joti-joti-parāyano-ti // //

"O King, a poor person who is without faith, selfish, miserly, evil-intentioned, holding wrong views, disrespectful, who abuses and reviles recluses, brahmins, and others who beg alms, a nihilist, wrathful, and refuses to give food to those who ask for it, such a person, O King, after dying proceeds to a terrible hell, going from darkness to darkness, O Lord of the people.

O King, a poor person who has faith, is not selfish, who gives, is well-intentioned, not confused, who rises and honors recluses, brahmins, and others who beg for alms, who practices proper behavior, and does not prevent the donation of food to those who ask for it, such a person, O King, after dying proceeds to the divine realm, O Lord of the people.

O King, a rich person who is without faith, selfish, miserly, evil-intentioned, holding wrong views, disrespectful, who abuses and reviles recluses, brahmins, and others who beg alms, a nihilist, wrathful, and refuses to give food to those who ask for it, such a person, O King, after dying proceeds to a terrible hell, going from light to darkness.

O King, a rich person who has faith, is not selfish, who gives and honors recluses, brahmins, and others who beg alms, who practices proper behavior, and does not prevent the donation of food to those who ask for it, such a person, O King, after dying proceeds to the divine realm, O Lord of the people."

[19]See Majjhima, I, pp.388-389.

ace khopan'assa evaṃ diṭṭhi hoti: iminā'haṃ sīlena vā vatena vā tapena vā brahmacariyena vā devo vā bhavissāmi devaññtaro va ti sā'ssa hoti micchādiṭṭhi. "But if someone should hold such a view: 'I' will become a god or one of the god's retinue because of this moral behavior, vow, austerity, or religious life'--this is a wrong view on his part."

Cf. Aṅguttara, IV, p.54.

[20]Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.86 and rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chapter seven, p.12 insert an objection: gal te sbyin pa la sogs pa'i chos phyin ci log pa yin na / 'o na 'jig rten na grags pa'i chos lugs kyi rjes su 'jug par bya'o zhe na / "If such things as giving are in error, then one should follow the customs that are well established among the people."

[21]Cf.MMK XVII.11:

dharmasya sādhanopāyāḥ śuklāḥ karmapathā daśa /
phalaṃ kāmaguṇāḥ pañca dharmasya pretya ceha ca //

"The ten pure paths of action are the means of realizing the doctrine. The five desirable qualities are the result of the doctrine after death and in this world."

[22]Cf. Dhammapada v.73.

[23]Cf. Saṃyutta, III, p.142.

Seyyathāpi bhikkave māyākaro vā māyākarantevāsī vā mahāpathe māyaṃ vidaṃseyya // taṃ enaṃ cakkumā puriso passeyya

nijjhāyato yoniso upaparikkhato rittakaññeva khāyeyya tucchakaññeva khāyeyya asārakaññeva khāyeyya // *kiñhi siyā bhikkave māyāya sāro* // "Monks, suppose a magician or a magician's student should cause an illusion to appear at the crossroads, and an insightful person should see it, reflect on it, and correctly analyze it. It would appear to that person who sees, reflects, and analyzes it correctly that it is empty, worthless, and without substance."

Cf. also MMK XVII.31-32; MKV 46.1-7, 238.3-9, 330.4-335.3.

[24]Cf. *Aṣṭa* p.433.

[25]Cf. *Udānavarga* II.18:

api divyeṣu kāmeṣu sa ratiṃ nādhigacchati /
tṛṣṇākṣayarato bhavati buddhānāṃ śrāvakaḥ sadā //

"A disciple of the Buddha does not find pleasure even in divine pleasures, but always delights in the exhaustion of desire." Cf. also *Dhammapada* v.187.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PREPARATION OF A STUDENT

Chapter eight comes as a transition between the seven earlier chapters in which Āryadeva emphasizes methods for the accumulation of merit and the eight subsequent chapters in which he places the emphasis on methods for the accumulation of knowledge. In this chapter he offers the student advice on how to prepare for the transmission of the Buddha's profound teachings. The student must become fit to receive these teachings by eradicating the afflictions and by stopping all action that results in involuntary rebirth. These profound teachings, according to Āryadeva, refer to the fact that all things have originated in interdependence (pratītyasamutpanna) and thus are empty of a real, substantial nature of their own (svabhāvaśūnya). Knowledge of these teachings brings about the tranquil state of Nirvāṇa.

Āryadeva directs his first remarks against people who maintain that it is impossible for themselves and others to remove desire, since the bondage of desire remains so attractive (CŚṬ D f.132a, P f.147a). He says:[1]

1. In the same way as friendship between
people who disagree does not last long,

> desire does not last long when the
> fault of all [things] is understood.

The mind superimposes the qualities of friendship on agreeable people, but not on those who are disagreeable, since the fault in that is understood. In the same way as friendship does not last long between people who oppose one another, how is it possible that a yogin would not be free of desire, since he understands the fault of external and internal things (CŚṬ D f.132b, P f.148a)?

Moreover, Āryadeva points out that people's reactions to any given object will differ:

> 2. Some are attracted to it; some hate it; and some are confused by it. Therefore desire is without a [real] object (nirarthaka).

Desire arises in dependence upon an attractive object. But this attractive object is not established by virtue of its own-nature (svarūpasiddha), for every object that attracts one person repels someone else. If it were attractive by its very nature, then it would be so at all times for all people. Since we do not observe this consistency, therefore desire for sense objects is empty because of the fact that it is not established by its own nature (HPS p.473, CŚṬ D ff.132b-133a, P f.148b).

Furthermore:

> 3. The existence of desire, etc., is not found apart from conceptual construction (kalpanā). What intelligent person would admit that it is real (bhūtārtha) and a conceptual construction?[2]

The Buddha said that desire, hatred, and ignorance originate in conceptual construction (saṃkalpa). An incorrect conceptual construction (ayoniśo kalpanā) in regard to sense objects is the cause for the establishment of desire. These exist only when there is conceptual construction, just as in the case of a snake that is imagined (parikalpita) to exist where there is a coiled rope.[3] Someone who admits that desire, etc., is established by its own-nature must not admit that origination in dependence upon conceptual construction is contradictory to establishment by own-nature. If desire is real, then how is its existence dependent on conceptual construction? But if it is dependent, then how is it real (HPS p.473, CŚṬ D f.133a-b, P f.149a-b)?

Desire has a nature of its own, the opponent argues, because it binds a woman and a man together, and they cannot escape this mutual bondage (HPS p.473, CŚṬ D f.133b, P f.149b). Āryadeva replies that this bondage has no real existence of its own, for if it were existent by its very nature, then it would be impossible to sever it. He says:

4. The so-called bond between one
person and another does not exist, as
the severance of the bond with someone
else would be impossible.

Just as desire is not established by its own-nature, since it has originated in dependence upon conceptual construction, similarly there is no bond, by virtue of its own-nature, between one person and another, since "woman" and "man" are not established by their own-nature.[4] The bond between one person and another is imagined, for if it existed by its own-nature, it could never be severed. Something that has a nature of its own cannot assume a different nature (HPS pp.473-474, CŚṬ D ff.133b-134a, P ff.149b-150a).

If analysis (vicāra) removes the afflictions, then why, objects the opponent, do we observe that most people do not conquer the afflictions (HPS p.474, CŚṬ D f.134a, P f.150a)? Āryadeva's reply suggests that not all people understand the Buddha's profound teaching. But even doubting these teachings, he says, leads towards understanding and liberation from cyclic existence.

5. Someone of little merit does not
even doubt this teaching. Mere doubt
would shatter cyclic existence!

A fool repeatedly expresses erroneous views about the beginningless cycle of existence. Since he is conceptually

attached to things--which resemble reflections--, he considers the teaching of the emptiness of own-nature as a dangerous pitfall. Someone whose mental continuum (cittasantāna) lacks the good roots that result in liberation through this teaching of emptiness will think in this way. Not even a single doubt about this teaching of emptiness arises because of his false sense of certainty. But if this person were to doubt: 'Is this teaching so, or not?', then this mere doubt surely would shatter cyclic existence for him (HPS p.474, CŚṬ D f.134a-b, P f.150a-b).[5]

Moreover, only fools disregard this teaching. Āryadeva says:

> 6. The Sage said that someone who has no respect for a teaching that flourishes until liberation clearly is not an intelligent person.

The opponent then asks: Are these things seen as empty for the sake of detachment (vairāgya), or are they designated as empty by virtue of their original nature (prakṛti) (HPS p.475, CŚṬ D f.135a, P f.151b). Āryadeva favors the latter view:

> 7. What is not empty is not regarded as empty. The Tathagatas proclaim that from the wrong view, viz., "Let me attain Nirvana," there is no Nirvāṇa.[6]

If things that are not empty were visualized as empty, then Nirvāṇa would be attained by means of a wrong view. But the Buddhas do not explain Nirvāṇa to an individual who holds a wrong view. They explain Nirvāṇa only to someone who holds the correct view, i.e., things are empty of a nature of their own because of the fact that they have originated in interdependence (HPS p.475, CŚṬ D f.135a-b, P f.151b)[7]

Then shouldn't you teach only the emptiness of own-nature, the opponent asks, since that is the ultimate teaching? No, the Mādhyamikas reply, for it is impossible to teach the ultimate truth without first teaching the wordly (laukika) truth. Instruction that concerns wordly activity (pravṛtti) must be given because this is the way to introduce ultimate truth. Instruction in the emptiness of own-nature also must be given because this is the cause that results in obtaining the bliss of Nirvāṇa[8] (HPS p.475, CŚṬ D f.135b, P f.152a). Āryadeva says:

> 8. Worldly activity is proclaimed where there is the teaching that relates to the world. Withdrawal from activity (nivṛtti) is proclaimed where there is the ultimate teaching.

Worldly activity is proclaimed where a progressive method (krama), concerned with the activity of cyclic existence,

is taught in order to refute, with the sequence that begins with ignorance (avidyā) and karmic constructions (saṃskāra), that things have no cause, an identical cause, or a dissimilar cause. Withdrawal from activity is proclaimed where the emptiness of own-nature is taught. Because the emptiness of own-nature is understood as ultimate truth, a detached person puts an end to clinging (upādāna), which has desire as its condition, and birth, old age, sickness, and death cease (HPS p.475, CŚṬ D f.136a, P f.152a-b).

If nothing exists on the level of ultimate discourse because all things are empty, the opponent objects, then it would follow that everything is non-existent. Since everything is non-existent, there would be nothing to do. Furthermore, since the agent, the action, and its result are all non-existent, there will be no liberation (HPS p.475, CŚṬ D f.136a, P f.152b)! Āryadeva replies:

> 9. You are frightened, thinking "What
> will I do? Everything is non-existent."[9]
> If there were something that must be done,
> then this teaching would not be conducive
> to a withdrawal from activity!

This ultimate teaching is conducive to a withdrawal from worldly activity because of the fact that everything is non-existent. Why isn't someone who wants to withdraw from worldly activity eager for the non-existence of

everything that provides a basis for action (HPS p.476, CŚṬ D f.136b , P f.152b)?

However, he cautions anyone who is attached to this teaching of emptiness:

> 10. You are partial to your own position and dislike someone else's position. You will not attain Nirvāṇa while there is no rest from quarreling!

If you are attached to your own position and think that emptiness is best, and you detest others' positions because you consider them false, then you will not attain Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is not for someone who quarrels and opposes conciliation. Those who are impartial (udāsina) obtain, by destroying attachment, the rest that has the unique flavor of unceasing bliss[10] (HPS p.476, CŚṬ D f.136b, P f.153a).

The opponent concedes that Nirvāṇa is ultimate bliss (paramasukha), since it is the absence of all distress (upadrava). However, he argues that Nirvāṇa is impossible to attain, for the methods given for attaining it are too difficult. On the other hand, cyclic existence is attained easily, without any effort, and therefore people persist in worldly activity (HPS p.476, CŚṬ D f.137a, P f.153b). Āryadeva disagrees, insisting rather that the laborious activity that cyclic existence demands makes rebirth difficult to attain. He says:

11. Nirvāṇa is for someone who is inactive; rebirth is for someone who is active. Therefore Nirvāṇa is easy to attain without worry; the other is not.

If Nirvāṇa is for someone who is inactive, why, objects the opponent, do you teach the importance of impermanence (HPS p.476, CŚṬ D f.137b, P ff.153b-154a)? Āryadeva answers that teaching about impermanence induces people to feel disgust for cyclic existence. He says:

12. How can someone who is not disgusted by this world have respect (bhakti) for tranquility? It is as difficult to leave cyclic existence as it is to leave one's own house.

People who feel disgust for cyclic existence respect Nirvāṇa because it offers escape (niḥsaraṇa) from this cycle. Since they feel no disgust, the slow-witted are unable to leave cyclic existence, just as someone is unable to leave his own house, even though it is of little value, because of his difficulty in exhausting his excessive attachment to it (HPS pp.476-477, CŚṬ D f.137b, P f.154a).

The opponent asserts that the wealthy, who enjoy the pleasures of the senses, may be unable to leave their homes and attain Nirvāṇa, but it is appropriate for those

who are motivated by the pain of illness to leave the world (HPS p.477, CŚṬ D f.137b, P ff.154a-b). Āryadeva denies that a desire to escape one's own individual pain provides the proper motivation for attaining Nirvāṇa. He says:

> 13. Some, tormented by pain, are seen
> to desire death. These, then, entirely
> on account of confusion (moha) do not
> attain the highest state.

Some people, afflicted by illness, lose all attachment to themselves and commit suicide. If they were to eradicate all attachment to themselves after they had determined that cyclic existence is painful, then they would soon dwell in the bliss of Nirvāṇa. But people who hold erroneous views never attain Nirvāṇa on account of their ignorance (HPS p.477, CŚṬ D ff.137b-138a, P f.154b).

If, by rejecting cyclic existence, one should strive only to attain Nirvāṇa, where there is no aging or death, the opponent says, then teach meditation (bhāvanā). Why did the Buddha talk about giving and moral conduct (HPS p.477, CŚṬ D f.138a, P ff.154b-155a)? Āryadeva responds that the Buddha adapts his teaching to the needs and capabilities of each individual. He says:

> 14. Giving is spoken of to low nature
> people; moral conduct, to middle nature
> people; and tranquility, to high nature

people. Therefore always behave as a
high nature person.[11]

Moreover, the teaching is gradual:

15. Whoever understands that first
demerit is rejected, in the middle
self is rejected, and finally all
is rejected is wise.[12]

First all demeritorious actions must be rejected, since they are the cause of many errors. The self must be rejected next because it is not found to exist in any of the five ways in relation to the aggregates (_skandha_), the elements (_dhātu_), or the sense bases (_āyatana_). Finally all things must be rejected, for all attachment to the aggregates, etc., should be repudiated. A wise person attains Nirvāṇa without any further clinging (CŚṬ D ff.138b-139a, P f.155b).[14]

How, objects the opponent, is this absence of clinging obtained? By seeing that all things are empty of own-nature the Mādhyamikas reply. If things are limitless, the opponent contends, how can its domain be seen (CŚṬ D f.139a, P f.156a)?

Āryadeva replies:

16. It is said that whoever sees
one thing sees all. The emptiness
of one is precisely the emptiness
of all.[15]

Whatever is empty of the own-nature of form (rūpa) is empty of the own-nature of the other aggregates as well (CŚṬ D f.139a-b, P f.156a).[16]

If things should be rejected because they are empty, the opponent argues, then why is it said that a monk experiences the maturation of merit? This is contradictory (CŚṬ D f.139b), P f.156b)! Āryadeva denies that there is a contradiction. The teachings seem contradictory only because they are addressed to different audiences. He says:

> 17. The Tathāgatas speak about attachment to good practices to those who desire heaven.[17] To those who desire liberation they will criticize it. How much more so [attachment] to something else!

Attachment to good practices, giving, etc., is appropriate for those who wish to accumulate merit. The merit acquired in this world brings about happiness in the next; a lack of merit results in unhappiness. The Buddha told this to people who feared a bad rebirth and were incapable of practicing meditation. But he did not tell this to people who sought liberation, since for them attachment to good practices is seen only as continuing the bondage of cyclic existence. They know that good practices must be given up, just like the raft.[18] It is even more appropriate to speak about giving up bad practices (CŚṬ D f.140a, P ff.156b-157a).

If emptiness eliminates pain by removing attachment, then only the teaching of emptiness should be promulgated, the opponent contends. (CŚṬ D f.140b, P f.157b). Āryadeva disagrees, for it may be harmful to speak of emptiness in some cases. He says:

18. Someone who desires merit should
not speak about emptiness at all times.
Doesn't medicine that is unsuitably
applied become poison?

A compassionate person who desires merit should not teach emptiness to sentient beings whose roots of virtue have yet to mature. The teaching of emptiness would be of no use to those people, just as if it were an unsuitable medicine.[19] Whatever is most suitable to the mental development of sentient beings should be taught. Initially one should talk about how worldly things exist, since this provides an introduction to the teaching of emptiness (CŚṬ D ff.140b-141a, P ff.157b-158a).

Furthermore,

19. In the same way as it is impossible to
make a barbarian understand in a different
language, it is impossible to make worldly
people understand [the truth] without
references to worldly things.[20]

Just as a barbarian cannot understand a language that is different from his own and must be taught in his own

language, similarly worldly people should be introduced to the truth by referring to worldly things.[21] Without using the conventions of the world, even an intelligent person would not understand that the own-nature of the ultimate is inexpressible. But introductory talks on how things exist on the level of worldly convention lead to the comprehension of things as being like magic illusions, and talk of things as illusory leads to the comprehension of the ultimate's inexpressible own-nature (CŚṬ D f.141a-b, P f.158b).[22]

The use of the four positions (catuṣkoṭi) exemplifies this gradual introduction to ultimate truth. Āryadeva says:

> 20. Existence, non-existence, [both] existence and non-existence, and neither are taught. Doesn't each one become what is called medicine according to the illness?[23]

The Buddha spoke of existence to his disciples in order to remove the stain of seeing everything as non-existent. To some, in order to remove their conceptual attachment to existent things, he spoke of non-existence. In order to remove both views, he spoke of existence and non-existence. He spoke of neither for the sake of destroying conceptual proliferation (prapañca) in all respects (HPS p.478, CŚṬ D f.141b, P f.158b).[24]

Even a limited knowledge of the truth brings its rewards. Āryadeva says:

21. When one sees correctly, the
highest state is attained ; when
one sees a little, a good rebirth.
Therefore intelligent people always
direct the mind towards inner contem-
plation (adhyātmacintā).

Moreover,

22. Even if someone who understands
the truth does not attain Nirvāṇa in
this life, surely he will attain it
effortlessly in the next life, in
accordance with karma.[25]

Even if someone who is experienced in seeing the truth does not attain the end result of detachment in this life, nevertheless, he certainly will attain Nirvāṇa in his next birth, in accordance with karma.[26] If the fruit of an action does not ripen in this life, that action surely will bear fruit in the next life (HPS p.479, CŚṬ D f.143a, P f.160a-b).

If knowledge of the truth exists, then why, asks the opponent, don't we see more liberated people (HPS p.479, CŚṬ D f.143a, P f.160b)? Āryadeva responds:

23. The intended accomplishment of
all deeds is rare. It is not the case

that Nirvāṇa is absent in this
world, but that those who are
suitably disciplined and liberated
are rare.[27]

Not only is it rare to experience detachment, but it is difficult to ascertain whether everything that is undertaken will bear fruit, for reflection alone will not become fruitful. The accomplishment depends upon a combination of causes and conditions (hetupratyayasāmagrī), but this combination of causes is difficult to obtain and consequently the accomplishment of all deeds is also rare. Similarly, even though the Sugata's teaching exists, and people strive to attain Nirvāṇa, nonetheless, by being deprived of spiritual friends (kalyāṇamitra) and because of the absence of correct attention (yoniśo manasikāra), people who are suitably endowed are rare. Consequently those who become liberated are also rare (HPS p.479, CŚṬ D f.143b, P f.161a).

How is it possible to remove the multitude of afflictions that have been active over a long period of time the opponent inquires (HPS p.479, CŚṬ D f.143b, P f.161a)? Āryadeva reply's furnishes an appropriate method for combatting desire:

24. After hearing that the body has
no good qualities, desire does not last
for a moment. Wouldn't this very method
exhaust everything.[28]

If the continuum of birth has been in operation since beginningless time, how, asks the opponent, will it end (HPS p.479, CŚṬ D f.144a, P f.161b)? Āryadeva answers this last question by using the example of a seed:

25. In the same way as the end of a
seed is seen--and its beginning is not--
birth does not arise because its cause
is incomplete.[29]

We see the end of a seed, whose beginningless continuum has operated over a long period of time, when fire destroys it. Similarly, the birth of the seed of consciousness, whose causes and conditions have been active for a long time, will not arise again if its causes are incomplete. Karma depends upon the afflictions in projecting birth, and when the fire of knowledge burns the afflictions, karma will not bring about rebirth[30] (HPS p.489, CŚṬ D f.144a, P f.161b).

CHAPTER VIII

NOTES

[1]See Vaidya, pp. 129-133 and Bhaskar, pp.173-176 for translations into French and Hindi, respectively.

[2]Cf. Udānavarga II.2:

kāma jānāmi te mūlaṃ saṃkalpāt kāma jāyase /
na tvāṃ saṃkalpayiṣyāmi tato me na bhaviṣyasi //

"Desire, I know your source; you arise from conceptual construction. I will not construct you, then you will not arise."

This verse is cited in PP pp.350.11-12 and 451.9-10.

See also Majjhima, III, p.27:

Katame ca, thapati, akusalāsaṅkappā? Kāmasaṅkappo, byāpādasaṅkappo, vihiṃsāsaṅkappo, ime vuccanti, thapati, akusalā saṅkappa. Ime ca, thapati, akusalāsaṅkappā kiṃsamuṭṭhānā? Samuṭṭhānam pi nesaṃ vuttaṃ. Saññāsamuṭṭhana ti'ssa vacanīyaṃ.

"Carpenter, which are the unwholesome constructions? The construction of desire, the construction of malevolence, and the construction of cruelty. And how do these unwholesome constructions arise? Their origination has been stated. It should be stated that their origination is from conception."

Nāgārjuna also makes the same point in ŚS v.60:

gang phyir de nyid la chags shing /
de la zhe sdang de la rmongs //
de phyir rnam par rtog pas bskyed /
rtog de'ang yang dag nyid du med //

"Because desire, hatred, and confusion [arise] in regard to that same [thing] , therefore they are produced by conceptual construction and that conceptual construction doesn't exist ultimately."

and in MMK XXIII.1ab:

saṃkalpaprabhavo rāgo dveṣo mohaś ca kathyate /

"It is said that desire, hatred, and ignorance arise from conceptual construction."

[3]Cf. Wayman, *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*, p.271.

[4]Cf. the *Pitṛputrasamāgamasūtra* (quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* p.425):

bhavati mahārāja sa samayo yat strī adhyātmam ahaṃ strīti kalpayati / sā adhyātmam ahaṃ strīti kalpayitvā bahirdhā puruṣaṃ puruṣa iti kalpayati / sā bahirdhā puruṣaṃ puruṣa iti kalpayitvā saṃraktā satī bahirdhā puruṣeṇa sārdhaṃ saṃyogam ākāṅkṣate / puruṣo 'dhyātmaṃ puruṣo 'smīti kalpayatīti pūrvavat / tayoḥ saṃyogākāṅkṣayā saṃyogo bhavati / saṃyogapratyayāt kalalaṃ jāyate / tatra mahārāja yaś ca saṃkalpo yaś ca saṃkalpayitā ubhayam etan na saṃvidyate / striyāṃ strī na saṃvidyate / puruṣe puruṣo

na saṃvidyate / ity asann asadbhūtaḥ saṃkalpo jātaḥ / so 'pi saṃkalpaḥ svabhāvena na saṃvidyate / "Mahārāja, there is a time when a woman conceives subjectively, 'I am a woman'. After conceiving subjectively, 'I am a woman', she conceives objectively a man. After objectively conceiving a man, she becomes impassioned and desires sexual intercourse with the man. As before, the man subjectively conceives 'I am a man'. Because of their desire for sexual intercourse, it occurs, and from that sexual intercourse an embryo is produced. In this case, Mahārāja, both the conceptual construction and its constructor do not exist. There is no 'woman' in the woman and no 'man' in the man. Hence a non-existent and unreal conceptual construction has been produced. This conceptual construction also does not exist by its own-nature."

[5]See rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap. eight, p.4: des na bsod nams chung ngu rten 'byung rang bzhin gyis grub pas stong bzhin du bya byed thams cad 'thad pa'i bden pa gnyis kyi chos slob dpon klu sgrub kyis bzhed pa 'di la de lta yin nam / on te min snyam du the tshom za bar yang mi 'gyur bas nyon mongs spangs pa'i thabs pa ga la thob / stong pa nyid bstan pa na ci 'di ltar yin no snyam du the tshom za ba tsam zhig gis srid pa 'hrul por byas par 'gyur te / gnas lugs kyi don yid kyi yul cung zad byas pa'i phyir ro /

"Consequently, how will someone of little merit obtain the means for removing the afflictions, since he does not even doubt whether this teaching of the two truths, which admits all actions and agents are empty of establishment by own-nature and are interdependently originated, held by the teacher Nāgārjuna, is so or not? By the mere doubt 'Is this teaching of emptiness so?'; cyclic existence shatters, since for a little while the significance of ultimate reality has been made the object of the mind."

[6]This verse is quoted in MA p.119. See also Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, p.269.

CF. MMK XVI.9:

nirvāsyāmy anupādāno nirvāṇaṃ me bhaviṣyati /
iti yeṣāṃ grahas teṣāṃ upādānamahāgrahaḥ //

"Those who think 'I will attain Nirvāṇa without clinging. Nirvāṇa will be mine,' have a great hold on clinging."

[7]See rGyal tshab, bzhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap. eight, p.6: gang zag dang phung po bden stong du ma rtogs par bden par zhen nas bdag ni stong nyid bsgoms pas mya ngan las 'da' bar 'gyur ro zhes dngos po stong pa min pa la stong pa ltar mthong ba min te / "Without understanding that the individual and the aggregates are truly empty, and because he is attached to them as being true, someone thinks 'I will attain Nirvāṇa by meditating on emptiness'. He does not see a non-empty thing as empty."

[8] Cf. MMK XXIV.10:

<u>vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate</u> /
<u>paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇam nādhigamyate</u> //

"Without resorting to conventional speech, the ultimate cannot be taught; without understanding the ultimate, Nirvāṇa is not attained."

[9] Cf. <u>Ratnāvalī</u> I.26:

<u>nāsmy ahaṃ na bhaviṣyāmi na me 'sti bhaviṣyati</u> /
<u>iti bālasya santrāsaḥ paṇḍitasya bhayakṣayaḥ</u> //

"Thinking 'I am not, I will not be, I have nothing, and I will have nothing', a fool is afraid and a wise person destroys fear."

[10] Cf. <u>Aṣṭa</u> p.421. The Buddha declares that he will not speak about 'escape' (<u>niḥsaraṇa</u>) to a Bodhisattva who has quarreled with another until he confesses: <u>yena mayā sarvasattvānāṃ vigrahā vivādā virodhā utsārayitavya nidhyāpayitavya praśamayitavyāḥ so 'haṃ nāma svayam eva vivadāmi</u> / "I, who ought to dispel, pacify, and calm all sentient beings' quarrels, disputes, and conflicts, indeed engage in quarreling myself."

[11] See <u>Dīgha</u>, I, pp.109-110.

<u>Ekamantaṃ nisinnassa kho brāhmaṇassa Pokkharasādissa Bhagavā ānupubbikathaṃ kathesi seyyathīdaṃ dānakathaṃ sīlakathaṃ saggakathaṃ, kāmānaṃ ādīnavaṃ okāraṃ saṃkilesaṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ pakāsesi. Yadā Bhagavā aññāsi brāhmaṇaṃ Pokkarasādiṃ kallacittaṃ muducittaṃ vinīvaraṇa-cittaṃ</u>

udagga-cittaṃ pasanna-cittaṃ atha yā buddhānaṃ sāmukkaṃsikā dhamma-desanā taṃ pakāsesi: dukkhaṃ samudayaṃ nirodhaṃ maggaṃ.
"The Lord explained to the brahmin Pokkarasāti, who was seated to one side, the gradual instruction, namely, instruction on giving, instruction on moral conduct, instruction on heaven, the disadvantage, the rejection, and the defilement of desires, and the advantage of renunciation. When the Lord knew that the brahmin Pokkarasāti's mind was prepared, pliable, unbiassed, joyful, and clear, he explained the excellent teaching of the Buddhas, namely, suffering, its origination, its cessation, and the path [that leads to its cessation] ."

Dīgha, III, p.218 associates these practices of giving, moral conduct, and meditation with meritorious action:

Tīni puñña-kiriya-vatthūni. Dāna-mayaṃ puñña-kiriya-vatthu, sīla-mayaṃ puñña-kiriya-vatthu, bhāvanā-mayaṃ puñña-kiriya-vatthu. "There are three foundations for meritorious action: the foundation for meritorious action based on giving, the foundation for meritorious action based on moral conduct, and the foundation for meritorious action based on meditation."

Cf. ŚS: 下中上人 布施戒智.

"[The Buddha teaches] low, middle, and high nature people giving, moral conduct, and insight." See also Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, pp.12-13 for Vasu's commentary on this passage.

Cf. also MMK V.8:

astitvaṃ ye tu paśyanti nāstivaṃ cālpabuddhayaḥ /
bhāvanāṃ te na paśyanti draṣṭavyopaśamaṃ śivaṃ //

"Those of little intelligence who see the existence and non-existence of things do not see the calm, the tranquility of visible things."

and Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 55(ed. Lindtner, Nagarjuniana, p.116):

bālāḥ sajjanti rūpeṣu vairāgyaṃ yānti madhyamāḥ /
svabhāvajñā vimucyante rūpasyottamabuddhayaḥ //

"Fools are attached to visible form, middle-status people attain detachment; and those of highest intelligence, who know the own-nature of visible form, are liberated."

[12]Quoted in PP p.359, 8-9.

See also Ruegg, "The Four Positions of the Catuṣkoṭi," p.7 and Geshe Rabten, The Life and Teaching of Geshe Rabten, ed. and trans. B. Alan Wallace, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980), pp. 190-191.

[13]See May, Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, p.183, n.597 for references.

[14]Cf. PP pp.356.1-359.6.

[15]Quoted in PP p.128.3-4.

See also Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp.139-

140, Wayman, _Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real_, p.366, and Jeffrey Hopkins, _Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism_ (Valois, NY: Gabriel / Snow Lion, 1980) p.177.

[16]Cf. _Pañcaviṃśati_ p.138:
rūpaṃ śūnyaṃ rūpasvabhāvena tasya nāpi jātir nāpi niryāṇaṃ upalabhyate. "Form is empty of the own nature of form, and neither its birth nor its departure are perceived." Cf. also Lamotte _Traité_, I, pp.1090-1091.

[17]See _Majjhima_, I, pp.350-351 and _Aṅguttara_, V, pp.342-346. The phrase "if he does not extinguish the outflows, then because of attachment to the teaching, by delight in the teaching, by exhausting the five lower fetters, he is reborn spontaneously and there attains final Nirvāṇa and does not return from that world "(_no ce āsavānaṃ khayaṃ pāpunāti teneva dhammarāgena tāya dhammanandiyā pañcannaṃ orambhāgiyānaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ parikkhāya opapātiko hoti tattha parinibbāyī anavattidhammo tasmā loka_) is repeated for each of the eight attainments (_samāpatti_).

[18]See _Majjhima_, I, p.135: The Buddha speaks of his teachings as a raft and advises his disciples:
Evaṃ eva kho bhikkave kullūpamo mayā dhammo desito nittharaṇatthāya no gahaṇatthāya. Kullūpamaṃ vo bhikkhave ājānantehi dhammā pi vo pahātabbā, pag eva adhammā. "Monks, I taught good practices in comparison with a raft for the sake of crossing over, not for the sake of grasping onto. Monks, by understanding the good practices taught

in comparison with a raft, you should even leave behind good practices, how much more bad practices!"

[19]Candrakīrti (CŚṬ D f.141a, P f.158a) cites the following verse:

> blun la nye bar bstan pa ni //
> 'krug pa'i rgyu yin zhi phyir min //
> lag 'gro 'o ma 'thungs pa ni //
> dug 'phel 'gyur ba 'ba' zhig go //

"Teaching a fool brings about anger, not tranquility. A snake's drinking milk only increases the poison."

Cf. Shes rab sdong bu v.239 (ed. and trans., W. L. Campbell, The Tree of Wisdom Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1919 p.121). See also Pañcatantra 389 in Bhattacarya, The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva, p.23.

[20]Quoted in PP p.370.4-5.

and in MA p.121.

[21]Cf. the following extract from the Manorathapūraṇī commentary on the Aṅguttara, I, pp.94-95, cited by Jayatilleke Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p.365 n.1.

...Bhagavā ye sammutivasena desanaṃ sutvā atthaṃ paṭivijjhitvā mohaṃ pahāya visesaṃ adigantuṃ samatthā tesaṃ sammutidesanaṃ deseti. Ye pana paramatthavasena desanaṃ sutvā atthaṃ paṭivijjhitvā mohaṃ pahāya visesaṃ adhigantuṃ sammatthā tesaṃ paramatthadesanaṃ deseti. Tatrāyaṃ upamā: yathha hi desabhāsakusala tiṇṇaṃ vedānaṃ atthasaṃvaṇṇako ācariyo ye damilabhāsāya vutte atthaṃ jānanti tesaṃ

damilabhāsāya ācikkhati..."The Lord teaches the conventional teaching to those who hear the teaching, penetrate its meaning, reject ignorance and are able to attain distinction by means of the conventional teaching. But he teaches the ultimate teaching to those who hear the teaching, penetrate its meaning, reject ignorance, and are able to attain distinction by means of the ultimate teaching. In this respect there is this comparison: Just as in the case of a teacher who is skilled in regional languages and who explains the meaning of the three Vedas, to those who understand the meaning of it is spoken in Tamil, he explains in Tamil."

[22]Candrakīrti discusses this at greater length in the MA VI.23-35, 79-80. MA VI.80ab is quoted by rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap. eight, p.11:

> tha snyad bden pa thabs su gyur pa dang //
> don dam dben pa thabs byung gyur pa ste //

"The conventional truth is the means, the ultimate truth is the goal."

[23]Quoted in PP, p.372.5-6.

See also Ruegg, "The Four Positions of the Catuṣkoṭi," p.7.

[24]Cf. PP, pp370.9-372.3.

[25]Quoted in MA p.2.

See also Hopkins, Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, p.106.

[26] rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap. eight, p.17 and mDo sngags, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i tshig don, p.139, cite MMK XVIII.12 as proof that, even in the absence of a Buddha, knowledge of the truth and attainment of Nirvāṇa are possible: sambuddhānām anutpāde śrāvakānāṃ punaḥ kṣaye / jñānaṃ pratyekabuddhānāṃ asaṃsargāt pravartate // "When the fully enlightened Buddhas do not arise, and the disciples disappear, knowledge comes forth for the solitary Buddhas independently of contact."

[27] In using the expression yuktā muktāś ca, Āryadeva may have had in mind the following passage in Aṅguttara, II, p.135: Cattāro'me bhikkave puggalā santo saṃvijjamānā lokasmiṃ: Katame cattāro? Yuttapaṭibhāno muttapaṭibhāno, muttapaṭibhāno na yuttapaṭibhāno, yuttapaṭibhāno ca muttapaṭibhāno ca, n'eva yuttapaṭibhāno na muttapaṭibhāno. Ime kho bhikkhave cattāro puggalā santo saṃvijjamānā lokasmin ti. "Monks, there are four individuals present in the world. Which four? One whose presence of mind is correct but not quick, one whose presence of mind is both correct and quick, and one whose presence of mind is neither correct nor quick--these, monks, are the four individuals present in the world."

[28] Mindfulness of the body is the first of the four applications of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna). As Lamotte notes, Traité, IV, pp.2047-2048, n.3, the four applications

of mindfulness, according to Aṅguttara, I, p.296, constitute the middle path, which MMK XXIV.8 associates with emptiness; Traité, IV, pp.2047-2055 correlates these four applications of mindfulness with the first three of the eighteen types of emptiness.

[29]Cf. CŚ XIV.25.

[30]Cf. Satyasiddhi, I, p.380, II, pp.359-360.

CHAPTER IX

SHOWING THE REALIZATION OF THE REFUTATION OF PERMANENT THINGS

Āryadeva presents in the eight previous chapters of the CŚ methods that are intended to encourage the student to engage in moral conduct (*śīla*) and meditation (*samādhi*). These methods prepare the student to receive knowledge of the Buddha's profound teachings. In the last eight chapters of the CŚ, Āryadeva emphasizes methods that are intended to develop the student's insight (*prajñā*) into the truth of these teachings. He sheds light on this truth in the latter chapters by demonstrating the errors of the Madhyamaka school's Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents. In chapter nine Āryadeva refutes the belief in permanent things.

Āryadeva begins his philosophical exegesis (*viniś-caya*) so that the student will understand the truth about things as they are in reality. He explains that a conditioned thing is unsubstantial (*asāra*), because it arises and ceases (HPS p.480, CŚṬ D f.145a, P f.163a). Āryadeva says:[1]

> 1. Everything has arisen for the sake
> of an effect; consequently nothing is
> permanent. Therefore, except the Sage,

There is no Tathāgata in the real
sense (*yathābhāvas*).[2]

Activity in the world is for the sake of an effect; it has no nature of its own. A conditioned thing does not arise separately; it arises only in the form of a collection of individual things. This collection occurs given the mutual dependence of cause and effect: "When this exists, that comes into existence."[3] The Lord Buddha is a Sage because he is endowed with the silence--physical, verbal, and mental--of someone who is beyond training (*aśaikṣa*). He alone is called 'Tathāgata': for, by his teachings on impermanence and emptiness, he has 'thus arrived at' and 'thus understood' the own-nature of things as they are in reality.[4]

An alternative explanation says: "Whatever has the property of origination necessarily has the property of cessation,"[5] and "old age and death have birth as their condition."[6] The effect of something that has arisen is in fact destruction, since arising has this as its object. Therefore Āryadeva says: "Everything has arisen for the sake of an effect; consequently nothing is permanent." This statement means that there is no own-nature, and because this is so, Āryadeva says: "Therefore, except the Sage, there is no Tathāgata in the real sense."

A third explanation says: Actions are experienced in accordance with three sensations--pleasant, unpleasant,

or neutral-- and in accordance with distinctions of time, place, and state; without these no one would observe the effects of any action. On account of an object's coming into existence, either internally or externally, Āryadeva says: "Everything arises for the sake of an effect," i.e., nothing is established by its own-nature, and "consequently nothing is permanent." If an object were established by its own-nature, then it would be permanent, since own-nature is not destructible. This statement means that everything is empty of a nature of its own. No teacher, except the Tathāgata, taught about emptiness. For this reason, Āryadeva says: "Therefore, except the Sage, there is no Tathāgata who understands a thing as it really is." (HPS pp.480-481, CŚṬ D ff.145a-146b, P ff.163b-164a).

A Vaiśeṣika opponent contends that such things as space, which lack two features, i.e., of being cause and effect, and such things as earth atoms, which lack one feature, i.e., of being an effect, are permanent.[7] (HPS p.482, CŚṬ D f.147a-b, P f.165a-b). Āryadeva denies that permanent things exist on the grounds that there are no things whose existence is not dependent upon something else. He says:

2. There is never any existence that is not dependent.[8] Therefore there is never anything that is eternal.[9]

Why wouldn't someone who sees that the existence of pleasure, etc., arises in dependence upon certain causes and conditions conclude by presumption (arthāpatti)[10] that no thing that has not originated in dependence exists? (HPS p.482, CŚṬ D f.147b, P f.165b).

This opponent admits that pleasure arises in dependence, since the self is its inherence cause (samavāyi-kāraṇa).[11] A non-existent thing cannot function as an inherence cause, and therefore the self exists, since its effect, i.e., pleasure, exists. Moreover, it is permanent, because an existent thing that has no cause is considered to be permanent. (HPS p.482, CŚṬ D f.148a, P f.166a). Āryadeva denies that an existent thing is possible without a cause that establishes it. He says:

3. There is no existent thing without
a cause. Whatever has a cause is not
permanent. Therefore the Knower of Truth
said that establishment that has no cause
is not establishment.[12]

The opponent observes created things, e.g., a pot, and then concludes by presumption that there are uncreated things, e.g., the self, which are permanent. (HPS p.483, CŚṬ D f.148b, P f.166b). Āryadeva turns this reasoning back on the opponent and says:

4. If one observes that what is imper-
manent is created, [and concludes] what

> is permanent is uncreated, then, consequently, when one observes the existence of what is created, what is permanent should not exist![13]

A Buddhist opponent interjects here that if Āryadeva accepts as permanent and existent the uncreated things--space, analytical cessation (pratisaṅkhyānirodha), and non-analytical cessation (apratisaṅkhyānirodha)--spoken of in the Abhidharma treatises,[14] then this acceptance cancels out the assertion that the uncreated is non-existent. (HPS p.483, CŚṬ D f.148b, P f.166b). Āryadeva retorts:

> 5. Ordinary people conceive space, etc., to be permanent. Intelligent people do not perceive a real object (artha)[15] among these, even on the worldly level.

Since the conventional expression 'space' applies only to the mere absence of material form, there is nothing called 'space' that has the nature of a real object. Moreover, since there is no impediment to the production of a material object, when no form other than that which comprises it occurs, therefore just the mere absence of another material form is called 'space', for things shine intensely there.[16] Consequently the Vaibhāṣikas, confused by teaching that merely concerns designations (nāmadheya),

superimpose a real object upon an unreal and non-existent thing. Their argument is not based on a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa), and therefore it does not cancel out out assertion. When those who are knowledgeable about the own-nature of things employ the designation 'space', they do not perceive --even on the level of ordinary awareness--an object of that designation that has a nature of its own (HPS p.483, CŚṬ D ff.149b-149a, P f.167a).

Space is permanent, the Vaiśeṣika opponent argues, because it is all-pervasive (vibhu); and impermanent things, e.g., a pot, are not (HPS p.483, CŚṬ D f.149a, P f.167a).[17] Āryadeva's reply suggests that to conceive of space as encompassing all directions implies that it has these directions as its parts. He argues that, because no single directional part (pradeśa) occupies all of space, space must contain other directional parts. He says:

> 6. What is called 'directional part'
> is not present in the entire thing that
> has directional parts. Clearly, therefore,
> there is another directional part in a
> thing that has direction.[18]

The directional part that contacts the pot is not the same one that contacts something else. If it were, then the pot would be all-pervasive, since its locus could not be differentiated. Moreover, if a directional part were present in all places, then it also would be all-pervasive,

just like the thing possesses it. The designation 'directional part' would no longer apply to it; and if there are no directional parts, then no thing could possess them.

But if the opponent desires to avoid that error and supposes that the directional part does not contact the entire thing that possesses it, then he must admit that this thing contains some directional part that is not all-pervasive. This admission would weaken the opponent's claim that space is all-pervasive. Furthermore, nothing that possesses directional parts exists apart from the mutually differentiated directional parts themselves, so how can something whose existence is not established be permanent (HPS p.484, ṢŚT D f.149a-b, P ff.167b-168a)?[19]

Time causes the world's periodic rise and fall, the opponent claims. Also we observe that a sprout does not arise all the time, even when the conditions for its production, the seed, etc., are present, but only at certain times. If the time is not right, no sprout appears.[20] (HPS p.484, ṢŚT D f.150a, P f.168b). Āryadeva responds to this argument in the following verses by attacking the belief that there are permanent causes, such as time. He says:

7. A thing in which activity and
inactivity are perceived depends upon

something else. Consequently it
also is an effect.

The opponent contends that this inferred thing 'time' exists and is permanent because no cause brings it into existence. But because time is permanent, then shouldn't the sprout be produced permanently, since its production depends on time? If the opponent argues that time's ability to produce an effect is contingent upon other conditions, then because time's activity and inactivity depends on something else, it is nothing but an effect, just like the sprout; and just like the sprout, it will be impermanent (HPS p.484, ŚṬ D f.150a, P f.168b).

Moreover, Āryadeva argues, if the opponent admits that something is a cause, then he must admit also an effect. He says:

8. A cause that lacks an effect does
not have the property of being a
cause.[21] Therefore it would follow
that all causes are nothing but effects.

That thing called 'cause' does not exist by its own-nature, since it is impossible for the property of being a cause to belong to something that has no result. If a thing has the property of being an effect's cause, and that effect has this very cause for its origination, then why shouldn't that thing also have the property of being an effect? And if it has the property of being an effect, then how could it be permanent (ŚṬ D f.150b, P f.169a)?

If the opponent supposes that time brings various living things into existence, then when it produces an effect, it must change and assume a different nature than it had previously (CŚṬ D f.151a, P f.169b). Āryadeva says:

9. A cause, while undergoing change,
becomes the cause of something else.
Whatever undergoes change is not
called permanent.[22]

But a permanent thing does not change, the opponent objects (CŚṬ D f.151b, P f.170a). Āryadeva asserts that a permanent cause has not come into existence in dependence upon some other cause, but has come into existence by itself; and hence it would be contradictory to suppose that it has a cause. He says:

10. That thing whose cause is permanent
is produced from something that has
not come into existence. A cause for
something that has come into existence
by itself is false.

Furthermore, by appealing to people's ordinary experience, Āryadeva argues against a permanent cause producing an impermanent effect. He says:

11. How will a thing that is produced
from something permanent become imper-
manent? Both cause and effect never are
seen to have dissimilar characteristics.[23]

In the verses that follow, Āryadeva directs his attention to the Vaiśeṣika opponent's claim that atoms are permanent. Gradually, beginning with the dyad, impelled by an unseen force (adṛṣṭa), the opponent says, these permanent atoms begin to form whole substances and produce various living things (CŚṬ D f.152a, P ff.170b-171a).[24] Āryadeva responds that if one part of these atoms contacts others and becomes a cause, and if some other part does not, then these atoms must be composite things. And composite things are not permanent. He says:

12. Whatever has some part which
is a cause and some part which is
not a cause would, therefore, be a
composite thing. It is not possible
that a composite thing is permanent.[25]

Because the opponent wants to avoid the undesirable conclusions that all wholes are atomic in dimension, he claims that spherical dimension (pārimaṇḍalya) is present in the cause, but not in the effect.[26] But if this were accepted, then it would not be possible for contact to occur over the entire atom. Consequently just that part of the atom which contacts others is a cause and that part which does not contact others is not a cause. Since the atom has multiple parts, it is a composite thing; and hence it is impermanent (CŚṬ D f.152b, P f.171a).

Atoms do not have parts, the opponent objects, and therefore they do not contact one another with some part of themselves. An atom contacts another with its entire self (CŚṬ D f.152b, P f.171a). Āryadeva denies that atoms contact one another in their entirety; for if they did, then the effect brought about by their contact would have the same dimension as its cause. He says:

13. The spherical dimension of the
cause is not present in the effect.[27]
Therefore it is not feasible that atoms
are in contact in their entirety.

If an atom contacts another in its entirety, and not with a part of itself, then it follows that the atoms' spherical dimension occurs in the effect, beginning with the dyad. Since all wholes then would be atomic in dimension, no one could perceive them. However, wholes are not just atomic in dimension; and hence it is not feasible that atoms contact one another in their entirety (CŚṬ D f.152b, P f.171a-b).

Moreover, since atoms do not contact one another in their entirety, they do not share the same locus. Therefore, Āryadeva states, the effect and its cause are not both atomic in dimension:

14. It is not held that the locus of
one atom is also that of another.
Therefore it is not held that both
cause and effect are equal in dimension.

The opponent concedes that the undesirable consequence that atoms have parts might apply when the effect begins to be produced, but argues that atoms are partless prior to the commencement of the effect (CŚṬ D f.153a, P f.171a). Āryadeva disagrees. Even at this time atoms have parts, he says:

15. Whatever has an eastern side has
an eastern part. Therefore it is said
that whatever atom has direction is not
a [partless] [28] atom. [29]

Moreover, no atom moves unless it has parts:

16. When moving forward, the back
is left behind. Whatever lacks these
two also is not a goer either.

When a body's front side moves in a forward direction, its back side abandons the previous direction. Because it has no parts, an atom cannot move forward. Therefore because they are immobile, it is logically impossible to say that there are atoms which set the effect in motion (CŚṬ D f.153a, P f.172a).

If no atoms exist, the opponent argues, then yogins could not perceive them. But yogins do perceive atoms with their divine vision, [31] and therefore an atom is permanent (CŚṬ D f.153a-b, P f.172a). In reply, Āryadeva asks the opponent:

17. How is something that has no
front, middle, or rear, and is
invisible, perceived?[32]

These permanent atoms exist, the opponent insists, using another argument, because a seed arises out of coarse particles and these would not exist if there were no atoms (CŚṬ D f.153b, P f.172b). Āryadeva replies that the cause, viz., the atom, ceases to exist after it has produced the effect, and therefore it is not permanent. He says:

18. The effect either destroys the cause
and therefore the cause is not permanent
or the effect is not present where the
cause exists.[33]

If atoms were causes, then, just as in the case of the seed and the sprout, the whole, viz., the substance, would destroy the atoms. Since they do not exist at the same time as the effect, therefore the atoms are impermanent, just like the seed. But if the opponent supposes that the cause does not repudiate its own-nature and yet produces something different from itself, viz., the effect, then because the effect has a different locus than its cause, the atoms could not be the cause (CŚṬ D f.154a, P f.172b).

In concluding his refutation of permanent atoms, Āryadeva informs the Vaibhāṣikas that their position on permanent atoms is also indefensible. He says:

19. A permanent thing that can be
obstructed is never seen anywhere.
Therefore the Buddhas never said that
an atom is permanent.

Because an atom does not engage others with its entire self, it can be obstructed. It is wrong for something that can be obstructed to be permanent. Therefore the atom is not permanent. Furthermore, the atoms of the eight substances exist conceptually (prajñaptisat), since they are conceived in dependence upon the eight substances.[34] Therefore the Tathāgatas never teach that an atom is permanent (CŚṬ D f.154a-b, P f.173a).

In the last verses of this chapter, Āryadeva refutes Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents who believe that liberation is permanent. A Buddhist opponent quotes scripture to support his contention that Nirvāṇa is permanent: The Buddha said, "Monks, the unborn, unoriginated, and unconditioned exist," and "unconditioned things are permanent."[35] Therefore Nirvāṇa, which is the goal of the truth of the path, is permanent. If it were not permanent, then it would be senseless to impede the arising of the afflictions, etc., and in addition if Nirvāṇa did not exist, then the third noble truth, which puts an end to the truths of suffering and its origination, also would not be taught (CŚṬ D ff.154b-155a, P ff.173b-174a).[36] Āryadeva replies:

20. If liberation were a different
thing from the bondage, the thing
bound, and the method, then nothing
could arise from it; and therefore
it could not be called 'liberation'.[37]

Bondage refers to the truth of origination; the thing bound refers to the truth of suffering; the method for stopping these two refers to the truth of the path; and from their cessation we infer the third truth. No liberation that has the characteristic of exhausting the afflictions exists apart from these latter two truths. Bondage and liberation are not parts of a relation.[38] If there were some connection between them, then some effect would arise, and the existence of a separate entity could be inferred from that effect. However, this does not occur, and therefore there is no separate entity apart from what has become liberated. It is wrong to say that liberation is a separate entity.[39] But it is not contradictory to employ the expression 'third truth' because of the afflictions.[40] (CŚṬ D f.155a-b, P f.174a-b).

Moreover, Āryadeva says:

21. In Nirvāṇa the aggregates do not
exist and the individual is not possible.[41]
Insofar as the place in which Nirvāṇa has
occured is not perceived, then what Nirvāṇa
is there?

The opponent argues that since Nirvāṇa is an existent thing, it depends upon a substratum (ādhāra) and this substratum is the place in which Nirvāṇa occurs. This substratum is either the aggregates or the individual. But if Nirvāṇa is conceived of as a real thing, then either it is a substratum or a superstratum (ādheya). First of all, Nirvāṇa is not a substratum because Āryadeva says: "In Nirvāṇa the aggregates do not exist and the individual is not possible." Since they do not exist, there is nothing that can be seen in the place where Nirvāṇa occured, thus what Nirvāṇa is there? Moreover, in the absence of a substratum, how can Nirvāṇa be a superstratum (CŚṬ D f.156a-b, P f.175a-b)?[42]

A Sāṅkhya opponent argues that liberation results from understanding the distinction between the qualities (guṇa) and Puruṣa, from reversing the sequence of activity that began with the intellect (mahat), and from pacifying completely the multitude of Prakṛti's evolutes. Since Puruṣa is conscious at the time of liberation, the self is liberated (CŚṬ D f.156b, P f.175b).[43] Āryadeva responds:

> 22. At the time of liberation, what
> good quality is there in positing
> consciousness for someone free of desire?[44]
> An unconscious existence clearly is
> analogous to non-existence.

It is wrong to suppose that Puruṣa is conscious at the time

of liberation. They hold that Puruṣa knows the objects which the intellect apprehends; it has consciousness as its nature and discriminates objects. They hold Prakṛti enjoys objects and is different from the Puruṣa; when the faculties evolve, it becomes the cause for the Puruṣa's enjoyment of objects. When the Puruṣa ceases to enjoy objects, desire ceases. For someone free of desire, there is no good quality for consciousness. No object is experienced because the multitude of Prakṛti's evolutes has been pacified completely. Therefore it is wrong for a liberated self to be conscious at the time of liberation. But if the Puruṣa, which has consciousness as its own-nature, is unconscious at the time of liberation, then it clearly is non-existent, just like a barren woman's son (CŚṬ D ff.156b-157aa P ff.175b-176a).

It is also wrong for the opponent to suppose that at the time of liberation a self exists because it has the potential to become conscious (CŚṬ D f.157a, P f.176a). Āryadeva says:

> 23. If a self were to exist in liberation,
> then a seed [of consciousness] would exist.[45]
> If it were not to exist, then there would
> not even be a thought about the existence
> [of consciousness that has no substratum].[46]

If the opponent supposes that a self exists at the time of liberation, then the potential for consciousness, which has

the self as its substratum, would exist. Since the self's own-nature is consciousness, it cannot exist apart from that; and the potential for consciousness cannot exist without a substratum. However, any conscious activity for a liberated self is impossible; and because the seed of consciousness does not exist, no self exist. Since both the activity of consciousness and its potentiality lack a substratum, they do not exist in any way. When a seed, which is the substratum for the potential sprout, is destroyed, the continuum of the sprout is inactive. Similarly, liberation occurs when the continuum of the self is inactive (CŚṬ D f.157a-b, P f.176a-b).[47] Āryadeva says:

> 24. Surely, nothing else exists for
> those who are liberated from suffering.
> Therefore it is said that it is best
> to get rid of the self altogether.

The afflictions and karmic conditions, which have the properties of arising and ceasing, produce suffering. On the basis of these things, the individual is superimposed; this is the self. When the suffering ceases, the self, which appropriates pleasure, etc., does not arise. For this reason, Āryadeva says: "It is best to get rid of the self altogether." No liberated self exists, since it would have no cause; nor does it exist by its own nature. If it had a nature of its own, then because a permanent

thing does not change, there would be no difference between bondage and liberation. If there were a difference, then because the self would change, it would not be permanent (CŚṬ D f.157b, P ff.176b-177a).

No liberated self exists at the time of liberation because no karmic conditions arise. Nirvāṇa has the nature of complete extinction (parikṣaya) and is ultimate reality (HPS p.485, CŚṬ D f.158a, P f.177a). Āryadeva concludes his treatment of the self in the final verse of chapter nine and indicates that teaching about the self may be beneficial on an introductory level, but ultimately the Buddha's teaching on the nonsubstantiality of the self is best. He says:

25. Only on the worldly level is this
[self] better, not on the ultimate level.
Some things exist on the worldly level;
nothing exists on the ultimate level.

This self is better on the worldly level, for on the worldly level one should accept things as having originated in dependence and as being dependently designated (upādāya prajñaptam), and one should reject the unreal own-nature of things imputed by the heterodox philosophers. Also on the worldly level one should accept that the effect of karma which has not matured yet will mature in the present or in the future. However, this is not best on the ultimate level, for the self does not exist in any

respect on the ultimate level (HPS p.485, CŚṬ D f.158a-b, P f.177b).[48]

CHAPTER IX
NOTES

[1]Vaidya and Bhaskar translate all of chapter nine into French and Hindi, respectively. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, pp.219-220, translates verses 12-19 into German, and May, "Āryadeva et Candrakīrti sur la Permanence," Indianisme et Bouddhisme, Mélanges offerts à Mgr. Étienne Lamotte, Louvain la Neuve, 1980, pp.217-232, translates verses 1-7ab into French, along with the corresponding portion of the CŚṬ, and Āryadeva et Candrakīrti sur la Permanence. (II) "BEFEO LXIX (1981): 75-96, translates verses 7cd-11cd and commentary into French. Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," translates the Hsüan-tsang's translation of chapter nine into Italian, and Susumu Yamaguchi, "Gesshō-zō Shihyakuronchūshaku Hajo-hon no kaidoku" (Translation and Annotation on the Chapter 'Negation of Eternal Things') translates chapter nine of the CŚ and CŚṬ into Japanese.

[2]This is translated in accordance with the Chinese. Cf. the commentary of Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.101: de ma rtogs pa gzhan ji lta ba bzhin du dngos po'i de kho na nyid thugs su chud pa'i de bzhin gshegs pa yod pa ma yin te /

"There is no Tathāgata who understands the truth of a thing as it really is, except for him."

[3]asmin satīdam bhavati. See May, Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, p.123, n.321, for references to this formula.

[4]Cf. Lamotte, Traité, I, p.126 and Satyasiddhi, I, pp.15-16, II, pp.11-12. For additional references, especially from the Pali commentaries, see Carter, Dhamma, pp.70-72, n.31.

[5]yat samudayadharmi tad avaśyaṃ nirodhadharmi. Cf. yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ. For references see PTSD and Pali Tipitakam Concordance s.v. nirodhadammam.

[6]jātipratyayaṃ jarāmaraṇam. This is the concluding member of the twelve-membered formula of interdependent origination.

[7]Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.101, and rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap. nine, p.3, comment that space, etc., lacks the ability to be an object of production (bskyed bya) and to be a producer (skyed byed), whereas atoms can function as producers, but not as objects of production.

[8]Cf. CŚ XIV.1.

[9]This verse is quoted in PP pp.397.1-2, 505.5-6. See Also Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.196.

[10]The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya schools do not accept presumption (arthāpatti) as a separate means of valid knowledge, but subsume it under inference. See the discussion on this topic in Nyāya Sūtras, II.2.1-6.

[11]See Daśapadārthaśāstra I.2 (Ui, Vaiseshika Philosophy, p.94). The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the substance 'self' is the inherence cause of the quality 'pleasure', as the effect, i.e., pleasure, is produced through the relation of inherence. For further discussion on inherence causes see Mahesh Chandra Bhartiya, Causation in Indian Philosophy (Ghaziabad: Vimal Prakashan, 1973), pp.155-156, and Potter, Encylopedia of India's Philosophies, vol.II, index, s.v. samavāyikaraṇa.

[12]Candrakīrti (HPS p.483, CŚṬ D f.148a, P f.166b) and Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.103 quote the following words of the Buddha as support for this assertion:

mkhas pas rten 'byung chos rnams shes 'gyur te //
mkhar lta ba la brten par byed pa'ang min //
rgyu bcas rkyen bcas chos ni shes 'gyur te //
rgyu med rkyen med chos ni yod ma yin //

"An intelligent person understands that things have originated in interdependence and does not rely on the extreme views. He knows that things have causes and conditions; there are no things that lack causes and conditions." This same verses is cited also in PP p.505. 10-13.

[13]See Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p.197.

Cf. *Śataśāstra* IX:
外曰應有常法 作法無常故不作法是常

"The non-Buddhist says: 'A permanent thing exists. Because a created thing is not permanent, therefore an uncreated thing is permanent'. The Buddhist says: 'It would be non-existent as well as existent!"

See also Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic*, pp.73-74, for a translation of Vasu's commentary on this passage.

[14]See AK I.5-6 (*Kośa*, I, pp.8-10) and *Le Traité de la Descente dans la Profounde Loi* (*Abhidharmāvatāraśāstra*), trans. Marcel Van Velthem, (Louvain-La-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1977), pp.74-78. For further references see May, *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*, p.140, n.398.

[15]Hsüan-tsang translates *artha* in the sense of meaning, 義.

[16]LVP, *Kośa*, I, p.8, note 3, and Sukomal Chaudhuri, *Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakośa* (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1976), p.73, n.25, translate this definition of *ākāśa*.

[17]May, "Āryadeva et Candrakīrti," p.230, n.59, identifies this theory with the Jains.

[18]See Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p.198.

[19]Cf. the discussion on this topic in ŚŚ IX and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic*, p.74).

[20]Cf. Śalistambhasūtra, ed. LVP, pp.74-75.

[21]Cf. MMK XX.22:

na cājanyamānasya hetutvam upapadyate /

hetutvānupapattau ca phalaṃ kasya bhaviṣyati //

"The property of being a cause is not feasible for something that is not being produced; and if the property of being a cause is not feasible, to what will the effect belong?"

[22]See Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.197.

[23]Ibid. p.199.

[24]See Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, pp.121-131.

25See Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.200.

[26]Cf. Daśapadārtha I.3 (Ui, Vaiseshika Philosophy, p.95) and Padārthadharmasaṃgraha pp.318-319. See also Potter, Encyclopedia of India's Philosophies, II, pp.123-124.

[27]Cf. ŚŚ:

内曰二微塵非一切身合果不圓故.

"The Buddhist says: 'Two atoms are not combined with their entire bodies, since the effect is not spherical."

[28]This is translated in accordance with rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap. nine, p.9. He says: des rdul cha med kyi rdul phran min par bsnyad de / "Therefore it is said that the atom is not a partless atom."

[29]Cf. Lamotte Traité, II, p.729, and Viṃśatika v.7.

[30]See Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.201.

[31]See Padārthadharmasaṃgraha p.131, the yogin's perception of atoms.

[32]See Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.201.

[33]Ibid.

[34]AK II.22 describes the atom as having the nature of the eight substances (aṣṭadravyaka). AKV p.180 comments on this verse: aṣṭau dravyāni catvāri mahābhūtāni catvāri copādāyarūpāni rūpagandharasaspraṣṭavyāni. "The eight substances are the four great elements and the four derivatives, form, smell, taste and touch.

The commentary on AK II.22 considers the atoms to be substantially existent, but when they combine they form things that exist conceptually. Satyasiddhi, I, pp.98-100, II, pp.76-78 describes the four great elements and their derivatives as conceptually existent.

[35]See Udāna VIII.3:

atthi bhikkhave ajātam abhūtam akatam asaṃkhatam.

"Monks, the unborn, the unoriginated, the produced, and the unconditioned exist."

Saṃyutta, IV, p.370 described the unconditioned as permanent (dhuvam).

[36]Cf. LVP, "Le Nirvāṇa d'après Āryadeva," p.130: "Il y a des gens qui croient que le Nirvāṇa est entite (dravya-sat), eternelle (nitya), bienheurese (sukha), d'après le Sūtra: 'Bhikṣus, sachez qu'il un nirvāṇadhātu non né, non detruit, sans marque (animitta), non-produit par les causes (asaṃskṛta), parfait, bienheureux'."

[37]The Chinese translation of this verse differs:
離能縛所縛因更無真解脫生成用闕故言說有
亦名無.
"Apart from the bond, the thing bound, and the means, there is no true liberation. Because it is deprived of the function of production and completion, should one suppose that it exists, one should also say that it does not exist."

Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.528, n.2, cites the following verse from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra:

bandhyabandhananirmuktā upāyaiś ca vivarjitāḥ /
tīrthyā mokṣaṃ vikalpenti na ca mokṣo hi vidyate //

"Freed from the thing bound and the bondage and separated from the means, the heterodox philosophers conceive liberation, but there is no liberation."

[38]Cf. MMK XVI in which Nāgārjuna reduces the supposed relation between bondage and liberation to absurdity.

[39]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap. nine, p.12, comments: ...sdug kun las thar par byed pa'i thabs lam bden las gzhan thar pa dngos par gyur pa gal te yod na ni des phan pa'i 'bras bu 'gag zhig byed dgos na de las 'bras bu ci yang mi skye te phan pa cung zad kyang 'byung ba med des na 'gog pa rdzas grub de thar pa zhes mi brjod..."If liberation were an entity apart from the truth of the path, the method that brings about liberation from suffering

and its origination, then it must perform some beneficial effect, but no effect at all arises from this and no benefit occurs. Therefore one does not call that substantially established cessation 'liberation'."

[40]See Dharmapāla's commentary on this verse, which LVP translates in "Le Nirvāṇa d'après Āryadeva," pp.131-132. Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," provides a partial translation of this commentary, pp.528-529, n.2.

See also the lengthy discussion on this topic in SS X (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, pp. 80-81). LVP, "Le Nirvāṇa d'après Āryadeva," translates this same passage on pp.128-130.

[41]Cf. MMK 16.4 and Ratnāvalī I.41.

[42]Cf. PP pp.519.6-523.1.

[43]See Sāṅkhyakārikā vv.64-65.

[44]The Chinese translation of 22ab differs:
我時捨諸德離愛有何思

"When the Puruṣa abandons the qualities and is separated from desire, why should it be conscious?"

[45]Cf. the Chinese version of this verse:
無餘有我種則定能生思要無我無思諸有乃無有

"If in Nirvāṇa which has no substratum remaining (nirupādhiśeṣa) there were the seed of a self, then certainly thought could arise. If there is no self, then there is no thought; all things are non-existent."

[46]See gZhan dga, *dBu ma bzhi brgya pa mchan 'grel*, f.39a: *de med na ni rten med pa'i shes pa yod srid pa la* / *bsam par bya'ang yod ma yin no* // "If it did not exist, then one should not even be able to think about the existence of consciousness that has no substratum."

[47]See MMK XXI.17cd:

nirvāṇakale cocchedaḥ praśamād bhavasaṃtateḥ //

"And at the time of Nirvāṇa the continuum of existence is annihilated through tranquility."

[48]Cf. PP pp.356.1-359.6.

CHAPTER X

SHOWING THE REALIZATION OF THE REFUTATION OF THE SELF

In chapter ten Āryadeva is concerned primarily with refuting Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya notions of a permanent self. He denies that there is a real self that either differentiates one individual from another or provides the identity linking a succession of individual rebirths. He rejects also the opponents' contentions that the self--whether considered conscious or unconscious in nature--functions as an agent of karma.

A 'self' does not exist by its own-nature. If it did, then, certainly, it should be female, male, or neuter, for no other conceptual constructions are possible. The heterodox philosophers describe the self in two ways: internal and external. According to their disparate conceptual constructions, this internal self resides in the body, consists of the collection of the six sense faculties (indriya), instigates a person's actions, serves as the substratum for the ego (ahaṃkāra), and experiences the fruition of karma. They consider the external self subservient to the internal self. But if these heterodox philosophers should conceive of the internal self as female, then, because it does not relinquish its own-nature and acquire another gender

mark (liṅga), it should be female permanently (HPS p.485, CŚṬ D f.158b, P f.178a). Āryadeva maintains that the self should lack all marks of gender and attributes his opponent's claim to the contrary to ignorance. He says:[1]

> 1. When the internal self is neither
> female, male, nor neuter, then it is
> only from ignorance (ajñāna) that you
> think: 'I am male'.

Statement such as 'I am male' arise out of ignorance. Since an investigation fails to establish the existence of a real object (vastu), it is wrong to suppose that there is some other reason--apart from ignorance and conceptual construction--for these statements, just as in the case of a snake superimposed upon a rope (HPS p.485, CŚṬ D f.159a, P f.187a-b).

But should the opponent alter his argument and claim that these gender marks belong instead to the external self and that they apply to the internal self because the two are related (sambandha), then he must explain how these gender marks can belong to the external self, since it is comprized of the four great elements and they have no such marks (HPS p.486, CŚṬ D f.159a-b, P ff.187b-179a). Āryadeva asks:

> 2. When all the elements are neither
> female, male, nor neuter, then how,

> dependent upon them alone, can there
> be female, male, or neuter?[2]

If the self existed by its own-nature, then it should be the objective support (*ālambana*) for all egos, in the same way as it is for one (HPS p.486, CŚṬ D f.160a, P f.179a-b). Āryadeva denies that this objective support is anything other than a conceptual construction superimposed upon impermanent things. He says:

> 3. What is a self for you and not a
> self for me therefore is not a self
> because of lack of determination. Surely,
> isn't it the case that a conceptual
> construction is produced in regard to
> impermanent things?[3]

Your self, whose range (*viṣaya*) encompasses your ego and self-affection (*ātmasneha*), is not mine, for it does not encompass the range of my ego and self-affection.[4] Because the self is not established independently of the aggregates, surely, isn't it the case that a conceptual construction, i.e., 'self', is falsely superimposed upon impermanent things, i.e., the aggregates (HPS p.486, CŚṬ D f.160a-b, P ff.179b-180a)?[5]

The self exists by its own-nature, a Vaiśeṣika opponent contends, because it is the cause of activity (*pravṛtti*) and inactivity (*nivṛtti*). If the self did not exist, then what would create good and bad karma

and experience its results? There exist distinctions in birth in this triple world, and birth occurs in accordance with karma. Demeritorious practices (adharma) harm the self and meritorious practices (dharma) release it.[6] The Mādhyamikas reply that this self either conforms to the changes that the body undergoes in rebirth, or it does not. If it does conform, then it doesn't do anything and must therefore be an imaginary thing. But if it does not conform to these changes, then this self must not be permanent (HPS p.487, CŚṬ D f.160b, P f.180a). Āryadeva adds that if this latter alternative is adopted, then the self becomes indistinguishable from the body. He says:

> 4. The self (puṃs) undergoes change
> from one birth to another, just as the
> body does. It is impossible that this
> [self] of yours is something other than
> the body and permanent?

The opponent now introduces a new argument: If the self does not exist by its own-nature, then there will be nothing to instigate the body's movements. Consequently the self should be accepted as an inner agent which instigates the movements of a body, just as Devadatta instigates the chariot's movements (CŚṬ D ff.160b-161a, P f.180b).[7] Āryadeva responds:

> 5. What is called 'propulsion' does not arise from an intangible thing. Therefore the self (jīva) is not the agent for the body's movement.[8]

An intangible thing cannot move a chariot, since only tangible things propel others. The self, which you imagine to exist, is intangible, for it has no body and nothing can touch it. How can this intangible thing, which you infer to be the cause of the body's movements, move anything? Moreover, the self is intangible because it lacks directional parts; and since it lacks these parts, it cannot contact anything else. And there is no propulsion without contact (CŚṬ D f.161a, P f.180a-b).

In the next verse, Āryadeva implies that if the self is permanent, as the opponent claims, then it should not need protection from harm caused by a bad rebirth.[9] He asks:

> 6. One wonders what is the reason for non-harming when the self is permanent? A diamond never has to be protected from a wood-worm!

The opponent then argues that a permanent self must exist to account for the memory of past lives (CŚṬ D ff.161b-162a, P f.181a).[10] Āryadeva replies that if the memory of a previous life proves that the

internal self is permanent, then, using this same line of argument, the memory of a scar, previously left on the body, should prove that the body, i.e., the external self, is permanent. He says:

> 7. According to you, if the self is permanent, because of the memory of [past births], then why isn't your body permanent after experiencing a scar previously incurred?[11]

But if the opponent tries to overcome this objection by arguing that the self remembers past births because it is connected with consciousness (CŚṬ D f.162b, P f. 182b),[12] then Āryadeva answers that if the self becomes conscious through its connection with consciousness, then it undergoes change and things that change are not permanent. Moreover, in the same way as consciousness is imparted to the self through its connection with consciousness, because of this connection with the unconscious self, consciousness should become unconscious. He says:

> 8. Even though an [unconscious] self is connected with consciousness, if it is in fact a conscious agent, then for that reason consciousness would not be conscious. And the self would not be permanent.[13]

The opponent points out that the self is connected with pleasure and pain in the same way as it is connected with consciousness (CŚṬ D f.163a, P f.182b).[14] Āryadeva replies that if the self is thus connected with the diverse qualities of pleasure and pain, then it should change its nature and become diverse itself. He says:

9. The self (jīva) which is connected
with pleasure, etc., is seen as diverse,
like pleasure, etc. Therefore it also
is not permanent, like pleasure, etc.[15]

At this point a Sāṃkhya opponent interjects his position: This refutation of a permanent self applies only to those who hold that the self is unconscious by nature (CŚṬ D f.163a, P f.183a).[16] Āryadeva argues in the following verses that his refutation of a permanent self applies equally well to those who maintain that the self is conscious. He says:

10. If consciousness (caitanya) were
permanent, then the instrument (karaṇa)[17]
would serve no purpose. If fire were
permanent, then fuel would be useless.[18]

When the eye, etc., serves as an instrument and encounters an object, visible form (rūpa), etc., then the corresponding cognition 'visible form', etc., arises and subsequently the self cognizes that object. Consciousness has the own-nature of constructing objects; the Puruṣa

has the own nature of not being different from consciousness and of being permanent. Since consciousness is inseparable from the Puruṣa, it too must be permanent. Therefore the instrument, the eye, etc., becomes unnecessary and the series of Prakṛti's transformations becomes useless (CŚT D f.163a-b, P f.183a-b).

The opponent now modifies his claim: The Puruṣa has the potential (*śakti*) for consciousness. The Puruṣa enjoys sense objects because the intellect (*buddhi*), which is the basis for the instrument's operations, becomes manifest, and because the processes (*vṛtti*) of consciousness become manifest. Consequently how is this series of transformations useless (HPS p.488, CŚT D ff.163b-164a, P f.183b)?[19] Āryadeva suggests that if consciousness is active, then it must possess motion, like an action (*kriyā*); and it must also reside in some substance, from which it is separable. He says:

> 11. Certainly there is no substance that is mobile until its destruction, as in the case of action. Therefore it is impossible that the Puruṣa exists and consciousness does not.

An action by its very nature activates some substance. It is active from the time of its production until its destruction. But substances, trees, etc., remain at rest until the wind moves them. They continue to move

until the wind stops. However, the Puruṣa, which has consciousness as its own nature, cannot exist independently of consciousness; and it is equally impossible that consciousness can be conceived independently of the Puruṣa, which is its substratum (HPS p.488, CŚṬ D f.164a, P f.184a).

The opponent then claims that, prior to the actual manifestation of consciousness, Puruṣa has the potential for consciousness (HPS p.488, CŚṬ D f.164a-b, P f.184b). Āryadeva criticizes this claim that Puruṣa is potentially conscious at one point and is actually conscious at another point. If this were so, then the Puruṣa should change its nature when it becomes actually conscious. He says:

> 12. It seems that the element (dhātu)
> of consciousness exists in one place and
> consciousness in another. Therefore the
> Puruṣa undergoes change, like iron melting.

The Vaiśeṣika opponent reiterates his position that the self is not conscious by nature (HPS p.488, CŚṬ D f.164b, P ff.184b-185a). Āryadeva concurs and points out the difficulty of the self ever becoming conscious, when the mental organ (manas) is minute and the self is vast. He says:

> 13. Were consciousness the size of the
> mental organ and the self vast, like

space (ākāśa),[20] then unconsciousness
would appear to be its own nature.

The opponent argues that the self pervades an individual's entire body, just as space does. The self becomes conscious when consciousness unites with the mental organ in a place that is atomic in dimension. But if the self is vast, like space, and consciousness has the same atomic dimension as the mental organ, and if the self becomes conscious from its connection with consciousness, then it is impossible that it ever would become conscious. For example the Ganges does not become salty when it encounters a minute measure of salt (HPS p.489, CŚṬ D ff.164b-165a, P f.185a).

If the opponent contends that this self pervades sentient beings (HPS p.489, CŚṬ D f.165a, P f.185a), then Āryadeva retorts:

14. If one's self is all-pervasive,
then why isn't someone else conceptualized
as one's self? It is not possible to say
that this is obstructed by that.

If you suppose 'I am all-pervasive', i.e., ubiquitous in dimension, then why doesn't the conceptual construction 'my self' arise in regard to some other sentient being? If my self were all-pervasive, it should exist in regard to me and in regard to someone else. My self and someone else's self should exist in the same place, since self

pervades everything. But when they exist in the very same place, then it would be impossible to say that one self obstructs another (HPS p.489, CŚṬ D f.165a-b, P f.185b).[21]

Āryadeva returns in the two following verses to his refutation of the Sāṃkhya opponent by attacking the notion of Prakṛti as the unconscious agent of the series of transformations.[22] He says:

15. There is no difference between
insane people and those for whom an
unconscious thing always has the
property of being the qualities' agent!

Insane people are those whose stream of consciousness (vijñānasaṃtati) is mixed up. Consequently they do not apprehend things correctly and babble incoherently about unreal things. So do the Sāṃkhyas (HPS pp.489-490, CŚṬ D ff.165b-166a, P f.186a-b)!

Āryadeva then attacks the position that the qualities function as agents, but do not experience the fruits of their action. He says:

16. The qualities always are known to
construct houses, etc.[23], but they are
not known to experience [the results].
Is there anything more unreasonable
than this?

The Vaiśeṣika position that the self is both the agent and the experiencer of merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) also comes under attack (CŚṬ D f.166a-b, P f.186b). Āryadeva denies that a permanent and all-pervasive self can be an agent:

> 17. What performs an action (kriyāvān) is not permanent; what is all-pervasive does not perform an action; and a lack of action equals a lack of existence. Why doesn't the non-substantiality of the self (nairātmya) please you?[24]

An agent should be the cause of some performed action. It is wrong to say that something that does not do anything and has no cause is an agent. If something performs an action, then it should be different prior to the commencement of that action. A self that does not differ before and after performs no action. Moreover, the self performs no action because it is al-pervasive. For example, Devadatta is a goer and we say 'he goes' because of his relation with going. By picking up one foot and putting down the other, he performs the action of leaving behind his previous location and proceeding to a new location. But if he were supposed to be all-pervasive, the question arises: Where would he go? Where wouldn't he be already? And if the self performs no action, then isn't it just the same as something that does not exist? A thing that

performs no action does not exist. It is like a flower in the sky! If the self does not exist, then why doesn't the non-substantiality of the self please you? It certainly should please you, for it brings an end to all false views (CŚṬ D ff.166b-167a, P ff.186b-188a)!

Āryadeva argues that all people should perceive the self in the same way if it existed by its own nature. But he says:

18. Some see it as ubiquitous;
some see it as the size of an individual's
body; and some see it as minute in size.
A person endowed with insight (_prajñā_)
sees it as non-existent.[25]

He argues also that if the self existed by its own nature, then it could not be liberated, since things that have a permanent nature of their own cannot change. No suffering could induce such a self to seek liberation. He says:

19. How can what is permanent be harmed?
How can there be liberation without harm?
Therefore liberation is impossible for
someone for whom the self is permanent.[26]

The next verse criticizes the 'hypocritical philosophers' (_pāṣaṇḍa_) who hold that liberation is for the purpose of extinguishing all grasping after a self and what belongs to a self (CŚṬ D f.168a, P ff.188b-189a).[27]

He says:

> 20. If the so-called 'I' exists, then
> it is wrong to think 'I do not exist' or
> it is false to think that someone who
> knows the truth attains Nirvāṇa from the
> certainty [of abandoning belief in a
> self].[28]

If an 'I' existed by its own nature, then it would exist even in the state of liberation, since its own nature would not cease. Therefore it would be impossible to relinquish belief in a self by thinking 'I do not exist', since even in the state of liberation there is an 'I' that fails to eradicate the cause of belief in a self. Consequently it is false to think that someone who knows the truth of the self, because of certainty, attains Nirvāṇa from the relinguishing of belief in a self, since even in that case belief in an 'I' exists (CŚṬ D f.168a-b, P f.189a)!

Moreover, the self of a liberated person does not exist by its own nature, Āryadeva insists, because if this were so, then that person should remain unchanged before and after liberation. He says:

> 21. If a liberated person truly exists,
> then he did not exist before [as a non-
> liberated person] .[29] It is explained
> that what is seen to be unconnected [with

anything else] is called 'own nature'.[30]

If the self does not exist, the opponent objects, then nihilism will ensue, since conditioned things by their nature perish each moment (CŚṬ D f.169a, P f. 189b).[31] Āryadeva responds by citing the example of grass that dies and springs up again in a new season:

> 22. If what is impermanent were annihilated, then how could grass, etc., still exist? If this were so, then even ignorance would no longer arise in anyone!

People do not suppose that impermanent things are annhilated. Beginning with the first eon, people observed that grass, etc., continued to rise up again; a series of activity, a connection of cause with effect, persisted without interruption. But if it were true that impermanent things are annihilated, then ignorance would no longer persist in any sentient being. Since even this would be annihilated, cyclic existence would cease effortlessly (CŚṬ D f.169a, P ff.189b-190a)!

But should the opponent suppose that a permanent self is the cause for all things' coming into existence, and for that reason grass, etc., is not annihilated (CŚṬ D f.169b, P f.190a), then Āryadeva replies that ordinary experience shows that visible form arises, persists, and ceases in dependence upon causes other than the self.

He says:

23. Even if the self were to exist, visible form is seen to arise on account of something else, to persist on account of something else, and to cease on account of something else.

If things had the self as their cause, then they could not arise from anything else. But we observe that fire arises from the contact of a crystal and wood. The fire persists while fuel exists and ceases when fuel becomes insufficient (ĆṬ D ff.169b-170a, Pff. 190b-191a).

Furthermore, no permanent thing produces something that is impermanent. Āryadeva says:

24. In the same way as a created seed produces a created sprout, all impermanent things arise from [other] impermanent things.

Āryadeva concludes this chapter with a verse that summarizes his refutation of the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism. He says:

25. Since a thing continues, consequently annihilation does not occur. Since a thing ceases, consequently permanence does not occur.[32]

The sprout arises from its cause, the seed, and therefore the seed is not annihilated. However, the seed is annihilated when fire destroys it. Since the seed ceases

after the sprout arises, therefore it is not permanent (CŚṬ D ff.170b-171a, P ff.191b-192a).

CHAPTER X

NOTES

[1]For translations into French and Hindi respectively see Vaidya, pp.138-142 and Bhaskar, pp.280-283. Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," pp. 534-539, translates the Chinese version of this chapter into Italian.

[2]According to Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.534, n.1, this verse refutes the Lokāyata. The Tibetan commentators indicate that vv.1-9 refute the Vaiśeṣika; vv.10-12, the Sāṃkhya; and vv.13-14, the Nyāya.

[3]Candrakīrti quotes this verse in PP p.199.3-4. p.131) See also Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.204 and Lamotte Traité, II, p.737, n.1.

[4]Cf. the Chinese translation:
汝我餘非我 故我無定相 豈不於無常 妄分別為我

"Your self is not a self for others. Consequently the self has no fixed mark (lakṣaṇa). In regard to non-eternal things, certainly, isn't there the conceptual construction 'self'?"

[5]Cf. Ratnāvalī I.32:

ahaṃkāras tathā skandhān upādāyopalabhyate /

na ca kaścit sa tattvena svamukhapratibimbavat //

"Thus the self is perceived dependent upon the aggregates.

It is not something that exists ultimately, but is like the reflection of one's self own face [in a mirror]."

[6]See Vaiśeṣikasūtras III.1.19, III.2.1ff., Daśapadārthasūtra I.3. (Ui, Vaiseshika Philosophy, p.98) and Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, pp. 199-209.

[7]See Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, p. 199.

[8]See Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.204.

Cf. the Chinese translation:
若法無觸對則無有動搖是故身作業
非命者能造.
"If a thing (dharma) lacks touch, then it lacks motion. Therefore it is the body that performs action; it is not the self (jīva) that can act."

Cf. the discussion on this topic in ŚŚ II and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, pp.30-31).

[9]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap. 10, pp.4-5 says: gal te bdag rtag pa pa yin na bdag ngan 'gro la sogs pa'i gnod pa bsrung ba'i don du mi tshe ba dang chos su bstan pa dang / bdag rtag 'di la mi 'gal ba'i rgyu ni ci yod snyam pa 'gal bar thal / "If the self were permanent, then it follows that it is contradictory to think: what reason is there that doesn't present a contradiction between this permanent self and teaching about meritorious practices (dharma) and non-violence (ahiṃsa) for the purpose of protecting the self from the harm of a bad rebirth, etc."

[10]See Nyāyasūtras III.1.12-14, 18-26; III 2.40.

[11]Candrakīrti (CŚṬ D f.162a, P f.182a) uses the following illustration to explain an individual's passage from one birth to the next: 'di ltar 'dam bzhin du zho'i snod khang pa'i nang na gnas pa dag la rtsa thog che mod pos g.yogs pa'i steng na gnas pa'i phug ron skya bo'i rkyang rjes dmigs mod kyi / de'i rkyang pa zhugs pa ni cis nas rkyung srid ma yin no // "Thus just as in mud, the impression of a gray pigeon's foot is seen inside a vessel of curd and on top of its grass covering, but it is not at all possible that the [pigeon's] foot entered [the curd vessel]."

Cf. Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, p.354. Wayman, p.476, n.354, says: "The example seems to mean that one can find the 'footprints' left in the previous time of the stream of consciousness, compared to a person, even if one cannot dip into the 'milk' of the previous time." I think the point of the example is that just as the impressions left behind by a pigeon's foot passed from one place (the grass lid) to another (the curd contained within the vessel) and the pigeon itself did not, similarly, the karmic impressions left behind by an individual pass from one life to another, but the individual does not.

[12]See Vaiśeṣikasūtras IX.22-23, and Nyāyasūtras III.2.22.

[13]Cf. the Chinese translation:
若我與思合轉成思念者思亦應非思故我非常住。
"If the self unites with consciousness and becomes a conscious thing, it must be conscious and non-conscious. Therefore the self is not permanent." See also Dharmapala's commentary on this verse, translated by Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.535, n.2.

[14]See *Nyāyasūtras* I.1.10.

[15]Cf. ŚS II (Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic* pp.26-27).

[16]See *Sāṃkhyakārikās* v.60 Cf. the extensive refutation of the Puruṣa in ŚS II (Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic*, pp.20-23.

[17]*Sāṃkhyakārikās* vv.32-33, state that the *karaṇa* comprizes thirteen of Prakṛti's evolutes: the intellect (*buddhi*), the ego (*ahaṃkāra*), the mental organ (*manas*), the five sense faculties (*buddhindriya*), and the five faculties of action (*karmendriya*).

[18]Śāntarakṣita in *Tattvasaṃgraha* VII.305 uses the same argument against the Sāṃkhya:

akṣyarthādy aphalaṃ tu syāc caitanyaṃ śāśvataṃ yadi /
na bhaved indhanenārtho yadi syāc chāśvato 'nalaḥ //

"If consciousness were permanent, then such things as the eye would be fruitless. If fire were permanent, then there would be no purpose for fuel."

[19]See Honda, "Dharmapāla's Report on Sāṃkhya," pp.4-5, for an analysis of Dharmapāla's commentary on this topic.

[20]Vaiśeṣikasūtra VII 1.22-23 describes the <u>ātman</u> as large (<u>mahat</u>) and the mental organ as small (<u>aṇu</u>).

[21]Cf. Lamotte <u>Traité</u>, II, p.738.

[22]Candrakīrti (HPS p.489) describes the transformations of Prakṛti as follows: <u>tatrāyaṃ kramo yaduta prakṛter mahān</u> / <u>mahān iti buddheḥ paryāyaḥ</u> / <u>mahato 'haṃkāraḥ sa ca trividhaḥ</u> / <u>sāttviko rājasas tāmasa iti</u> / <u>tatra sāttvikād ahaṃkārāt pañcabuddhīndriyāṇi śrotavyaṃ tvak cakṣuḥ rasanaṃ ghrāṇam iti</u> / <u>pañcakarmendriyāṇi vākpāṇi-pādapāyūpasthākhyāni</u> / <u>ubhayātmakaṃ ca manaḥ ity ekā-daśa pravartante</u> / <u>rājasād ahaṃkārāt pañcatanmātrāṇi śabdasparśarūparasagandhāḥ</u> / <u>tanmātrebhyo bhūtāni ākā-śavāyutejojalapṛthivyākhyāni</u> / <u>tāmasas tv ahaṃkāra ubhayor ahaṃkārayoḥ pravarttaka ity</u>..."This is the series, namely, from Prakṛti comes <u>mahat</u>--<u>mahat</u> is a synonym of <u>buddhi</u>--and from <u>mahat</u> comes <u>ahaṃkāra</u> and it is threefold: <u>sāttvika</u>, <u>rājasa</u>, and <u>tāmasa</u>. From the <u>sāttvika</u> <u>ahaṃkāra</u> comes the five sense faculties, i.e., ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose, and the five faculties of action, i.e., voice, hands, feet, and the organs of excretion and generation. The eleventh, i.e., the mental organ comes forth having the nature of both [faculties]. From the <u>rājasa</u> <u>ahaṃkāra</u> comes the five subtle elements, i.e., sound, touch, form, taste, and

smell; and from the subtle elements come the five gross elements, i.e., space, air, fire, water, and earth. And the <u>tāmasa</u> <u>ahaṃkāra</u> activates the other two."

Cf. <u>Sāṃkhyakārikās</u> vv.32-36.

See also the treatment of this topic in Vasu's commentary to ŚŚ II (Tucci, <u>Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic</u>, pp.19-20) and compare this treatment with a passage from the <u>Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa</u>, translated by Honda, "Āryadeva's Critique Against Sāṃkhya," JIBS 2311 (1974) p.487.

[23]Cf. the use of the expression 'constructor of the house' in <u>Udānavarga</u> XXXI.6-7:

<u>anekaṃ jātisaṃsāraṃ saṃdhāvitvā punaḥ punaḥ</u> /
<u>gṛhakārakaiṣamānas tvaṃ duḥkhā jātiḥ punaḥ punaḥ</u> //
<u>gṛhakāraka dṛṣṭo 'si na punar gehaṃ kariṣyasi</u> /
<u>sarve te pārśuke bhagnā gṛhakūṭaṃ visaṃskṛtaṃ</u> /
<u>visaṃskāragate citte ihaiva kṣayaṃ adhyagāḥ</u> //

"After passing through the cyclic of existence in many births again and again, searching for you, constructor of the house, birth again and again is painful. You are seen, O constructor of the house. You will not construct the house again. All your rafters are broken, the house's ridgepole is destroyed. When mind has attained dissolution, you have reached the exhaustion of this very world."

Cf. also <u>Dhammapada</u> vv.123-124 and <u>Nidānakathā</u> vv.278-279.

[24]This verse is quoted in PP p.116.10-11. See also Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.204.

Cf. Ratnāvalī I.41:

mokṣe nātmā na ca skandhā mokṣaś ced īdṛśaḥ priyaḥ /
ātmaskandhāpanayanaṃ kim ihaiva tavāpriyam //

"Neither the self nor the aggregates exist in liberation. If such a liberation pleases you, then why doesn't the elimination of the self and the aggregates please you?"

[25]This verse is quoted by Honda, "Āryadeva's Critique Against Sāṃkhya," p.10. He says: "This stanza is referred (sic) to by Dharmapāla in the 成唯識論 [Ch'eng wei shih lun] , which is explained by his disciple 慈恩 [Tz'u En] respectively as 1) Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, 2) Āhrikya tīrthika and 3) Pasupata etc."

rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap.10, p.11 identifies the first position with the Sāṃkhya and others (probably Vaiśeṣikas) and the second with the Jains. He refers to the third position only as the position of people who reject the Jain position.

See also Lamotte Traité, II, p.744. Lamotte, p.744, n.2., comments that this passage's speculations on the size of the ātman can be traced to several of the Upaniṣads.

[26]Cf. Lamotte, Traité, II, p.745.

[27]This seems to attack the Pudgalavādins, who rejected self-grasping, but maintained the existence of a pudgala that passes through the cycle of existence, etc. On the

views of this school see Bareau, Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, pp.114-120 and Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp.122-130. Lamotte, Traité, I, p.43, n.3 provides additional references.

[28]See Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on Emptiness," p.192 and p.202. Buddhapālita's Madhyamakavṛtti cites a variant reading of 20cd:

yang na de nyid rtogs pa'am //
mya ngan 'da' ba nges rdzun 'gyur //

"Otherwise realizing the truth or Nirvāṇa certainly will be false."

Cf. the Chinese translation:
我若實有性不應言讚離住我
定知真實者趣解脫應虛
"If the self has the nature of truly existing, then one must not praise the relinquishment of the self. And it must be false that one who certainly knows the truth advances to Nirvāṇa."

See also Tattvasaṃgraha 3494:

na yuktaṃ nāham ity evaṃ yady ahaṃ nāma vidyate /
niyamāt tattvavid yāti nirvāṇam iti vā mṛṣā //

"Thinking 'I am not' is not correct if the so-called 'I' exists. Or else it is false to think that someone who knows the truth attains Nirvāṇa from certainty."

[29]Cf. the Chinese translation of 21ab:
解脫中若無前亦應非有，

"If it does not exist in Nirvāṇa, then it must also not exist before."

[30]Cf. MMK XV.2cd: akṛtimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca // "For own nature is uncreated and is not dependent upon anything else."

[31]Cf. the Pudgalavādin argument in Traité, II, pp.742-743.

[32]This verse is quoted by Buddhapālita in the Madhyamakavṛtti. See Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on Emptiness," p.199 and p.210.

Cf. MMK XVII.8:

bījāc ca yasmāt saṃtānaḥ saṃtānāc ca phalodbhavaḥ /
bījapūrvaṃ phalaṃ tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam //
"Since the continuum comes forth from the seed and the arising of the fruit from the continuum, the fruit has the seed as its antecedent. Therefore it is neither annihilated nor permanent."

and ŚS VII (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, p.65).

CHAPTER XI

SHOWING THE REALIZATION OF THE REFUTATION OF TIME

Āryadeva in chapter eleven examines various arguments for the existence of time. He begins by denying that the future exists either in dependence upon the past and the present or by its own nature. He goes on to show the difficulties that result from his opponents' attempts to establish future time as permanent or impermanent. The latter part of chapter eleven focuses on the ascriptions of the marks 'impermanence' and 'duration' to things.

An opponent agrees that the self does not exist, because form arises from some other cause and because we cannot apprehend the self either by ordinary perception (laukikapratyakṣa) or by inference (anumāna). However, it is not true that no permanent things exist; time exists. Sometimes sprouts and flowers grow and sometimes they do not, even though the seed exists. From this observation we infer that they are the effects of time. Time begins with a single moment (kṣaṇa). It is past, present, and future (CŚṬ D f.171a-b, P f.192a-b).[1]

Āryadeva argues against the existence of a future time that is dependent upon the previous existence of the past and the present. He says:[2]

> 1. The present pot does not exist in the future pot; the past [pot] does not exist. Since these two are the future, therefore the future does not exist.[3]

The future pot indicates future time. Similarly, the past and present pots refer to past and present time. The future has not yet arrived at the present; the past has already passed over it; and the present has arisen but has not yet ceased.[4] Because we now perceive the present, it is dominant; and the other two are not. These three times are mutually dependent. The future cannot be established independently of the past and the present. The future pot is neither the present pot nor the past pot, because their marks (lakṣaṇa) differ and because it is impossible for one to exist when the other exists.

But if the opponent objects that the future exists by virtue of its relation to the present but not by virtue of itself, then we reply that this is not so. Both the present and the past are established when the future is established. If the future does not exist, then how will either the present or the past exist? On the other hand, because both the past and the present are future, all three times are future. Then since the past and the present do not exist, how will they establish

the future? Consequently future time does not exist (CŚṬ D ff.171b-172a, P ff.192b-193a).[5]

Even though the past does not exist in the future in all respects, nonetheless, another opponent argues, it does exist in the future pot as the pot's nature (CŚṬ D f.172b, P f.193b). Āryadeva questions the opponent's contention that the past is the latent nature of the future. How, he asks, can it change its nature and become actually past?

2. If the past exists in the future as
the nature of the future, then how will
that which exists as the nature of the
future become past?[6]

He argues further that it is impossible for anything that has a given nature to change. He says:

3. Because a future thing remains
future in nature, therefore it is
impossible that it is in fact future
after it becomes present.[7]

Just as a blue thing, which currently has a blue nature, does not have a yellow nature, similarly, after a future thing becomes present, it can no longer be future (CŚṬ D f.172b, P f.194a).

Other Buddhist opponents maintain that things have their own marks (svalakṣaṇa). Because all three times exist, only a thing that does not abandon its own nature

occurs due to the combination of causes and conditions (_hetupratyayasamāgrī_) (CŚṬ D f.173a, P f.194a).[8] Āryadeva doubts whether something that exists in all three times should be considered impermanent. He says:

> 4. The future exists, the past exists,
> the present exists. What does not exist?
> How can something which exists at all times
> be impermanent?[9]

The opponent claims that even on past and future occasions the mind apprehends the own nature of this present thing. How can that thing be considered impermanent? It would in fact be permanent! This contradicts Buddhist teaching, for the Buddha said, "Conditioned things are impermanent. They have the property of arising and ceasing. After they arise, they will cease. They are calm and blissful"[10] (CŚṬ D f.173a, P ff.193b-194a).

Āryadeva denies that the past exists by its own-nature. He asks:

> 5. How will what is [already] past
> become past on account of the past?
> How will what is not [yet] past become
> past on account of the past?

First of all, it is wrong to call what is already past 'past' because of its past nature. We do not call yogurt, which was milk in the past, 'milk'. But if you suppose that the past is not past on account of the past, then

how will what is not yet past, and which lacks activity, become past? The opponent then claims that since the past is established by virtue of its own-nature, therefore only what is not yet past becomes past on account of the past. The Mādhyamikas reply that this would be true if the past were established. However, when examined, the past does not exist. Consequently because the past does not exist, whatever is not yet past, which depends on the past, also does not exist (CŚṬ D f.173a-b, P ff. 194b-195a).

Further difficulties ensue if the opponent supposes that a future thing is produced. Āryadeva says:

> 6. If the future [pot] is produced, then
> doesn't it become present? But if it is
> not produced, then isn't the future
> permanent?[11]

The opponent conceded that the future pot is not produced, but argues that, unlike unconditioned things (asaṃskṛta), it is destructible. Because of certain causes and conditions, the future nature becomes present. No unconditioned thing is deprived of its own nature in this way. Therefore the future is not permanent, like unconditioned things (HPS p.491, CŚṬ D f.174a, P f.195b). Āryadeva responds:

> 7. If, even without being produced, the
> future is impermanent because of its

> [subsequent] destruction, then there
> being no destruction of the past, isn't
> it conceived to be permanent?

If because it is deprived of its own-nature the future is not permanent, then because the past is not deprived of its own nature one might suppose that it is permanent (HPS p.491, CŚṬ D f.174a, P f.195b).

In the next verse, Āryadeva suggests that if the past and the present are not impermanent, as the opponent contends, then there is no basis for an impermanent future. He says:

> 8. This present and the past are not
> impermanent. Apart from these two,
> there is no third possibility for it.

The opponent claims that this present thing is not impermanent. It is called 'present' because it has the property of being present and because it is not deprived of its own nature. Because an impermanent thing is connected with non-existence, it is not present. It is impossible for existence and non-existence to occur at the same time; and therefore it is not possible that the present is impermanent. And it is not possible that the past is impermanent because the past has ceased. It is not logically possible for something that has already ceased to cease again, since that would serve no purpose nihprayojana), have no basis (āśrayābhāva), and would

entail an infinite regress (anavasthāprasaṅga). The Mādhyamikas reply that when it is not possible that something which has been produced is impermanent, then the future, which has not been produced, is just like a flower in the sky (HPS p.491, CŚṬ D f.174a-b, P f.196a)!

The future exists, the opponent insists, because we perceive that certain conditions produce it. It is not possible that something which did not exist previously should be produced at a later time (HPS p.491, CŚṬ D f.174b, P f.196a). Āryadeva retorts:

9. If that thing which is produced afterwards exists previously, then the Fatalist (niyativādin) position[12] is not wrong!

If one supposes that a thing exists prior to its production, then the Fatalist position that there is a predetermined (niyata), uncaused own-nature which is not influenced by human effort (puruṣakara)--a position that is contrary to logical possibility (upapatti)-- will not be wrong! And this position is wrong because it contradicts our experience, because it denies human effort, and because it denies interdependent origination (HPS p.491, CŚṬ D ff.174b-175a, P f.196a-b).

Moreover, Āryadeva says:

10. It is not logically possible to say that something whose coming into existence is produced has existed

> previously. If there were the
> production of an [already] existent
> thing, then there would be the coming
> into existence of what has been
> produced.[13]

It is not logically possible to say that a thing which causes and conditions bring into existence has existed previously. For if it did, then the production of something that already exists would occur. The production of something that already exists is logically impossible because it serves no purpose, because it would follow that there would never be an end to the production again and again of a single thing, and because nothing else would be active--which contradicts the fact that causes and conditions exist (HPS p.491, CŚṬ D f.175a, P f.196b).

But if the future does not exist, the opponent objects, then the yogins' cognition that results from previous vows (praṇidhijñāna)[14] and has the future as its object (ālambana) would be incorrect. Yogins do predict the future correctly, and this would not be possible if the future did not exist (HPS p.492, CŚṬ D f.175a, P ff.196b-197a). Āryadeva replies:

> 11. If a future thing is perceived,
> why isn't a non-existent thing per-
> ceived? The future is not remote for
> someone for whom it exists.

It has already been explained that no future thing exists by its own nature prior to its production. If yogins could perceive things that are not present, then they could perceive a barren woman's son, for both equally have a non-existent own-nature! It is not right to maintain that one is perceived and the other is not. Moreover, the future is not remote for someone who holds that the future exists by its own-nature. The opponent considers past and future things to be remote and present things to be close at hand. But the future is not remote, for it is now in the process of becoming present (HPS p.492, CŚṬ D ff.175a-176a, P ff.197a-198a).

Furthermore, meritorious practices (dharma), such as giving and moral conduct, which will be performed in the future, given the condition of hearing about such practices from a good friend (kalyāṇamitra) and the subsequent maturation of one's faculties (indriya),[15] should already exist (HPS p.492, CŚṬ D f.176a-b, P f.198a)! Āryadeva says:

> 12. If meritorious practice exists, even
> though it has not been produced, then
> self-restraint (niyama) is useless.[16]
> But if there is anything that should be
> done,[17] however slight, then an [already]
> existent effect is impossible.[18]

The effort expanded in the restraint of body, speech, and mind in order to attain meritorious practice is in vain if this is possible to attain even without such restraint. But if this self-restraint brings about distinction, then this distinction, which previously was absent, is produced subsequently (HPS pp.492-492, ĆSṬ D f.176b, P f.198a).

Āryadeva contends that something which exists both before and after its production must be permanent. He holds that the notion that an effect pre-exists in its cause is incompatible with the fact that things are impermanent. He says:

> 13. If something is impermanent, how will there be a pre-existent effect? People call whatever has a beginning and an end 'impermanent'.

Should the opponent admit the error in maintaining that effects pre-exist in their causes and suppose that the future effect does not exist (ĆSṬ D f.177a, P f.198b),[19] then Āryadeva replies:

> 14. There being liberation without effort,[20] there would be no futurity to liberation. If this is so, then passion (rāga) also will arise without the impassioned person (rakta)![21]

Because future afflictions will not exist, liberation will occur without any effort, without cultivating the noble path. People subject to liberation will become liberated effortlessly now, not in the future. If the effect of liberation does not occur in the future, no effort is needed. This is wrong; not only will it follow that liberation will occur effortlessly, but also liberation will arise without a cause. Similarly, even desire, which has the individual subject to desire as its substratum and which arises dependent upon this, would occur independently of the individual subject to desire, without any cause. It is not possible that it has no cause, for it would follow that desire could then exist even in saints (CŚṬ D f.177a, P ff.198b-199a).[22]

Āryadeva asserts that both his opponents who hold that the effect pre-exists in its cause and those who hold that the effect is previously non-existent in its cause are in error.[23] In the following verse, he implies that if the effect already exists, then it is not necessary to adorn the house with pillars, since these pillars should already be present. On the other hand, if the effect, i.e., the pillars, is non-existent, then these pillars will never adorn the house. He says:

15. The adornment of pillars, etc.,
for a house is useless for someone who
holds that the effect is pre-existent and

for someone who holds that the
effect is non-existent.[24]

A Sāṃkhya opponent now offers a new line of argument: Although past and future have been refuted, the present still exists. Since the present exists, the future exists; a future thing becomes present by undergoing transformation. For example, milk is transformed into curd (CŚṬ D f.178b, P f.200b). Āryadeva responds:

16. Although things may be transformed,
not even the mental organ (manas) will
perceive them. Nonetheless, fools
imagine that the present exists.

Not only do the five sense faculties fail to perceive these transformed things, but even the mental organ which is capable of apprehending things that lack perceptible form, fails to perceive them (CŚṬ D f.179a, P f.201b).

Time exists because there is a thing that is its cause. Since time has no physical body, we can ascertain it only in dependence upon some thing, but not by itself (CŚṬ D f.179a-b, P f.201b).[25] Āryadeva attacks this argument by denying that the thing persists longer than a single moment. If it were to endure, then it would never become old and perish. He says:

17. How could there be a thing that
doesn't endure? Because it is impermanent,

how could it persist? If it first
were to endure, then it would not
become old in the end.[26]

Āryadeva further argues that the cognition which apprehends that thing lasts only a moment. He says:

18. Just as one cognition does not
apprehend two things, similarly two
cognitions do not apprehend one thing.

If a thing endures, then it would be the object (*jñeya*) of many cognitions (*jñāna*). On the assumption that this thing, which one cognition apprehends, subsequently is perceived by another cognition, the opponent then supposes that this thing endures until a later cognition cuts it off. But this is not possible, since both the cognition and its object exist just for one moment (CŚṬ D f.179b, P f.202a).

The opponent then claims that duration (*sthiti*) exists because it is the mark of present time (CŚṬ D f.180b, P f.203b). Āryadeva replies:

19. If duration exists in time, then
duration will not be time. But if
there were no duration, then without
duration an end will not exist.

If the opponent supposes that duration exists in time, then duration cannot be time. For example, Devadatta who is in the house is not the house, since the container

and the thing contained differ. Similarly duration is not time because it is included within time. Because duration is not the own nature of time, it cannot be a mark of time. But if there were no duration, then there would be no cessation (CŚṬ D ff.180b-181a, P f.203b).

Since a thing that endures is impermanent, the opponent claims, duration exists. No thing exists without duration, and impermanence cannot exist without a substratum. Consequently a thing that is impermanent will also persist (CŚṬ D f.181a, P ff.203b-204a). Āryadeva analyzes the relation between a thing and its mark of impermanence in terms of identity and difference. If the two were completely different, then no relation between them is possible. But if they were completely identical, then no other mark is possible. He says:

> 20. If impermanence were different
> from the thing, then the thing would
> not be impermanent. But if they were
> identical, then that very thing would
> be just impermanent. How then could
> it endure?[27]

The opponent counters this objection with a new claim. He asserts that when a thing endures, there is no impermanence, for duration has greater power (CŚṬ D f.181a, P f.204a). Āryadeva argues that if duration were not the weaker of the two, then how could impermanence become

more powerful later and put an end to duration? He says:

> 21. Were duration not weak where
> impermanence is weak, then, surely,
> how would these later be seen to
> reverse?

On the other hand, if impermanence has greater power, how will things endure? Yet impermanence must exist in all things; otherwise they will endure permanently. Āryadeva says:

> 22. If impermanence is not weak
> and exists in all things, then
> either all will not endure, or all
> will not be impermanent.

The mark 'impermanence' either comes into existence at the same time as the marked thing (lakṣya) or it comes into existence afterwards (CŚṬ D f.182a, P f.204b). Āryadeva says:

> 23. If impermanence exists continuously,
> then either duration does not exist
> continuously or something becomes
> impermanent after it has completed
> being permanent.

Because a marked thing does not have a mark that is incompatible with it, if it were connected continuously with impermanence, then duration could not exist continuously.

But if the opponent desires to avoid that error and maintains that a thing becomes impermanent later, then this same thing which was permanent earlier, because of its connection with persistence, becomes impermanent later because it is connected with impermanence. However, a thing cannot be both permanent and impermanent, for these marks are mutually incompatible (CŚṬ D f.182a, P ff.204b-205a).

Moreover, no thing has the marks of duration and impermanence simultaneously. Āryadeva says:

> 24. If a thing endures and is impermanent at the same time, then either it is false that it is impermanent or it is false that it endures.

Because we remember things that were experienced in the past, time exists the opponent contends (CŚṬ D f.182a-b, P f.205a). Āryadeva rejects this argument also. He says:

> 25. A thing that has been seen does not reappear. Moreover, the cognition of it does not reoccur. Therefore to talk about memory is false; in fact it is error alone that occurs.

We have refuted already the notion that two cognitions apprehend one thing; consequently a thing does not reappear.

When the thing itself does not reappear, the cognition that took it as its object also will not reoccur.

When the past thing lacks a nature of its own, the memory that apprehends it also lacks a nature of its own. For this reason, the memory is false. That is to say, it has no nature of its own and has originated in dependence. It is not intended that 'false' means 'non-existent'. Memory is like the experience we have of a dream after we have awakened (CŚṬ D ff.182b-183a, P ff.205b-206a).

CHAPTER XI

NOTES

[1]This same argument occurs earlier (CŚṬ D f.171b, P f.192b) and Āryadeva's response is given in IX.7.

[2]Vaidya, pp.143-146 and Bhaskar, pp.62-76, translate this chapter into French and Hindi respectively. Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," pp.540-545, translates the Chinese version into Italian. Ogawa Ikkyō, "Jikan ron ni taisuru Daijō Bukkyōteki shiten Gesshō-zō Shihyakuron-chūshaku daijūichi Shō," (Mahāyāna Buddhism's viewpoint on the question of time in Candrakīrti's Catuḥśatakaṭīkā, chapter eleven), The Annual Report of Researches of the Ōtani University, no.29 (1976), pp. 1-56, translates chapter eleven of Candrakīrti's commentary into Japanese.

[3]Cf. ŚŚ II and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, pp.76-77), which corresponds to CŚ XI.1-5.

[4]Cf. PP p.382.4-6 on MMK XIX.1: yasmād utpanno niruddho hi bhāvasvabhāva 'tīta iti vyapadiśyate utpanno 'niruddho hi vartamānaḥ / alabdhātmabhāvo 'nāgata iti / "Since a thing's own nature has arisen and ceased it is called 'past', when a thing's own nature has arisen and not ceased it is called 'present', and when self-nature is not apprehended it is called 'future'.

This passage and a similar one from the <u>Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam</u> are cited in Paul Williams, "On the Abhidharma Ontology," JIP 9 (1981): 236.

[5]Candrakīrti discusses the mutual dependence of the three times at length in his commentary to MMK XIX.1-4 (PP pp.382.1-385.10). CŚ XI and MMK XIX.1-4 seem to refute a similar position. Paul Williams, "Buddhadeva and Temporality," JIP 4 (1977) suggests (pp.280-281) that Nāgārjuna's refutation of time is based upon the position of Buddhadeva.

Buddhadeva was one of four Abhidharma masters whose views later critics cite. See Louis de La Vallée Poussin "Documents d'Abhidharma--La Controverse du Temps;" MCB (1937):22-24. <u>Kośa</u>, IV, pp.50-54; (AKV pp.805-818), <u>Abhidharmadīpa</u>, pp.259-261; and <u>Tattvasaṃgraha</u>, pp.613-617.

[6]The Chinese translation differs:
未來過現有 便是未來無
此則恒未來 云何成過現
"If the future, which has already ceased, still has a future essence, then inasmuch as this is constantly future, how can one say that it becomes past and present?"

Cf. ŚS IX and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, <u>Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic</u>, pp.76-77.

[7]The Chinese translation of 3ab differs:
法若在未來 現有未來相

"If a thing (dharma) in the future is seen to have the mark (lakṣaṇa) of the future."

The position that Āryadeva refutes in vv.2-3 resembles Ghoṣaka's view that the transformation of one temporal mark (lakṣaṇānyathā) into another differentiates one time from another. He claims that when a thing passes through time it becomes conjoined with the mark 'past' (atītalakṣaṇayukta) and is then considered 'past', though it is not separated completely from the marks of the present and the future.

Ghoṣaka's views also can be found in the sources cited above in n.5.

[8]Cf. Kathāvatthu, pp.120-121, in which the views of a Sabbatthivādin opponent who claims that "form does not abandon its nature as form" (rūpaṃ rūpaṃ bhavaṃ na jahati) are refuted.

[9]The Chinese translation of 4ab differs:
去來如現有 取果用何無
"If past and future exist like the present, why wouldn't they have a casual function?"

This position is similar to the views of Vasumitra, who held that the three times differ because of a change in state (avasthānyathā). When a thing is active it is called 'present'; when its activity ceases it is called 'past'; and prior to its engaging in activity it is called 'future'.

See, for example, the following passage from AKV, p.808:

yady atītam api dravyato 'sty anāgatam iti kasmāt tad atītam ity ucyate anāgatam iti vā? nanu coktam advānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitā iti?

"[Sautrāntika] : If past and future substantially exist, how is something called 'past' or 'future'?

[Sarvāstivādin] : Hasn't it been stated that the times are determined by causal function?"

[10]This verse is found in Dīgha, II, p.157; Saṃyutta, I, p.6, p.158, p.200; II, p.193.

annica vata saṅkhārā // uppādavayadhammino // uppajjitvā nirujjhanti // tesaṃ vūpasamo sukho-ti //

"Indeed impermanent are conditioned things which have the properties of arising and ceasing. After arising, they cease. For these there is calm and bliss."

Cf. MMK VII.16:

pratītya yad yad bhavati tac tac chāntam svabhāvataḥ / tasmād utpadyamānam ca śāntam utpattir eva ca //

"Whatever exists in dependence is calm by its very nature. Therefore both the process of being produced and the production itself are calm."

[11]Cf. Kathāvatthu, p.125:

Anāgataṃ hutvā paccupannaṃ hotiti? Āmantā Taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccupannan ti? "We ask: After it has been future, does it become present? Then isn't the future in fact present?"

[12] A. L. Basham, History and Doctrine of the Ājīvikas (London: Luzac & Co., 1951), pp.224-235; Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, pp.142-152; and Kalupahana, Causality, pp.32-41, all examine the views of the Niyativādins.

[13] Candrakīrti cites this verse in his commentary to CŚ XIV.21 (HPS p.511, CŚṬ D f.217b, P f.246b).

[14] On the term praṇidhijñāna see AK 37ab and AKV pp.1011-1012 (Kośa, V, pp.88-89). Cf. Armelin, Le Coeur de la Loi Supreme, pp.155, 174-175, 240n.15.

[15] These indriya include confidence (śraddhā), effort (vīrya), mindfulness (smṛti), concentration (samādhi), and insight (prajñā). See Lamotte Traité, III, pp.1125-1127, 1179.

[16] Cf. VVv.54:

atha na pratītya kiṃcit svabhāva utpadyate sa kuśalānām /
dharmāṇām evam syād vāso na brahmacaryasya //

"But if the own-nature of wholesome things arises without dependence upon anything else, then there would be no practice of the religious life."

[17] The accomplishment of 'what should be done' (karaṇīyam) is one of the arahant's achievements. See, for example the following description of the arahant: khīṇa jāti vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparaṃ itthatvaṃ. "Birth is exhausted; the religious life accomplished, what should be done has been done. There is nothing more to this life." For other references see PED s.v. arahant.

[18]Candrakīrti cites this verse in his commentary to CŚ XIV.21 (HPS p.511, CŚṬ D f.217b, P f.246b).

[19]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap. 11, p.8, refers to the opponent as a Sautrāntika.

[20]mDo sngags, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i tshig don, pp.188-189 bases his comments on the reading bsgrib pa med "without being obstructed" instead of bsgrim pa med "without effort." He says: 'o na ma 'ongs pa'i skye pa la sogs pa sgrib pa zad pa'i phyir du lam sgom pa'i 'bad rtsol gyis bsgrib pa med par thar par 'gyur te grol ba la bar du gcod pa'i gegs chags sogs kyi sgrib pa ma 'ongs pa na yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // ma 'ongs pa na chags sogs kyi sa bon med kyang thar pa la bar du gcod pa'i sgrib pa skyes pa yod pa de ltar yin na chags bral rnams kyi rgyud la rten chags pa med par yang ni rten can gyi 'dod chags kyang ni 'byung bar 'gyur ro // "In that case there would be liberation without encompassing the path of meditation in order to remove such obstructions as future births, since future obstructions, desire, etc., do not exist. In the future, even without the seed, desire, etc., an obstruction, an impediment to liberation arises. If this is so, desire, the thing contained, would occur even in containers that lack desire, in the continuum of those who are free from desire."

[21] Cf. the Chinese version of 14cd:
或許有去來貪應離貪者

"Some hold that past and future desires must be separate from the individual subject to desire."

[22] Cf. PP p.138.6-9 on MMK VI.1:

rakto rāgāśrayaḥ / *sa yadi rakto rāgāt pūrvaṃ rāgatiraskṛto rāgarahito bhavet* / *tadā taṃ rāgatiraskṛtaṃ raktaṃ pratītya rāgo bhavet* / *evaṃ sati rakte rāgo bhavet iti yuktam* / *na tv evaṃ sambhavati yad rāgarahito raktaḥ syād arhatām api rāgaprasaṅgāt* //

"The individual subject to desire is the substratum for desire. If there were, prior to desire, an individual subject to desire, who is independent of desire and free from desire, then desire would be dependent upon that individual subject to desire, who is independent of desire. Thus it is possible to say that when the individual subject to desire exists desire would exist, but it is not possible to say that there is an individual subject to desire who is free from desire, because of the consequence that desire would exist even in saints!"

[23] Red mda' ba, *dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa*, p.135 identifies the *satkāryavādins* as Sāṃkhyas and Vaibhāṣikas. On the *satkāryavāda* of the Vaibhāṣikas see Kalupahana, *Causality*, pp.149-151. On the *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṃkhyas see Bhartiya, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, pp.36-41, Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies*,

pp.106-109, and Gerald J. Larson, "The notion of satkārya in Sāṃkhya," PEW 25 (1975): 31-40.

Red mda' ba, *dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa* (p.136) identifies the *asatkāryavādins* as Sautrāntikas and Vaiśeṣikas. On the *asatkāryavāda* of the Sautrāntikas see Kalupahana, *Causality*, pp.151-154. On the *asatkāryavāda* of the Vaiśeṣikas see Bhartiya, *Causation in Indian Philosophy*, pp.138-148, and Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies*, pp.111-114.

[24]Candrakīrti cites this verse in his commentary to CŚ XIV.21 (HPS p.511, CŚṬ D f.217b, P f.246b).

[25]Cf. PP p.387.7-15 on MMK XIX.6.

[26]Buddhapālita cites this verse and vv.23-24 in his commentary to MMK VII.2., *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p.92.

Cf. *Ratnāvalī* I.68 (cited in MKV p.546).

kṣaṇike sarvathābhāvāt kutaḥ kācit purāṇatā /
sthairyād akṣaṇike cāpi kutaḥ kācit purāṇatā //

"How can a momentary thing become old, since it does not exist at all? How can a non-momentary thing become old, since it persists?"

[27]Cf. MMK XIX.5:

nāsthito gṛhyate kālaḥ sthitaḥ kālo na vidyate /
yo gṛhyetāgṛhitaś ca kālaḥ prajñapyate katham //

"A time that does not persist cannot be grasped, and there is no persisting time that could be grasped. How is a time that cannot be grasped made known?"

CHAPTER XII

SHOWING THE REALIZATION OF THE REFUTATION FOR WRONG VIEWS

Āryadeva in chapter twelve explains why most people reject the Buddha's teaching on emptiness and the non-substantiality of persons (pudgalanairātmya) and things (dharmanairātmya). They lack the intelligence, he claims, needed to realize the truth of these profound teachings. Instead, they fear them and cling to the false views of Brahmins and Jains.

You clarify and explain in detail the teaching of non-substantiality, a teaching that the Buddha fully understood and proclaimed, the opponent says. But why, he asks, don't people follow his teaching (CŚṬ D f.183a, P f.206a)? Āryadeva replies that, despite the virtues of the teacher and his teachings, most people lack the qualities that characterize a capable student. He says:[1]

> 1. It is explained that a student who is
> impartial, intelligent, and industrious
> is called 'a vessel'. The teacher's good
> qualities do not change, and for the student
> it is not the case[2] [that good qualities
> become faults].[3]

The word 'impartial' refers to someone who does not fall under the prejudicial influence of his own or someone else's

position. Impartiality is the basis for rejecting erroneous positions.[4] Consequently an impartial student is the right vessel for the true teaching. Moreover, a student must be intelligent in order to discriminate between essential and non-essential teachings. An intelligent person will reject what is non-essential and will accept what is essential. An intelligent and impartial student will work hard for the sake of these teachings.

The teacher's qualities include the ability to speak impartially, non-erroneously, clearly, and without anger.[5] He has the ability to discern a student's intention[6] and his mind is free from self-interest (<u>nirāmiṣa</u>).[7] An impartial, intelligent, and industrious student respects both the teacher and teachings. For this student the teacher's good qualities never change and become faults (CŚṬ D ff.183a-194a, P ff.206a-207a).

Āryadeva contends that people who fail to grasp the Buddha's teachings on the four noble truths blame their lack of comprehension on the Buddha. He says:

> 2. He spoke about cyclic existence and
> the means[8] for cyclic existence. Similarly,
> he spoke about tranquility and the means
> for tranquility. People perceive whatever
> they fail to understand as if that were
> the [fault] of the Sage.

The expression 'cyclic existence' refers to the five appropriating aggregates (upādānaskandha), which are the effect;[9] 'means for cyclic existence' refers to the conditioned forces (saṃskāra), which are the cause; 'tranquility' refers to Nirvāṇa, for that has the nature of eliminating all harm; and 'means for tranquility' refers to the eight constituents of the noble path. The Buddha taught these four noble truths to people who sought liberation, for they knew what to accept and what to reject. Only people who engage in learning (śruti), reflection (cintā), and meditation (bhāvanā) and are capable of analyzing things correctly will comprehend the Buddha's teachings. Others, who are not suitable vessels for his teachings, complain: 'We do not understand. This has not been taught properly'. But this is not the Buddha's fault. He taught the four noble truths only for humanity's sake. How is he at fault? If the blind fail to see, it is not the sun's fault, for people who are not blind do see (CŚṬ D f.184a-b, P f.207a-b)!

Although the Buddha's teachings are clear, nevertheless, the opponent explains, since these teachings declare that all things are non-existent, we do not understand them. Moreover, since the Buddha refutes the own-nature of things, his teaching displeases us (CŚṬ D f.184b, P ff.207b-208a)! Āryadeva responds:

3. All hypocritical philosophers (pāṣaṇḍa)
hold that Nirvāṇa is attained by complete
renunciation. What is the reason for
their displeasure when everything is
refuted?[10]

The hypocritical philosophers, Sāṃkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas, and others, maintain that the removal of all defilements (saṃkleśa), pleasure, and pain leads to liberation. When they claim that Nirvāṇa results from complete renunciation, then they are not saying anything that we have not said earlier (HPS p.494, CŚṬ D f.184b, P f.208a).[11]

Then what is the difference between you Buddhists and the heterodox philosophers (tīrthika) who hold that complete renunciation leads to Nirvāṇa, the opponent asks (HPS p.494, CŚṬ D f.186a, P f.209b). Āryadeva answers that the heterodox philosophers talk about renunciation, but they do not mention the right method for renunciation.

4. How will someone who does not know
the means for renunciation practice
renunciation? Consequently the Sage
indeed said that there is no tranquility
otherwise.[12]

How will someone who relies on the heterodox philosophers' views and does not know the means for renunciation practice renunciation? Since this person does not know that the right means for renunciation is characterized by the fact

that all things are empty of a nature of their own (svabhāvaśūnya), which is the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya), therefore the Sage said that there is no tranquility otherwise (HPS p.494, CŚṬ D f.186a, P f.209b).[13]

When the things that the Buddha teaches are beyond the limits of the sense faculties, then haven't you some doubts about them, the opponent queries, since these things are not perceptible (HPS p.494, CŚṬ D f.186b, P f.210a)? Āryadeva replies:

> 5. Whoever doubts what the Buddha said
> about the imperceptible (parokṣa) must
> have confidence concerning emptiness
> precisely in this connection.[14]

All things may not be understood through perception (pratyakṣa), but may be understood through inference (anumāna). In this case an inference is possible because an example (dṛṣṭānta) exists. The phrase 'in this connection' refers to the statement that the means for renunciation is the fact that all things are empty of own nature. Emptiness cannot be established in any other way than through inference. Although its significance constantly lies close at hand, it is subtle, for not all people can perceive it. Yet it is logically possible and taught through eradicating belief in the own nature of things.

But if someone should suppose that there is some reason for uncertainty: 'Is this true or not', and if this point has not been refuted in a previous chapter, then the reason should be given. When no reason for uncertainty can be given, then the example is proven. Consequently the Buddha's word should be accepted as correct, even when he speaks of imperceptible things (HPS p.494, CŚṬ D ff.186b-187a, P f.210a-b).[15]

Unlike the Buddha, no heterodox philosopher perceives things correctly. Āryadeva says:

> 6. Someone who has perceived this world
> with difficulty is in fact confused about
> the other world. Those who follow him
> for a very long time will be misled!

The heterodox philosophers cannot comprehend obvious things, since the causes and conditions of this world baffle them. Then how can they comprehend something that is extremely subtle, remote in distance, time, or place? People who seek liberation, yet reject the Lord Buddha to follow the heterodox philosophers, who are themselves confused about the own-nature of perceptible and imperceptible things, will be led astray for endless cycles of existence (HPS p.495, CŚṬ D f.187a-b, P fff.210b-211a).

Then why do people who seek liberation follow these heterodox philosophers, the opponent asks (HPS p.494, CŚṬ D f.187b, P f.211a)? Āryadeva replies that these

people are unable to attain liberation by themselves.

7. Those who attain Nirvāṇa by themselves accomplish what is very difficult to do. Even when following a guide, an inferior person's mind is unable to proceed [to Nirvāṇa] .

Inferior people, subject to the influence of the ego (ahaṃkāra) and all that belongs to the ego, are unable to proceed to Nirvāṇa by themselves, or even by following a guide (HPS p.495, CŚṬ D f.188a, P f.211b).

But why, the opponent persists, does an inferior person's mind not proceed to Nirvāṇa? Because of fearing emptiness, the Mādhyamikas reply. Why do people fear emptiness, asks the opponent (HPS p.495, CŚṬ D f.188a, P f.211b)? Āryadeva responds that only people who know little about the Buddha's teachings on emptiness and non-substantiality fear them. He says:

8. When it is not understood, no fear arises. When it is understood, fear completely vanishes. Consequently fear is established, surely, for someone who knows little.[16]

Cowherds who have no experience of the treatises' verbal expressions (saṃketa) do not fear the significance of emptiness. They would not understand it even if emptiness were proclaimed one hundred times! The fear of those

who are knowledgeable about emptiness has vanished completely, for they are not attached to ego and all that belongs to the ego, which is the cause of fear. But it is appropriate for someone who knows little to be afraid (HPS p.495, CŚṬ D ff.188b-189a, P f.211b-212a).

Why don't these people who know little seek the supreme state, the opponent asks (HPS p.495, CŚṬ D f.189a, P f.212a)? Āryadeva replies that people who know little fear teachings that advocate withdrawal from worldly activities. He says:

> 9. The practice of a teaching that involves activity (pravartaka) is exclusively for fools. They fear a teaching that involves withdrawal from activity (nivartaka) because they lack constant practice.

About these fools Āryadeva remarks:

> 10. When there is not even a good rebirth for someone, influenced by ignorance (moha), who would create an impediment to the truth, why speak of liberation?

The expression 'someone influenced by ignorance' means someone influenced by envy, jealousy, fear, hatred, and so on. This person prevents someone else who could benefit

from hearing them. When a good rebirth, as a god or a human being, is no longer possible for such a person, why even bother to discuss liberation (HPS p.495, CŚṬ D f.189a, P f.213a)?

Āryadeva goes on to quote the Buddha on the importance of the right view in attaining liberation:

> 11. Even regression from moral conduct (*śīla*) is preferable, but regression from the [right] view is never preferable. Moral conduct leads to heaven; the [right] view leads to the supreme state (*paraṃ padam*).[17]

If someone does not display ill-will towards saints who possess the right view, then regression from moral conduct, in accordance with the nature of the regression-trifling, middling, or severe (*mṛdumadhyādhimātra*)--results in rebirth as a hungry ghost (*preta*), an animal, or in hell. For ordinary people who don't possess the right view, pure moral conduct results in rebirth in heaven. But regression from the right view, however trifling, yields a powerful result. Even over hundreds of thousands of incalculable eons, those who regress from the right view cannot come to equal those who regress from moral conduct, much less surpass them (HPS pp.495-496, CŚṬ D ff.189b-190a, P f.213a-b)![18]

In the four verses that follow, Āryadeva presents the advantages of the Buddha's teachings on non-substantiality. First he warns that these teachings are not appropriate for all people. He says:

> 12. The apprehension of ego (ahaṃkāra)
> is preferable for inferior people, but
> not the teaching of non-substantiality.[19]
> One leads in fact to a bad rebirth, but
> the superior one leads in fact to
> tranquility.[20]

An inferior person is someone who lacks a firm conviction (adhimukti) in non-substantiality and who is attached to self. Relying upon untrue teachings, this person wanders in an impenetrable jungle of false views. The teaching that a self exists is better for this person, for it leads to the rejection of bad conduct. Since he is attached to the self and values his own welfare, he will put an end to bad conduct; and abstention from evil (pāpa) easily brings about a good rebirth.

On the other hand, someone who rejects, or fails to understand, the teaching of non-substantiality damages his mind and body. Failure to understand the teaching on non-substantiality leads an inferior person to a bad rebirth, not to tranquility. However, a superior understanding of non-substantiality leads in fact to tranquility, not to a bad rebirth.

In addition, someone who fails to understand the significance of emptiness, or rejects it, is an inferior person. The teaching of emptiness in fact leads this inferior person to a bad rebirth; the very same teaching leads a superior person to tranquility. A person who repudiates attachment to the self, through a firm conviction in the teaching of emptiness, destroys a multitude of afflictions and bad karma and approaches the state of rest (HPS p.496, ĆṬ D f.190a, P f.214a-b).

Āryadeva continues:

13. Non-substantiality is called
'non-dual' (advītya), 'the door to
tranquility', 'terrifying to those
with wrong views', and 'the sphere
of all the Buddhas'.[21]

Here the so-called self belongs to existent things (bhāva), has its own nature and its own-form (svarūpa), and is not dependent upon anything else. The self is considered two-fold, in accordance with the distinction made between factors of existence (dharma) and persons (pudgala).[22] There exists the non-substantiality of factors of existence and of persons. The so-called person is designated in dependence upon the aggregates, and this person when examined in five ways in relation to these aggregates[23] does not exist. The term 'factor of existence', refers to the aggregates, sense fields (āyatana), and elements

(dhātu). Because these things and the person arise successively in dependence upon causes and conditions, they lack a nature of their own.

People who cultivate the right view reject attachment to things and the self and attain Nirvāṇa. Thus non-substantiality is 'non-dual' and 'the door to tranquility'. Although there are three doors, namely, emptiness, signlessness (ánimitta), and wishlessness (apraṇihita),[24] the teaching of non-substantiality is the most important in attaining Nirvāṇa.

People who hold wrong views imagine that things have a nature of their own. Because the teaching of non-substantiality utterly destroys this position, it terrifies them.

Furthermore, non-substantiality is the sphere of all the Buddhas. The expression 'all the Buddhas' includes the disciples (śrāvaka), solitary Buddhas (pratyekabuddha), and the fully enlightened Buddhas. It is called the sphere of all the Buddhas because they dwell in the sphere distinguished by knowledge (jñāna), or because no Buddhas dwell apart from the body of the teaching (dharmaśarīra) (HPS pp.497-498, CŚṬ D ff.190a-191a, P ff.214b-215b).

Āryadeva explains why this teaching on non-substantiality should not be taught to inferior people:

14. Even the name of this teaching frightens inferior people! What powerful person is known who does not terrify the weak?[25]

Because this teaching is hard to fathom and profound, even hearing the term 'non-substantiality' frightens inferior people. This teaching eradicates all false views, and because it is so powerful, it frightens the powerless (HPS p.498, CŚṬ D f.191b, P ff.215b-216a).

Shouldn't this teaching be taught in order to refute wrong views, the opponent queries (HPS p.498, CŚṬ D f.191b, P f.216a)? Āryadeva replies:

15. The Tathāgatas did not proclaim this teaching for the sake of argumentation. Nevertheless, it destroys other positions, just like fire destroys fuel.

Furthermore, he says:

16. Whoever knows this teaching is unwelcome to an opponent. Consequently this teaching seems to me as if it were the door to destruction!

Why doesn't this teaching frighten the noble ones, the opponent asks (CŚṬ D f.192a, P f.217a)? Āryadeva retorts:

17. Why should someone who considers non-substantiality as the truth delight

> in existence? Why should he fear
> non-existence?

Why should someone who does not imagine that external and internal things exist by virtue of their own nature delight in the view of existence or fear non-substantiality on account of the view of non-existence? He is not attached to the view that things exist; he is not adverse to the view of non-substantiality. Consequently, without engaging in arguments, he proceeds easily to the city of Nirvāṇa. Therefore, since Nirvāṇa is the supreme state, why is there any reason for fear (CŚṬ D f.192b, P f.217a)?

Āryadeva compares the Buddha's teachings with those of Brahmins and Jains in the following four verses. He notes first that the false teachings of the heterodox philosophers endanger people and encourages the spread of the Buddha's teachings. He says:

> 18. After seeing that the heterodox
> philosophers--who are the seeds of
> misfortune--are many, who wouldn't
> take pity on people who desire the
> teaching?

Why, asks the opponent, do even virtuous people follow the teachings of the heterodox philosophers and not the Buddha's teachings (CŚṬ D f.193a, P f.217b)? Āryadeva explains that this occurs because the Buddha's teachings are more subtle:

> 19. The teaching of the three, Śākya-[muni], the Jains, and the brahmins, is apprehended respectively with the mind, the eyes, and the ears. Therefore the Sage's teaching is more subtle.

The essence of the Brahmins' teachings is the recitation of the scriptures; the ears apprehend these teachings. The Jains torment their bodies by plucking out their hair and expose them to wind and heat. They do without clothing and bathing; the eyes apprehend these teachings. The Buddha's teachings illumine the mind; they shed light on all things' lack of own-nature. Like the sun, these teachings dispel the darkness of ignorance, for all conditioned things appear like dreams, etc. Mental cognition (<u>manasvijñāna</u>) apprehends these teachings, and therefore the Buddha's teachings are more subtle than the others. For this reason, even sentient beings who desire merit fail to adopt the Buddha's teachings (CŚṬ D f.193a-b, P f.218a-b).

Āryadeva criticizes the teachings of Brahmins and Jains:

> 20. Just as the Brahmins' teaching is said to be largely hypocrisy, similarly, the Jains' teaching is said to be largely stupidity.

Brahmins recite prayers (<u>japa</u>), burn oblations, perform

auspicious ceremonies, and so on. They undertake these actions because of their desire for wealth and fame. Consequently their teaching is hypocrisy, for the most part. Their teaching conflicts with the desires of those who seek liberation, since it conforms to cyclic existence. But people who seek liberation from the cycle of existence should not pursue the practices of the Jains either, since their teaching stupefies the mind (CŚṬ D f.193b, P f.218b).

Āryadeva concedes that people respect Brahmins and pity the Jains:

21. Just as Brahmins are respected
for their acquisition of knowledge,
similarly, Jains are pitied for their
acquisition of afflictions.

However, he points out that birth as a Brahmin and the Jain's experience of pain both result from the maturation of good and bad karma, respectively:

22. Just as pain is not the teaching,
because it is the maturation of karma,
similarly, Brahmin birth is not the
teaching, because it is the maturation
of karma.[26]

If Brahmin birth and the pain of the Jains are not the true teaching, then what other teaching is there, the opponent asks (CŚṬ D f.194a, P f.219a)? In reply Āryadeva summarizes the Buddha's teaching:

23. In brief the Tathagatas explain
that the teaching is non-harming
(ahiṃsa) and emptiness in fact is
Nirvāṇa. Here there are only these
two.[27]

The intention to harm other sentient beings and the physical and verbal action that ensues because of this intention defines 'harming'. The path of the ten virtuous actions (kuśalakarmapatha),[28] since it removes harm, defines 'non-harming'.

The Lord Buddhas proclaim that the emptiness of own-nature is Nirvāṇa. Calming suffering--whose nature is the five aggregates--is Nirvāṇa. The understanding that suffering is unoriginated by nature gets rid of error and suffering then ceases, for it is impossible to conceive of it in any other way.

These two teachings, non-harming and emptiness, lead to heaven and liberation, respectively. Therefore there are only these two (CŚṬ D f.194a-b, P f.219a-b).

Why, continues the opponent, don't non-Buddhists respect these teachings (CŚṬ D f.194b, P f.219b)? Āryadeva answers that they are too attached to their own point of view:

24. All people love their own position,
just as they love their own birthplace.
Yet why should a reason that defeats
it distress you?

He concludes this chapter with the advice that intelligent people ought to adopt all good teachings, even those which other schools promulgate. He says:

> 25. A wise person who desires good fortune accepts things that are suitable, even from opponents. Isn't the sun common to everyone on earth who has eyes?

CHAPTER XII

NOTES

[1]Vaidya, pp.146-150, and Bhaskar, pp.188-190, translate chapter twelve into French and Hindi, respectively. Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," pp.545-550, translates Hsüan tsang's Chinese translation into Italian.

[2]The Chinese translation differs in cd:
稟和希勝慧是法器應知
異此有師資無因獲勝利
"Even-tempered, eager, and intelligent--this person should be recognized as a vessel for the teaching. Anyone other than this may have the teacher's assistance, yet has no grounds for attaining the supreme benefit."

[3]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap.12, p.2 explains: ...skyon du snang bar mi 'gyur bar yon tan kho nar snang la / nyan pa po la'ang yon tan gyi ngo bor 'gyur ba min no //
"They do not appear as faults; they appear only as good qualities. For the student also, good qualities do not change in nature to faults."

[4]Cf. Yuktiṣaṣṭikā v.51.
che ba'i bdag nyid can de dag //
rnams la phyogs med rtsod med //
gang rnams la ni phyogs med pa //
de la gzhan phyogs ga la yod //

"Those who have a superior nature are impartial and not argumentative. Where is there a divergene position for those who are impartial?"

[5]Suttanipāta v.450 cites the four qualities of well-spoken discourses:

"Subhāsitaṃ uttamaṃ āhu santo,
dhammaṃ bhaṇe nādhammaṃ taṃ dutiyaṃ,
piyaṃ bhaṇe nāppiyaṃ, taṃ tatiyaṃ,
saccaṃ bhaṇe nālikaṃ, taṃ cattutthan" ti.

"The virtuous say: first it is well-spoken; second it is concerned with good practices, not bad practices; third it is kind, not unkind; and fourth it is true, not false."

[6]Majjhima, I, p.70 notes the Buddha's ability to understand exactly the diverse aspirations of sentient beings (sattānaṃ nānādhimuttikataṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti) as the fifth of his ten powers. For additional references see Lamotte Traité, III, p.1506.

[7]Prajñāpāramitāratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā XVII.3, ed. Akira Yuyama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p.64 says of irreversible Bodhisattvas: "Free from self-interest, they instruct the people in the teaching" (dharmaṃ nirāmiṣu jagasy' anuśāsayanti).

[8]The Chinese translation has 'cause' (yin, 因).

[9]Cf. PP p.475.11-13.

[10]The Chinese translation of 3cd differs:
真空破一切如何有彼不成

"Since everything is destroyed through true emptiness, why aren't they delighted?"

[11]The Sāṃkhyas regard liberation as the isolation (*kaivalya*) of the Puruṣa from pain, etc. See *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* vv.60-68. The Vaiśeṣikas also speak of liberation as lacking the qualities pain and pleasure. According to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* (V.2.15-18) pain and pleasure result from the contact of the self, the mental organ and the sense faculties; when this contact ceases, the self attains liberation.

[12]The Chinese translation of 4ab differs:
不知捨證因 無由能捨證

"Someone who does not know the cause of renunciation and realization, lacking the means, cannot renounce [cyclic existence] or realize [Nirvāṇa] ." Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.547 notes that Dharmapāla's commentary on this verse explains that renunciation refers to the renunciation of cyclic existence and realization refers to the realization of Nirvāṇa.

[13]Cf. the Buddha's characterization of the four noble truths in *Saṃyutta*, V, p.430-431.

Cattārimāni bhikkhave tathāni avitathāni anaññathāni //
katamāni cattari? // // *Idaṃ dukkham ti bhikkhave tatham etam avitatham etam anaññatham etam* // //
Ayam dukkhasamudayo ti tatham etam avitatham etam

anaññatham etam// //Ayam dukkhanirodho ti tatham etam avitatham etam anaññatham etam// //Ayam dukkhanirodha-gaminī paṭipadā ti tatham etam avitatham etam anaññatham etam// //Imāni kho bhikkave cattāri tathāni avitathāni anaññathāni // "Monks, these four are true, not false, not otherwise. Which four? 'This is suffering' is true, not false, not otherwise. 'This is the origin of suffering' is true, not false, not otherwise. 'This is the cessation of suffering' is true, not false, not otherwise. 'This is the path leading to the cessation of suffering' is true, not false, not otherwise. These, monks, are the four that are true, not false, not otherwise."

[14]See the quotation of this verse in Tantra in Tibet: The Great Exposition of Secret Mantra, trans. Jeffrey Hopkins (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), p.88. Tenzin Gyatso also quotes this verse in The Buddhism of Tibet and the Key to the Middle Way, trans. Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rinpoche (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p.83.

Ths Chinese translation of this verse says:

若於佛所說 深事以生疑
可依無相空 而生決定信.

"If someone doubts what the Buddha said about profound matters, he can rely on emptiness, which has no characteristics, and certainly generate confidence."

[15] rGyal tshab, _bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po_, chap.12, p.5 comments: ..._de yis the tshom bcad pa'i phyir du chos thams cad rang bzhin gyis grub pas stong pa bsten te_ / _bya byed thams cad 'thad pa'i bden pa gnyis kyi gnas shin tu phra zhing rtogs par dka' ba rnams ji ltar gsungs pa bzhin du gnas pa dper byas nas shin tu lkog gyur don bstan pa rnams de kho na ltar gnas pa'i sgo nas 'di nyid kho nar thams cad mkhyen par yid ches par bya ste_ /
"In order to remove doubt he must rely on the fact that all things are empty of establishment by own nature. All acts and agents, the existence of the two logical truths, things that are very subtle and difficult to understand exist exactly as the Buddha stated. Taking that as an example, he must have confidence that only this one [i.e., the Buddha] is omniscient, because his teachings on quite imperceptible things exist in accordance with reality."

cf. mDo sngags, _dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i tshig don rnam pa bshad pa_, p.198: _sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa'i bden pa bzhi yi don zab mo gzhal bya lkog gyur gyi don la gang zag gang zhig blo rnam dpyod dang mi ldan pa'i skyon gyis ji bzhin ma rtogs par de ltar min no snyam du the tshom skye bar 'gyur ba yin no_ // _gang tshe the tshom tsam skyes pa de yis ni stong pa nyid kyi don la brten te shes rab gsum gyis blo yongs su sbyangs te 'di_

nyid kho nar nges pa'i shes pa gting tshugs pa'i sgo nas yid ches par bya dgos so // "Some person, due to the fault of his mind lacking discriminative judgement, not understanding correctly what the Buddha said about the profound significance of the four truths, objects of valid means of knowledge, things that are imperceptible, doubts: 'That isn't so'. When mere doubt arises, he must rely on the significance of emptiness, purify his mind by means of the three [forms of] understanding, and must have confidence precisely in this, because of penetrating to the depths of certain knowledge."

See also Tenzin Gyatso's remarks on this topic in his introduction to Tantra in Tibet, pp.31-33.

[16] Cf. Ratnāvalī I.39:

sarvaduḥkhakṣayaṃ dharmaṃ śrutvaivam aparīkṣakaḥ /
saṃkampaty aparijñānād abhayasthānakātaraḥ //

"Thus, after hearing the teaching that removes all suffering, someone who does not examine it trembles because of ignorance, frightened by the fearless state."

[17] The Buddha in Majjhima, III, p.72 declares that the right view is twofold:

Sammādiṭṭhim p'ahaṃ bhikkhave, dvayaṃ vadāmi. Atthi, bhikkhave, sammādiṭṭhi sāsava puññabhāgīyā upadhivepakkā; atthi, bhikkhave, sammādiṭṭhi ariyā anāsavā lokuttarā maggaṅgā. "Monks, I say that the right view is twofold. There is, monks, the right view that has impurities, is

conducive to merit, and results in the substratum [for rebirth]. There is, monks, a right view that is noble, pure, and part of the path."

The 'impure' right view advocates generosity, acceptance of the workings of karma, respect for parents, brahmins, ascetics, etc. The 'pure' right view advocates cultivation of the noble path and the acquisition of understanding (*paññā*).

Lamotte, *Traité*, V, p.2346 n.1 quotes this entire passage on the twofold nature of the right and comments: "Par opposition au mécréant (*mithyādṛṣṭika*), l'homme de vue correcte mondaine est respectueux de la loi naturelle (ou conventionelle): il croit en: 'efficacité des rites, à la récompense du bien et à la punition du mal, en la vie future; il honore ses parents et les divinites; il vénère les religieux et les brahmanes. Mais cette une vue correcte mondaine est impure (*sāsrava*) parce qu'elle repose sur la croyance au Moi, à l'Ātman, qui est une fausse croyance. Si elle contribue à gagner des merites (*puṇyabhāgīya*) et aboutir à des bonnes renaissances dans les destinées supérieures, elle est incapable de mettre fin à la douleur et n'assure pas la délivrance. En revanche la vue correcte supramundaine, non viciée par la croyance au Moi, et qui est l'un des huit membres du chemin est vraiment libératrice."

[18] rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap.12, p.8 adds: ston pa nyid la skur pa debs pa rang gzhan la gnod pa shin tu che bas tshul khrims las ni nyams pa sla yi..."Because casting aspersions on emptiness greatly harms both oneself and others, it is better to regress from moral conduct."

[19] Candrakīrti (CŚṬ D ff.189b-190a, P f.214a) quotes from the Kāśyapaparivarta: bcom ldan 'das kyis kyang 'od srung gang zag tu lta ba ri rab tsam ni bla 'i / mngon pa'i nga i rgyal can stong pa nyid du lta ba ni ma yin no // de ci'i phyir zhe na / 'od srung lta bar gyur pa thams cad la nges par 'byung ba ni stong pa nyid yin na gang stong pa nyid du lta de ni gsor mi rung ngo // zhes gsung so // "The Buddha said: Kāśyapa, the view of a person, [though in strength] the size of Mount Sumeru, is better. The view of emptiness is not for someone who has conceptual attachment. Why? Because, Kāśyapa, the remedy for getting rid of all views is emptiness, and incurable is someone for whom emptiness is a view." Cf. the Ratnakūṭasūtra quoted in PP pp.248.4-249.2 and the Kāśyapaparivarta 64-65, ed. A von Stael-Holstein (Tokyo: Meicho-Fukyu-kai, 1977), pp.95-98.

[20] See the treatment of this topic in Ratnāvalī II.19-25 and Lamotte Traité, III, p.1684.

[21] This verse is quoted in Lamotte Traité, I, p.69 and IV, p.xiv.

[22]This portion of Candrakīrti's commentary is quoted by Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, p.272.

[23]On this five-fold examination see May, Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakvṛtti, pp.16, 183, n.596 and Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School, pp.40-41, n.99.

[24]On these three doors see the references in Lamotte Traité, III, pp.1213-1215. See also Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp.59-70.

[25]This verse is quoted in Lamotte Traité, III, p.1686 and IV p.xv.

[26]Cf. Suttanipāta v.596 :

tesañ no jātivādasmin vivādo atthi Gotama:
'jātiyā brahmano hoti' Bhāradvājo iti bhāsati,
ahañ ca 'kammanā' brūmi evaṃ jānāhi cakkuma.

"Gotama, there is a dispute between us over birth. Bhāradvājo says that one becomes a brahmin by birth. I say that it is by karma. Thus may the Wise One know." The Buddha tells Vāseṭṭha his own definition of a brahmin in vv.620-656: not birth, but the performance of virtuous actions and the attainment of enlightenment make an individual a brahmin.

The Udānavarga in chapter XXXIII similarly discusses the nature of the true brahmin. The first verse of this chapter, however, may refer to the Jains:

na nagnacaryā na jaṭā na paṅkā
no 'nāśanaṃ sthaṇḍilaśāyikā vā /

na rajomalaṃ notkuṭukaprahāṇaṃ

śodheta martyaṃ hy avitīrṇakāṅkṣam //

"Not nakedness, not tangled hair, not mud, not fasting, not lying on the ground, not dust and dirt, and not the exertion of a squatting posture purity a human being who is not freed from doubt."

[27]This verse is quoted in PP p.351.13-14; in Buddhapālita's Madhyamakavṛtti, ed. and trans. Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on Emptiness", pp.193, 203; and by Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, p.454.

The Chinese translation of this verse says:

略言佛所說是二，別餘宗
不害生人天觀空證解脫

"In brief, what the Buddha said: 'These two things are distinct from other schools, viz., non-harming produces [rebirth as] men and gods, and the view of emptiness verifies Nirvāṇa'."

[28]The path of the ten virtuous actions advocates abstention from taking life, taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, false speech, slander, harsh speech, idle chatter, covetousness, ill-will, and wrong views. For additional references see PTSD s.v. kammapatha, BHSD s.v. karmapatha, and May, p.148 n.433.

See Ratnāvalī I.8-10 and MMK XVII.11 PP pp.183.7-11 and 314.10-315.3 discusses these ten virtuous actions.

CHAPTER XIII

SHOWING THE REALIZATION OF THE REFUTATION OF THE SENSE FACULTIES AND THEIR OBJECTS

Āryadeva in chapter thirteen examines various theories on perception held by some of his Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents. He rejects the position that the sense faculties (indriya) and their respective objects have a real substantial nature of their own. In his opinion, both the sense faculties and the objects which they apprehend are insubstantial and resemble mirages and illusions.

It is impossible to understand that all things have no nature of their own, the opponent objects. We do not perceive non-existent things, such as a hare's horn, but we do perceive the pot and the color 'blue' (CŚṬ D f.195a, P f.220b). Āryadeva replies that the pot is not directly perceptible, since it is a composite thing and by merely perceiving one part of the pot we cannot claim to perceive the entire pot. He says:[1]

> 1. When the visible form (rūpa) is perceived, the pot in its entirety is not perceived. And who, knowing the truth, would say that a pot is directly perceptible (pratyakṣa).[2]

When the visible form is perceived, the entire pot is not perceived, since the pot has the nature of eight substances.[3] The eye perceives only the visible form, not the smell. Consequently the eye fails to perceive the entire pot. By not examining the own nature of a thing and by taking ordinary experience as authoritative, someone says 'I perceive the pot' (ŚṬ D f.196a, P f.221b).[4]

Āryadeva similarly treats the objects of the other sense faculties. He says:

> 2. With this very same reasoning, intelligent people should refute everything, e.g., the fragrant, the sweet, and the soft.[5]

This word 'fragrant' refers to objects which the nose apprehends; the word 'sweet' to objects which the tongue apprehends; and the word 'soft' to objects which touch apprehends. These objects also are composed of eight substances. Since each faculty cannot apprehend all the aspects of its object, what person, knowing the truth, would say 'I perceive a flower, etc.' (CŚṬ D f.198a-b, P f.224a).

Even if the pot is not distinct from its visible form, the opponent concedes, nonetheless, the visible form pervades the pot and by perceiving the visible form, we perceive the entire pot (CŚṬ D f.198b, P f.224a-b).[6]

Āryadeva replies:

3. If by perceiving the visible form
all that [pot] were perceived, then by
not perceiving [the pot] shouldn't the
perceived visible form not be perceived?

If by simply perceiving the visible form, the entire pot were perceived, then even though we don't see all of it, then by not perceiving the pot, why wouldn't it follow that the perceived visible form is not seen? There is another significance. Eight substances make up the pot. If all eight were perceived because one of them, i.e., visible form, is perceived, then because visible form and these other substances never exist apart from one another, and because the seven other substances are not perceived separately, why isn't it understood that visible form is not perceived? Therefore since the smell, etc., is not perceived, the perceived visible form also would not be seen. Therefore because the visible form is not seen, it is not possible to perceive the pot (CŚṬ D f.198b, P f.224b).

The opponent disagrees: It is possible for us to perceive visible form and therefore we perceive the pot too (CŚṬ D f.198b, P f.224b). Āryadeva responds:

4. Direct perception is not possible
in fact for the entire visible form.[8]
since it has outer, inner, and middle
parts.

Even visible form by itself--not to mention its connection with smell, etc.--cannot be perceived in all of its aspects, for it has outer, inner, and middle parts. And these outer, inner, and middle parts themselves have outer, inner and middle parts and so on down to the atoms, which also have parts (CŚṬ D f.199a, P f.225a).

Āryadeva declines to take up again the subject of atoms:

> 5. The investigation of whether or not atoms have parts will not be introduced again here. Therefore it is not logically possible to establish the thing to be established (*sādhya*) by means of [something else] that is to be established.[9]

He continues:

> 6. Even a whole after it has become parts is a whole once again. Therefore even though a syllable (*akṣara*) is uttered, it does not exist.

The pot, which depends upon its constituent parts, i.e., the potsherds, is a whole. However, these potsherds, which depend upon their own constituent parts, are wholes also, and so on down to the atoms. The atoms depend upon the eight substances as well and have front, back and middle parts. Because all these parts can form wholes, no thing is a part, or a whole, by virtue of its own nature. Therefore the pot is not directly perceptible.

The syllables that form words can be analyzed in the same way as atoms, since, like atoms, they are not established. Because the pot does not exist, even the syllables which signify it do not exist. Without an object, both cognition and speech are impossible (CŚṬ D f.199a-b, P f.225a-b).[10]

The base of visible form (rūpāyatana) is twofold: color (varṇa) and shape (saṃsthāna), claims a Buddhist opponent.[11] For this reason, we assume that the pot is directly perceptible (CŚṬ D f.199b, P f.225b). Āryadeva questions this distinction:

> 7. If the shape is different from the
> color, then how is the shape apprehended?
> But if it is not different, then wouldn't
> the body also apprehend color?[12]

A color, blue, etc., is the object of the visual sense faculty (cakṣurindriya). If the shape were different from the color, as sound is, then the eye would not apprehend it. Because the eye apprehends shape, just as it does color, the shape is not different from the color.

But if the opponent desires to avoid that error and claims that the shape is not thought to be different from the color, then since the body apprehends shape in the dark, why isn't the color also apprehended in the dark? Therefore it is not true that shape is identical with

color. Apart from the conceptual constructions 'identity' and 'difference', no other possibility exists. Therefore, like the color, the shape also is not possible. And without these no thing is perceived (CŚṬ D ff.199b-200a, P ff.225-226a).

The base of visible form exists, this opponent argues, since it has a cause, i.e., the four great elements (mahābhūta). Since these four great elements exist, therefore their effect, the base of visible form, must also exist (CŚṬ D f.200a, P f.226a).

Āryadeva responds:

> 8. The cause of visible form is not
> perceived apart from the act of
> perceiving visible form. If that were
> so, then why wouldn't the eye appre-
> hend both?[13]

Visible form is not apprehended apart from the four great elements, which arise at the same time as the eight substances. The cause of visible form is not apprehended apart from the base of visible form. But the eye apprehends the base of visible form and the body apprehends the cause of color.

If the opponent supposes that visible form arises from a cause that is not different, then the eye would apprehend both the cause and the effect, since the cause of visible form is not different from visible form, its

effect. This is impossible because the object differs and a different sense faculty apprehends each object, and because of a difference in mark (CŚṬ D f.200a, P f.226a-b).

Āryadeva explains in the next verse that the element 'earth' is characterized by hardness. A different sense faculty, touch, apprehends this mark. He says:

9. It is experienced that earth is
called 'hard' and the body apprehends
it. Therefore touch alone communicates
'this is earth'.[14]

A Vaiśeṣika opponent[15] objects that the pot is not perceptible by virtue of its own nature but because of its connection with perceptibility (CŚṬ D f.200b, P f.227a).[16] Āryadeva replies:

10. There is no quality (guṇa) in
this pot when it arises as a percep-
tible object. Therefore, like the
arising of perceptibility, the nature
of being existent also doesn't exist.

Suppose that a universal 'perceptibility' exists--either it has the nature of the perceptible object, or it does not. If it has the nature of the perceptible object, then what is the point of imagining it? But if it does not have the nature of the perceptible object, it is still wrong to imagine it, since it would follow that even

disembodied things would be perceptible. Moreover, the arising of a universal 'perceptibility' is incompatible with something that does not exist. Just as the universal 'perceptibility' is not possible for a pot that is not perceptible, similarly the universal 'existence' also is not possible for a pot that is imperceptible. It is wrong to imagine a universal 'perceptibility' for a pot that does not exist (CŚṬ D ff.200b-201a, P f.227a-b).

An object, e.g., visible form, is perceptible, the Buddhist opponent now argues, since the sense faculty that apprehends it exists (CŚṬ D f.201a, P f.227b). Āryadeva responds:

> 11. The eye is derived matter (bhautika), so is the ear. The eye sees,[17] but another sense faculty does not. Consequently the Sage said that the maturation of karma is inconceivable.[18]

How is it possible to imagine the own nature of the eye, etc., since this is contrary to logical possibility? Just as in the case of derived matter, it is wrong to imagine a difference in apprehending the object. Therefore it is incorrect to claim that the object is directly perceptible because the sense faculty exist.

If the eye, etc. were not possible, then how would we determine the nature of this sense faculty's karma?

Do we refute the nature of its maturation? If the refutation of the eye, etc., is established, then isn't its maturation also refuted, you ask? We reply that we seek only to examine the own nature of things. We deny that things are established by virtue of their own nature. But we do not deny the maturation of the karma which the eye, etc. creates and which has originated in interdependence.

The eye is derived matter and so is the ear. Isn't it an error, the opponent asks, to say that the eye sees and the other does not? There is no error, we reply, because the maturation of karma is inconceivable. We cannot employ logic and analyze the maturation of karma because karma is not established by own-nature. If it were established by own nature, then it would exist at all times without interruption. Then it would follow that either the karma that has matured already would mature again, or else it would never mature, since it is not possible for own nature to change. It is untrue that we do not experience karma's effects. Therefore an intelligent person apprehends the truth by investigating worldly objects and perceives that the maturation of karma is inconceivable. The entire world should be perceived as magically created from a magical creation (CŚṬ D ff.201a-202a, P ff.228-229a).[19]

The eye does exist by virtue of its own nature, this opponent claims, since we experience consciousness, its effect (CŚṬ D f.202a, P f.229a). Āryadeva replies:

> 12. Because the conditions are incomplete, cognition (*jñāna*) doesn't exist prior to the act of perception (*darśana*). Or else, afterwards, the cognition is useless. A third construction is useless.[20]

There is no visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) prior to the act of perception, since the dominant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*)[21] is incomplete. But if it is supposed to exist after the act of perception, then the cognition is useless. If the eye, which is not conscious, perceives visible form, then it is uselss to imagine consciousness. A third conceptual construction, i.e., that the act of perception and cognition arise simultaneously, also is useless. If the act of perception and cognition arise simultaneously, then it is wrong to suppose that consciousness--which is simultaneous with the act of perception--arises in dependence upon that act of perception (CŚṬ D f.202b, P f.229b).[22]

The eye is the agent (*kāraka*), the opponent contends (HPS p.499, CŚṬ D f.202b, P f.229b). Āryadeva responds that if the eye went out to its object, then it would take it much longer to perceive objects at a distance

than up close. He says:

> 13. If the eye possessed motion, then
> it would perceive that [object] at a
> distance over a long period of time.
> And isn't that visible form visible
> both up close and at a distance?[23]

If the eye, because it comes into contact with its object (prāpyakārin),[24] were to go to the locus of the object, then by merely opening our eyes we should not see the moon or the stars! Because of the difference in time that it takes to reach the object, it is wrong to suppose that it takes the same amount of time to see an object nearby as it does to see one far off. It is wrong therefore that by merely opening our eyes we see something at a distance in the same way as we see something close by.

Moreover, if the eye were to come into contact with its object, then it should see even something extremely close, e.g., eye-ointment, just as clearly as it sees something at a distance. But this is not possible (HPS p.499, CŚṬ D ff.202b-203a, P f.229b).

Āryadeva denies both that the eye first reaches its object and afterwards perceives it, and the alternative suggestion, namely that the eye first perceives its object and afterwards reaches it. He says:

> 14. If the eye goes after it has per-
> ceived the visible form, then there is

no advantage to going. Or else, the
desired object, surely, arises in vain.[25]

If the opponent supposes that the eye goes to the locus of visible form after it has perceived it, then there is no purpose in going. The eye goes in order to perceive an object, but if the object has been perceived already, then the going is useless. On the other hand, if it goes without having perceived the object, then, surely, the act of perceiving the desired object does not take place. Without having perceived the object, the eye goes to an unseen locus, as if it were blind (HPS p.499, CŚṬ D f.203a, P f.230a).

Furthermore:

15. Were the eye to apprehend [the
object] without going, then it should
perceive this entire world! There is
neither close nor far for something
that does not go.

Āryadeva argues in the following verses against the position that the act of perception is the very nature of the eye.[26] He says:

16. Were the own nature of all things
first seen in regard to themselves,
then why wouldn't the eye apprehend
itself?[27]

Just as the fragrance of sandalwood and flowers is apprehended first in their own substrata and afterwards in the oil, etc., which comes into contact with them, and as fire's heat is present first in itself and afterwards experienced in something else, similarly, if the eye has the act of perception as its own nature, then it should perceive itself first (HPS pp.499-500, CŚT D f.203b, P f.230b).

Moreover,

> 17. The eye does not possess consciousness, consciousness does not possess the act of perception, and visible form does not possess both. How do they perceive visible form?[28]

First of all, the eye does not possess consciousness. The eye is not conscious of the object, because its own nature is non-conscious. The eye is derived matter and because it is senseless (jaḍa), it is not possible that it is aware of the object. Thus the eye does not possess consciousness. Consciousness does not possess the act of perception, for consciousness is conscious of the object, but does not perceive it. If consciousness were to perceive an object, it would perceive the visible form, because it is conscious in nature. Visible form does not possess either consciousness or the act of perception, because it is non-conscious and because it does not have the nature of awareness.

It also does not possess the act of perception because it is non-perceptive in nature. Consequently, when consciousness, the object, and the sense faculty all are deficient, then, even though they combine, they do not perceive visible form (HPS p.500, CṢT D f.204a, P f.231a-b).

Āryadeva now examines whether or not sound comes into contact with the ear. He says first of all that sound depends upon a speaker:

18. If the sound goes to the ear
when someone is speaking, then why
doesn't the speaker? But if it goes
when someone is not speaking, why
does conviction (pratyaya) arise in
regard to it?

And if sound is heard only after it comes into contact with the ear, is the beginning of that sound heard or not, he asks?

19. If the sound is apprehended after
it has reached [the ear] , then how
is its beginning apprehended? If
the sound does not approach alone,
then why is it alone apprehended?

If the sound is apprehended after it has reached the auditory sense faculty (śrotrendriya), then how is its beginning apprehended? Because sound is apprehended after

it has reached the ear, the ear does not apprehend the sound's beginning. Nor does any other sense faculty apprehend it. Consequently, because this is not apprehended, it is not sound. You object that sound does not approach by itself, since it is made up of the atoms of nine substances.[29] But your ear apprehends only sound, not smell, etc. (HPS p.500, CŚṬ D f.204b, P f.231b).

Finally, if the beginning of sound is not heard, how do we determine whether or not something is sound, Āryadeva asks?

> 20. As long as sound is not heard,
> sound does not arise. And it is not
> possible that in the end something
> that is not sound possesses the
> property of being sound.

Whatever is not heard is not in fact sound, as in the case of smell, etc. But if you think that when it is heard, then it becomes sound, that also is incorrect. Smell, etc., is not experienced to possess the property of sound. Something that is not sound does not have afterwards the property of being sound (HPS pp.500-501, CŚṬ D ff.204b-205a, P f.232a).

Āryadeva rejects also the claim that the mental faculty (manas) apprehends objects, since it depends upon the operations of the sense faculties. He says:

> 21. Deprived of the sense faculties,
> what will the mind (citta) do, even
> after it has gone [to the object] ?
> This being the case, why isn't this
> living being (jīva) here always without
> perception (amanaska)?[30]

It is also wrong for you to suppose that the mind ascertains the object after it has gone to it. Either the mind goes to the object accompanied by the sense faculties, or it goes alone. First of all, it does not go accompanied by the sense faculties, since the sense faculties always remain in the body. And if the sense faculties go along with the mind, then the body will be deprived of them. On the other hand, if the mind goes alone, then it will be deprived of the sense faculties and what will it do, even if it goes to the object? It cannot perceive visible form, etc., without the sense faculties, for then it would follow that even the blind would see!

But if you suppose that somehow the mind goes to the object and perceives it, then because there is a continuous awareness of the object, the self (ātman) would be in fact without thought (acintaka). It is not right for something that is without thought to possess the property of being a self, since it would follow that even pillars, etc., could possess the properties of a self.

Thus because it is impossible for sense faculties, objects, and consciousness to have the nature of being existent, when examined by logic they are not established virtue of their own nature. If they were established by virtue of their own nature, then when examined by logic, they would be perceived clearly because of their own nature. Since they are not so perceived, therefore it is established that they are empty of a nature of their own (HPS p.501, CŚṬ D f.205a-b, P f.232b).

But if these things have no nature of their own, the opponent objects, then how does perception (_saṃjñā_), which has the nature of determining their differences, determine these differences (HPS p.501, CŚṬ D f.205b, P f.232b)? Āryadeva replies:

22. That thing, which the mind apprehends,
previously experienced as if it were a
mirage, is known as the aggregate of
perception (_saṃjñāskandha_).[31]

Here dependent upon the eye and visible form, visual consciousness arises and then ceases, along with the sense faculties and their objects. When visual consciousness ceases, the mind apprehends that object which was perceived earlier. How is the apprehension of something that is not present possible? It is apprehended just like a mirage. There isn't the slightest amount of water in a mirage; yet dependent upon certain

causes and conditions a perception (<u>saṃjñā</u>) that has the aspect (<u>ākāra</u>) of water arises. Similarly, for an object previously perceived, even though it has no nature of its own, like a mirage, consciousness arises, and this is the reason for determining all things. Because this is the reason for determing all things it is known as the aggregate of perception. Perception recognizes all things' differences but not the basis for all things' own nature, since their own nature is not at all possible (HPS p.501, CŚṬ D ff.205b-206a, P f.233a).

The opponent objects: the aggregate of perception exists by virtue of its own nature, for if it didn't, then how would things be differentiated? The Mādhyamikas reply that since perception is joined with consciousness it cannot exist independently of consciousness. Moreover, since consciousness also is not established independently of perception, it does not exist by virtue of its own nature (HPS pp.501-502, CŚṬ D f.206a, P f.233a). Āryadeva contends that the mental faculty, since it is dependent upon the sense faculties, has no real existence of its own and is like an illusion. He says:

> 23. Dependent upon the eye and visible form, the mental faculty arises as if it were an illusion. It is not possible to call that which has real existence 'an illusion'.[32]

The opponent then claims that the sense faculties' apprehension of their objects is a wonder. Āryadeva disagrees; the wise see the operation of the sense faculties as deceptive, like a mirage, but not as something wondrous. He says:

24. When to the wise nothing on earth
is a wonder, then indeed what is amazing
in the movement of the sense faculties?

All cyclic existence in fact, Āryadeva concludes, is deceptive and insubstantial. He says:

25. Cyclic existence is the same as a
firebrand's circle, a magical creation, a
dream, an illusion, a moon in water, vapor,
an echo, a mirage, or a cloud.[33]

CHAPTER XIII

NOTES

[1]Vaidya, pp.151-155, and Bhaskar, pp.191-194, translate chapter thirteen into French and Hindi respectively. Tucci, "la versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," pp.550-555, translates Hsüan tsang's Chinese version into Italian.

[2]Candrakīrti quotes this verse in PP p.71.6-7.

Cf. the Chinese translation:
於瓶諸分中可見唯是色言瓶全可見如何能悟真

"Among all the pot's parts, only the visible form is perceived. How is someone who says that the entire pot can be perceived able to apprehend the truth?"

See also ŚS VI and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, <u>Pre-Diṅnāga, Buddhist Texts on Logic</u>, pp.54-55).

[3]The eight substances include the four great elements (<u>mahābhūta</u>), earth (<u>pṛthivī</u>), water (<u>ap</u>), fire (<u>tejas</u>), and air (<u>vāyu</u>) and the four types of derived matter (<u>bhautika</u>), visible form (<u>rūpa</u>), taste (<u>rasa</u>), smell, (<u>gandha</u>), and the tangible (<u>spraṣṭavya</u>). See AK II.22 and AKV pp.180-185 (<u>Kośa</u>, I, pp.144-149) and <u>Abhidharmadīpa</u> II.110 and <u>Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti</u>, p.65.

[4]Wayman quotes part of the CŚṬ on this verse in <u>Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real</u>, pp.222-223.

[5]This verse is quoted in PP p.71.8-9.

[6]None of the commentaries identify the opponent. However, since the Vaiśeṣika claim that color (rūpa) is a quality that pervades its locus, the opponent here may be a Vaiśeṣika. On color as a locus-pervading property see Daśapadārthaśāstra II.2.7 (Ui, Vaiseshika Philosophy, p.111).

[7]Cf. the Chinese translation:
若唯瓶色即言見瓶者餘不見香等應名不見瓶

"If only the visible form is perceived and one says that the pot is perceived, then since smell, etc., is not perceived, one must say that the pot is not perceived."

See also the lengthy discussion on this topic in ŚS VI and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, pp.54-55). Much of this discussion Tucci also translates in "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.550, nn.1-2.

[8]The Chinese translation of 4ab differs:
有障礙諸色體非全可見

"All visible form that is obstructed (sapratigha)--its whole essence cannot be perceived."

[9]See Dharmapāla's commentary, Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.551 n.1.

[10]See Red mda' ba, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa, p.61: ji ltar gzugs kyi mtha' rdul phran la cha yod med dpyad ba ma grub pa de bzhin du ming gi mtha' yi ge la'ang rnam par dpyad na ma grub ste / de'i phyir yi ge'i rang bzhin

gyi brjod pa'ang 'jig rten 'di na tha snyad tsam du yod kyi rang gi ngo bos yod pa ma yin no // "In the same way as the atoms of visible form are not established when they are examined as to whether or not they have parts, the syllables of a word are not established when they are examined. Therefore although one speaks about the nature of a syllable, it exists as merely a conventional expression here in this world but does not exist by virtue of its own nature."

Cf. Dharmapāla's commentary, Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.551, n.2.

[11] See AK I.10, p.32: *rūpaṃ dvidhā varṇaḥ saṃsthānaṃ ca*. "Visible form is twofold: color and shape."

[12] Cf. *Śūnyatāsaptati* v.50:

gang tshe nam yang kha dog dang //
dbyibs dag tha dad nyid med pas //
de dag tha dad 'dzin yod min //
gzugs de gcig tu'ang grags pa min //

"When there is never a difference between color and shape, then they are not apprehended as different. But that visible form also is not considered to be one."

[13] Cf. the Chinese translation of 8cd:

二法體既異如何不別觀

"Since the essential nature of the two things is different, why aren't they perceived to be different?"

[14]See Dharmapāla's commentary, Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," pp.522-523 n.1.

Karunadasa discusses hardness as a mark of earth in Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp.17-18. See also the references cited by May, p.91, n.197 .

[15]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap.13, p.7 identifies the opponent as a Vaiśeṣika (bye brag pa).

[16]According to the Vaiśeṣikasūtras (IV.1.6-12) the quality 'color' (rūpa) is a necessary condition for the perceptibility of any object.

[17]On the thesis 'the eye sees' (cakṣuḥ paśyati) see AK I.42 and AKV p.129 and Abhidharmadīpa I.44 and Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti, p.32.

See also Kośa, I, p.82 n.1.

[18]Cf. Milindapañha p.189 in which Nāgasena describes the maturation of karma as 'inconceivable' (acinteyyāni).

[19]Wayman quotes part of CŚṬ in Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, pp.219-220.

[20]The Chinese translation of 12d specifies this alternative construction: 同時見無用 "Both seen at the same time is useless.

[21]PP p.77.4 defines the adhipatipratyaya as follows: yasmin sati yad bhavati tat tasyādhipateyam iti. "That, which being existent, something else comes into

existent is the dominant [condition] of that [later thing]."

See also Kalupahana, Causality, pp.165-66.

[22]Wayman quotes part of the CŚṬ in Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, p.225.

[23]Cf. ŚŚ V and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, p.51).

[24]See Jadunath Sinha, Indian Psychology, vol. 1 (Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House, 1958) pp.21-23 for a summary of Buddhist arguments against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that the visual organ is prāpyakārin. See also Potter, Encyclopedia of India's Philosophies, vol. II, pp.161-162 for a summary of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position on the connection (sannikarṣa) between the sense faculty and its object.

AK I.43cd states the Buddhist position:
aprāptārthāny akṣimanaḥ śrotrāṇi trayam anyathā.
"The eye, the mental faculty, and the ear do not reach their objects. For the [other] three it is otherwise."

[25]Cf. ŚŚ V and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, pp.51-52).

[26]Cf. Vibhāṣaprabhāvṛtti, p.32: cakṣurdravyam hi draṣṭṛsvabhāvam. "The substance 'eye' has the own nature of being a perceiver."

[27]Wayman quotes this verse in Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, p.332.

Buddhapālita quotes this verse in the Madhyamaka-vṛtti on MMK III.2, p.55.

Cf. MMK III.2:

svam ātmānam darśanam hi tat tam eva na paśyati /
na paśyati yad ātmānam drakṣyati tat parān //
"The act of perception does not in fact see itself.
And what does not see itself will not perceive others."

Cf. ŚŚ V and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, p.52.

On svātamani kriyāvirodhāt see May, p.79, n.135.

[28]Āryadeva has in mind Majjhima, I, p.111: cakkhuñ ca paticca rūpa ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇam. "Dependent upon the eye and visible form, visual consciousness arises."

See MMK III.7cd.

[29]AK II.22, however, says that sound is composed of eight substances (aṣṭadravyako śabdaḥ).

[30]Cf. ŚŚ V and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, pp.52-53).

On the role of manas in perception see the references cited by May, p.78 n.130.

[31]See Saṃyutta, III, p.142:

Pheṇapiṇḍūpamam rūpam ,//vedanā bubbūlupamā //Marīcikūpamā saññā // saṅkharā kadalūpamā // Māyūpamañca viññāṇam dīpitādiccabandhunā // "The Buddha, a relation of the sun, explained that visible form is like a mass of foam,

sensation is like a bubble, perception is like a mirage, conditioned forces are like a banana tree, and consciousness is like an illusion."

[32]Here manas is equivalent to vijñāna. The reference again is to Saṃyutta, III, p.142 quoted above in n.31.

Cf. Śūnyatāsaptati v.56:

nang dang phyi skye mched la //
brten nas rnam par shes pa 'gyur //
de ltar bas na rnam shes ni //
smig rgyu sgyu ma bzhin du stong //

"Dependent upon the inner and outer sense bases, consciousness arises. Thus consciousness is empty like a mirage or an illusion."

[33]This verse is quoted twice in PP p.173.3-4 and 552.2-3, by Murti in The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.177, and by Lamotte in Traité, I, p.359, n.4 and in La Somme du Grande Véhicule, p.22*. Lamotte in Traité, I, pp.358-360, n.1-6 and in La Somme du Grande Véhicule, pp.21*-22*, n.1-9 cites numerous parallel passages.

Nāgārjuna also employs these images:

Ratnāvalī I.36:

trivartamaitad anādyantamadhyamaṃ saṃsāramaṇḍalaṃ /
alātamaṇḍalaprakhyaṃ bhramaty anyonyahetukam /

"This cycle of existence, which has no beginning, middle, or end, turning in three ways, mutually caused, turns round like the wheel of a firebrand."

Śūnyatāsapatati v.66:

'du byed dri za'i grang khyer dang //
sgyu ma smig rgyu skra shad dang //
dbu ba dang chu bur dang sprul pa dang //
rmi lam mgal me'i 'khor lo mtshungs //

"The conditioned resembles a city of celestial musicians, an illusion, a mirage, a net of hair, foam, a bubble, a magical creation, a dream, or the circle of a firebrand."

Yuktisastikā v.28

chu shing bzhin du snying po med //
dri za'i grong khyer 'dra ba ste //
rmongs pa'i grong khyer mi zad pa'i //
'gro ba sgyu ma bzhin du snang //

"The inexhaustible world, a city of delusion, like the city of celestial musicians, without an essential core, like a banana tree, appears like an illusion."

CHAPTER XIV

SHOWING THE REALIZATION OF THE REFUTATION FOR HOLDING EXTREME POSITIONS

In chapter fourteen Āryadeva refutes the extreme positions, which he interprets here as the notions of identity and difference. He rejects both extremes in the course of his examination of the various relations that his opponents claim exist between some thing, its constituent parts, and its characteristic marks (lakṣaṇa). Āryadeva argues that interdependence properly describes the relation extant between a thing, the parts that comprise it, and the marks that characterize it. Things have originated in interdependence (pratītyasamutpanna), he says not by virtue of their own nature, or by virtue of something else that is different in nature from themselves.

If existence (bhava)[1] has no nature of its own, and is like a circle made by a whirling firebrand, since it has originated in interdependence, then what has a nature of its own, the opponent asks (HPS p.503, CŚṬ D f.209a, P f.236b)? Āryadeva replies:[2]

1. Were an existent thing not dependent somewhere upon another, its existence

(astitā)[3] certainly would be established,
but that does not exist anywhere.[4]

If there were no dependence involved in the establishment of some thing, then to conceive of it as existing by virtue of its own nature would be possible, for an independent thing (svatantra), not being dependent on anything else, is established only by itself.[5] However, it is not possible that things which have originated in dependence upon causes and conditions arise independently of one another (HPS p.503, CŚṬ D f.209a, P ff.236b-237a).

In the next verse, Āryadeva provides an example of a thing that lacks a nature of its own. He notes the various relations that might exist between the pot and its constituent qualities; and he repudiates them all:

2. That there is identity (aikya), viz.,
the color (rūpa) itself being the pot
is not so; nor is the pot that possesses
the color different [from the color] .
The color does not exist in the pot, and
the pot does not exist in the color.

The visual sense faculty apprehends something as a pot. The opponent then supposes that this pot is either identical (abheda) with its color, or that it is different (bheda) from that color.[7] First of all, there is no identity between the pot and the color. If there were identity, then the pot would exist wherever the color

exists, and when the color is destroyed in the firing of the pot, the pot would also be destroyed.[8] This does not happen and therefore the pot and the color are not identical.

But should the opponent suppose that the pot which possesses the color is different from the color, in the same way as the cows and Devadatta, who possesses them, are different things, then we reply that the pot should be perceived independently of the color, in the same way as the cows and Devadatta can be perceived independently of one another. Since the pot is never perceived independently of the color, therefore it is not different from the color.

Moreover, since no difference between the pot and the color can be established, even the supposition (kalpanā) of the locus-located relation (ādhārādheya) should be rejected. If there were a difference between them, then we could say that the color is in the pot, just as we might say that the curd is in the jar, or, we could say that the pot is on the color, just as we might say that Devadatta is on the straw mat. (HPS p.504, (CŚṬ D ff.209b-210a, P ff.237a-238a).

A Vaiśeṣika opponent now objects: Even if a difference between the pot and the color is rejected, there is still a difference between existence (bhāva) and the pot, since existence is a great universal (mahāsāmānya) and

the pot is a particular substance that is called 'existent' because of its connection with that universal (HPS p.505, CŚṬ D f.210b, P f.238b).[9] Āryadeva responds that if the pot and existence were different from one another, then there could be no connection between them, and this would lead to the conclusion that the pot would be non-existent.[10] He says:

> 3. After perceiving a difference in
> mark (vailakṣaṇa)[11] between the two,
> if [you say] the pot is different
> from existence, then [we reply] no.
> Why, then, wouldn't existence also
> be different from the pot.[12]

The pot exists, the Vaiśeṣika opponent insists, because it is the substratum (āśraya) for qualities (HPS p.505, CŚṬ D f.211a, P f.239b).[13] A connection, Āryadeva points out, exists only between similar things. Because the quality 'one' and the substance 'pot' are dissimilar things, and hence unconnected, the conclusion follows that the pot is not numerically one. He says:

> 4. If [you say] one is not considered
> to be the pot, then [we reply] the pot
> also is not one. This is not a
> connection between similar things[14]
> and consequently that [pot] also is
> not one.

Āryadeva then demands to know why his Vaiśeṣika opponent refuses to admit that some qualities, e.g., color, do not have other qualities, e.g., dimension, as their substratum. He finds unacceptable the reply that such a position goes against established Vaiśeṣika tenets (siddhānta). He says:

> 5. When the color is as large as the
> substance, then isn't the color large?
> A doctrine becomes something to be
> asserted if the opponent is not from
> another [school].[15]

When the opponent admits that a substance has a certain dimension and that the color also has that same dimension, then when the substance is large or small, the color also should be large or small. Consequently why don't largeness and smallness occur in the color, as they do in the substance, which is its material cause (kāraṇa)?[16]

The Vaiśeṣika opponent replies that color and dimension are both qualities and it contradicts established tenets to say that one quality enters into another.[17] Consequently, even if the color is as large as the substance, we say that largeness and smallness do not exist in the color from fear of contradicting our tenets.

If the opponent were from your own school, then it would be appropriate to talk about contradicting your tenets, since this has the power to refute him. However,

when the opponent is from a different school, talk about a contradiction to your tenets becomes ineffective, since he argues against your tenets (HPS p.506, CŚṬ D f.212a-b, P f.240b)!

The Vaiśeṣika opponent concedes that any difference between the pot and existence has been refuted, but argues that since the pot's own nature has not been refuted, there is an existence termed 'pot' by virtue of its own nature (HPS p.506, CŚṬ D f.212b, P f.240b). Āryadeva rejects this claim that the pot exists by its own-nature and argues for the interdependent nature of the marked thing (lakṣya) and its marks (lakṣaṇa). He says:

> 6. Where there is no establishment of
> the marked thing, even by means of a
> mark, then there is no existence [of
> that marked thing] apart from [its
> marks] number, etc.[18]

First of all, the number 'one' is not the pot, since it is a quality. The qualities color and dimension also are not the pot. Existence is not the pot, for it is a universal. Therefore the pot, which you Vaiśeṣikas consider to be different from its marks, number, etc., has no nature of its own. Even the mark of differentiation (vyāvṛtti) fails to establish that the marked thing has a nature of its own apart from its marks.

Even if the Vaiśeṣika opponent supposes that number, etc., is the pot's mark and that the pot is a marked thing because number, etc., marks it, it is still impossible to establish the pot's own nature apart from its marks, since its own nature cannot be perceived independently of its marks, number, etc. Therefore the pot does not exist by virtue of its own-nature (HPS pp.506-507, CŚṬ D ff.212b-213a, P f.241a-b).

Now that he has refuted the claim that there is any difference between marked thing, pot, and its various marks, Āryadeva proceeds to challenge the opinion of a fellow Buddhist who holds that the marked thing and its marks are identical. He says:

> 7. Identity does not exist between the
> pot and its marks because of the fact
> that they are not separate; nor is
> plurality possible when the pot is
> absent in each one.[19]

Because the opponent maintains that the pot is not separate from its marks, color, etc., it is then wrong to claim that the pot is one, since it and its marks are inseparable.[20] But, the opponent might object, then the pot must be plural, since it is not one. However, because the pot is not perceived to exist in each of its marks, it is wrong also to claim that the pot is plural (HPS, p.507, CŚṬ D f.213a, P f.214b).

If identity does not exist between the pot and its marks because they are inseparable, nevertheless, the Buddhist opponent continues, identity will exist because of their mutual connection (parasparasaṃyoga) (HPS p.507, ĆSṬ D f.213b, P f.242a). Āryadeva denies once again the possibility of any connection between dissimilar things. He says:

8. There is no connection between a
tangible thing and a non-tangible thing.
Therefore the [pot's] connection with
color, etc., is not possible.

But if this opponent should insist that even without mutual contact between the pot and color, etc., the union (samudāya) of color, smell, etc. receives the designation 'pot' (HPS p.507, ĆSṬ D f.213b, P f.242a-b), then Āryadeva counters:

9. The color is a part of the pot,
and therefore it is not the pot.
Since the whole does not exist,
therefore the part also does not exist.

Color, smell, etc., individually are not considered to be the pot, since they are parts of the whole. But if the opponent argues that the whole exists on the grounds that its parts, color, smell, etc., exist, then we reply: If the pot is non-existent in each individual part, how can there be any whole? Since it is impossible to establish

the own nature of a whole independently of its parts, the whole, e.g., the pot, does not really exist. Its parts also, e.g., color, smell, etc., do not really exist, for they are parts of a non-existent whole! Therefore the union of color, smell, etc., is not identical with the pot (HPS p.507, CŚṬ D ff.213b-214a, P f.242b).[21]

Moreover, he says:

> 10. The property of being form (rūpatva)
> is without distinction in mark (avilakṣaṇa)
> for all forms. What is the reason for the
> pot's existence in relation to one and not
> in relation to another?

The expression 'for all forms' includes color, smell, etc., because they are all encompassed in the aggregate of form (rūpaskandha).[22] These forms exist in the color, just as they exist in the pot. They differ in locus but not in their intrinsic mark (svalakṣaṇa). If the state (avasthāna) 'potness' is associated with one form, why shouldn't it be associated with other forms as well, since these forms are not different? Either the state 'potness' occurs in all forms, or in none. If the latter is true, then the state 'potness' will not occur in the pot. If the former is true, then there is no difference between any form and a pot. Similarly, it follows that there is no difference between color and smell, since

these two forms cannot be differentiated from a pot (HPS p.508, CŚṬ D f.214a-b, P f.243a).

But if the Buddhist opponent now argues that there is a difference between color and taste, since a different sense faculty apprehends them, while not admitting any difference between color and the pot, (HPS p.508, CŚṬ D f.214b, P f.243a), then Āryadeva replies that if the pot does not exist apart from taste, etc., which the opponent holds is different from color, it should follow that the pot, like taste, etc., is also different from color. He says:

11. Your opinion is that color is
different from taste, etc., but not
from the pot. How is that [pot] , which
itself is non-existent without that [taste,
etc.,] not different from color?

Āryadeva examines in the following two verses the pot's origination. He says:

12. There is no cause for the pot;
yet an effect does not arise by itself.
Therefore no pot exists apart from
color, etc.

When the pot's cause is not found in the color, etc., then someone might suppose that the pot has no cause. But it is not possible that the pot is an uncaused effect.[23] It is also impossible that an effect arises by itself. Since

the effect 'pot' is never perceived apart from the color, etc., therefore it is established that the pot does not exist independently of the color, etc.[24]

But if the opponent rejects the notion of the color, etc., as the material cause (upādāna) of the pot and contends that the pot is the effect of its parts, the potsherds (HPS p.508, CŚṬ D f.214b, P f.243b), then Āryadeva responds:

13. The pot is established by a cause.
A cause is established by another [cause].
How could something that has not been
established by itself produce something
else?[25]

The pot's cause, the potsherds, also require some cause, namely, clay fragments, and hence the question arises: how could they produce something else by virtue of their own nature when they are unable to produce themselves by virtue of their own nature (HPS p.508, CŚṬ D f.215a, P ff.243b-244a).

The discussion returns to the Buddhist opponent's supposition of identity between the pot and the color, etc. The opponent now argues that the expression 'pot' refers to the color, etc., when in a state of conglomeration (samudita). Furthermore, even when the color, etc., is multiple, it does not follow that the pot is multiple (HPS, p.509, CŚṬ D f.215a, P f.244a) Āryadeva replies:

14. The property of being odor is not attested in the color, even in union (samavāya).[26] Therefore the oneness (ekatā) of the conglomerate thing is not possible, as in the case of the pot.

Although color, smell, etc., unite as a conglomerate, they do not lose their own marks. Since color doesn't lost its own mark, it cannot have the property of being odor. Moreover, oneness is impossible for a conglomerate thing which has a multiple substratum (HPS p.509, CŚṬ D f.215a-b, P f.244a).

Because it is impossible for a conglomerate thing to exist as a unity distinct from its multiple parts, Āryadeva rejects the opponent's position which identifies the pot with the conglomeration of color, smell, etc. He says:

15. Just as the pot does not exist apart from the color, etc., similarly, the color does not exist apart from air, etc.[27]

In the same way as the pot is not established apart from the color, etc., which is its cause, it is not possible for the color to exist apart from the four great elements (mahābhūta), i.e., earth, air, fire, and water, which are its cause[28] (HPS p.509, CŚṬ D f.215b, P f.244b).

In the verses that follow, Āryadeva discusses the mutual dependence of the elements. He says:

16. A thing that is hot precisely
is fire. How could what is not hot
[i.e., fuel] be burned? Therefore
what is called 'fuel' does not exist,
and without it fire does not exist.[29]

If fire, the thing that is hot, burns fuel, then only the fire is hot, not the fuel. Since it is impossible to burn what is not hot, fuel, which is not hot, is not burned. Therefore, fuel, which has the nature of the three other elements, does not exist, since it is incapable of being burned. When fuel is not a separate thing distinct from fire, then when the fuel is non-existent, the fire, being without a cause, also does not exist (HPS p.509, CŚṬ D f.215b, P ff.244b-245a).

The Buddhist opponent objects: Fuel has the nature of not being hot because its nature is to be hard (kāṭhinya). Since fire, which has the nature of being hot, overpowers it, the fuel also becomes hot and is burned (HPS p.509, CŚṬ D ff.215b-216a, P f.245a). Āryadeva retorts:

17. If what is overpowered also
becomes hot, then why doesn't it
become fire? But if [you say]
there is a separate thing in the

fire that is not hot, [we reply]
that is not possible.

If fuel becomes hot when fire overpowers it, then how is it different from fire, since they both have the nature of being hot? But if the opponent supposes that the fuel remains not hot, even when the fire overpowers it, then we reply that is impossible, since there would be an incompatible separate thing that is not hot existing in the fire (HPS pp.509-510, CŚṬ D f.216a, P f.245a).

If the Buddhist opponent claims that, even without fuel, fire exists in the atoms (<u>paramāṇu</u>) of fiery substances, but not in other substances, then Āryadeva replies that fire would be uncaused:

18. If fuel does not exist in the
atoms, then fire exists without
fuel. If fuel were to exist in
it, then the atom would not be single
in nature.[30]

Because of the consequence that fire would be uncaused, it is not acceptable for people of our own school to support the notion that atoms exist in substances. But if the opponent supposes that the fuel does exist in the atoms, then he must admit that the atom in fiery substances does not have a single nature.[31]

Āryadeva's refutation of oneness continues in the following verse. He argues that when things that are one

in nature cannot be established, then a thing that is made up of these supposed unitary things, and thought to be plural in nature, also cannot be established. He says:

> 19. Each thing that is examined lacks oneness. Since a thing that is one [in nature] does not exist, therefore things that are plural [in nature] do not exist.

A Sāṃkhya opponent objects that the previous refutation of the identity of a thing with its constituent parts does not apply to his school, since identity is seen as a denial of impermanence, as well as a denial of difference. Permanent earth atoms, etc., he claims, combine with other things that are not different from themselves (HPS p.510, CŚṬ D f.216b, P f.246a).[32] Āryadeva denies that things can be composed of the three qualities (guṇa) and still be considered one in nature:

> 20. If [your] opinion is that the three things are not different, and in this respect a thing that is one [in nature] exists, then [we reply] since the property of being three (tritva) exists in all cases, consequently the property of being one (ekatva) does not exist.

Āryadeva says that the wise analyze identity, etc., by denying the applicability of any of the four alternatives (catuṣkoṭi):

> 21. Existing, non-existing, [both] existing and non-existing, and neither existing nor non-existing--this is the method that intelligent people should use constantly in regard to identity, etc.[33]

If the own nature of things does not exist, an opponent objects, then what logical reasoning (upapatti) do you Buddhist philosophers employ to account for the existence of things (CŚṬ D f.220a, P f.249a)? Āryadeva in response provides the reason for the opponent's mistaken opinion that things are permanent:

> 22. Just as one might say that a permanent thing exists if the continuum (saṃtāna) is perceived wrongly, similarly, one might say that a thing exists if the combination of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya-sāmagrī is perceived wrongly.

Like the flame of a lamp, the continuum comes into existence when there is a combination of causes and conditions, and it continues to exist without interruption as the connection between the cause and the effect from one

moment to the next.[34] Non-Buddhist philosophers, who do not understand the momentary destruction of things, perceive the continuum, which is in fact an unbroken series of aggregates (skandha), as permanent. Similarly, things, e.g., the pot, which depend upon the conglomeration of color, smell, etc., are wrongly perceived as really existent (CŚṬ D f.220a-b, P ff.249a-250a).

This opponent then argues: If you deny that things exist, then you contradict ordinary experience. The Mādhyamikas reply: Our position is not nihilism, because we accept the teaching of interdependent origination, which is the same as saying that things lack a nature of their own, are not produced by virtue of their own nature, that as effects their nature is comparable to a magic illusion, that things are empty (śūnya) and non-substantial (nairātmya) (CŚṬ D f.220b, P f.250b).[35] Āryadeva says:

> 23. What has arisen in dependence is
> not independent (svatantra). This all
> lacks independent reality; consequently
> self [nature] does not exist.[36]

A thing that has a nature of its own and not dependent upon anything else is established by virtue of itself; it has not originated in dependence. But a thing that has originated in dependence upon causes and conditions is not independent; it does not have a self, i.e.,

a nature of its own (CŚṬ D ff.220b-221a, P ff.250b-251a).

A Buddhist opponent now contends that a lack of independent reality is the significance of interdependent origination. What is the difference, he asks, between my view and the Madhyamaka view? What you conceive of and speak of as the significance of interdependent origination, we reply, is not understood properly--that is the difference. Although you accept interdependent origination, you fail to comprehend own nature as it really is; you fail to see that interdependent origination, like a reflection, also is empty of a nature of its own. You fail to grasp the fact that own nature is non-existent and therefore you apprehend things after you have superimposed an existent own-nature upon them. By your lack of understanding, you deceive both yourself and others (CŚṬ D f.221a-b, P f.251a-b).

Moreover, Āryadeva says:

> 24. No union exists anywhere for a
> thing that has no effect. That
> union which exists for the sake of
> an effect is not union according to
> the saints.[37]

If the source of things were own nature, then that would be independent of any effect. Furthermore, since unitary things cannot produce any effect after they have ceased,

an effect will require the union of many things if it is to be produced. But a union which exists only for the sake of producing some effect is not really existent according to the saints who can perceive its own nature (CŚṬ D f.221b, P f.251b).

Āryadeva closes this chapter with a verse that indicates how cyclic existence can be brought to an end:

> 25. The seed of existence is cognition (vijñāna).[38] Sense objects are the sphere of its activity. Were non-substantiality perceived in all sense objects, then the seed of existence will cease.[39]

Cognition, the cause of attachment, becomes the seed of existence. By perceiving sense objects as lacking a nature of their own, cyclic existence ceases for the disciples (śrāvaka), solitary Buddhas, and Bodhisattvas who have acquired intellectual receptivity into the truth that things have no origination (anutpattikadharmakṣānti).[40] The intention for enlightenment (bodhicitta), the seed that ripens into the knowledge of a Tathāgata, will not cease, and for this reason all will obtain the knowledge of a Tathāgata (CŚṬ D f.221b, P f.252a).

CHAPTER XIV

NOTES

[1]On <u>bhava</u> as one of the twelve members of interdependent origination see Louis de La Vallée Poussin, <u>Bouddhisme Études et matériaux</u>. <u>Théorie des douze causes</u> (Gand: E. Van Goethem, 1913), pp.30-31.

[2]Vaidya, pp.155-159 and Bhasker pp.195-198, translate this chapter into French and Hindi, respectively. Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," pp.555-557, translates Hsüan tsang's translation into Italian.

[3]The Tibetan translation has <u>bdag nyid</u>. gZhan dga', <u>dBu ma bzhi brgya pa mchan 'grel</u>, f.58 explains: <u>gal te dngos po gang zhig grub pa'i tshe gzhan 'ga' la'ang</u> // <u>rag las par ni mi 'gyur ba zhig yod na</u> // <u>de yi bdag gi nog bo nyid 'grub par 'gyur ro</u> // "If there were some thing that is not dependent upon something else at the time of its establishment, it would be established by its own nature."

[4]This verse is quoted twice in PP, pp.397.1-2, 505.5-6.

[5]Āryadeva and Candrakīrti both follow Nāgārjuna's definition of <u>svabhāva</u> in MMK 15cd:
<u>akrtimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca</u> / "Own nature is uncreated and non-dependent upon anything else."

[6] mDo sngags, dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i tshig don rnam par bshad pa, p.236 cites MMK XXIV.19:'
apratītya samutpanno dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate /
yasmāt tasmād aśūnyo hi dharmaḥ kaścin na vidyate //
"Since there is no thing that has arisen independently, therefore there is no thing that is non-empty."

Candrakīrti (HPS p.504, CŚṬ D f.209a, P f.237a) comments that things which are supposed to have a nature of their own are "unreal because of the fact that they are incompatible with the truth, like a firebrand's circle, etc." (alātacakrādivad visaṃvādakatvād avastukā). Cf. Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, p.275. He erroneously identifies this passage as commenting upon CŚ XIV.2.

Cf. PP pp-237.11-239.4.

[7] Cf. Gokhale, Akṣara Çatakam, p.10.

[8] See AKV, II, p.572 (Kośa, III,p.7) and Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, p.257.

[9] See Vaiśeṣikasūtra I.2.7: sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu sā sattā. "Existence is that by which substances, qualities, and actions are considered 'existent'."

For additional references see Wilhelm Halbfass, "Conceptualization of 'Being' in Classical Vaiśeṣika," WZKSOA 19, p.184ff.

[10] See the discussion on this topic in ŚŚ IV and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic pp.45-46.

[11]rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap.14, p.14 says: spyi dang khyad par gyi mtshan nyid mthun "a difference in mark between the universal and the particular."

Cf. Candrakīrti (HPS p.505): ghaṭādidravyāṇām anupravṛttilakṣaṇatvāt sāmānyam bhāvaḥ / vyāvṛttilakṣaṇatvāc ca ghaṭo viśeṣalakṣaṇa iti / "Existence has a universal mark because of the fact that it has the mark of recurring in a substance such as the pot; the pot has a particular mark because of the fact that it has the mark of differentiation."

See Vaiśeṣikasūtra I.2.4 and Padārthadharmasaṃgraha p.29 on these marks anupravṛtti and vyāvṛtti.

[12]The Chinese translation differs:
若見二相異言離瓶同二相既有殊應離瓶有異.
"If one sees a difference between the two marks and says that identity exists apart from the two marks, then since the two marks differ, difference must exist apart from the pot."

[13]See Vaiśeṣikasūtra I.1.16: dravyāśrayy aguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣu akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam. "The mark of a quality is: having a substance as its substratum, not possessing qualities, not the cause of conjunction and disjunction, and unrelated to conjunctions and disjunctions ."

[14]The Tibetan translation (CŚT D f.211b, P f.240a) adds an example: *dper na ldan pa gnyis la gnas pas spun gyi ga la yang spun zla nyid dang 'brel pa yin gyi gang yang rung ba ni ma yin bzhin no // gcig dang bum pa dang mi ldan pa'i phyir te* / *yon tan rnams ni rdzas la brten pa'i zhes khas blangs pa'i phyir ro* // "For example, because a connection resides in two things, the relation of brotherness exists between both brothers but it does not exist for anyone at all. The [number] one and the pot are not similar things, since only the pot possesses oneness and oneness does not possess the pot, and since qualities are located in the substance."

[15]Cf. the Chinese translation of 5cd:
敵論若非他應申自宗義.
"If the opponent is not from another [school] , then one must state the meaning according to one's own school."

[16]Here *kāraṇa* is synonymous with *samavāyikāraṇa*. Substance is defined in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* I.1.15: *kriyāguṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam*. "The mark of a substance is: possessing actions and qualities and being an inherence cause."

Just as the potsherds are the inherence cause of the pot, similarly, the pot is the inherence cause of its color.

[17]According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the quality, 'dimension' (parimāna) is perceptible because it inheres in substances that possess color. See Vaiśeṣikasūtra IV.1.11: sāṃkhyāḥ parimānāni pṛthaktva saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpadravyasamavāyāt cākṣuṣāni. "Numbers, dimensions, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, farness, nearness and action are visible on account of inhering in substances that are colored."

However, to claim that the color itself possesses dimension would contradict Vaiśeṣikasūtra I.1.16, for qualities cannot possess other qualities (aguṇavān).

[18]Cf. MMK V.4:

lakṣaṇāsampravṛttau ca na lakṣyam upapadyate /
lakṣyasyānupapattau ca lakṣaṇasyāpi asambhavaḥ //

"Where the marks do not occur a marked thing is not feasible. Where the marked thing is not possible the marks are not possible."

[19]Cf. the discussion in ŚŚ IV and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, pp.41-42), Ratnāvalī I.71 and Satyasiddhi, I, pp.361-363, II, pp.341-343.

[20]This argument implies that the use of the term 'identity' signifies that some distinction can be made between the two things that are considered to be identical, for if they were really inseparable, the claim that one is identical to the other could not be made.

[21]Cf. ŚS IV and Vasu's commentary, (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, pp.47-48) and Satyasiddhi I, p.347, II, pp.367-368.

[22]See AK I.9ab: rūpaṃ pañcendriyāṇy arthāḥ pañcāvijñaptir eva ca and its commentary, p.30: pañcendriyāṇi cakṣuḥśrotaghrāṇajihvākāyendriyāṇi pañcārthās teṣām eva cakṣurādīnām indriyāṇām yathāsvam ye pañca viṣayāḥ rūpaśabdagandharasaspraṣṭavyākhyāḥ avijñaptis ca iti etāvān rūpaskandhaḥ. "Form is the five sense faculties, their objects, and unmanifest form (avijñapti)." "The five sense faculties, i.e., the faculties of vision, hearing, smelling, taste, and touch, their five objects, the sense objects of the faculty of vision, etc., respectively, i.e., visible forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangible things, and unmanifest form--such is the aggregate of form."

See also Karunadasa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter, p.9ff.

[23]See MMK VIII.4ab and May, p.146, n.422.

[24]Cf. Satyasiddhi, I, p.363, II, p.343.

[25]PP 89.3-4 quotes this verse with the reading 'cloth' (paṭa) instead of 'pot' (ghaṭa). Buddhapālita, Madhyamakavṛtti, pp.31-32, also quotes this verse with the reading 'cloth' (snam bu).

The Chinese translation, however, supports the reading 'pot'.

[26]While *samavāya* is used by the Vaiśeṣikas as a technical term 'inherence', Āryadeva employs it in this verse as a non-technical term in the sense of 'union'.

[27]This verse is quoted in PP,p.71.1-2.

[28]The four *mahābhūta*, as Karunadasa points out in *Buddhist Analysis of Matter*, p.14, should not be understood in a literal sense as earth, water, fire, and air. "The first," he notes, "represents solidity (*kakkhalatta*) and extension (*pattharana*); the second, fluidity (*davatā*) and cohesion (*bandhanatta*); the third, the temperature of cold and heat (*sīta*, *uṇha*) and the fourth, distension (*thambhitatta*) and mobility (*samudīrana*)."

These four *mahābhūta* mutually condition one another and are each considered the co-existent cause (*sahabhūhetu*) of the others. See AKV, I,p.283 (*Kośa*, I, p.248). See this and other references discussed in Karunadasa, *Buddhist Analysis of Matter*, pp.23-24. These *mahābhūta* also give rise to color, smell, etc., the derivative forms (*upādāyarūpa*). On the relationship between the *mahābhūta* and the *upādāyarūpa* see Karunadasa, *Buddist Analysis of Matter*, pp.30-33.

[29]Wayman quotes this verse in *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*, p.333.

Nāgārjuna in the tenth chapter of MMK analyzes fire and fuel in terms of identity and difference. He concludes in MMK X.14:

<u>indhanaṃ punar agnir na nāgnir anyatra cendhanāt</u> /
<u>nāgnir indhanavān nāgnāv indhanāni na teṣu saḥ</u> //
"Again fire is not fuel nor is it in anything other than fuel. Fire does not possess fuel. There is neither fuel in fire nor fire in fuel."

See also <u>Ratnāvalī</u> I.83-90.

[30]Wayman quotes this verse in <u>Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real</u>, p.231.

[31]See Lamotte <u>Traité</u>, II, pp.729-730.

[32]On Vaiśeṣika ideas, e.g., eternal atoms, being adopted by some Sāṃkhya philosophers see Frauwallner, <u>History of Indian Philosophy</u>, p.316ff.

[33]D. S. Ruegg cites this verse in "The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuṣkoṭi," p.9.

Cf. the Chinese translation:
有非有俱非一非一雙泯隨情二凡應西已屬智者之諦非真

"Existence, non-existence, both and neither--both identity and difference vanish in accord with the series that fits. The wise understand what is untrue."

[35]The comparison between the continuum and the flame of a lamp occurs also in MMK XXVII.22ab:
<u>skandhānāṃ eṣa saṃtāno yasmād dīpārcisaṃ iva</u> /
"Since the continuum of the aggregates is like the flame of a lamp..."

[36]Cf. MMK XXIV.18:

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe /
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā //

"We proclaim that whatever is interdependent origination is emptiness. It is a dependent designation and is in fact the middle path."

and VVv.22:

yaś ca pratītyabhāvo bhāvānāṃ śūnyateti sā proktā /
yaś ca pratītyabhāvo bhavati hi tasyāsvabhāvatvam //

"Whatever is the dependent nature of things that is declared 'emptiness'. And whatever is dependent in nature lacks the property of own-nature."

See also *Lokātītastava* v.20:

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatā saiva te matā /
bhāva svatantro nāstīti siṃhanādas tavātula //

"Whatever is interdependent origination you regard precisely as emptiness. Your incomparable lion's roar is: 'there is no independent thing'."

Wayman quotes this verse twice in *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real*, pp.270, 377. Tenzin Gyatso also quotes this verse in *The Key to the Middle Way*, p.15.

Cf. the Chinese translation:
若者法衆緣成性羸無自在虛假依他立
故我法皆無.

"All things arise from causes, are weak in nature, and lack independence. Since they are false, imaginary,

and dependent upon others, therefore both the self and things (dharma) are non-existent."

[37]Cf. the Chinese translation:
果衆緣合成離住緣無別果知是與果合者聖人皆無

"Effects arise from union with causes. Apart from causes, there is no distinct effect. An effect from a union like this, the nobles understand as being totally non-existent."

[38]See Lamotte, Traité, III, pp.1152-1153.

[39]Buddhapālita cites this verse in the Madhyamakavṛtti, Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on Emptiness," pp.195, 206.

Wayman quotes this verse in Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, pp.264, 394.

[40]On the term kṣānti see May, p.212, n.717.

CHAPTER XV

SHOWING THE REALIZATION OF THE REFUTATION OF THE CONDITIONED

In chapter fifteen Āryadeva examines the three marks--origination, duration, and cessation--of conditioned things (saṃskṛta) and concludes that neither these three marks nor the things which they characterize have a real nature of their own. He considers first the mark 'origination' (utpāda) and denies that this mark applies either to some effect that had not existed previously or to some effect that already exists in its cause.

A conditioned thing exists by virtue of its own-nature, an opponent asserts, because its marks, origination, etc.,[1] exist (CŚṬ D f.222a, P f.252a). Āryadeva wants to know how this conditioned thing originates. Is the effect pre-existent in its cause? Or is the effect non-existent prior to its origination?[2] He says:[3]

1. [If you claim] the non-existent in the end will arise [then we reply] how will the non-existent arise? [If you claim] the existent will arise in the beginning, [then we reply] how will the existent arise?

If this mark 'origination' produces a conditioned thing, then that conditioned thing is either non-existent or existent prior to its production. First of all, someone who holds that the effect is non-existent in the cause, argues that the sprout does not exist in the seed; instead a combination of causes and conditions produces the sprout in the final moment of the seed. We reply that it is impossible for the non-existent to arise since it would follow that even the horns of a hare could arise! But if the opponent wants to avoid that error and argues that a pre-existent effect arises, then we reply: If you imagine that the sprout is contained in the seed before its production, then its production is impossible because it already exists (CŚṬ D f.222a, P f.252ab)!

Furthermore:

> 2. The effect destroys the cause; for
> this reason the non-existent does not
> arise. There is no establishment of
> something that is established; for this
> reason the existent also does not arise.[4]

It is wrong to hold that the sprout in the process of arising destroys its cause, the seed, and for this reason the non-existent arises. Barley and wheat seeds never contain rice sprouts and no transformation of those seeds will ever bring about such a sprout. In

the same way as sesame oil comes from sesame seeds, the rice sprout destroys the rice seed. Consequently the non-existent does not arise. Moreover, a sprout that has arisen already will not arise again. Consequently the existent also does not arise[5] (CŚṬ D f.222b, P ff.252b-253a).

At no time is the origination of some thing possible Āryadeva contends:

> 3. At that time there is no origination
> and at another time there is no origin-
> ation. If there is no origination at
> that time or another time, then how
> will origination exist?

At the time when the sprout acquires a nature of its own no origination is possible because its nature is already established. At another time when its own nature is not yet established no origination is possible because what is not established does not exist and because the activity of origination does not occur where there is no substratum[6] (CŚṬ D f.222b, P f.253a).

Milk produces curd the opponent argues (CŚṬ D f.222b, P f.253a). Āryadeva replies that milk cannot transform its own-nature and produce something different in nature:

> 4. Just as that nature [e.g., milk]
> does not arise for it, similarly

another nature [e.g., curd] does
not arise for it.[7]

Āryadeva claims that these marks, 'origination', 'duration' and 'cessation' do not exist independently of one another:

5. 'Beginning', 'middle', and 'end'
are not possible prior to [a conditioned
thing's] arising. When any two do not
exist, how will any one occur?[8]

The terms 'beginning', 'middle', and 'end' refer to a thing's origination, duration, and cessation. First of all, no conditioned thing exists prior to its origination, for the other two marks by their very nature do not exist prior to origination. It is wrong to hold that the mark 'origination' is present at the time of some thing's origination, the mark 'duration' at the time of its duration, and the mark 'cessation' at the time of its cessation. Since both duration and cessation are absent at the time of a conditioned thing's origination, this conditioned thing, being without duration and cessation, does not exist. Similarly, at the time of a conditioned thing's duration or cessation the other two marks are absent, and for this reason the activity of each one of them is not possible (ŚṬ D f.223a, P f.253b).[9]

In the following verse Āryadeva emphasizes the interdependent nature of origination. No thing originates

either by virtue of itself or by virtue of something else he says.

> 6. Self-nature does not come into existence apart from other-nature. Therefore there is no coming into existence from either oneself or from something else.[10]

A pot does not have the nature of being established by itself since it is dependent upon the potsherds. These potsherds also are not established by themselves since they depend upon the clay. When these potsherds, whose nature is other than the pot, do not exist, then the pot has no nature of its own. Similarly, when the potsherds have no nature of their own, being dependent upon the pot, then they also lack the nature of being other. Lacking a nature of its own,no thing becomes other. Therefore origination is not possible either from oneself or from something else (CŚṬ D f.223a-b, P ff.253b-254a).

Āryadeva denies that the mark 'origination' exists prior to a thing's production, after its production, or at the same time:

> 7. It is not possible to say that it exists before, afterwards, or at the same time. Therefore the pot and

origination do not come into
existence simultaneously.[11]

It is wrong to suppose that origination exists prior to a pot's production since it would have no substratum. And it is wrong to suppose that it exists afterwards since then origination would be useless. Nor does it exist at the same time since then both would not be mutually dependent (ĆṬ D f.223b, P f.254a).

The pot has origination, the opponent argues, since the pot would not become old if it had not originated previously (ĆṬ D f.223b, P f.245a). Āryadeva responds:

8. Because it has arisen previously,
something that has arisen previously
does not become old. Even after it
arises, it does not become something
that has arisen afterwards.[12]

When the pot was produced previously it was not old; then it was called 'new'. Even after its production how can the new become old? If something that was produced previously is now called 'old', then is this the same thing or something different? If it is the same, then because there is no change in its 'new' state it does not become old. But if it is different, then because this thing also is newly produced, it is in fact new, not old (ĆṬ D f.223b, P f.254a).[13]

Moreover, the past, the present, and the future play no role in the production of a thing. Āryadeva says:

> 9. A present thing does not come into existence from this present. It does not come into existence from the future. Nor does it come into existence from the past.

A present thing does not come into existence by itself, for cause and effect do not exist at the same time. This thing does not come into existence in the future since the future does not exist. Nor does it come into existence in the past since the past also does not exist (CŚṬ D f.224a, P f.255a).

Āryadeva now refers to the scriptural authority of the Buddha to support his argument that the marks 'origination', 'duration', and 'cessation' have no real existence. He says:

> 10. What has arisen has no coming; similarly what has ceased has no going.[14] If this is so, then isn't [cyclic] existence like an illusion?[15]

Certainly there is no own nature. Why is there no own nature, you ask? We reply: Whatever has a created nature, the cause of defilement (_saṃkleśa_) and purity (_vyavadāna_), and has originated in interdependence exists,[16] it is like an elephant or a horse created by a magician.

Foolish people imagine that this thing has a nature of its own. The saints correctly analyze a thing as lacking a nature of its own and as being like an illusion or a mirage. Something that has originated in interdependence, correctly perceived, resembles an illusion; but it does not resemble a barren woman's son. If you hold that this analysis demonstrates that a conditioned thing does not exist because all origination was refuted, then we reply: This would not be like an illusion but would be compared with a barren woman's son, etc. From fear of the consequence that would ensue if interdependent origination were compared with a barren woman's son, namely that it also would be considered non-existent, that comparison is not made. But interdependent origination is compared to an illusion since this comparison is not a logical contradiction.[17] Consequently the saints perceive cyclic existence--which is like an illusion--as insubstantial. The exhaustion of all attachment to this insubstantial cycle will bring about liberation (CṢT D ff.224b-225a, P ff.255a-256a).

The marks of conditioned things also have no substantial nature of their own. Āryadeva contends:

11. Origination, duration, and cessation
do not come into existence at the same
time, nor do they come into existence

sequentially. When is there coming
into existence?[18]

First of all, because origination, duration, and cessation are mutually incompatible, they do not come into existence at the same moment. Nor do they come into existence in a series since when any two do not exist, no one of them can come into existence. Apart from their coming into existence at the same time or sequentually, no other alternative is possible (CŚṬ D f.225a, P f.256a).

In the next verse Āryadeva refutes the position that each of the three marks possesses a secondary mark (anulakṣaṇa). He denies that there is an origination of origination, etc., for this would lead to an infinite regress.[19]

12. For each one, origination, etc.,
all will come into existence again.
Consequently cessation appears like
origination and duration appears like
cessation.[20]

Furthermore, these marks and the things marked by them are neither identical nor different Āryadeva says:

13. If the marked thing is different
from the mark, then how is the marked

thing impermanent? Of else [if identical] clearly these four have no real nature.

Just as in the case of heat and cold, etc., namely, when one is absent, the other is present, similarly, if the marked thing were to operate independently of the mark, then it would operate even without the mark, e.g., impermanence. Since a conditioned thing does not come into existence without the mark 'impermanence', the marked thing and the mark are not different. But if to avoid this error you suppose that the marked thing and the mark are one, then they cannot be four things! Because the own-nature of the mark and the marked thing has not been established, you should not advocate either their identity or difference (CŚṬ D ff.225b-226a, P ff.256b-257a).

The opponent objects: Origination, etc., exists because it is an instrumental cause (nimittakāraṇa). The wise say that a sprout arises in dependence upon a combination of causes. If origination did not exist, then the combination of causes would be useless (CŚṬ D f.226a, P f.257a). Āryadeva replies that no thing ever arises from anything else:

14. An existent thing (bhāva) does not arise from an existent thing. An

existent thing does not arise
from a non-existent thing (abhāva).
A non-existent thing does not arise
from a non-existent thing. A non-
existent thing does not arise from an
existent thing.[21]

First of all, an existent thing, whose nature is accomplished (siddha), e.g., a sprout does not arise from any other existent thing, e.g., a seed that is transformed. It does not arise from a seed that is not being transformed (aviparinamyamāna). Nor does an already established seed arise again. A sprout cannot arise from a non-existent thing, for a seed destroyed by fire cannot produce any effect. Moreover, a non-existent thing cannot arise from a non-existent thing; for example, a barren woman cannot give birth to a son. Nor can a non-existent thing arise from an existent thing--this position is included in the error mentioned above. When neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing arise from some other existent thing or non-existent thing, then since origination is not possible, how will a thing exist because of a combination of causes and conditions (CŚT D f.226a-b, P f.257a-b)?

He continues:

15. An existent thing does not become
existent. An non-existent thing does

> not become existent. A non-existent
> thing does not become non-existent.
> An existent thing does not become non-
> existent.[22]

The opponent concedes that neither an existent nor a non-existent thing arises, but argues instead that what arises is something that is in the process of arising (jayamāna) (CŚṬ D f.227a, P f.258a). Āryadeva replies:

> 16. Something in the process of arising
> does not arise, since something in the
> process of arising is half-arisen. Or
> else, it would follow that everything
> in fact has the property of being in
> the process of arising.[23]

If some of a thing has arisen and some of it has not arisen, then that thing would be in the process of arising. But this third aspect of time, i.e., being in the process of arising, is not found to exist apart from what has already arisen and what has not yet arisen. If something in the process of arising has a double nature, then since some of it is included in what has already arisen it does not arise. And since some of it is included in what has not yet arisen it does not arise.

But if the opponent supposes that both what has already arisen and what has not yet arisen have the property of arising, then even past and future things

would have the property of arising (CŚT D f.227a, P f.258a-b).

Furthermore, Āryadeva denies that the activity of arising (janikriyā) is either present or absent in the nature of something in the process of arising.[24] He says:

17. In the nature of what is in the process of arising activity is not in the process of arising. In the nature of what is not in the process of arising non-activity is not in the process of arising.[25]

The process of arising does exist, the opponent insists, since it is a state between the past and the future. If it did not exist, then in relation to what would the past and the future exist (CŚT D f.227b, P f.259a)? Āryadeva responds that the supposition of a state between the past and the future would lead to an infinite regress of such intermediate states. He says:

18. There is no process of arising for whom both [past and future] do not come into existence without an intermediate state, since even that would have an intermediate state.

The error mentioned above applies only to someone who holds that the process or arising is the same as being half-arisen, the opponent claims, not to someone who holds that the state which ceases prior to a thing's arising is called 'the process of arising' (HPS p.512, ŚṬ D ff.227b-228a, P f.259b). Āryadeva states the opponent's position:

> 19. Since what has arisen originates
> from the cessation of the process of
> arising, therefore the real existence
> of something else also in the process
> of arising is seen.[26]

Since a thing has arisen from the cessation of the process of arising, therefore even apart from what has half-arisen there exists a thing that is in the process of arising (HPS p.512, CŚṬ D f.228a, P f.259b).

He replies that once something has arisen the process of arising is no longer possible:

> 20. When something has arisen, then
> the process of arising is not possible.
> When what has arisen is in the process
> of arising, then from what does it
> originate?

When this thing is said to have arisen, then there is no process of arising. And since the process of arising is not possible, then what is said to have arisen in fact

does not exist because the process of arising is inferred from what has arisen. But if what has arisen also were called 'the process of arising', then we reply that no origination is possible for it because it has arisen already. When what has arisen already is said to be a thing in the process of arising, then from what does that thing in the process of arising originate? The implication is that since it is already established, the supposition of its origination is wrong (HPS p.512, CŚṬ D f.228a, P f.259b).

The opponent now argues that because it nears production, even though it has not yet arisen, the process of arising is called 'arisen'. Therefore the process of arising is in fact what has arisen and its origination is not useless (HPS p.512, CŚṬ D f.228a, P ff.259b-260a). Āryadeva retorts that if there is no distinction between what has already arisen and what has not yet arisen, then a pot already existent might be called 'non-existent'. He says:

21. Why is it asserted about the process
of arising that what has not arisen has
arisen? Because there is no difference,
why then isn't a pot conceived to be a
non-existent thing?

If someone supposes that a thing in the process of arising, which in fact has not arisen, has arisen because it nears

production, then since there is no difference between what has arisen and what has not arisen, why isn't a pot conceived to be a non-existent thing? Some thing is called a pot because it is in fact in a produced state (jātāvastha). Because of the oneness between the produced and the unproduced, the pot would be a non-existent thing, even though it has been produced by means of a prior non-existence (pragabhāvena)--which is incorrect (HPS p.512, CŚṬ D f.228a-b, P f.260a).

But if the opponent supposes that there is some difference between the process of arising and what has already arisen and contends that because a thing possesses the activity of origination (utpattikriyā) it is said to be in the process of arising, (HPS p.512, CST D f.228b, Ṗ f.260a) then Āryadeva responds:

> 22. Although the process of arising
> is not completed (aniṣpanna), it is
> excluded from what has not arisen;
> nevertheless, what has not arisen
> arises since it is excluded from
> what has arisen.

Though a thing in the process of arising is not completed, it is excluded from the future. In the same way as the process of arising is excluded from what has not arisen, it is excluded from what has arisen already because it is not yet completed. And therefore it is wrong to say

that something which has not yet arisen arises; hence the so-called process of arising does not exist (HPS p.513, CŚṬ D f.228b, P f.260a).

Moreover:

23. Even though the process of arising
did not exist before, it is said to
exist afterwards. Because of that also
[you argue] what has not arisen arises.
[We reply:] What is non-existent
(abhūta) surely does not arise.

This thing that is now designated by the state of arising did not exist previously. Although this thing in the process of arising did not exist in the past, it is said to exist afterwards, and therefore what has not arisen is in fact the process of arising at the time it possesses the activity of arising (janikriyā). However, since this has not yet arisen, it is non-existent, and the activity of arising, being without a substratum, cannot operate in some thing that is non-existent (HPS p.513, CŚṬ D f.228b, P f.260b).

Āryadeva begins his summation of this chapter in the following verse:

24. About the completed it is said:
'It arises, it exists'; about the
uncompleted it is said 'It does not

> exist'. When the process of arising is non-existent, then what indeed is it said to be?
>
> And he concludes:
>
> 25. When there is no effect apart from a cause, then both activity (pravṛtti) and cessation of activity (nivṛtti) are impossible.

When the effect being investigated does not exist apart from its cause, then activity, i.e., the origination of the effect, has no substratum. And cessation of activity, i.e., the destruction of the cause, does not exist[27] (HPS p.513, ŚṬ D f.229a, P f.260b).

CHAPTER XV

NOTES

[1]See Aṅguttara, I, p.52: Tīnimāni bhikkhave saṅkhatassa saṅkhatalakkhāni. Uppādo paññāyati vayo paññāyati thitassa aññathattam paññāyati. "Monks, there are for the conditioned three marks [which are themselves] conditioned. Origination is discerned, cessation is discerned, and an alteration of what endures is discerned."
PP p.145.4-7 reproduces this quotation. See also Bhattacarya, p.232, n.2., Lamotte, Traité, I, p.139,n.3, May, p.107, n.259, and Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.191, n.5.

[2]See above chap. 11 pp.415-416 n.23.

[3]Vaidya, pp.160-163 and Bhaskar, pp.198-201 translate chapter fifteen into French and Hindi respectively. Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," pp.557-562, translates the Chinese translation of Hsüan tsang into Italian.

[4]Cf. ŚŚ VIII and Vasu'a commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, pp.70-71) and Lamotte, Traité, I, p.380.

[5]Candrakīrti examines origination from oneself and from something other in more detail in MA VI vv.8-17.

[6]See also Dharmapāla's commentary on this verse, cited by Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.558 n.1.

[7]Cf. the Chinese translation:

如生於自性 生義既為無
於他性亦然 生義何成有

"Just as the meaning of production is non-existent for production by own nature, likewise is production by another nature. How does the meaning of production become existent?"

[8]Cf. ŚS VIII and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic*, pp.67-68), MMK XIII.6, and MMK VII.2:

utpādādyās trayo vyastā nālaṃ lakṣaṇakarmaṇi /
saṃskṛtasya samastāḥ syur ekatra kathaṃ ekadā //

"Separated, the three, origination, etc., are not capable of acting as a mark of a conditioned thing. Were they united, then how could they be in the same place at the same time?"

and *Ratnāvalī* I.69-70 and 65ab:

sthiter abhāvād udayo nirodhaś ca na tattvataḥ /

"Because of the absence of duration, neither origination nor cessation exist in reality."

[9]See the discussion on this topic in PP, pp.146.9-18.

[10]Cf. MMK I.1:

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetukaḥ /
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana ke cana //

"No things ever originate at any time from themselves,

from something else, or from no cause."

and MMK I.3cd:

avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate //

"When own nature does not exist, other nature does not exist."

See also MMK XV.1-4.

11 The Chinese version of 7cd differs:

故生與瓶等唯假有非真

"Therefore origination and the pot, etc., are only false, not true."

Cf. ŚŚ VIII and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic*, p.67).

12 Cf. the Chinese version:

舊若在新前 前生不應理

舊若居新後 後生理不成

"If the old is present prior to the new, then the previous production must not be right. If the old remains new afterwards, then the production afterwards must not be right."

13 See Dharmapāla's commentary, cited by Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.559, n.1.

14 Red mda 'ba , *dBu ma bzhi brgya pa'i 'grel pa*, p.190 and rGyal tshab, *bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad*, chap. 15, p.15 quote the entire scriptural passage:

bcom ldan 'das kyis dge slong dag / *mig ni skye ba na gang nas kyang 'ong ba ma yin* / '*gag pa na gar yang*

'gro ba ma yin no zhes gsungs so // "The Buddha said: 'Monks, the eye when it arises does not come from anywhere; when it ceases it does not go anywhere'."

[15]This verse is quoted in Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, p.213.

The Chinese version of 10cd differs:

法體相如是幻等喻非虛

"The mark of a thing's nature is like that. It is compared to illusion, etc., not to what is unreal."

See also Ratnāvalī II.13ab:

tathā māyopamo loko naiti yāti na kutracit /

"Thus the world, like an illusion, neither comes nor goes."

[16]Part of the CŚṬ is quoted in Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, p.213.

[17]Wayman translates this passage of the CŚṬ twice in Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, pp.219, 361-362.

[18]See Murti's discussion of this verse in The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.192.

Cf. ŚŚ VIII and Vasu'a commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, pp.67-68).

[19]See the treatment of anulakṣaṇa in AKV pp.253-255 (Kośa, I, pp.224-226).

[20]Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p.193, n.1 cites this verse.

Cf. Ś̋S VIII and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, p.68).

and MMK VII.3:

utpadasthitibhaṅgānām anyat saṃskṛtalakṣaṇam /
asti ced anavasthaivaṃ nāsti cet te na saṃskṛtāḥ //

If there is any other secondary conditioned mark for origination, duration, and cessation, then there would be an infinite regress. If there is not, then they are not conditioned."

On the infinite regress of marks, see May, p.107, n.259.

[21]As Bhattacarya Catuḥśataka notes on p.250 this verse is identical to MMK XXI.12.

[22]See Ś̋S VIII and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, pp.71-72).

[23]This verse is cited in MKV p.80.

Cf. the Chinese translation:

半生半未生 非一生時體
或以未生位 應亦是生時

"Half-produced, half not yet produced--there is no single nature for what is in the process of production. Or else, what is completed and what is not yet produced must also be in the process of production."

[24]Cf. p.80 jayamāne 'pi bhāve kriyā na sambhavati jātājatavyatirekena jayamānābhāvāt / "Activity is not

possible in a thing, even in the process of arising, because there is no process of arising apart from what has arisen and what has not arisen."

[25]The Chinese translation differs:
生時若是果體即非生時
生時若自然應失生時性
"If what is the process of production is an effect, then its nature is not the process of production. If the process of production is so by itself, then it must lose the nature of the process of arising."

[26]Cf. MMK VII.13.

[27]See Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, p.362.

CHAPTER XVI

SHOWING THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN MASTER AND DISCIPLE

The last chapter of the CŚ culminates in Āryadeva's discussion of the philosophy of emptiness. In particular he shows how a proper understanding of emptiness eliminates the various logical problems his opponents charge against it. He concludes that no opponent can refute someone who does not take a position based on the assumption that things exist, do not exist, or both.

The previous fifteen chapters refuted the theses of those opponents who maintained that things have a real nature of their own, Āryadeva says:[1]

1. For some reason what is empty is
seen as if it were not empty. All the
[preceeding] chapters refute that.

Someone who fails to ascertain correctly the significance of emptiness cannot get rid of attachment to cyclic existence and produce a longing for Nirvāṇa. Since emptiness frightens people, someone skilled in communicating displeasing things must introduce intelligent people to the significance of emptiness. People who erroneously cling to the self and what belongs to the self do not see

that things perish each moment. They do not understand properly the activity of the aggregates and so affirm permanence. These people view the world as if it were not empty.

This work states repeatedly that the significance of emptiness is that a thing has no own nature. All fifteen preceeding chapters refute opponents who contend, for some reason, that a thing is not empty, for they apprehend what is not true (HPS p.514, CŚṬ D f.213a, P f.263a).

Āryadeva explains that all his opponents' efforts to establish that things are not empty are in vain. He says:

2. When a disputant (vaktṛ) and the object of his assertion (vācya) exist, then it is incorrect to say that they are empty. That [own nature] upon which all arise in dependence is not existent in the three.[2]

You claim that a barren woman's son does not exist and that it is wrong to consider him a disputant, since neither his words nor the object indicated by his words exist. But these three--a disputant, his assertion (vacana), and the object of his assertion--do exist. Thus you argue that things are established as having a nature of their own. We reply that this is incorrect.

Why? Because Āryadeva says: "That own nature upon which all arise in dependence is not existent in the three." Own nature is a word that must be supplied. A disputant is imputed on the basis of an assertion and an object of this assertion. A disputant has no own nature, and neither the assertion nor the object of the assertion have the nature of a disputant. Therefore the disputant is empty. Similarly the object of the assertion is imputed on the basis of a disputant and his assertion and consequently has no own-nature. This same reasoning applies also to the assertion. Therefore all three are established as empty of own nature (CŚṬ D f.231a-b, P ff.263b-264a).

If everything is empty, the opponent objects, then since both the sense faculties and their objects would not exist, a sentient being will resemble a rabbit's horn! Because the sense faculties and their objects do have a true nature, all things have a nature of their own (CŚṬ D f.231b, P f.264a). Āryadeva counters:

> 3. If the fault of emptiness were to
> establish the non-empty, then shouldn't
> the fault of the non-empty establish
> emptiness?[3]

If a sentient being were not empty, then since sentient beings would exist by virtue of their own nature, which cannot change, these sentient beings would be permanent,

not subject to birth or death! It is not correct to assert that sentient beings are not empty, because we see them as being dependent. If your reasoning is correct, then shouldn't a fault involving what is not empty establish the significance of emptiness? It is incorrect for you to establish your own position by undertaking the refutation of the teaching of emptiness (CŚṬ D f.213b, P f.264a).

Moreover,

> 4. The negation of an opponent's
> position established one's own position.
> If you are enamored of a position that
> negates, then why are you not enamored
> of one that establishes?[4]

You ought to be enamored of positive position that establishes in the same way as you are enamored of a position that negates. If everything were not the same as what is to be established (sādhyasama)[5], then first of all you must set forth some logical evidence (upapatti). We argue that according to the teaching of emptiness everything is exactly the same as what is to be established. Therefore after apprehending a thesis that has no ability to establish your thesis, not showing partiality to any thesis, and entering the middle path, it is impossible for you to fear anything, since there is no incompatibility

between what has been experienced and what has not been experienced (CŚṬ D f.231b, P f.264b).

This doctrine of emptiness when examined, the opponent asserts, is incorrect. Therefore when it is proven not to exist, and since no other thesis exists, our thesis, which refutes the opponent's thesis, is established (CŚṬ D f.232a, P f.264b). Āryadeva responds that even the opponent's theses of identity, etc., will not stand up to a thorough examination. He says:

> 5. If whatever is non-existent when
> examined is not a thesis, then even
> all three [theses], identity, etc.,
> would not be theses.[6]

In the saṃe way as you argue that our thesis when examined does not exist, our opponents' thesis, i.e., identity, difference, and indeterminability are non-existent. Therefore since all these theses are non-existent when examined, you should not cling to your own thesis[7] (CŚṬ D f.232a, P ff.264b-265a).

You argue that because of emptiness all theses, identity, etc., are wrong, the opponent states (CŚṬ D f.232a, P f.256a). Āryadeva replies that it is inappropriate for the opponent to claim that his own acceptance of the authority of direct perception is a reason for rejecting the Madhyamaka position on the emptiness of all things. He says:

> 6. [You claim:] The reason (hetu) of emptiness is useless when the pot is directly perceived. [We reply:] In this case a reason that comes from an opponent's school is not [acceptable] to others.[8]

You contend that the reason of emptiness does not apply to those who maintain that a pot is directly perceived. No one directly perceives the non-existent son of a barren woman, but a pot is directly perceived. You conclude that the reason of emptiness is wrong, because the reason of direct perception refutes it. We reply that since we have refuted already the thesis that the pot is directly perceived,[9] the objection fails to harm us.

But if the opponent then objects: You refute the direct perception of the pot, but I don't, then we respond: In this case a reason that comes from an opponent's school is not [acceptable] to others. In this case those who advocate the doctrine of emptiness do not accept reasons that are well-known in the basic texts of an opponent, since they argue that these same basic texts are wrong! Whenever opponents share the same views, then since they both accept direct perception, it is appropriate as an authoritative means of cognition (pramāṇa). But when something is appropriate, then either it is logically

possible (sopapattika) or an established tenet (siddhānta). Consequently in this case since a reason well-known in the opponent's basic texts does not damage our point of view, the reason of emptiness is not useless (CŚṬ D f.232a-b, P f.265a).

The opponent might suppose that those who advocate the doctrine of emptiness speak about a thing 'emptiness' and then argue that since there is no empty thing that is not dependent upon a non-empty thing, therefore things do have a nature of their own. We reply that if there were some thing termed 'emptiness' established by virtue of its own nature, then things would have a nature of their own. But this is not so[10] (CŚṬ D f.232b, P f.265b) Āryadeva asks:

> 7. How would the empty arise without the non-empty?[11] Without the one, how would [its] opposite (pratipakṣa) arise?[12]

If there were some thing that is termed 'non-empty', then there would be some thing that is empty, its opposite. But some thing that is not empty is impossible, since the existence of an uncaused thing is impossible, just like a flower in the sky! When a non-empty thing is impossible, then its opposite, an empty thing, also is impossible, since it also would lack an opposite (CŚṬ D f.232b, P f.265b).

Because there is no thing termed 'empty', there may be no thesis of emptiness, the opponent concedes, but nevertheless since even a non-thesis is apprehended as a thesis, it becomes in fact a thesis. Since without depending upon a counterthesis no thesis is possible, there is a counterthesis. And because there is a counterthesis also to emptiness, our own thesis, namely that all things exist, is established (CŚṬ D f.233a, P f.266a). Āryadeva argues that if the opponent's thesis were to exist, then emptiness, which is not a thesis, might be considered a thesis. But since emptiness is not a thesis, there is no counterthesis to it. He says:

8. If there were in fact a thesis, then
what is not a thesis might have the nature
of a thesis. When there is in fact no
non-thesis what would be a counterthesis?[13]

The own nature of things does exist, the opponent insists, because we perceive the distinctive nature of things (CŚṬ D f.233a-b, P f.266b). Āryadeva retorts that he has refuted already the notion that heat is the distinctive nature of fire:

9. [You claim:] If a thing does not
exist, then how would fire become hot?
[We reply:] The refutation 'heat and
fire do not exist' was given above.[14]

He urges the successive rejection of each of the four alternative positions (catuṣkoṭi):

10. After perceiving a thing, there is
the refutation 'the thing does not exist'.
Thus what position is experienced by
someone who has rejected the error in
all four [positions] ?[15]

Because we perceive error in all four positions, it is wrong to cling to any thesis (CŚṬ D f.233b, P f.266b).

Moreover Āryadeva denies that even the most subtle thing, namely, an atom, has true existence. Even the Buddhas cannot perceive any true existence in atoms. He says:

11. Where there is no true existence
(sadbhāva) even in an atom, how will it
arise? It is even non-existent for
to the Buddhas. Therefore it is incorrect.

He does on to say:

12. If everything is non-dual (advaya),
then what else has true existence? If
that is acceptable to you also, then
how can an opponent reply?

Given the doctrine of non-duality, what thing has a nature of its own? First of all, because things that are permanent do not exist by virtue of their own nature, the conceptual constructions (kalpanā) 'existence' and 'non-existence'

are inconceivable, for there is no permanent thing that is the cause for the operation of these conceptual constructions. However, since things that are produced lack a permanent nature, they are incompatible in mark with the mark of own nature. Thus they also are unable to establish the conceptual constructions, 'existence' and 'non-existence'. Furthermore, no other thing apart from conditioned and unconditioned things is established. Therefore the opponent should give up this doctrine of duality, which his own mind falsely constructs, and adopt the doctrine of non-duality (ĆṬ D f.234a-b, P f. 267b).

Āryadeva contends that when properly examined things lack all dualistic distinctions. He says:

13. No distinction is possible
in regard to the non-existence of
all things. Whatever is seen in all
substances is no distinction.

Whatever is the own nature of things has no cause, for otherwise causes and conditions would produce it; consequently own nature would be created. But it is impossible that an uncaused thing exists. Hence based upon a non-affirming negation (prasajyapratiṣedha)[17] own nature is in fact a non-existent thing, for it is not an existent thing. Therefore since this own nature does not differentiate things, it has a single nature, i.e., a non-

existent nature. For example, although a clay pot and a metal dish differ, there is no distinct own nature in empty space (ākāśa), which is the mere absence of material form. In each instance there is the same absence of obstruction (CŚṬ D f.234a, P f.268a).

But if the opponent supposes that it is possible to reply to someone who maintains that some thing exists, but not to someone who maintains that all things are non-existent (CŚṬ D f.235a, P f.265-), then Āryadeva replies:

> 14. Were it said that there is no reply
> to the opponent's thesis because of [all
> things'] non-existence, then why isn't
> your own thesis, which the reason [of
> emptiness] refutes, established?[18]

If you argue that since your opponent maintains that everything is non-existent no reply is possible, then why doesn't some logical evidence establish your own thesis, which the reason of emptiness has refuted? It is not established because it is wrong to accept it (CŚṬ D f.235a, P f.286b)!

Moreover, it is wrong to claim that refuting an opponent's thesis is easy, Āryadeva asserts, since the Madhyamaka point of view is not easy to refute. He says:

15. When people say that it is easy to
find a reason that advances a refutation,
then why isn't it possible to state the
fault in the opponent's thesis?[19]

Furthermore, Āryadeva argues, people's use of conventional expressions does not prove that the objects to which they refer really exist. He says:

16. If by merely saying 'it exists' that
in fact is an existent thing, then wouldn't
that also be a non-existent thing by merely
saying 'it doesn't exist'?

In the same way as your statement 'it exists' establishes that this thing exists, why wouldn't my statement 'it doesn't exist' establish that ultimately a thing does not exist? Therefore by rejecting the duality of both statements we establish a middle position, i.e., non-duality, for this duality is all conceptual proliferation (prapañca) and artificial (CŚṬ D f.235b, P f.269a).

The opponent now objects: If a thing does not exist ultimately, then the term 'existent' for a non-existent thing is inappropriate. However, here we consider it inappropriate for the term 'existent' to refer to the non-existent son of a barren woman (CŚṬ D f.235b, P f.269a). Āryadeva responds:

17. [You claim:] Since the terms
'existence' and 'possessing' are

> employed, therefore there is some
> thing that is not non-existent.
> [We reply:] Since the term
> 'existing' [conventionally] applied,
> therefore that [thing to which it
> refers] is not [truly] existent.[20]

These terms do not exist simultaneously with the own nature of the thing to which these terms refer; a desire to employ terms exists both before and after. Someone with good eyes might be termed 'blind in one eye'. A short period of time might be termed 'a long period of time'. Thus the terms may be incompatible with the thing to which they refer.

If you suppose that because the term 'existing' refers to an existent thing, that thing exists by virtue of its own nature, then when logically examined since the term 'non-existing' refers to a non-existent thing, why isn't the negation of existence ascertained (CŚṬ D ff.235b-236a, P f.269a-b)?

Words do not make the own nature of a thing empty, the opponent counters. If the thing referred to were empty of a nature of its own, then when someone utters the word 'fire', his mouth would be on fire! Therefore we say that everything exists in accordance with conventional verbal expressions (<u>saṅketa</u>), employing words that do not affect the own nature of a thing (CŚṬ D f.236a,

P f.267b). Āryadeva answers:

> 18. If everything were to exist
> conventionally because people
> say so, then how is a thing which
> exists ultimately (tattvatas)
> conventional?[21]

If you claim that a thing conventionally is said to have a nature of its own, using words that do not affect its own nature, and that it exists by virtue of its own nature, then we reply that since this thing exists by virtue of its own nature it is in fact ultimately existent, not conventionally existent (CŚṬ D f.236a, P ff.269b-270a).

Although you use ordinary language, nonetheless, the opponent objects, since you refute things, things are non-existent for you. We reply: that statement goes beyond our intention. If from our negation of a thing the assertion of non-existence, the contradictory position to existence, would ensue, then we would not establish the negation of all doctrines, since to assert the doctrine of nihilism (nāstikavāda) is much worse[22] (CŚṬ D f.236b, P f.270a)! Āryadeva replies that the Mādhyamikas are not nihilists. He says:

> 19. If all things are in fact non-
> existent because they do not exist
> [ultimately] then it is not correct
> that all positions are non-existent.[23]

Āryadeva considers the conceptions 'existence' and non-existence' to be dependent on one another. He says:

20. Because an existent thing
doesn't exist, there is no existence
possible for a non-existent thing.
Without an existent thing how will
a thing be established as non-existent?

We say conventionally that a thing which has the mark of change (anyathālakṣaṇa) and ceases is non-existent. But because that thing doesn't exist when it is examined properly, how then is a non-existent thing possible? When a non-existent thing is not possible, then since the conceptual construction 'existent thing' depends upon a non-existent thing, that existent thing is established as non-existent and that non-existent thing also is established as non-existent (CŚṬ D f.236b, P f.270a-b).

Since there is no establishment of a thing without a reason (hetu), you should state a reason for establishing emptiness, the opponent argues. And should a reason exist, then all things are not empty; other things also should exist, just as the reason does (CŚṬ D f.236b, P f.270a). Āryadeva responds:

21. If [you claim:] emptiness is for a
reason, therefore everything is not
empty. [We reply:] The thesis is not
different from the reason. Therefore
there is no reason.

The opponent argues that since emptiness does not exist prior to the reason and since it exists afterwards, emptiness is created. And if it were not created, then it would be deceptive, like a magically created elephant. We reply that the nature of emptiness is always the same; it is not deceptive. No reason establishes it.

But if the opponent supposes that the reason communicates (jñapaka), then we reply that a reason is not possible. Why? A reason exists for the purpose of establishing a thesis. If the reason were different from the thesis, it would not convey the meaning of the thesis. If the reason were not different from the thesis, then because the reason is like the thesis in nature, it is not considered a reason (CŚṬ D ff.236b-237a, P f.270b).[24]

The opponent now contends that the example (dṛṣṭānta) of emptiness exists. And since that example exists, there will be other things that are similar to it. We reply that the example must be connected with the reason or in the process of connection. First of all, if it were connected, then the refutation of the reason would refute the example also. But if it were not connected, then since both the reason and the example have no ability to establish the thesis the reason doesn't do anything. What's the use of some thing that is imaginary (CŚṬ D f.237a, P ff.270b-271a)? Āryadeva responds:

22. [You claim:] Since the example of
emptiness exists, therefore [everything]
is not empty. [We reply:] Isn't it
possible to say that just as the crow
is black, I am black?

If you suppose that some thing is established from an example that is not connected with the reason, then the example of the black crow will make even me black (CŚṬ D f.237a, P f.271a)!

The opponent objects: If the reason and the example do not exist, then all things will not exist. What are the statements of your texts intended to establish? If the own nature of some thing is perceived, then own nature should be accepted. The doctrine of emptiness will then be in error (CŚṬ D f.237a, P f.271a). Āryadeva answers:

23. If a thing exists by its own nature,
then what merit is there in perceiving
emptiness? Perceiving [own nature] because
of conceptual construction is bondage; that
must be refuted here.[25]

Instruction on emptiness is given in order to teach about ultimate truth. You argue that if some thing exists by its own nature, then since that is ultimately true, only experiencing it is good for those who seek liberation, and not experiencing emptiness. We reply that not only does this argument lack merit, but since it involves

negation (apavāda) it is in fact erroneous. When things which have no nature of their own are perceived erroneously as having a nature of their own, then conceptual attachment to the world ensues. The activity of cyclic existence follows from that, since the continuum of birth arises from karma caused by attachment to things and from the afflictions (kleśa). This text demonstrates that things lack a nature of their own by rejecting both imputation (samāropa) and negation (apavāda).[26] People who reject things' lack of own nature become conceptually attached to things that resemble reflections, etc. The exhaustion of the karma caused by attachment to things and the exhaustion of the afflictions, and the removal of the bondage of desire, etc., brings about liberation.

Conceptual construction imputes a false own nature on a thing.[27] The Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, endowed with great compassion and pained by the suffering of sentient beings, see sentient beings bound to cyclic existence; and they teach that things lack a nature of their own and that own nature is incompatible with interdependent origination in order to repudiate the view that things have a nature of their own and in order to stop the pain of cyclic existence. This in brief is the meaning of the Buddha's discourses (CŚṬ D ff.237b-238a, P ff.271a-272a).

Moreover,

24. It is said; 'one exists, one doesn't exist'. This is neither truth nor worldly usage. Consequently it is not possible to say 'this exists, this doesn't exist'.[28]

When someone wants to discuss worldly things, then taking worldly conceptual constructions as an authoritative means of cognition the existence of all five aggregates should be accepted. But when someone wants to discuss the supramundane ultimate truth, then depending on the knowledge of the saints (ārya) these five aggregates should be explained as being empty of own nature.

If mind (citta) and mental factors (caitta) exist, then the pot and the cloth, etc., also exist, since these things are known to all people. But when examined the pot and cloth don't exist, and then the mind and mental factors also will not exist, since both lack logical evidence. Thus it is impossible to say 'this exists, this doesn't exist' (CŚṬ D f.238a-b, P f.272b).

We can't reply to you now, the opponent concedes, but after diligently studying the Tathāgata's teachings, we will reply (CŚṬ D f.238b, P f.272b). However, Āryadeva concludes that no reply is ever possible:

25. Even after a long period of time, one cannot refute someone for whom there

> are no theses, viz., 'existing', 'non-existing', 'both existing and non-existing'.[29]

If a thesis were maintained, then it can be refuted. But it is impossible to refute someone who does not maintain a thesis, since this person has rejected such theses as 'it exists', 'it doesn't exist', 'it both exists and doesn't exist' (ĆŚT D f.238b, P f.273a).

CHAPTER XVI

NOTES

[1]Chapter sixteen has been translated into French and Hindi respectively by Vaidya, pp.163-167, and Bhaskar, pp.202-204. Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," pp.562-567, translates Hsüan tsang's Chinese version into Italian.

[2]Cf. the Chinese translation of 2cd:
諸法假緣成故三事非有.

"All things falsely arise in dependence; therefore the three things do not exist." See also Dharmapāla's commentary on this verse, Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.562, n.2.

[3]Cf. ŚS X and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic*, p.82) and VV v.1 and Nāgārjuna's reply in v.21:

sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaś cet /
tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṃ na nivartayituṃ svabhāvam alam //

"If the own-nature of all things is not found anywhere at all, then your statement is unable to deny own-nature."

hetupratyayasāmgryāṃ ca pṛthak cāpi madvaco na yadi /
nanu śūnyatvaṃ siddhaṃ bhāvānām asvabhāvatvāt //

"If my statement does not exist in the combination of causes and conditions or separately, then isn't emptiness established because of the fact that things lack a nature of their own."

In the VV the opponent argues that Nāgārjuna errs in claiming that all things are empty, since his own statement would be empty and thus incapable of establishing anything. Nāgārjuna responds: Shouldn't emptiness be established, because the opponent errs in assuming that things are not empty?

[4]Cf. the Chinese translation of 4: 諸欲壞他宗必應成己義何樂談他失而無立己宗.

"All who want to destroy an opponent's thesis, surely must establish their own meaning. How can someone enjoy discussing an opponent's error without establishing his own thesis?"

See also Ś́S X and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, p.83).

[5]A reason which has the same need of proof as the thing which is to be established (sādhyasama) is, according to Nyāyasūtras I.2.8, a fallacy involving the reason of an inference (hetvābhāsa). On this fallacy see Bimal Krishna Matilal, "A Note on the Nyāya Fallacy Sādhyasama and Petitio Principii," JIP 2 (1974): .211-224. In a companion article, Kamalesvar Bhattacharya, "A Note on the Interpretation of the Term Sādhyasama in Madhyamaka Texts," JIP 2 (1974): 225-230, discusses Nāgārjuna's end and Candrakīrti's use of the term. He cites, p.225, MMK IV.8-9:

<u>vigrahe yaḥ parihāraṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet</u> /
<u>sarvaṃ tasyāparihṛtaṃ samaṃ sādhyena jāyate</u> //
<u>vyākhyāne ya upālambhaṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet</u> /
<u>sarvaṃ tasyānupālabdhaṃ samaṃ sādhyena jāyate</u> //

"If an argument is advanced by means of emptiness and should someone state a reply, his entire reply is the same as what is to be established."

"If an exposition is advanced by means of emptiness and should someone state a refutation, his entire refutation is the same as what is to be established."

See also Ruegg, <u>The Literature of the Madhyamaka School</u>, p.22, n.49.

[6]Cf. the Chinese translation of v.5. Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.562, n.2. remarks: "Il testo cinese interpreta più che tradurre letteralmente."

為破一等執假立遣為宗他三執既除自宗隨不立.

"By refuting the positions, identity, etc., a thesis which dispels [others] is falsely established. When the opponent's three positions are rejected, subsequently one's own thesis is not established."

[7]See also Dharmapāla's commentary, Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.562, n.3.

[8]Āryadeva points out earlier in CŚ XIV.5cd that only if the opponent is not from a different school is the citation of texts appropriate.

In VVv.30 Nāgārjuna denies that there is anything that can be apprehended through the use of direct perception:

yadi kiṃ cid upalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā /
pratyakṣādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me 'nupaṃbhaḥ //

"If I were to apprehend something by means of direct perception, etc., then I would make either an affirmation or a denial. Because that thing does not exist, no refutation of me is possible .

[9]See below CŚ XIII.vv.1-4.

[10]Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, p.248, quotes part of the introduction to this verse.

[11]See MMK XIII.3 (the opponent's objection) and 7 (Nāgārjuna's reply):

bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhavatvaṃ anyathābhāvadarśanāt /
asvabhāvo bhāvo nāsti bhāvānāṃ śūnyatā yataḥ //
yady aśūnyaṃ bhavet kiṃ cit syāc chūnyam iti kiṃ cana /
na kiṃ cid asty aśūnyaṃ ca kutaḥ śūnyaṃ bhaviṣyati //

"Things have the property of lacking own nature because of the perception of change. A thing that has no own nature does not exist because all things have the property of being empty."

"If there were something no empty, then there might be something empty. But as there is nothing that is not empty, how will the empty exist?"

[12]Wayman, <u>Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real</u>, quotes this verse on p.249.

[13]Cf. the Chinese translation of v.8:
若許有無宗有宗方可立無宗若非有宗應不成.

"If one allows that there is a non-thesis, then one can establish that there is a thesis. If a non-thesis does not exist, then one cannot establish that there is a thesis."

See also ŚS X and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, <u>Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic</u>, p.85) and <u>Ratnāvalī</u> I.72 and II.4:
<u>vināśat pratipakṣād vā syād astitvasya nāstitā</u> /
<u>vināśaḥ pratipakṣo vā katham syād asty asambhavāt</u> //
<u>dṛṣṭaśrutādyaṃ muninā na satyaṃ na mṛṣoditam</u> /
<u>pakṣād dhi pratipakṣaḥ syād ubhayaṃ tac ca nārthataḥ</u> //
"The non-existence of existence would exist either on account of destruction or on account of a counterthesis. But how would either destruction or a counterthesis exist because of the impossibility of existence?" "The Sage has said that what is seen and heard, etc., is neither true nor false, for there would be a counterthesis to the thesis and both do not really exist."

[14]Cf. the Chinese translation of v.9.
若諸法皆空如何火名煖此如前貝遣火煖俗非真

"If all things are empty, then how is fire said to be hot? This is refuted as before: Fire and heat are conventional, not ultimate."

Āryadeva refutes the true existence of fire and hear below, CŚ XIV vv.16-17.

[15] Āryadeva refers to those four positions below in CŚ XIV.21.

[16] Cf. the Chinese translation of v.11:
若諸法都無生死應非有言者佛何曾許執法宗為無.
"If all things are non-existent, then arising and ceasing must not exist. Have all the Buddhas taught and allowed the assertion that things certainly are non-existent?" The phrasing of the question in Chinese suggests that a negative answer is expected.

rGyal tshab, bZhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad legs bshad snying po, chap. 16, p.8 comments on 11cd: de'i phyir bden grub khas len pa 'thad pa'i phyogs gang dang yang ma 'brel pa'o // "Therefore the acceptance of true establishment is not connected with any logical thesis."

[17] On the term prasajyapratiṣedha see Matilal, Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, pp.163-164 and Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka pp.37-39, 65.

[18] Cf. the Chinese translation of v.14:
若謂法非有無能破有因破有因已明汝宗何不立.
" [You claim:] If one says that things do not exist, then there is no reason that can refute existence. [We reply:] The refutation of a reason for existence has been illustrated already. Why isn't your thesis established?"

[19]Cf. the Chinese translation of v.15:
說破因易得是世俗虛言汝何緣不能破真空義.

"When it is said that a reason that refutes is easy [to find], this is a conventional and false statement. Why aren't you able to refute the ultimate, the significance of emptiness?"

See also Dharmapāla's commentary, Tucci, "La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva," p.562, n.3.

[20]Cf. VV v.9cd and the reply by Nāgārjuna in v.58:
<u>nāmāsad iti ca yad idaṃ tat kiṃ nu sato bhavaty utāpy asataḥ</u> /
"And does this term 'non-existent' belong to an existent thing or to a non-existent thing? Whether it belongs to an existent thing or a non-existent thing--in both cases your thesis is rejected."
<u>yadi ca na bhavet svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāva ity eva</u> /
<u>nāmāpi bhaven naivaṃ nāma hi nirvastukaṃ nāsti</u> //
"If things had no own nature, then even the term 'without own nature' would not exist, for there is no term without an object."

[21]Cf. the Chinese translation of v.18:
若者世間可說皆是假非真離住世俗名言乃是真非假.

"All that can be termed conventional, that is all false, not ultimate. However, what exists apart from worldly conventional expressions that is ultimate, not false."

[22]Cf. PP p.13.4-6: nanu ca naiva svata utpannā ity avadhāryamāṇe parata utpannā ity aniṣṭam prāpnoti / na prāpnoti / prasajyapratiṣedhasya vivakṣitatvāt parato 'py utpādasya pratiṣetsyamānatvāt / "[Someone objects:] When stating 'they are not produced from themselves' isn't the undesired [statement] 'they are produced from something else' entailed? [Response:] It is not entailed because a non-affirming negation is intended and because production from something else will be negated also."

For references to the relation between the doctrine of emptiness and nihilism see May, p.123, n.323.

[23]Cf. Chinese translation of v.19:
言竟諸法為無可墮於無見唯蠲諸妄執如何說墮無

"[You object:] The assertion that all things are non-existent falls into the nihilism view. [We reply:] If we remove (or cleanse) all false positions, how can it be said that we fall into nihilism?"

See also ŚŚ X and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, p.86).

[24]See Nāgārjuna's commentary to VV v.64:
niḥsvabhāvaḥ sarvabhāvā ity etat khalu vacanaṃ na niḥsvabhāvān eva sarvabhāvān karoti / kiṃ tv asati svabhāve bhāvā niḥsvabhāvā iti jñāpayati / "This statement 'all things are without own-nature' does not make all things in fact without a nature of their own. But when own-nature

is non-existent, it communicates that things lack a nature of their own."

On this point see Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School, p.22, n.48.

[25]Buddhapālita quotes this verse in the Mulamadhyamakavṛtti (P f.299b). Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real also quotes this verse, p.268, although he wrongly identifies it as 399cd instead of 398cd.

See also ŚŚ X and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, p.87).

[26]On these two terms see May, Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, p.187, n.609.

[27]Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real quotes part of the CŚṬ, p.268.

[28]Cf. the Chinese translation of v.24:
法成一成無違眞亦違俗故與有一異二俱不可言.

" By saying 'Things are established are one, things are established as non-existent, one repudiates the ultimate and one repudiates the conventional. Therefore both identity and difference should not be stated."

See also ŚŚ X and Vasu's commentary (Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic, p.83).

[29]Candrakīrti quotes this verse in PP p.16.4-5. It is also quoted by Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, pp.289, 300-301.

Nāgārjuna in the _Yuktiṣaṣṭikā_, vv.42-60 criticizes those who postulate things in the course of a debate, under the influence of attachment and adversion, and praises those who abandon all positions. In v.43 he says:

'di 'am de 'o zhes gang du //
rnam par spyad na mi dmigs na //
rtsod pa 'di 'am de bzhin zhes //
mkhas pa su zhig smra ba 'gyur //

"After investigating what is stated to be 'this or that', if it is not perceived, then what intelligent person would say that the dispute 'this or that' is so?"

In the VV v.29 he says:

yadi kā cana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ /
nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ //

"If I were to have some thesis, then this error would be mine. But I have no thesis, therefore I have no error."

I

CDNP f.1b gang la 'jig rten gsum mnga' bdag //
rang nyid 'chi bdag byed po med //
[1]yod des[1] rnal bzhin gnyid log na //
de las ma rungs gzhan ci yod //[1]
[1]yong nges CD.

P f.2a 'chi bar bya phyir skyes *gyur cing //
gzhan dbang 'gro ba'i ngang can la //
'chi ba bya ba ltar snang ste //
gson pa bya ba min ltar ro //[2]

N. f.2a *khyod kyis 'das dus thung ngu ltar //
mthong zhing ma 'ongs gzhan du na //
khyod mnyan mi mnyan ltar sems de[1] //
gsal bar 'jigs pa'i 'o dod 'dra //[3]
[1]te NP.

gzhan dag la yang spyi mthun[1] phyir //
khyod la 'chi ba'i jigs med na //
gcig la gnod gang de phrag dod //
sgo nas sdug bsngal bskyed[2] 'gyur ram //[4]
[1]thun NP
[2]skyed CD.

nad bcos rga ba gso bya des //
de dag la khyod mi 'jigs mod //
chad pa phyi ma bcor med pas //
D f.2a *khyod ches gsal bar de la 'jigs //[5]
gsad par bya ba'i phyugs rnams ltar //
C f.2a *'chi ba kun *gyi thun mong zhing //
N f.2b gzhan yang 'chi bar snang[1] 'gyur[1] na //
P f.2b khyod la 'chi bdag 'jigs *cis med //[6]

[1]gyur CD.

dus la nges[1] pa med pa'i phyir //
bdag rtag snyam du sems na[2] ni //
nam zhig dus na 'chi bdag gis //
khyod la gnod pa byed par 'gyur //[7]

[1]des C.

[2]nas NP.

ma 'ongs pa yi don lta zhing //
gson pa zad pa ma yin na //
bdag nyid 'tshong la bdag nyid ni //
[1]byams ldan mkhas pa[1] su zhig smra //[8]

[1]rnam dpyod ldan zhes CD; ldan zhes mkhas pa DT; byams, zhes mkhas pa PT.

bdag nyid gta' mar bzhag byas te //
sdig las ci yi phyir na byed //
nges par khyod ni mkhas rnams ltar //
bdag la 'dod chags bral bar zad //[9]
su la'ang gson pa zhes bya ba //
sems kyi skad cig las gzhan med //
skye bos de nges mi rig pa //
des na bdag nyid shes pa dkon //[10]
khyod ring gson pa la dga' zhing //
rgan nyid la khyod mi dga' na //
N f.3a *e ma khyod spyod skye bo ni //
'dra la dam pa lta bur 'gyur[1] // [11]
[1]snang CD.
khyod rang 'chi la mya ngan na //
bu sogs rnams phyir ci ste yin //
rang nyid spyo bya smra po ni //
D f.2b ci lta bur na smad mi *'gyur // [12]
C f.2b *gang tshe 'ga' zhig ma bcol bar //
rang nyid bur gyur de yi tshe //
ma dris nyid du de 'gro ba //
rigs[1] par mi 'gyur ma yin no // [13]
[1]rig NP.

gti mug phyir na bu yi ni //
rnam par[1] rtog pa med par zad //
'di yi 'gro bar spro ba nyid //
rga[2] bas ston par byed par 'gyur // 14

[1]pa NP.
[2]rgas CD.

ji ltar pha la bu sdug pa //
de ltar de la skye ma yin //
'jig rten 'di ni 'og tu 'gro //
de phyir mtho ris kyang rnyed dka' // 15
gang tshe[1] rjes su mi mthun pa //
'ga' yang sdug ces bya yod min //
de tshe chags pa tshong[2] dang ni //
'dra ba 'ba' zhig skye bar zad // 16

[1]che P.
[2]'tshong CD.

bral bas skyed pa'i sdug bsngal ni //
N f.3b mi rnams snying las *myur ldog ste //
chags la'ang sdug bsngal bral ba yis //
mtshon pa'i mi brtan pa nyid ltos // 17

gnod pa gzir bar[1] byas zin kyang //
yon tan med snyam shes bzhin du //
khyod bdag nyid la phyi 'chos[2] 'gyur //
de yang bdag la mi rigs so // 18

[1]ba CD.

[2]chos NP; phyir, 'chos DṬ PṬ

sdug bsngal rnam par 'ged lta bu[1] //
'jig rten 'di ni yongs su 'khyam //
P f.3a sdug bsngal *gyur pa'i skye bo la //
sdug bsngal 'ged pas ci zhig bya // 19

[1]bur CD.

gang gi[1] 'du ba dga'[2] yin de'i //
'bral ba ci ltar dga' ma yin //
'du ba dang ni 'bral ba dag //
lhan cig rgyu bar snang min nam // 20

[1]gis N.

[2]gangs N.

'das la thog ma yod min la //
ma 'ongs tha ma yod[1] min na //
cis na khyod kyis 'du mthong zhing //
ring por gyur kyang bral[2] ba min // 21

[1]yon P.

[2]'bral NP.

śatruvat yānti te kālā niyamena kṣaṇādayaḥ /
sarvathā tena te rāgaḥ śatrubhūteṣu teṣu mā // 22

skad cig la sogs dus de rnams //
nges par dgra dang 'drar 'gyur te //
des na dgrar gyur de dag la //
rnam kun khyod 'dod chags mi bya // 22

viprayogabhayād gehān na nirgaccha⟨s⟩i durmate [2] /
x x x[3] nāma kartavyaṃ kuryād daṇḍena ko budhaḥ // 23

[1]HPS: nirgacchami.

[2]HPS reconstructs: durmate.

[3]HPS reconstructs: vivicya.

blo ngan bral ba'i jigs pa yis //
khyim nas nges par mi 'byung na //
mkhas pa su zhig nges par ni //
bya dgos chad pas byed par 'gyur // 23
khyod 'di byas nas gsal bar ni //
nags su 'gro bya snyam sems na //
gang zhig byas kyang gtang bya ba //
de byas yon tan ci zhig yod // 24

niyamād vidyate yasya martyo 'ham iti bhāvanā /
tasya saṅgaparityāgād mṛtyor api [1]⟨bhayaṃ ku⟩[1] taḥ // 25
[1]HPS reconstructs: bhayaṃ ku.

bdag ni 'chi 'o snyam sems pa //
CD f.3a gang la nges par *yod gyur pa //
de ni chags pa yong btang phyir //
'chi bdag la yang ga la 'jigs // 25

N f.4a *rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las rtag pa 'dzin pa spang ba'i thabs bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa dang pa 'o //

II

lus ni dgra ltar mthong mod kyi //
de lta na yang de [1]bsrung bya[1] //
khrims ldan yun ring 'tsho ba ni //
de las bsod nams chen po byed // 1
[1]yang bsrung NP.

mi rnams sdug bsngal lus nyid las //
skye zhing bde ba gzhan las na //
sdug bsngal kun gyi snod gyur pa //
khog pa la khyod ci ste gus // 2

gang tshe bde ba sdug bsngal ltar //
shas cher mi la mi 'byung na //
de ltar sdug bsngal chen po de //
chung ngo snyam du sems byed dam // 3

'jig rten bde la mngon phyogs shing //
bde gyur dag kyang rnyed dka' ste //
des na skye bo 'jig 'di la //
sdug bsngal rjes su snyegs pa 'dra // 4
sdug bsngal 'dod pas rnyed 'gyur gyi //
'dod pas bde pa ga la yin //
khyod cis dkon pa la gus shing //
mod la ci ste khyod mi 'jigs // 5
bde bar byur pa'i lus po ni //
P f.3b *sdug bsngal snod[1] du[2] gyur te des[2] //
lus[3] la gus dang dgra la gus //
de dag gnyis ni mtshungs par snang // 6

[1]snyed C.

[2]'gyur ba de CD.

[3] las C.

śarīraṃ sucireṇāpi sukhasya svaṃ na jāyate /
pareṇābhibhavo nāma svabhāvasya na yujyate // 7

lus ni shin tu 'tor bas kyang //
bde ba'i bdag tu mi 'gyur te //
rang bzhin gzhan gyis zil gnon ces //
bya ba rigs pa mi yin no // 7

agryāṇāṃ mānasaṃ duḥkham itareṣāṃ śarīrajam /
duḥkhadvayena loko ' yam ahany ahani hanyate // 8

mchog la yid kyi sdug bsngal te //
tha mal[1] rnams la lus skyes so //
N f.4b sdug bsngal gnyis kyis *'jig rten 'di //
nyin re nyin re 'joms par byed // 8

[1]ma CD.

kalpanāyāḥ sukhaṃ vaśyaṃ vaśyā duḥkhasya kalpanā /
ato ' sti kiñcit sarvatra na duḥkhād balavattaram // 9

bde ba rtog pa'i dbang gyur cing //
rtog pa sdug bsngal dbang gyur pa //
de phyir kun na sdug bsngal las //
shin tu stobs ldan ci yang med // 9

kālo yathā yathā yāti duḥkhavṛddhis tathā tathā /
tasmāt ka⟨l⟩[1]evarasyāsya paravad dṛśyate sukham // 10

[1]HPS: ḍ.

ji ltar ji ltar dus 'gro ba //
de ltar de ltar sdug bsngal 'phel //
de phyir bde ba lus 'di yi //
gzhan po lta bur snang bar 'gyur // 10

vyādhayo 'nye ca dṛśyante yāvanto duḥkhahetavaḥ /
tāvanto na tu dṛśyante narāṇāṃ sukhahetavaḥ // 11

sdug bsngal gyi ni rgyu mang po //
nad rnams dang gzhan snang gyur pa //
de snyed du ni mi rnams la //
CD f.3b *bde ba'i rgyu dag snang ma yin // 11

sukhasya varddhamānasya yathā dṛṣṭo viparyayaḥ /
duḥkhasya varddhamānasya tathā nāsti viparyayaḥ // 12

'phel bzhin pa yi bde ba la[1] //
ji ltar bzlog pa mthong 'gyur ba[2] //
de ltar sdug bsngal 'phel bzhin la[3] //
bzlog pa yod pa ma yin no // 12

[1] las CD.
[2] gyur pa CD.
[3] las CD.

rkyen dang lhan cig bde ba la[1] //
bzlog pa mthong gi[2] sdug bsngal la //
rkyen rnams nyid dang lhan cig tu //
bzlog pa yod pa ma yin no // 13

[1] las CD.
[2] ba NP.

khyod 'chi bzhin la dus song zhing //
'gro ba dang ni 'gror 'gyur na //
'chi bzhin pa ni bde 'gyur zhes //
rnam pa kun tu[1] rigs ma yin // 14

[1]NP add: 'ang.

lus can rnams la bkres sogs kyis[1] //
gnod pa rtag tu yod 'gyur[2] na //
gnod bzhin pa ni bde 'o zhes //
rnam pa kun tu'ang[2] rigs ma yin // 15

[1]kyi CD.
[2]gyur CD.
[3]CD om: 'ang.

nus pa med pas 'byung kun la //
tshogs pa zhes bya skye 'gyur te //
'gal ba rnams la bde 'o zhes //
rnam pa kun tu mi rigs so // 16

grang sogs rnams la [1]phyir 'chos pa[1] //
rtag tu yod pa ma yin na //
brlag bzhin pa ni bde' o zhes //
rnam pa kun tu'ang rigs ma yin // 17

[1]phyir 'tsho ba NP; bco 'tsho ba PT.
[2]CD om.: 'ang.

'bad rtsol[1] med par spyod pa zhes //
bya 'ga'ang[2] sa steng[3] yod min na //
P f.4a las byed bde ba yin no *zhes //
rnam pa kun tu'ang mi rigs so // 18

[1]stsol CD.
[2]NP om.: 'ang.
[3]stengs CD
[4]CD om.: 'ang.

'di dang gzhan du bdag nyid ni //
rtag tu sdig[1] las bsrung bar bya //
ngan 'gro yod na bde ba zhes //
rnam pa kun tu rigs ma yin // 19

[1]bdud C.

bzhon[1] pa sogs la mi rnams kyi //
bde ba rtag tu yod min te //
dang por gang la rtsom med pa //
de la mthar 'phel ga la yod // 20

[1]gzhon CD.

gser gyi snod du skyug pa na[1] //
ji ltar 'ga' zhig dga'[2] 'gyur ba //
de bzhin sdug bsngal phyir 'chos de[3] //
bde' o snyam du sems par byed // 21

[1]la CD.
[2]dgar CD.
[3]bcos pa CD; bcos te DṬ PṬ

rtsom [1] pas skyes pa ldog 'gyur na //
sdug bsngal rtsom la'ang[2] bde ci yod //
de phyir thub pas skye 'jig dag //
sdug bsngal yin zhes gsungs pa snyam // 22

[1]brtsams CD.
[2]pa'ang CD.

N f.5a so so'i skye bos *sdug bsngal ni //
bde bas g.yogs ltar mi mthong na //
gang gis sdug bsngal sgrib 'gyur ba //
bde ba zhes bya ci yang med // 23

C f.4a khyod sdug *chags *bral med do zhes //
D f.4a so so'i skye bo bstan bya des //
nges par de bzhin gshegs rnams kyis //
gti mug kun gyi tha mar gsungs // 24

anityasya dhruvā pīḍā pīḍā yasya na tat sukham /
tasmād anityaṃ yat sarvaṃ duḥkhaṃ tad iti jāyate // 25

mi rtag pa la nges par gnod //
gang la gnod yod de bde min //
de phyir mi rtag gang yin pa //
thams cad sdug bsngal zhes byar 'gyur // 25

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las bde bar 'dzin pa spang ba'i thabs bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa gnyis pa 'o //

III

yun ni shin tu ring pos kyang //
yul la mur thug yod min te //
sman pa ngan ltar khyod lus[1] la //
ngal ba 'bras bu med pa 'byung // 1

[1]yul CD.

bsten par byed pa 'ga' zhig la //
sa sred ldog pa med ji bzhin //
bsten[1] bzhin pa yi mi rnams la //
'dod re 'phel ba'ang[2] de bzhin no // 2

[1]bstan NP.

[2]NP om.: 'ang.

bud med kun la 'khrig pa la //
tha dad cung zad yod min zhing //
gzugs gzhan gyi yang longs spyod na //
khyod la mo mchog gis ci byed // 3
gang la gang yid 'ong [1]gyur pa[1] //
de ni de yis 'tshengs[2] par rlom //
khyi sogs rnams la'ang thun mong pas //
P f.4b *blo gros ngan pa khyod ci chags // 4

[1]'gyur ba CD.

[2]'tshems C.

khyod[1] la yan lag[2] kun mdzes mo //
gang de[3] sngar kun thun mong na //
de rnyed[4] khyod[5] la ngo mtshar ltar //
ji ltar yang ni 'gyur ba min[6] // 5

[1]khyed CD.

[2]lags C.

[3]der CNP gal te DT PT

[4]snyed N.

[5]khyed C.

[6]rGyal tshab: yin.

yon tan ldan pa sdug pa dang //
bzlog pa la ni bzlog mthong na [1] //
rnam par gnas med snga ma' am //
cig shos las ni gang zhig bden // 6

[1]nas CD.

blun po'i 'dod chags yon tan dang //
ldan pa 'ba' zhig la mi skye //
rgyu med pa la [1] 'jig rnams kyi //
ldog pa rgyu las ga la zhig[2] // 7

[1]las CD.

[2]yin NP

ji srid gzhan shes[1] ma gyur pa[2] //
de srid de ni [3]khyod la 'dug[3] //
nad ngan dang mtshungs bud med ni //
rtag tu rkyen las bsrung bar bya // 8

[1]bshes NP.

[2]na CD.

[3]khyo la sdug CD; khyo la 'dug DT.

dar mar rang gis byas pa gang //
de ni rgan po [1] mi 'dod na //
ji lta bur na grol ba rnams //
de la shin tu gdung mi 'gyur // 9

[1] por CD.

ma chags pa la bde med cing //
de yang blun min la med na //
gang yid rtag tu phyir phyogs pa //
de yi bde ba ci 'dra zhig // 10

khyod la gus bzhin rtag par ni //
CD f.4b mo dang lhan * cig phrad pa med //
N f.5b 'di nga'i[1] gzhan *gyi[2] ma yin zhes //
yongs 'dzin 'di ko[3] ci zhig yin // 11

[1] nga CD.
[2] gyis C.
[3] go NP.

gal te 'dod chags bde yin na //
bud med dag gis dgos med 'gyur //
bde ba dor bya zhes bya bar //
ji ltar yang ni ma[1] mthong ngo // 12

[1] mi NP.

bud med lhan cig sbyor [1] ba na'ang[1] //
bde ba gzhan las skye 'gyur na //
de rgyu mdza' mo nyid yin zhes //
blun po min pa su zhig 'dzin // 13

[1]na yang CD.

mdze po 'phrug bzhin 'dod chags kyis[1] //
ldongs[2] pas 'dod pa'i skyon mi mthong //
chags bral rnams la mdze po ltar //
chags can sdug bsngal ldan pa snang // 14

[1]kyi NP.

[2]mdongs NP; mDo sngags: gdung bas.

mgon med brkes pas nyen rnams la //
mu ger bya ba gang 'byung[1] ba //
de ni bud med phrad pa'i tshe //
[2]chags can[2] kun gyi[3] g.yo ba yin // 15

[1]byung NP.

[2]sems can CD.

[3]gyis NP.

dregs pa yis ni kha cig la //
bshang khang la yang chags skye zhing //
bu med la la la chags pa //
'ga' zhig 'ga' la phrag dog byed // 16

mi gtsang ba la gti mug ni[1] //
'byung zhing khro ba 'byung rigs kyi //
rnam pa kun tu 'dod chags ni //
P f.5a *'byung bar rigs pa ma yin no // 17

[1]na N.

mi rnams ma gtogs mi gtsang ba'i //
snod ni smad par 'byung 'gyur na //
gang la mi gtsang 'byung 'gyur ba //
de ni smad par cis mi[1] sems // 18

[1]ma C.

dngos po gtsang ba thams cad kyi //
tha ma gang du dmigs [1]'gyur ba[1] //
de la gtsang ba yod do zhes //
blo ldan mi ni gang[2] zhig smra // 19

[1]gyur pa CD.

[2]su CD.

gang zhig bshang khang nang 'dug cing //
de med par ni mi gnas pa[1] //
mi gtsang ba yi srin de la //
rmongs las dregs pa skye bar zad // 20

[1]par D.

thabs gang gis kyang lus kyi ni //
nang phugs[1] gtsang bar[2] mi 'gyur na //
khyod ni nang la 'bad byed pa //
de ltar phyi rol la ma yin // 21

[1]phyugs NP.
[2]mar NP.

gal te mdze can bzhin de ltar //
gcin can kun la mtshungs min na //
mdze can ji bzhin gcin can de //
de ltar mi kun gyis spong 'gyur // 22

pratināsikayā tuṣṭiḥ syād dhīnāṅgasya kasya cit /
rāgo 'śucipratīkāre puṣpādāv iṣyate tathā // 23

yan lag nyams pa 'ga' zhig ni //
sna yi tshab mas dga'[1] 'gyur ltar //
mi gtsang phyir 'chos me tog la[2] //
sogs pa 'dod chags de bzhin 'dod // 23

[1]dag D; dgar NP.
[2]las NP.

śuci nāma na tad yuktaṃ vairāgyaṃ yatra jāyate /
na ca so 'sti kva cid bhāvo niyamād rāgakāraṇam // 24

D f.5a C f.5a gang du 'dod *chags bral *skye ba //
de gtsang zhes byar mi rigs la //
nges par 'dod chags rgyur gyur pa'i //
dngos de gang na'ang[1] yod ma yin // 24

[1]NP om.: 'ang.

anityam aśubhaṃ duḥkham anātmeti catuṣṭayam /
ekasminn eva sarvāṇi sambhavanti samāsataḥ // 25

mdor na mi rtag mi gtsang dang //
sdug bsngal ba dang bdag med ces //
N f.6a bya ba bzhi po thams *cad ni //
gcig nyid la ni srid par 'gyur // 25

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las gtsang bar 'dzin pa spang ba'i thabs bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa gsum pa' o //

ahaṃ mameti vā darpaḥ sataḥ kasya bhaved bhave /
yasmāt sarve 'pi sāmānyā viṣayāḥ sarvadehinām // 1

bdag gam bdag gi snyam dregs pa //
srid par dam pa su la 'gyur //
gang phyir lus can thams cad la //
yul rnams thams cad mtshungs phyir ro // 1

gaṇadāsasya te darpaḥ ṣaḍbhāgena bhṛtasya kaḥ /
jāyate 'dhikṛte kāryam āyattaṃ yatra tatra vā // 2

tshogs bran drug chas[1] bstabs[2] gyur pa //
khyod kyi dregs pa ci zhig yin //
gang ngam de ru bya ba ni //
dbang du byas la rag las 'gyur // 2

[1]chos CD.

[2]stabs CD; Red mda' ba and rGyal tshab: btab.

ji ltar gso bya 'thob thob pa //
rje bo gtong por[1] sems de bzhin //
rje bo sbyin bya byin byas nas //
bdag ni gtong ba po snyam rlom // 3

[1]bar NP.

P f.5b

gzhan rnams *kyis ni[1] sdug bsngal gnas //
khyod la phyin ci log tu dran //
gzhan gyi las kyis 'tsho khyod kyi //
dga' ba gang gis bskyed par 'gyur // 4

[1]na NP.

'jig rten gyi ni bsrung po dang //
bsrung byar sa bdag snang gyur na //
ci ste gcig gis dregs yod cing //
ci ste gzhan gyi dregs bral min // 5

rigs kun nang n æs rang las la //
dga' bas 'tsho rnams rnyed pa dka' //
gal te khyod la mi dger 'gyur //
des na khyod la 'gro bzang dkon // 6

gzhan gyis bskul[1] te byed pa gang //
de ni sa steng[2] blun zhes bya //
khyod dang mtshungs pa'i gzhan dbang gzhan //
'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no // 7

[1]skul NP.

[2]stengs CD.

bsrung ba nga la rag las zhes //
'jig rten las[1] ni gla len zhing //
rang nyid kyis kyang sdig byed[2] na //
de mtshungs brtse med su zhig yod // 8

[1] la CD.

[2] spyod C.

skye bo sdig to byed rnams la //
gal te brtse ba bya min na //
byis pa so so'i skye bo ni //
thams cad bsrung byar mi 'gyur ro // 9
bdag nyid dga' ba bskyed[1] pa yi //
D f.5b C f.5b rgyu ni *gang du *yod[2] mi 'gyur //
lung la sogs pa'i rgyu rnams kyis[3] //
bsod nams min pa'ang[4] 'jig yod min // 10

[1] skyed CD.

[2] med CD.

[3] kyi NP.

[4] NP om.: 'ang.

yang dag srung[1] byed ces bya ba //
gal te sa bdag chos yin na //
nyon mongs gzo mkhan rnams la yang //
ci ste chos su 'gyur ma yin // 11

[1]bsrung NP.

'jig rten sa bdag rag las kyi //
sa bdag de ni smad de dper //
dam pas 'jig rten kun gyi ma //
srid pa yi ni sred[1] pa bzhin // 12

[1]srid CD.

N f.6b *blun min rgyal srid mi thob la //
blun la brtse ba yod min na //
bsrung po yin yang mi yi bdag //
brtse ba med la[1] chos mi gnas // 13

[1]par NP.

ṛṣīṇāṃ ceṣṭitaṃ sarvaṃ kurvīta na vicakṣaṇaḥ /
hīnamadhyaviśiṣṭatvaṃ yasmāt teṣv api vidyate // 14

drang srong rnams kyi spyod kun //
mkhas pa byed pa ma yin te //
gang gi phyir na de dag la //
dman 'bring khyad 'phags yod phyir ro // 14

putravat pālito lokaḥ purataḥ pārthivaiḥ śubhaiḥ /
mṛgāraṇyīkṛtaḥ so 'dya kalidharmasamāśritaiḥ // 15

sngar gyi sa bdag dge rnams kyis[1] //
'jig rten bu ltar[2] bskyangs pa de //
rtsod dus chos la brten rnams kyis[3] //
deng san ri dvags[4] dgon par byas // 15

[1]kyi NP.

[2]rnams NP.

[3]kyi NP.

[4]dags CDNP DṬ PṬ; Red mda'ba, rGyal tshab, gZhan dga', and mDo sngags: dvags.

chidraprahārinaḥ pāpaṃ yadi rājño na vidyate /
anyeṣām api caurāṇāṃ tat prāg eva na vidyate // 16

glags su snun[1] pa'i rgyal po la //
P f.6a gal te sdig *pa yod min na //
rkun po gzhan rnams la yang de //
dang po nyid du yod ma yin // 16

[1]bsnun CD.

sarvasvasya parityāgo madyādiṣu na pūjitaḥ /
ātmano ' pi parityāgaḥ kiṃ manye pūjito raṇe // 17

chang sogs dag la bdog pa kun //
yongs gtong mchod[1] pa ma yin na //
g.yul ngor bdag kyang yongs gtong ba[2] //
mchod pa snyam du sems sam ci // 17

[1]chad C.
[2]bas NP.

rgyal po 'jig rten mgon khyod la //
mgon 'ga'[1] yod pa ma yin na //
mgon nyid de yis[2] bdag nyid ni[3] //
ma btang su zhig dga' bar 'gyur // 18

[1]dga' NP.
[2]yi NP.
[3]na NP.

rgyal po shi bar gyur pa la'ang //
grags pas yon tan 'ga' mi 'byung //
khyod yon med dang khyi 'tshed la //
grags pa chen po ci ste med // 19

gang tshe kun gyi dbang phyug nyid //
bsod nams kyis bskyed de yi tshe //
'di ni dbang phyug rten min[1] zhes //
brjod par[2] rnyed ma yin no // 20

[1] mDo sngags: yin.
[2] pa CD.

'tsho ba'i thabs so cog la yang //
'jig rten na ni rigs zhes bsnyad //
des na sems can thams cad la //
[1]rigs las[1] dbye ba yod ma yin // 21

[1] rig yod C.

'das dus shin tu ring ba dang //
mi mo rnams yid g.yo ba ste //
de[1] phyir rgyal rigs zhes bya ba //
D f.6a rigs las 'ga' *yang yod ma yin // 22

[1] de'i NP.

x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x /
vipro ' pi karmaṇā śūdraḥ kena manye na jāyate // 23

C f.6a *gal te las kyis dmangs rigs kyang //
rgyal rigs zhes byar 'gyur na ni //
las kyis dmangs kyang bram zer ni //
gang gis 'gyur ba min par sems // 23

pāpasyaiśvaryavad rājan saṃvibhāgo na vidyate /
vidvān nāma parasyārthe kaḥ kuryād āyatīvadham // 24

rgyal po[1] sdig la dbang phyug ltar //
'ged[2] pa yod pa ma yin na //
gzhan gyi don du mkhas pa ni //
su zhig phyi mar 'joms par byed // 24

[1] po'i NP.
[2] 'geng CD.

dṛṣṭvā samān viśiṣṭāṃś ca parāṃś chaktisamanvitān /
aiśvaryajanito mānaḥ satāṃ hṛdi na tiṣṭhati // 25

dbang phyug gis bskyed nga rgyal ni //
mnyam dang khyad par 'phags pa yi //
pha rol nus ldan blta bya ste //
dam pa'i snying la mi gnas so // 25

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las bdag tu 'dzin pa spang ba'i thabs bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa bzhi' o //

na ceṣṭā kila buddhānām asti kā cid akāraṇā /

niḥśvāso 'pi hitāyaiva prāṇināṃ sampravartate // 1

N f.7a *sangs rgyas rnams kyi g.yo ba ni //

rgyu med 'ga'[1] yang yod min te //

dbugs kyang sems can rnams la ni //

P f.6b *sman slad kho nar yang dag 'byung // 1

[1]dga' NP.

'jig rten kun la 'chi bdag sgra[1] //

ji ltar 'jigs pa skyed[2] 'gyur ba //

de bzhin kun mkhyen sgra[3] 'di ni //

'chi bdag la yang 'jigs pa bskyed //[2]

[1]smra NP.

[2]skye NP.

[3]smra NP.

thub la[1] mdzad dang mdzad min dang //

gsung bya gsung bya min mnga' ba //

des na kun mkhyen kun mkhyen ni //

min zhes bya la rgyu ci yod // 3

[1]pa NP.

sems ma rtogs[1] par 'gro sogs la //
gang phyir bsod nams la sogs pa[3] //
ma mthong de phyir las kun la //
yid ni don por bsgrub par bya // 4

[1]Red mda' ba, rGyal tshab, and mDo sngags: gtogs.

[2]pa CD.

[3]la NP.

bsam pas byang chub sems dpa' la //
[1]dge ba'am on te mi dge'ang[1] rung //
thams cad dge legs nyid 'gyur te //
gang phyir yid de'i dbang gyur phyir // 5

[1]dge'am on te mi dge CD; dge'am gal te mi dge'ang DṬ PṬ.

byang chub sems dpa' dang po //
sa steng[1] skye bo thams cad ni //
'khor los sgyur ba nyid 'gyur ba //
de dag bsod nams las khyad 'phags // 6

[1]stengs CD.

rin chen rang bzhin mchog rten ni //
'jig rten snyed[1] mtho 'gas byas pa //
de bas [2]sems can gcig[2] 'dul po //
mchog tu bkrabs par brjod pa yin // 7

[1]rnyed CDNP; rnyed DṬ PṬ.
[2]sems bskyed bcug CD.

de la phan 'dod bla ma yis //
slob ma la ni sri[1] zhu bya //
gang phyir des[2] phan mi shes pa //
de phyir slob ma zhes bya' o // 8

[1]srid C.
[2]nges CD.

D f.6b C f.6b khro yang *'byung *pos bzung pa la //
sman pa 'khrug pa min pa ltar //
thub pa[1] nyon mongs dgrar gzigs kyi //
nyon mongs dang 'brel gang zag min // 9

[1]pas C.

gang zhig gang gang la dga' ba //
de yis[1] de de sngar dpyad[2] bya //
nyams par [3] gyur pa[3] dam chos kyi //
snod ni cis kyang ma yin no // 10

[1]yi NP.
[2]spyad NP.
[3]'gyur ba C.

ji ltar ma ni khyad par du //
nad thebs bu la gdung [1]'gyur ba[1] //
de bzhin byang chub sems dpa'i brtse //
dam pa min la khyad par du'o // 11

[1]gyur pa NP.

la la'i slob ma [1]'gyur ba[1] ste //
la la yi ni bla mar 'gyur //
thabs rigs[2] sna tshogs thabs kyis ni //
ma rtogs sems can rtogs par byed // 12

[1]gyur pa NP.
[2]rig DP.

P f.7a ji ltar sman pa mkhas *gyur pas //
nad pa sgrub[1] med dkon de bzhin //
byang chub sems dpa'i stobs rnyed nas //
gdul bya ma yin shin tu dkon // 13

[1]bsgrub NP.

N f.7b *byang chub sems dpa'i yul du ni //
gal te 'ga' zhig ma bskul bar[1] //
ngan song 'gro bar 'gyur na de //
blo ldan gzhan gyis[2] smad byar 'gyur // 14

[1]bas CD.

[2]gi CD.

gang zhig nyen pa gzhan dag la //
snying brtse legs zhes mi 'dod pa //
de rjes brtse bas mgon med pa //
dag la ji ltar sbyin pa gtong // 15

'gro la phan phyir gang zhig la //
'jig rten srid[1] du gnas yod pa //
de la sor gnas dag phung na //
sdang la bsam thag[2] ci zhig yod // 16

[1]sred P.

[2]dag NP.

gang la skye ba thams cad du //
mngon shes lnga char yang yod pa //
de yi dman pa lta'i dngos //
'di ni shin tu bya dka' ba' o // 17
thabs kyis kun tshe bsod nams gang //
shin tu yul ring bsags pa de //
thams cad mkhyen pa'i gzhal bya yang //
min zhes de bzhin gshegs pas gsungs // 18
'chi dang chos dang srid pa gzhan //
sbyin pa'i sgra yis gsal byed pa //
de phyir byang chub sems dpa' la //
sbyin pa'i sgra ni rtag tu snyan // 19
'dir byin pa yi sbyin pa las //
'bras bu chen po 'byung 'gyur zhes //
len dang yongs su gtong ba ni //
tshong spogs[1] bzhin smad par 'gyur // 20

[1] sogs NP.

gang la sngar byas sdig pa yang //
D f.7a *yod nyid yod pa ma yin pa //
C f.7a *dge ba'i las can de la ni //
bsgrub min zhes bya yod ma yin // 21

rlabs chen yid can de la ni //
'di na'ang gnod pa yod min te //
des na de la srid pa dang //
mya ngan 'das la khyad par med // 22
gang la kun tshe sems dbang ni //
nyid las skye ba yod gyur pa //
de ko rgyu cis 'jig rten ni //
kun gyi mnga' bdag 'gyur ma yin // 23
phul 'gro las chen phul 'gro ba //
'ga' zhig 'jig rten 'dir yang snang //
P f.7b *des na bsam mi khyab mthu yang //
nges par yod ces rtogs par gyis // 24
blun la shin tu zab chos la //
skrag pa skye ba ji ltar ba //
de bzhin zhan[1] la shin tu ni //
rmad byung chos la skrag pa skye // 25

[1]gzhan NP.

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa bsten pa ste rab tu byed pa lnga pa' o //

VI

bde bas 'dod chags 'phel 'gyur zhing //
sdug pas khro ba 'phel 'gyur na //
cis bde dka' thub can min zhing //
N f.8a sdug pa dka' thub *can cis yin // 1

'dod chags las ni sdud pa ste //
khro ba'i las ni rtsod pa' o //
'byung ba kun la rlung bzhin du //
gti mug las ni gsos 'debs pa'o[1] // 2

[1]so CD.

ma phrad[1] pa las[2] 'dod chags ni //
sdug bsngal dpung[3] med las khro sdug //
yongs mi shes las gti mug ste //
de dag gis de dag mi rtogs[4] // 3

[1]'phrad NP.

[2]la NP.

[3]spungs CDNP DT PT; dpung Red mda' ba, rGyal tshab, gZhan dga', and mDo sngags.

[4]rtog NP.

ji ltar bad kan la mkhris dang //
lhan cig phrad pa med mthong ba //
de bzhin khro la 'dod chags dang //
lhan cig phrad pa[1] med par mthong // 4

[1]par C.

'dod chags bran bzhin bkol bya ste //
gang phyir mi phangs de'i sman phyir //
khro la rje bo bzhin lta ste //
de'i[1] sman phangs pa yin phyir ro // 5

[1]de NP.

dang por gti mug yang dag 'byung //
bar du khro ba 'byung 'gyur zhing //
phyis ni 'dod chags 'byung ba ste //
nyin la rim pa gsum du' o // 6

'dod chags mdza' min mdza' 'dra ba //
des de la khyod mi 'jigs te //
mi phan mdza' bo khyad par du //
skyes bus spang bar bya min nam // 7

CD f.7b

'dod chags *rgyu las skye 'gyur zhing //
rkyen las kyang ni skye ba ste //
'dod chags rkyen las skye ba gang //
de ni sgrub sla cig shos min // 8

khro ba brtan[1] zhing nges par ni //
mi dge nyes chen byed pa ste //
de ltar rnam kun dbye shes pas //
nyon mongs rnams[2] mthar byed par
'gyur // 9

[1]bstan NP; rGyal tshab: bsten.

[2]rnam CD.

P f.8a lus *la dbang ji bzhin du //
gti mug kun la gnas 'gyur[1] te //
de phyir nyon mongs thams cad kyang //
gti mug bcom pas bcom par 'gyur // 10

[1]gyur CD.

rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba ni //
mthong na gti mug 'byung mi 'gyur //
de phyir 'bad pa[1] kun gyis 'dir //
gtam de kho na[2] bsnyad par bya // 11

[1]pas CD.
[2]nar C.

rtag tu sa 'dzin sogs dga' la //
gtong bo za[1] po gtsang zhing 'gyur //
de 'dra la sogs mtshan nyid rnams //
'dod chags can gyi mi la snang // 12

[1]rGyal tshab: bza'.

sangs rgyas rnams kyis chags can la //
zas dang chos gso gtsug lag khang //
dge legs [1]spangs pa[1] thamscad dang //
rtag tu bla ma'i thad gnas gsungs // 13

[1]yangs ba NP.

nus med la khros bdag nyid la //
mdog mi sdug pa 'ba' zhig byed //
nus pa gang la'ang brtse med pa[1] //
N f.8b de ni tha chad *ces byar brjod // 14

[1]la NP.

yid du mi 'ong ba yi sgra //
sngar byas sdig mthar byed par brjod //
rmongs shing dam pa ma yin pa //
bdag nyid rnam par dag mi 'dod // 15

mnyan[1] pa yid du mi 'ong ba'ang[2] //
ngo bo nyid kyis gnod mi byed //
de phyir rnam rtog las byung ba //
gzhan las yin no snyam du rlom // 16

[1]snyam CDNP; mnyam DT PT.

[2]CD om.: 'ang.

ji ltar gshe ba po la ni //
chad par bya ba mngon brjod pa //
de bzhin snyan par smra po la //
mchod par bya bar[1] cis mi 'gyur // 17

[1]ba CD.

khyod kyis[1] smad bya ma smras kyang //
gal te gzhan kyis shes na ni //
smra po la khro mi rigs na //
yang dag min smra la ci smos // 18

[1]kyi: Red mda' ba, rGyal tshab, gZhan dga', and mDo sngags.

dman las mi snyan zhes bya ba //
nges par 'byung ba ma yin te //
de phyir dman byung mi snyan pa //
yan gar nyung zad lta bur snang // 19

gzhan gnod pas bdag la ni //
yon tan cung zad kyang med na //
khyod khro yon tan med pa la //
C f.8a D f.8a gus pa zhen pa[1] *rkyang par *zad // 20

[1]par C.

P f.8b gal te bzod pas 'bad *med par //
bsod nams chen po thob 'gyur na //
gang zhig de la gegs byed pa //
de mtshungs blun po su zhig yod // 21

khro ba zhes bya khyad par du //
stobs ldan dag la skye mi 'gyur //
des na zhan[1] 'joms khro ba la //
ci nas khyod gus gyur ta re // 22

[1]gzhan CDNP; zhen Red mda' ba and rGyal tshab; zhan DT PT gZhan dga', and mDo sngags

gang zhig khro gnas la bzod pa //
de la bsgom pa skye bar 'gyur //
yon tan gnas la 'jigs shes[1] pa //
khyod kyi blun pa 'ba' zhig yin // 23

[1]zhes CD.

su zhig khyad bsad mthar byas nas //
'jig rten pha rol 'gro ba yod //
de phyir bdag ni[1] sdig pa bas //
brnyas pa legs so snyam du sems // 24

[1]nyid CNP.

gang gis rnam shes gnas la sogs //
gang dag tu[1] na rnams shes pa //
de yod na ni nyon mongs rnams //
nam yang blo gros la mi gnas // 25

[1]du NP.

rnam 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las nyon mongs spang ba'i thabs bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa drug pa' o //

VII

sdug bsngal rgya mtsho 'di la mtha' //
rnam pa kun tu yod min na //
byis khyod 'dir ni bying ba la //
'jigs pa cis na skye mi 'gyur // 1
lang tsho rgyab tu byung gyur nas //
slar yang mdun du[1] byung bar 'gyur //
gnas kyang 'jig rten 'di la ni //
N f.9a *'gros kyis[2] 'gran[3] pa lta bur mngon // 2

[1]tu N.
[2]kyi NP.
[3]'dren NP; 'gram CD; 'gran DT PT.

srid par khyod la rang 'dod kyis[1] //
'gro ba gzhar[2] yang yod min na //
gzhan gyi dbang dang 'jigs med par //
blo dang ldan pa[3] su zhig 'gyur // 3

[1]kyi NP
[2]gzhan NP.
[3]par CD.

ma ongs [1]tha ma[1] yod min zhing //
kun tshe'ang so so'i skye bo ste //
khyod 'das ji ltar de bzhin du //
de yang mi 'gyur de ltar byos // 4

[1]Bhattacarya wrongly emends this to thams cad.

nyan po myan bya 'chad po rnams //
'byung ba shin tu rnyed dka' ste //
des na mdor na 'khor ba ni //
mtha' med ma yin mtha' bcas min // 5
phal mo cher na[1] mi rnams ni //
P f.9a dam pa ma yin phyogs *yongs 'dzin //
des na so so'i[2] skye bo rnams //
phal cher nges par ngan 'gror 'gro // 6

[1]ni NP.

[2]so NP.

sa steng[1] sdig pa'i rnam smin ni //
CD f.8b co 'dri kho na yin par *mthong //
des na srid pa gsod gnas dang //
mtshungs par dam pa rnams la snang // 7

[1]stengs CD.

rnam shes gnas pa med pa las //
gal te smyon pa gyur[1] na ni //
srid gnas smyon pa ma yin zhes //
mkhas pa su zhig smra bar 'gyur // 8

[1]'gyur CD.

hīyamānāṃ rujaṃ dṛṣṭvā gamanādau [1]viparyate /
sarvakarmakṣaye tena karoti matimān matim // 9

[1]Bhattacarya emends: gamanāder.

gro la sogs pa'i sdug bsngal dag[1] //
bzlog la nyams pa mthong gyur te //
des na las kun zad pa la //
blo gros ldan pa [2]blo bskyed do[2] // 9

[1]las NP.

[2]Bhattacarya: blo ba skyed.

yadaikasyāpi kāryasya dṛśyate nādikāraṇam /
tadā kasya bhayaṃ na syād dṛṣṭvaikasyāpi vistaram // 10

gang tshe 'bras by gcig gi[1] yang //
thog ma'i rgyu ni snang min[2] pa //
de tshe gcig la yang rgyas par //
mthong nas gang la 'jigs mi 'byung // 10

[1]gis N.

[2]Red mda' ba: yin.

siddhiḥ sarvasya kāryasya niyamena na jāyate /
niyamena kṛtasyāntaḥ kiṃ tad arthaṃ vihanyase[1] // 11

[1]Bhattacarya emends: vihanyate.

'bras bu thams cad nges par ni //
'grub par 'gyur ba ma yin zhing //
grub la nges par mthar 'gyur na //
de yi don du ci ste 'joms // 11

yatnataḥ kriyate karma kṛtaṃ naśyaty ayatnataḥ /
virāgo 'sti na te kaś cid evaṃ saty api karmaṇi // 12

las ni 'bad pas byed 'gyur zhing //
byas zin 'bad pa med par 'jig[1] //
de ltar gyur kyang khyod la ko[2] //
las la chags bral 'ga' yod min[3] // 12

[1]'jigs C.
[2]go NP.
[3]Bhattacarya: med.

atītasya sukhaṃ nāsti nāpy aprāptasya vidyate /
vartamāno 'pi yāty eva śramo 'yaṃ kasya nāma te // 13

'das la bde ba yod min zhing //
ma 'ongs pa la'ang yod min la //
da ltar[1] byung ba'ang 'gro nyid de //
khyod kyi ngal[2] 'di gang phyir yin // 13

[1]CD om.: ltar
[2]las NP.

svargo nirayatulyo 'pi viduṣāṃ syād bhayaṅkaraḥ /
sarvathā durlabhas teṣāṃ bhavo yo na bhayaṅkaraḥ // 14

mkhas pa rnams la mtho ris kyang //
dmyal ba[1] dang mtshungs[2] jigs skyed[3]
'gyur //
rnam pa kun tu de rnams la //
srid gang 'jigs pa mi skyed[4] dkon // 14

[1]NP om.: ba.
[2]NP add: par.
[3]skye NP.
[4]bskyed NP.

saṃsāraduḥkhaṃ jānīyād yadi bālo 'pi sarvaśaḥ /
gacched atyanto nāśaṃ saha cittena tatkṣaṇam // 15

gal te byis pa'ang rnam kun tu //
'khor ba'i sdug bsngal shes gyur na //
skad cig de la sems dang ni //
N f.9b lhan cig gtan du[1] *'jig par 'gyur // 15

[1]tu CD.

amānī durlabhaḥ ⟨sattva⟩[1] mānī nāsti ghṛṇānvitaḥ /
uktaḥ sudurlabhas tena jyotir jyotiḥ parāyaṇaḥ // 16

[1]HPS: śakto; Bhattacarya emends this to sattva.

sems can rlom pa can min dkon //
rlom can snying rje ldan pa med //
des na snang[1] nas snang bar ni[2] //
'gro ba shin tu rnyed dkar gsungs // 16

[1]Bhattacarya adds: ba.

[2]gnas, C.; Bhattacarya om.: ni.

nivṛtt⟨a⟩[1] viṣayasyeha viṣayaḥ kila labhyate /
kenāpi hetunā dharmo viparīto 'pi sa smṛtaḥ // 17

[1]HPS: nivṛtti; Bhattacarya emends to nivṛtta:

P f.9b 'di *na yul log[1] gyur pa la //
yul ni dmigs par grags gyur te //
phyin ci log tu gyur pa'i chos //
rgyu ci zhig gis yang dag 'dod // 17

[1]logs NP.

puṇyasya phalam aiśvaryaṃ tac ca rakṣyaṃ sadānyataḥ /
kathaṃ nāma tad ātmīyaṃ yad rakṣyaṃ sarvadānyataḥ // 18

bsod nams 'bras bu phyug[1] pa ste //
de gzhan las yongs[2] bsrung bya na //
rtag tu gzhan las bsrung bya gang //
de ni ji ltar bdag gir 'gyur // 18

[1]phyugs NP.

[2]ye CD.

yā yā lokasthitis tāṃ tāṃ dharmaḥ samanuvartate /
dharmād api tato loko balavān iva dṛśyate // 19

'jig rten tshul lugs gang dang gang //
de dang de la chos rje 'jug //
de yi phyir na[1] chos pas[2] kyang //
CD f.9a 'jig rten stobs ldan lta bur *snang // 19

[1]ni N.

[2]Bhattacarya: las.

viṣayaś ca śubheneṣṭo viṣayaḥ sa kutsitaḥ /
śreyān yasya parityāgo niṣpannenāpi tena kim // 20

yul ni dge bas[1] yid 'ong na //
yul de'ang ngan par brtsi ba yin //
gang zhig btang ba[2] shis[3] 'gyur ba[4] //
de grub pa yis[5] ci zhig dgos // 20

[1]ba NP

[2]bas Np.

[3]Bhattacarya wrongly emends this to legs.

[4]gyur pa CD.

[5]yi NP.

kāryaṃ nāsty ājñayā yasya tasya dharmo nirarthakaḥ /
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x // 21

gang la bka' lung dgos med pa //
de la chos don med par 'gyur //
gang yang bka' lung don gnyer nyid //
de ni skye nang blun zhes bya // 21

ma 'ongs pa yi 'bras mthong nas //
chos 'dod chags pas khyod chags na //
ma 'ongs mtha' nyid mthong gyur nas[1] //
'jigs pa med dam[2] ci zhig byed // 22

[1]na CD.

[2]Bhattacarya: de.

gla pa[1] lta bu'i[2] bsod nams ni //
rnam kun rngan pa dang mtshungs 'gyur[3] //
gang dag dge ba'ang[4] mi[5] 'dod pa //
de dag mi dge ji ltar byed // 23

[1]Bhattacarya: pa'i.

[2]bu NP.

[3]pa NP.

[4]gang N.

[5]NP om.: mi.

gang gis 'gro ba 'khrul 'khor gyi[1] //
tshogs 'dra sgyu ma'i skyes bu ltar //
mthong bar gyur pa de dag ches //
gsal bar go 'phang dam par 'gro // 24

[1]gyis C.

gang dag la ni 'khor ba na //
yul rnams kyis kyang dga' med pa //
de dag la 'dir[1] rnam kun tu //
dga' ba 'thad pa ma yin nyid // 25

[1]dang NP.

rnal 'gyor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las mi nyid kyis 'dod pa longs spyod la zhen pa spang ba'i thabs bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa bdun pa' o //

VIII

ji ltar mi mthun mi rnams la //
mdza' ba yun ring mi gnas pa //
de bzhin kun la skyon shes la //
'dod chags yun ring mi gnas so // 1

tatraiva rajyate kaścit kaścit tatraiva duṣyati /
kaścin muhyati tatraiva tasmāt ka⟨m⟩[1]o nirarthakaḥ // 2

[1]HPS: kāyo. Vaidya emends this to rāgo and Bhattacarya to kāmo.

P f.10a *la la de nyid la chags te //
la la de nyid la sdang zhing //
la la de nyid la rmongs pa //
de phyir 'dod pa don med pa' o // 2

vinā kalpanayāstitvaṃ rāgādīnāṃ na vidyate /
bhūtārthaḥ kalpanā ceti ko grahīṣyati buddhimān // 3

rtog pa[1] med par 'dod chags la //
sogs la yod nyid yod min na //
yang dag don dang[2] rtog pa zhes //
N f.10a blo dang *ldan pa su zhig 'dzin // 3

[1]par C.

[2]de NP DṬ PṬ

kasyacit kenacit sārdhaṃ bandho nāma na vidyate[1] /
pareṇa saha ba ⟨n⟩[2] dhasya viprayogo na yujyate // 4

[1]Vaidya wrongly reads yujyate.

[2]HPS and Vaidya: baddhasya. Bhattacarya emends this to bandhasya.

'ga' la'ang gang dang lhan cig tu //
bcings pa zhes bya yod min te //
gzhan dang lhan cig bcings pa la //
bral bar rigs pa ma yin no // 4

asmin dharme 'lpapuṇyasya saṃdeho 'pi na jāyate /
bhavaḥ saṃdehamātreṇa jāyate jarjarīkṛtaḥ // 5

bsod nams chung ngu chos 'di la //
the tshom za bar yang mi 'gyur //
the tshom za ba tsam zhig gis //
srid pa hrul por byas par 'gyur // 5

[1]⟨ā mokṣād yasya⟩[1] dharmasya vṛddhim evoktavān muniḥ /
tatra bhaktir na yasyāsti suvyaktaṃ buddhimān na saḥ // 6

[1]HPS ātmā hy ādhyasya. Vaidya emends this to ā mokṣād yasya; Bhattacarya concurs.

chos gang zhig la thub pa yis[1] //
CD f.9b thar pa'i bar du 'phel ba *nyid //
gsungs der gang la gus med pa //
de ni gsal bar blo ldan min // 6

[1]yi C.

nāśūnyaṃ śūnyavad dṛṣṭaṃ nirvāṇaṃ me bhavatv iti /
mithyādṛṣṭer na nirvāṇaṃ varaṇayanti tathāgatāḥ // 7

bdag ni mya ngan 'da' 'gyur zhes //
stong min[1] stong ltar mthong min te //
log ltas mya ngan mi 'da' bar //
de bzhin bshegs pa rnams gsung ngo // 7

[1]nyid NP.

laukikī deśanā yatra pravṛttis tatra varṇyate /
paramārthakathā yatra nivṛttis tatra varnyate // 8

gang las 'jig rten bstan 'byung ba //
de las 'jug pa gsungs pa ste //
gang las don dam bsnyad 'byung ba //
de las ldog pa gsungs pa' o // 8

kiṃ karisyāmy asat sarvam iti te jāyate bhayam /
vidyate yadi kartavyaṃ nāyaṃ dharmo nivartakaḥ // 9

kun yod ma yin ci bya zhes //
khyod la 'jigs pa skye 'gyur grang[1] //
gal te bya ba yod na ni //
chos 'di zlog[2] byed mi 'gyur ro // 9

[1]Bhattacarya wrongly emends this to gang.

[2]bzlog C.

svapakṣe vidyate rāgaḥ parapakṣe tu te 'priyaḥ /
na gamiṣyasi nirvāṇaṃ na śivaṃ dvandvacāriṇaḥ // 10

khyod la rang phyogs chags yod cing //
gzhan gyi phyogs mi dga' na //
mya ngan 'das par mi 'gro ste //
gnyis spyod zhi bar yongs mi 'gyur // 10

akurvāṇasya nirvāṇaṃ kurvāṇasya punar bhavaḥ /
niścintena sukhaṃ prāptuṃ nirvāṇaṃ tena netaraḥ // 11

byed med mya ngan 'da' 'gyur zhing //
byed pas yang srid 'gyur te des //
bsam khral[1] med pas mya ngan las //
'das pa thob sla cig shos min // 11

[1]bral NP.

udvego yasya nāstīha bhaktis tasya kutaḥ śive /
nirgamaś ca bhavād asmāt svagṛhād iva duṣkaraḥ // 12

gang la 'dir skyo yod min pa //
de la zhi gus ga la yod //
rang khyim las bzhin srid pa ni //
P f.10b 'di nas 'byung *ba'ang bya bar dka' // 12

duḥkhābhibhūtā dṛśyante kecin maraṇakāṅkṣiṇaḥ /
te tadā kevalaṃ mohān na gacchanti paraṃ padam // 13

la la sdug bsngal zil mnan cing //
'chi bar 'dod pa dag snang ste //
de tshe de dag gti mug phyir //
go 'phang dam par mi 'gror zad // 13
sbyin pa dman pa la gsungs shing //
'bring la tshul khrims gsungs pa ste //
mchog la zhi ba gsungs gyur pa //
des na rtag tu mchog tu byos // 14

vāraṇaṃ prāg apuṇyasya madhye vāraṇam ātmanaḥ /
sarvasya vāraṇaṃ paścād yo jānīte sa buddhimān // 15

bsod nams min pa dang por bzlog[1] //
bar du bdag ni bzlog[2] pa dang //
phyi nas lta ni kun bzlog pa //
gang gis shes de mkhas pa yin // 15

[1] zlog NP.
[2] zlog NP.

bhāvasyaikasya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvasya sa smṛtaḥ /
ekasya śūnyatā yaiva saiva sarvasya śūnyatā // 16

dngos po gcig gi lta po gang //
de ni kun gyi lta por bshad //
gcig gi stong nyid gang yin pa //
de nyid kun gyi stong pa nyid // 16

chos chags de bzhin gshegs rnams kyis[1] //
mtho ris 'dod pa rnams la gsungs //
thar pa 'dod rnams la de nyid //
N f.10b smad[2] *'gyur[3] gzhan du smos ci dgos // 17

[1] kyi NP.
[2] slad NP.
[3] gyur NP.

bsod nams 'dod pas stong pa nyid //
kun tshe brjod par[1] bya min te //
[2]gnas ma yin par[2] sbyar ba'i sman //
dug tu 'gyur ba ma yin nam // 18

[1]pa C.

[2]gnas min gnas la CD.

nānyayā bhāṣayā mlecchaḥ śakyo grāhayituṃ yathā /
na laukikam ṛte lokaḥ śakyo grāhayituṃ tathā // 19

CD f.10a ji ltar *kla klo skad gzhan gyis //
gzung bar mi nus de bzhin du //
'jig rten pa yi ma gtogs par //
'jig rten gzung bar nus ma yin // 19

sad asat sadasac ceti nobhayaṃ ceti kathyate /
nanu vyādhivasat ⟨sarvam⟩[1] auṣadhaṃ nāma jāyate // 10

[1]HPS and Vaidya: pathyam. LVP emends this reading in PP 372.6 to sarvam; Bhattacarya concurs.

yod dang[1] med dang yod med dang //
gnyis ka[2] min zhes kyang bstan te //
nad kyi dbang gis thams cad kyang //
sman zhes bya bar 'gyur min nam // 20

[1]par N.

[2]ga CD.

samyag dṛṣṭe paraṃ sthānaṃ kiñcid dṛṣṭe śubhā gatiḥ /
tasmād adhyātmacintāyāṃ kāryā nityaṃ matir budhaiḥ // 21

yang dag mthong na gnas mchog la //
cung zad mthong na bzang 'gro ste //
de phyir nang bdag bsam pa la //
mkhas pa rtag tu blo gros bskyed // 21

kha yady api tattvajño nirvāṇaṃ nādhigacchati /
prāpnoty ayatnato 'vaśyaṃ punar janmani karmavat // 22

de nyid shes pas gal te 'dir //
mya ngan 'das pa ma thob kyang //
skye ba phyi mar 'bad med par //
nges par thob 'gyur las bzhin no // 22

sarvakāryeṣu niṣpattiś cintyamānā sudurlabhā /
na ca nāstīha nirvāṇaṃ yuktā muktāś ca durlabhāḥ // 23

bsam bzhin pa ni bya ba na //
kun la grub pa shin tu dkon //
'di na'ang [1]myang 'das med min gyi[1] //
P f.11a sbyor *dang grol rnams rnyed par dka' // 23

[1]mya ngan 'das med min NP.

śrūtvā śarīranairguṇyaṃ kṣaṇaṃ [1] rāgo na tiṣṭhati /
prāptas tenaiva mārgeṇa sarvasyāpi nanu kṣayaḥ // 24
[1]Vaidya emends this to ciram .

lus la yon tan med thos[1] nas //
'dod chags yun ring mi gnas te //
lam de nyid kyis thams cad kyang //
zad par 'gyur b a ma yin nam // 24
[1]thob NP.

yathā bījasya dṛṣṭo 'nto na cādis tasya vidyate /
tathā kāraṇavaikalyāj janmano 'pi na sambhavaḥ // 25

ji ltar sa bon mtha' mthong zhing //
de la thog ma yod min ltar //
de bzhin rgyu ni ma tshang phyir //
skye ba'ang 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro // 25
rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las
slob ma spyod pa ste rab tu byed pa brgyad pa' o //

IX

sarvaṃ kāryārtham utpannaṃ tena nityaṃ na vidyate /
tasmān munim ṛte nāsti yathābhāvas tathāgataḥ // 1

thams cad 'bras bu'i don skye ba //
des na rtag yod min de'i phyir //
thub pa ma gtogs ji lta'i dngos //
de bzhin gshegs pa yod ma yin // 1

apratītyāstitā nāsti kadācit kasyacit kvacit /

na kadācit kvacit kaścid vidyate tena śāśvataḥ // 2

gang zhig gang na nam du yang //
ma brten par ni yod nyid med //
des na nam yang gang zhig tu[1] //
rtag pa 'ga' yang yod ma yin // 2

[1]CD add: 'ang.

na vinā hetunā bhāvo hetumān nāsti śāśvataḥ /

tenākāraṇataḥ siddhiḥ siddhir nety āha tattvavit // 3

rgyu med par ni dngos po med //
rgyu ldan rtag pa yod min pa //
des na rgyu med las grub ni //
de nyid mkhyen pas grub min gsungs // 3

anityaṃ kṛtakaṃ dṛṣṭvā śāśvato 'kṛtako yadi /

kṛtakasyāstitāṃ dṛṣṭvā [1]nāsti tenāstu[1] śāśvataḥ

[1]Vaidya emends this to nāstitaivāstu.

mi rtag byas par mthong gyur nas //
ma byas gal te rtag na ni //
byas la[1] yod pa nyid mthong nas //
rtag pa yod nyid min par 'gyur // 4

[1]pa NP.

ākāśādīni kalpyante nityānīti pṛthagjanaiḥ /
laukikenāpi teṣv arthān na paśyanti vicakṣaṇāḥ // 5

mkha' sogs rnams rtag go zhes[1] //
so so'i skye bo dag gis rtog[2] //
mkhas pa rnams kyis de dag la //
CD f.10b 'jig rten *pas kyang don ma[3] mthong // 5

[1]ces NP.
[2]rtogs NP and Vaidya.
[3]mi NP.

pradeśini na sarvasmin pradeśo nāma vartate /
tasmāt suvyaktam anyo 'pi pradeśo 'sti pradeśini // 6

phyogs zhes bya ba phyogs can ni //
N f.11a kun la gnas pa *ma yin te //
de[1] phyir phyogs can la phyogs ni //
gzhan yang shin tu gsal bar yod // 6

[1]de'i NP

yasmin bhāve pravṛttis ca nivṛttiś copalabhyate /
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x // 7

gang zhig yod na dngos pa la //
'jug dang ldog pa'ang dmigs par 'gyur //
de ni gzhan gyi dbang 'gyur[1] te //
des na 'bras bur yang 'gyur ro // 7

[1]gyur NP.

'bras bu med par rgyu la ni //
rgyu nyid yod pa ma yin te //
de yi phyir na rgyu rnams kun //
'bras bu nyid du thal bar 'gyur // 8

kāraṇaṃ vikṛtiṃ gacchaj jāyate 'nyasya kāraṇaṃ /
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x // 9

rgyu ni rnam par 'gyur ba na //
P f.11b *gzhan gyi rgyu ru 'gyur ba ste //
gang la rnam par 'gyur yod pa //
de ni rtag ces byar yod min // 9

rtag pa gang gi rgyu yin pa'i //
dngos de[1] ma byung ba las skye //
rang nyid 'byung bar gyur de la //
rgyu ni log[2] par 'gyur ba ste // 10

[1]med P and Vaidya.
[2]ldog NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.

dngos po rtag pa las skye pa //
ci[1] lta bur na mi rtag 'gyur //
nam yang rgyu dang 'bras bu gnyis //
mtshan nyid mi mthun mthong ma yin // 11

[1]ji C.

gang gi phyogs 'ga' rgyu yin zhing //
phyogs 'ga' rgyu ma yin des na //
de ni sna tshogs 'gyur na ko[1] //
sna tshogs rtag par [2] mi rigs so[2] // 12

[1]go NP

[2]ga la rigs NP and Vaidya.

rgyu yi[1] zlum po gang yin pa //
de ni 'bras bu la yod min //
des na bdag nyid kun sbyor ba //
rdul phran rnams la mi 'thad do // 13

[1]ni NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.

rdul phran cig gi gnas gang[2] yin //
de ni gzhan gyi yang mi 'dod //
de phyir rgyu dang 'bras bu gnyis //
bong tshod mnyam par 'dod ma yin // 14

[1]khang NP.

gang la shar gyi phyogs yod pa //
de la shar gyi cha yang yod //
gang gi rdul la phyogs yod pa //
des rdul rdul phran min par bsnyad // 15

mdun gyis len cing rgyab kyis ni //
gtong bar gyur na de dag gnyis //
gang la yod pa ma yin pa //
de ni 'gro por yang mi 'gyur // 16
gang la dang po yod min zhing //
gang zhig la dkyil yod min la //
gang la tha ma yod min pa //
mngon med de ni gang gis mthong // 17
'bras bu yis[1] ni rgyu bshig[2] pa //
des na rgyu ni rtag ma yin //
yang na gang na rgyu yod pa //
de na 'bras bu [3] yod ma yin[3] // 18

[1]yi NP and Vaidya.

[2]Bhattacarya: bzhig.

[3]rgyu yod pa NP.

CD f.11a *thogs ldan dngos po rtag pa ni //
gang du'ang snang ba ma yin te //
des na nam yang sangs rgyas rnams //
rdul phran rtag pa nyid mi gsungs[1] // 19

[1]gsung NP.

'cing dang bcings dang thabs las gzhan //
N f.11b thar pa gal te yod *na ni //
de las[1] ci yang[2] mi skye ste //
P f.12a *des na de thar shes mi brjod // 20

[1]la NP and Vaidya.
[2]'ang NP.

mya ngan 'das la phung po rnams //
yod min gang zag srid ma yin //
gang du mya ngan 'das gyur pa //
ma mthong der myang 'das gang zhig // 21

srid dang bral la thar pa'i tshe //
shes yod yon tan ci zhig yod //
shes med pa yi yod pa yang //
gsal bar yod pa min dang[1] mtshungs // 22

[1]de NP and Vaidya.

thar pa [1] bdag gcig[2] yod na ni //
shes yod sa bon srid pa yod //
de med na ni srid pa la //
bsam pa'ang yod pa ma yin no[3] // 23

[1]par CD.
[2]cig NP.
[3]NP om.: no.

sdug bsngal las thar mi rnams la //
gzhan ni[1] yod pa min par nges //
de phyir rnam pa kun tu'ang bdag //
zad pa legs zhes bya bar brjod // 24

[1] la CD.

varaṃ laukikam evedaṃ paramārtho na sarvathā /
laukike vidyate kiñcit paramārthe na vidyate // 25

'jig rten pa 'di nyid bla yi //
don dam rnam kun ma yin te //
'jig rten pa la cung zad yod //
dam pa'i don la yod ma yin // 25

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las dngos po rtag pa dgag pa bsgom pa bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa dgu pa' o //

X

antarātmā yadā na strī na pumān na napuṃsakam /
tadā kevalam ajñānād bhāvas te 'haṃ pumān iti // 1

gang tshe nang bdag bud med min //
skyes min ma ning ma yin pa //
de tshe mi shes 'ba' zhig las //
khyod bdag pho' o snyam du sems // 1

yadā sarveṣu bhūteṣu nāsti strīpuṃnapuṃsakam /
tadā kiṃ nāma tāny eva prāpya strīpuṃnapuṃsakam // 2

gang tshe 'byung ba thams cad la //
pho mo ma ning yod min pa //
de tshe ci ste de dag nyid //
brten[1] nas pho mo ma ning yin // 2

[1]bsten NP.

yas tavātmā mamānātmā tenātm[1]āniyamān[1]na saḥ /
nanv aniteyeṣu bhāveṣu[2] kalpanā nāma jāyate // 3

[1]HPŞ ,Vaidya, and Bhattacarya: niyamān. PP 199.3: aniyamān.

[2]HPS: abhāveṣu. Vaidya, and Bhattacarya follow PP 199.4: bhāveṣu.

khyod kyi bdag gang nga'i bdag min //
des de bdag[1] min ma nges phyir //
dngos po mi rtag pa rnams la //
rtog pa skye bar 'gyur min nam // 3

[1]dag NP.

dehavad vikṛtiṃ yāti pumān janmani janmani /
[1]⟨dehāt tavā⟩[1] nyatā tasya niyatā ca na yujyate // 4

[1]HPS and Vaidya: dehāntena. Bhattacarya emends this to dehāt tava.

skye dang skye bar skyes bu ni //
lus bzhin rnam par 'gyur bar 'gyur //
khyod kyi de la lus las gzhan //
nyid dang rtag nyid mi rigs so // 4
reg dang mi ldan dngos po las[1] //
bskul ba zhes bya mi skye ste //
de phyir lus kyi g.yo ba la //
C f.11b srog[2] ni byed pa por *mi 'gyur // 5

[1]la NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.
[2]bdag C.

D f.11b P f.12b *mi 'tshe ba dang bdag *rtag pa //
'di las rgyu ni ci yod snyam //
rnam pa kun tu[1] shing srin las //
rdo rje bsrung byar mi 'gyur ro // 6

[1]CD add: 'ang.

skye ba dran pa yod pa'i phyir //
gal te khyod kyi bdag rtag na //
sngon byas pa yi rma mthong nas //
khyod kyi lus[1] ko cis mi rtag // 7

[1]bdag NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.

sems pa can dang ldan bdag kyang //
gal te shes po nyid yin na //
de yis[1] sems pa can sems pa //
min zhing[2] skyes bu'ang rtag mi
'gyur // 8

[1]yi NP.

[2]zhes NP and Vaidya.

bde ba la sogs dang ldan srog //
N f.12a bde sogs bzhin du sna *tshogs mthong //
de phyir bde [1] la sogs bzhin te[2] //
rtag pa nyid du'ang mi rung ngo // 9

[1]CD add: ba

[2]CD om.: te.

karaṇaṃ jāyate mithyā caitanyaṃ śāśvataṃ yadi /
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x // 10

gal te shes pa yod rtag na //
byed pa log par 'gyur ba ste //
gal te me ni rtag 'gyur na //
bud shing gis don yod mi 'gyur // 10

ā vināśāc calaṃ nāma dravyaṃ nāsti kriyā yathā /
puruṣo 'sti na caitanyam iti tena na yujyate // 11

rdzas ni bya ba ji bzhin du //
'jig pa'i bar du g.yo ba med //
des na skyes bu yod shes pa j/
yod pa med ces byar mi rigs // 11

cetanādhātur anyatra dṛśyate 'nyatra cetanā /
dravatvam iva lohasya vikṛtiṃ yāty ataḥ pumān // 12

gzhan du shes pa yod pa'i khams //
mthong zhing gzhan du shes yod de //
lcags kyi zhu nyid bzhin de'i phyir //
skyes bu rnam par 'gyur bar 'gyur // 12

caitanyaṃ ca manomatra mahāṃś cākāśavat pumān /
acaitanyaṃ tatas tasya svarūpam iva dṛśyate // 13

shes yod yid tsam zhig la ste //
skyes bu nam mkha' bzhin du che //
de phyir de yi ngo bo ni[1]
shes pa yod nyid min ltar mthong // 13

[1]nyid C; Vaidya and Bhattacarya: na.

paras 〈tarketi〉[1] kiṃ nāham ahaṃ sarvagato yadi /
tenaivavaranaṃ nāma na tasyaivopapadyate // 14

[1]HPS: taveti; Vaidya emends this to tasyeti. Bhattacarya emends to tarketi.

gal te kun la bdag yod na //
gzhan gyis de cis ngar mi rtog[1] //
de nyid kyis ni[2] de nyid la //
sgrib ces bya bar mi 'thad do //14

[1]rtogs C.

[2]na NP and Vaidya.

yeṣāṃ guṇānāṃ kartṛtvam acaitanyaṃ ca sarvaśaḥ /
teṣāṃ unmattakānāṃ ca na kiñcid vidyate 'ntaram // 15

gang gi yon tan byed po dang //
rnam kun shes yod ma yin pa //
de dag dang ni smyon pa la //
khyad par ci yang yod ma yin // 15

kartuṃ nāma vijānanti gṛhādīn sarvathā guṇāḥ /
bhoktuṃ ca na vijānanti kim ayuktam ataḥ param // 16

yon tan rnams kyis[1] rnam kun tu //
khyim la sogs dag byed shes kyi //
za ba rnam par mi shes pa //
'di las mi rigs gzhan ci yod // 16

[1]kyi NP and Vaidya.

kriyāvān śāśvato nāsti nāsti sarvagate kriyā /
niṣkriyo nāstitātulyo nairātmyaṃ kiṃ na te priyam // 17

bya ba dang ldan rtag pa med //
P f.13a *kun tu song la bya ba med //
bya ba med pa med dang mtshungs //
bdag med la khyod cis mi dka' // 17

la lar kun tu song bar mthong //
la lar skyes bu lus tsam zhig //
la lar [1]rdul tsam zhig mthong ste[1] //
D f.12a shes rab can *gyis med par mthong // 18

[1]skyes bu rdul tsam zhig NP. Vaidya emends the reading skyes bu to mthong ste .

C f.12a *rtag la gnod pa ga la zhig[1] //
gnod med thar pa ga la yod //
des na gang gi bdag rtag pa //
de la[2] thar pa mi rigs so // 19

[1]yod CD and Bhattacarya.

[2]yi NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.

gal te bdag ces bya yod na //
bdag med snyam pa mi rigs shing //
de nyid rig[1] pa nges pa las //
mya ngan 'das 'gyur[2] zhes bya'ang
brdzun // 20

[1]rigs NP and Vaidya.

[2] gyur D.

gal te grol ba yod[1] nyid na //
de ni sngar yang med pa nyid //
mi ldan pa la gang mthong ba //
de ni rang bzhin zhes byar bshad // 21

[1]med NP , Vaidya and Bhattacarya.

gal te mi rtag chad na ni //
da dung rtswa sogs ci ste yod //
'di ni gal te bden 'gyur na //
su la'ang gti mug kyang mi 'byung // 22
bdag ni yod par gyur na'ang gzugs //
gzhan las 'byung bar snang gyur la //
gzhan las gnas par snang gyur zhing //
N f.12b *gzhan las [1]rnam par 'jig par[1] snang // 23

[1]'jigs pa snang gyur NP.

ji ltar sa bon byas pa las //
myu gu byas pa skye 'gyur ba //
de bzhin mi rtag thams cad ni //
mi rtag dag las 'byung bar 'gyur // 24

yasmāt pravartate bhāvas tenocchedo na jāyate /
yasmān nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jāyate // 25

gang phyir dngos po 'jug 'gyur ba //
des na chad par mi 'gyur zhing //
gang phyir dngos po ldog 'gyur ba //
des na rtag par mi 'gyur ro // 25

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las bdag dgag pa bsgom pa bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa bcu pa' o //

XI

ma 'ongs bum la da ltar ba'i //
bum yod ma yin 'das pa med //
gang phyir de gnyis ma 'ongs pa //
de phyir ma 'ongs yod ma yin // 1

gal te zhig pa ma 'ongs pa'i //
ngo bor ma'ongs la yod na //
P f.13b ma 'ongs bdag nyid du yod *gang /
de ni ji[1] ltar 'das par 'gyur // 2

[1] ci CD.

gang gi phyir na ma 'ongs dngos //
ma 'ongs bdag tu gnas 'gyur ba //
de yi phyir na da ltar bar //
'gyur te ma 'ongs nyid mi srid // 3
ma 'ongs pa yod 'das pa yod //
da ltar ba yod ci zhig med //
gang gi dus kun yod nyid pa //
de yi mi rtag nyid ga las // 4
'das pa las ni 'das gyur pa //
ci yi phyir na 'das par 'gyur //
'das pa las ni ma 'das pa //
ci yi phyir na 'das par 'gyur // 5
CD f.12b *gal te ma 'ongs skyes yod na //
ji ltar da ltar bar mi 'gyur //
ci ste de la skyes med na //
ma 'ongs rtag par 'gyur ram ci // 6

vināpi janmanā bhaṅgād anityo yady anāgataḥ /
atītasya na bhaṅgo 'sti sa nityaḥ kiṃ na kalpyate // 7

skye ba med kyang 'jig pa las //
gal te ma 'ongs mi rtag na //
'das la[1] 'jig pa yod min te //
de ni rtag par cis mi rtog // 7

[1] pa NP and Vaidya.

anityo vartamāno 'yam atītaś ca na jāyate /

tābhyām anyā trtīyāpi gatis tasya na vidyate // 8

'das pa dang ni da ltar ba[1] //

'di ni mi rtag 'gyur min la //

de dag las gzhan rnam pa ni //

gsum pa'ang de la yod ma yin // 8

[1]bar C.

yaḥ paścāj jāyate bhāvaḥ sa pūrvaṃ vidyate yadi /

na mithyā jāyate pakṣas teṣāṃ niyativādinām // 9

dngos po gang zhig phyis skye ba //

de ni gal te sngar yod na //

de yi phyir na phywa[1] smra ba //

rnams kyi[2] phyogs ni log mi 'gyur // 9

[1]phya NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.

[2]kyis NP and Vaidya.

sambhavaḥ kriyate yasya prāk so 'stīti na yujyate /

sato yadi bhavej janma jātasyāpi bhaved bhavaḥ // 10

gang zhig 'byung bar byed pa de[1] //

sngar yod ces byar mi rigs te //

gal te yod pa skye 'gyur na //

skyes zin pa yang 'byung bar 'gyur // 10

[1]ste CD.

dṛśyate 'nāgato bhāvaḥ kenābhāvo na dṛśyate /
vidyate 'nāgatam yasya dūraṃ tasya na vidyate // 11

ma 'ongs pa yi dngos mthong na //
dngos po med pa cis mi mthong //
gang la ma 'ongs yod [1]'gyur ba[1] //
de la ring ba yod ma yin // 11

[1]gyur pa NP.

dharmo yady akṛto 'py asti niyamo jāyate vṛthā /
atha svalpo 'pi kartavyaḥ satkāryasya na sambhavaḥ // 12

gal te byas pa med kyang chos //
yod na nges sdom don med 'gyur //
N f.13a ci ste cung zad *byed na yang //
'bras bu yod pa mi srid do // 12

anitye sati satkāryaṃ kathaṃ nāma x x x x /
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x // 13

mi rtag yin na ji[1] ltar bur //
'bras bu yod ces bya bar 'gyur //
gang la thog ma mtha' yod pa //
de ni 'jig rten mi rtag brjod // 13

[1]ci CNP.

bsgrim pa med par thar[1] 'gyur te //
P f.14a grol la ma 'ongs *yod ma yin //
de ltar yin na chags med par //
'dod chags kyang ni 'byung bar
'gyur // 14

[1]thal CD PT.

stambhādīnām alaṃkāro gṛhasyārthe nirarthakaḥ /
satkāryam eva yasyeṣṭaṃ yasyāsatkāryam eva ca // 15

'bras bu yod nyid gang 'dod dang //
'bras bu med nyid gang 'dod la //
khyim gyi don du ka ba la //
sogs pa'i rgyan ni don med 'gyur // 15
dngos rnams yongs su 'gyur ba yang //
yid kyis kyang ni 'dzin mi 'gyur //
de lta na yang da lta ba //
yod par[1] mi mkhas rnams kyis rtog // 16

[1]pa C.

gnas med dngos po ga la zhig //
mi rtag pas gnas ga la yod //
gal te dang po gnas gyur na //
tha mar [1]rnying par[1] mi 'gyur ro // 17

[1]snying por NP and Vaidya, snyings par PṬ; rnyings par DṬ and Bhattacarya.

ji ltar rnam shes gcig gis ni //
don gnyis rnam par mi shes pa //
de bzhin rnam shes gnyis kyis ni //
don gcig rnam par mi shes so // 18
D f.13a gal te *dus la gnas yod na //
C f.13a *gnas pa dus su mi 'gyur ro //
ci ste gnas med na gnas pa //
med par mtha' yang yod ma yin // 19
gal te mi rtag dngos gzhan na //
dngos po mi rtag par mi 'gyur //
gcig na mi rtag nyid gang yin //
de nyid dngos te ga la gnas // 20
mi rtag nyid gar[1] stobs chung der[2] //
gnas pa stobs chung ma yin na //
phyi nas de dag nges par go //
bzlog par ci yis mthong bar 'gyur // 21

[1] gang D.

[2] des NP and Vaidya.

gal te mi rtag stobs chung min //
dngos po kun la yod pa ni //
kun la gnas pa med pa' am[1] //
yang na thams cad mi rtag min // 22

[1] dang NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.

gal te rtag tu mi rtag nyid //
yod na rtag tu gnas yod min //
yang na rtag par gyur zin nas //
phyis nas mi rtag par 'gyur ro // 23
gal te gnas pa mi rtag dang //
lhan cig dngos po la yod na //
mi rtag log par 'gyur ba' am //
yang na gnas pa brdzun par 'gyur // 24
mthong zin dngos po mi snang zhing //
slar yang sems skye[1] min des na //
dran pa zhes bya log pa yi[2] //
P f.14b *don la log pa kho na 'byung // 25

[1]kyi NP and Vaidya.

[2]yis NP and Bhattacarya.

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las dus dgag pa bsgom pa bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa bcu gcig pa' o //

XII

gzur gnas blo ldan don gnyer ba'i //
nyan po snod ces bya bar bshad //
smra po[1] yon tan rnam[2] gzhan du //
mi 'gyur nyan po la yang min // 1

[1]por NP and Vaidya.

[2]rnams P and Vaidya.

srid dang srid thabs zhi ba yi //
thabs dang de bzhin zhi gsungs te //
'jig rten yongs su mi shes gang //
de ni thub pa'i lta bur mngon // 2
thams bad btang bas mya ngan las //
'da' bar ya mtshan can kun 'dod /
kun sun 'byin la de dag ni //
mi dgar 'gyur ba rgyu ci zhig // 3

kiṃ kariṣyati sa tyāgaṃ tyāgopāyaṃ na vetti yaḥ /
śivaṃ anyatra nāstīti nūnaṃ tenoktavān muniḥ // 4

gang zhig gtong thabs mi shes de //
ci zhig gtong bar byed par 'gyur //
des na nges par thub pa yis //
gzhan du zhi ba med ces gsungs // 4

Buddhokteṣu parokṣeṣu jāyate yasya saṃśayaḥ /
ihaiva pratyayas tena kartavyaḥ śūnyatāṃ prati // 5

sangs rgyas kyis gsungs lkog[1] gyur la //
gang zhig the tshom skye 'gyur ba //
de yis[2] stong pa nyid bsten te //
CD f.13a *'di nyid kho nar yid ces bya // 5

[1] sgrog N.

[2] yi NP and Vaidya.

loko '[1]yaṃ yena durdṛṣṭo mūḍha eva paratra saḥ /
vañcitās te bhaviṣyanti suciraṃ ye 'nuyānti tam // 6

gang gis 'jig rten 'di mthong dka' //
de ni gzhan la[1] blun pa nyid //
gang dag de rjes 'gro de dag //
shin tu yun ring[2] bslus par 'gyur // 6

[1]ma NP and Vaidya.

[2]rings DNP and Vaidya.

svayaṃ ye yānti nirvāṇaṃ te kurvanti suduṣkaram /
gantuṃ notsahate netuḥ pṛṣṭhato 'py asato manaḥ // 7

mya ngan 'das par rang 'gro yang //
de ni shin tu bya dka'[1] byed //
'dren pa'i slad bzhin dam pa ni //
ma yin yid 'gro spro ma yin // 7

[1]'ga' N.

trāso nārabhyate 'dṛṣṭe dṛṣṭe 'paiti sa sarvaśaḥ /
niyamenaiva kiñcij jñe tena trāso vidhīyate // 8

ma mthong skrag pa mi rtsom ste //
mthong na rnam kun de ldog 'gyur //
des na nges par cung zad cig //
shes la skrag pa bsgrub[1] par bya // 8

[1]brjod CD PṬ.

ekāntenaiva bālānāṃ dharme 'bhyāsaḥ pravartake /
dharmān nivartakāt teṣāṃ anabhyāsatayā bhayam // 9

byis rnams nges pa kho nar ni //
'jug byed chos la goms pa ste //
de dag goms pa med pa yis[1] //
ldog byed chos la 'jigs par 'gyur // 9

[1]yi C.

vighnaṃ tattvasya yaḥ kuryād vṛto mohena kenacit /
kalyāṇādhigatis tasya nāsti mokṣe tu kā kathā // 10

gang zhig gti mug 'ga'[1] zhig gis //
bsgribs shing de nyid gegs byed pa //
de la dge legs 'gro ba yang //
med na thar pa [2]smos ci dgos[2] // 10

[1]'ba' CD; gZhan dga': gang

[2]ga la yod CD.

śīlād api varaṃ sraṃso na tu dṛṣṭeḥ kathaṃ cana /
śīlena gamyate svargo dṛṣṭyā yāti paraṃ padam // 11

tshul khrims las ni nyams bla yi //
P f.15a *lta las cis kyang ma yin te //
tshul khrims kyis ni mtho ris 'gro //
lta bas go 'phang mchog tu 'gyur // 11

ahaṃkāro 'sataḥ śreyān na tu nairātmyadarśanam /
apāyam eva yāty ekaḥ śivam eva tu netaraḥ // 12

dam pa min la bdag 'dzin mchog //
bdag med stong pa ma yin te //
gcig ni ngan 'gro nyid 'gro la[1] //
tha mal ma yin zhi nyid du' o // 12

[1]ba NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.

advitīyaṃ śivadvāram kudṛṣṭīnāṃ bhayaṃkaram /
viṣayaḥ sarvabuddhānām iti nairātmyam ucyate // 13

zhi sgo gnyis pa med pa dang //
lta ba ngan rnams 'jigs byed cing //
sangs rgyas kun gyi yul 'gyur la //
bdag med ces ni bya bar brjod // 13

asya dharmasya nāmno 'pi bhayam utpadyate 'sataḥ /
balavān nāma ko dṛṣṭaḥ parasya na bhayaṃkaraḥ // 14

N f.14a chos 'di yi ni las *kyang //
dam pa min pa 'jigs pa skye //
gzhan[1] la 'jigs pa mi bskyed pa'i //
stobs ldan zhes bya gang zhig mthong // 14

[1]zhan CDN.

[1]vādasya kṛtaśo[1] dharmo nāyam uktas tathāgataiḥ /
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x // 15

[1]Vaidya and Bhattacarya unnecessarily emend this to vādasya krte and vādasya hi kṛte, respectively.

chos 'di de bzhin gshegs rnams kyis[1] //
rtsod pa'i ched du ma gsungs te //
de lta'ang 'dis[2] ni gzhan smra rnams //
sregs[3] te me yis[4] bud shing bzhin // 15

[1]kyi NP and Vaidya.

[2]'di NP and Vaidya.

[3]bsregs NP and Bhattacarya; Vaidya: gsregs ; bsreg DṬ PṬ.

[4]yi NP and Vaidya.

chos 'di gang gis shes gyur pa //
de ni gzhan la mi dga' ste //
des na bdag la chos 'di ni //
'jig pa'i sgo dang 'dra bar snang // 16

de nyid du bdag med snyam du //
de ltar gang la dgongs gnas pa //
de ni yod pas ga[1] la dga'[2] //
med pas 'jigs par ga la 'gyur // 17

[1]gang NP and Vaidya.

[2]dka' Vaidya.

don min sa bon gyur pa yi //
CD f.14a mu *stegs can mang mthong nas ni //
chos 'dod pa yi skye bo la //
su zhig snying brtse skye mi 'gyur // 18
śā kya gos med bram zed ste //
gsum po[1] rnams[2] kyi'ang[3] chos yid dang //
mig dang rna ba yis 'dzin pa //
de phyir thub pa'i gzhung lugs phra // 19

[1]NP om.: po.

[2]rnam NP.

[3]kyis CD; CD om.: 'ang.

[4]smra CDNP, Vaidya; phra DṬ PṬ, Bhattacarya.

ji ltar bram ze rnams la chos //
phal cher phyi 'chos brjod pa ltar //
de bzhin gcer bu rnams la chos //
phal cer blun pa brjod pa yin // 20
ji ltar rig[1] pa blangs pa las //
bram ze [2] gus pa skye ba ltar //
de bzhin nyon mongs blangs pa las //
gcer bu pa la brtse bar 'gyur // 21

[1]rigs CD.

[2]zer CD.

sdug bsngal las kyi rnam smin phyir //
P f.15b ji ltar chos su mi 'gyur *ba //
de bzhin skye ba las kyi ni //
rnam smin yin phyir chos ma yin // 22

dharmaṃ samāsato 'hiṃsāṃ varṇayanti tathāgatāḥ /
śūnyatām eva nirvāṇaṃ kevalaṃ tad ihobhayam // 23

chos ni mdor na mi 'tshe bar //
de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyis gsungs //
stong nyid mya ngan 'das par ste //
'dir ni de gnyis 'ba' zhig go // 23

rang phyogs 'jig rten thams cad la //
skyes sa bzhin du sdug 'gyur na //
de yi ldog par byed pa'i rgyu //
khyod la gang gis sdug pa[1] 'gyur // 24

[1]bsngal NP and Vaidya; DT PT, Bhattacarya: par.

rigs pa'i don ni gzhan las kyang //
blo ldan legs pa 'dod pa blang //
nyi ma sa steng[1] mig ldan la //
kun gyi spyi thun ma yin nam // 25

[1]stengs CD.

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las lta ba dgag pa bsgom pa bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa bcu gnyis pa' o //

XIII

sarva eva ghaṭo 'dṛṣṭe rūpe dṛṣṭe hi jāyate /
brūyāt kas tattvavin nāma ghaṭaḥ pratyakṣa ity api // 1

gzugs mthong tshe na bum pa ni //
thams cad kho na mthong mi[1] 'gyur //
bum pa mngon sum zhes bya ba'ang //
de nyid rig pa su zhig smra // 1

[1]ma N.

etenaiva vicāreṇa sugandhi madhuraṃ mṛdu /
pratiṣedhayitavyāni sarvāṇy uttamabuddhinā // 2

rnam par dpyad pa 'di nyid kyis //
blo mchog ldan pas dri zim dang //
mngar dang 'jam pa thams cad dag //
so sor dgag par bya ba yin // 2

gal te gzugs mthong ba yis de //
thams cad mthong bar 'gyur na ni //
ma mthong ba yis[1] gzugs mthong ba //
mthong ba min par cis mi 'gyur // 3

[1]yi NP, Vaidya, and Bhattacarya.

gzugs ni 'ba'[1] zhig kho na la //
mngon sum nyid ni yod[2] ma yin //
gang phyir de la pha rol gyi //
cha dang tshul rol dbus yod phyir // 4

[1]Vaidya: 'ga'.
[2]Bhattacarya: srid.

CD f.14b *rdul la cha shas yod med ces //
dpyad pa der yang 'jug par 'gyur //
de[1] phyir bsgrub par bya ba yis //
bsgrub bya 'grub par mi 'thad do // 5

[1]Bhattacarya: de'i.

kun kyang yan lag tu gyur nas //
slar yang yan lag can du 'gyur //
de phyir yi ge brjod pa yang //
'di na[1] yod pa ma yin no // 6

[1]la CD. Vaidya: ni.

gal te mdog las dbyibs gzhan na //
P f.16a *ji lta bur na dbyibs 'dzin 'gyur //
'on te gzhan min na lus kyis //
mdog kyang ci ste [1]'dzin mi 'gyur[1] // 7

[1]Vaidya and Bhattacarya: mi 'dzin 'gyur.

gzugs ni lta[1] zhig ma gtogs par //
gzugs kyi rgyu ni mi snang ngo //
gal te de ltar 'gyur na ni //
gnyi ga yang ni mig nyid kyis //
'dzin par ci yi phyir mi 'gyur // 8

[1]blta NP and Vaidya.

sa ni brtan[1] zhes bya bar mthong //
de yang lus kyis 'dzin par 'gyur //
des na reg[2] pa 'ba' zhig ni //
sa' o zhes ni bya bar brjod // 9

[1]bstan NP and Vaidya.

[2]rag D.

blta bya skyes pas bum pa ni //
'di la yon tan 'gar[1] mi 'gyur //
des na blta bya nyid skye ltar //
yod pa'i ngo bo'ang yod ma yin // 10

[1]Vaidya and Bhattacarya: 'ga'.

mig ni 'byung 'gyur[1] rna[2] de bzhin //
mig gis mthong gi[3] gzhan gyis min //
des na nges par las rnam smin //
thub pas bsam mi khyab par gsungs // 11

[1]gyur CD and Bhattacarya.
[2]sna CDNP; rna DṬ PṬ, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.
[3]gis NP and Vaidya.

rkyen ma tshang phyir shes pa ni //
N f.15a lta[1] ba'i *sna rol yod ma yin //
'on te phyis na shes don med //
gsum pa byed pa don med 'gyur // 12

[1]blta NP and Vaidya.

paśyec cakṣuś cirād dūre gatimad yadi tad bhavet /
atyabhyāse ca dūre ca rūpaṃ vyaktaṃ na tac ca kim // 13

mig de 'gros dang ldan 'gyur[1] na //
thag ring yun ring gis mthong 'gyur //
ha cang nye dang ches ring du //
gzugs de gsal bar ci ste min // 13

[1]gyur CD.

gatena na guṇaḥ kaścid rūpaṃ dṛṣṭvākṣi yāti cet /
draṣṭavyaṃ niyameneṣṭam iti vā jāyate vṛthā // 14

gal te gzugs mthong[1] mig 'gro na //
song bas yon tan 'ga' yang med //
yang na blta byar 'dod pa ni //
nges shes bya ba rdzun[2] par 'gyur // 14

[1]mang NP.

[2]brjod NP and Vaidya, brdzun DT PT and Bhattacarya.

gṛhṇīyād agataṃ cakṣuḥ paśyet sarvam idam jagat /
yasya nāsti gatis tasya nāsti dūraṃ na cāvṛtam // 15

mig na song bar 'dzin na ni //
'gro ba 'di kun mthong 'gyur te //
gang la 'gro ba yod min pa //
de la ring med bsgrib pa'ang med // 15

svabhāvaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ pūrvam ātmani dṛśyate /
grahaṇaṃ cakṣuṣaḥ kena cakṣuṣaiva na jāyate // 16

dngos po kun gyi rang bzhin ni //
dang por bdag la snang 'gyur na //
mig ni mig nyid kyis 'dzin par //
ci yi phyir na 'gyur ma yin // 16

cakṣuṣo 'sti na vijñānaṃ vijñānasya na darśanam /
ubhayaṃ nāsti rūpasya tai rūpaṃ dṛśyate katham // 17

mig la rnam shes yod min zhing //
D f.15a [1]rnam shes la yang[1] lta[2] med *la //
C f.15a gnyi ga *gzugs la yod min na //
P f.16a *de dag gis gzugs ji[3] ltar mthong // 17

[1]rnam par shes pa PṬ and Bhattacarya.
[2]blta NP and Vaidya.
[3]ci NP and Vaidya.

na vaktā jāyate kena śabdo yāti bruvan yadi /
atha yāty abruvaṃs tasmin pratyayaḥ[1] kena jāyate[1] // 18
[1]Vaidya: jāyate katham.

gal te smra zhing sgra 'gro na //
gang gis smra ba por mi 'gyur //
'on te mi smra bar 'gro na'ang //
gang gis de la shes pa skye [1] // 18

[1]bskyed NP and Vaidya; skyed CD; skye DṬ PṬ and Bhattacarya.

prāptaś ced gṛhyate śabdas tasyādiḥ kena gṛhyate /
na caiti kevalaḥ śabdo gṛhyate kevalaḥ katham // 19

gal te phrad de sgra 'dzin na //
sgra yi[1] dang po gang gis 'dzin //
sgra ni rkyang par[2] mi 'ong na //
reng[3] bu ji ltar 'dzin par 'gyur // 19

[1]yis C.

[2]Bhattacarya: ba'ang.

[3]Bhattacarya wrongly emends this to ring.

yāvan na śrūyate śabdas tāvac chabdo na jāyate /
aśabdasyāpi śabdatvam ante tac ca na yujyate // 20

ji srid sgra thos ma gyur pa //
de yi bar bu sgrar mi 'gyur //
sgra med pa yang mthar sgra nyid //
'gyur na de ni mi rigs so //

viyuktam indriyaiś cittam kim gatvāpi kariṣyati /
evaṃ satīha jīvo ' yam amanaskaḥ sadā na kim // 21

dbang po rnams dang bral sems kyis[1] //
song ste 'ang ci zhig byed par 'gyur //
de lta yin dang srog 'di ni //
rtag tu yid med ci ste min // 21

[1]kyi NP and Vaidya.

manasā gṛhyate yo 'rthaḥ pūrvadṛṣṭo marīcivat /
sarvadharmavyavasthāsu sa saṃjñāskandhasaṃjñakaḥ // 22

sngar mthong ba yi don gang zhig //
yid kyis smig rgyu ltar 'dzin pa //
de ni chos kun rnam gzhag[1] la //
'du shes phung po zhes bya' o // 22

[1]bzhag PṬ and Bhattacarya.

cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpaṃ ca māyāvaj jāyate manaḥ /
vidyate yasya sadbhāvaḥ sā [1] māyeti na yujyate // 23

[1]HPS: sa.

mig dang gzugs la brten nas yid //
sgyu ma bzhin du skye bar 'gyur //
gang la yod pa nyid yod de //
sgyu ma zhes byar mi rigs so // 23

yadā na kiñcid āścaryaṃ viduṣāṃ vidyate bhuvi /
indriyāṇāṃ gatāv evaṃ tadā ko nāma vismayaḥ // 24

gang tshe mkhas la[1] sa steng[2] na //
ngo mtshar [3]min pa 'ga'[3] med pa //
N f.15b de tshe dbang *rtogs de 'dra la //
ya mtshan shes bya ci zhig yod // 24

[1]pa CD.

[2]stengs CD.

[3]can min can NP, DṬ PṬ, Vaidya, and Bhattacarya.

alātacakranirmāṇasvapnamāyāmbucandrakaiḥ /
dhūmikāntaḥpratiśrutkāmarīcyabhraiḥ samo bhavaḥ // 25

mgal me'i 'khor lo sprul pa dang //
rmi lam sgyu ma chu[1] zla dang //
khug sna nang gi brag ca dang //
smig rgyu sprin dang [2]srid pa
mtshungs[2] // 25

[1]chung P.

[2]Bhattacarya: mtshung sprid pa.

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las dbang po dang don dgag pa bsgom pa bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa bcu gsum pa' o //

XIV

āyattaṃ yasya bhāvasya bhaven nānyasya kutracit /
sidhyet tasyāstita nāma kvacit sa ca na vidyate // 1

dngos po gang zhig gzhan 'ga' la'ang //
rag las par ni mi 'gyur na //
de yi bdag nyid 'grub 'gyur na //
de ni gang na'ang yod ma yin //

rūpam eva ghaṭo naikyaṃ ghaṭo nānyo'sti rūpavān /
na vidyate ghaṭe rūpaṃ na rūpe vidyate ghaṭaḥ // 2

gzugs nyid bum zhes gcig ma yin //
gzugs ldan bum gzhan yod min la[1] //
bum pa la gzugs yod min zhing //
P f.17a gzugs la bum pa *yod ma yin // 2

[1]Bhattacarya: pa.

vailakṣaṇyaṃ dvayor dṛṣṭvā bhāvād anyo ghaṭo yadi /
ghaṭād anyo na bhāvo 'pi kim evaṃ na bhaviṣyati // 3

gnyis mtshan mi mthun mthong nas ni //
gal te dngos las bum gzhan na //
ma yin de ltar dngos po yang //
bum pa las gzhan cis mi 'gyur // 3

eko yadi ghaṭo neṣṭo ghaṭo 'py eko na jāyate /
na cāyaṃ samayor yogas tenāpy eko na jāyate // 4

gal te gcig bum mi 'dod na //
bum pa'ang gcig tu[1] mi 'gyur ro //
CD f.15b *ldan 'di mtshungs pa'ang ma yin pa //
des kyang gcig tu mi 'gyur ro // 4

[1]bu CD.

yāvad dravyaṃ yadā rūpaṃ tadā rūpaṃ mahan na kim /
samayo jāyate vācyaḥ prativādy aparo yadi // 5

gang tshe rdzas ci tsam gzugs na //
de tshe gzugs chen ci ste min //
gal te phyir rgol gzhan min na //
gzhung lugs bsnyad par bya bar 'gyur // 5

lakṣaṇenāpi lakṣyasya yatra siddhir na vidyate /
saṃkhyādivyatirekeṇa tatra bhāvo na vidyate // 6

mtshan nyid kyis kyang mtshan gzhi ni //
gang du grub pa yod min pa //
der[1] ni grangs sogs tha dad par //
dngos po yod pa ma yin no // 6

[1] de C.

ghaṭasya na bhavaty aikyam apṛthaktvād dhi lakṣaṇaiḥ /
ekaikasmin ghaṭābhāve bahutvaṃ nopapadyate // 7

mtshan nyid rnams dang so so ni //
min phyir bum pa gcig ma yin //
re re'i bum pa med na ni //
mang nyid 'thad par mi 'gyur ro // 7

na hy asparśavato nāma yogaḥ sparśavatā saha /
rūpādīnām ato yogaḥ sarvathāpi na yujyate // 8

reg ldan reg dang mi ldan dang //
lhan cig sbyor ba zhes bya med //
de phyir gzugs [1]sogs rnams sbyor ba[1] //
rnam pa kun tu rigs ma yin // 8

[1] rnams sbyor ba ni NP and Vaidya.

ghaṭasyāvayavo rūpaṃ tena tāvan na tad ghaṭaḥ /
yasmād avayavī nāsti tena nāvayavo 'pi tat // 9

gzugs ni bum pa'i yan lag ste //
des na re zhig de bum min //
gang phyir yan lag can med pa //
des na yan lag kyang yod min // 9

sarveṣām api rūpāṇāṃ rūpatvam avilakṣaṇam /
ekasya ghaṭasadbhāvo nānyeṣaṃ kim ⟨nu⟩[1] kāraṇam // 10

[1]HPS and Vaidya: na. Bhattacarya emends this to nu.

gzugs rnams kun la gzugs nyid ni //
mtshan nyid mi[1] mthun ma yin na[2] //
gcig la bum pa yod 'gyur zhing //
gzhan dag la min rgyu ci zhig // 10

[1]ni N.

[2]Bhattacarya: no.

rūpam anyad rasādibhyo na ghaṭād iti te matam /
svayaṃ yas tair vinā nāsti [1]⟨sa nānyo⟩[1] rūpataḥ
katham // 11

[1]HPS and Vaidya: so 'nanyo. Bhattacarya emends this to sa nānyo.

ro sogs dag las gzugs gzhan zhing //
bum las min zhes khyod 'dod na //
de rnams [1]med par[1] rang med gang //
N f.16a de gzugs las *gzhan ji[2] ltar min // 11

[1]ma gtogs NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.
[2]ci P and Vaidya.

ghaṭasya kāraṇaṃ nāsti svayaṃ kāryaṃ na jāyate /
rūpādibhyaḥ pṛthak kaścid ghaṭas tasmān na vidyate // 12

bum pa la ni rgyu yod min //
rang nyid 'bras bur mi 'gyur te //
de phyir gzugs sogs las gzhan du //
bum pa 'ga' yang yod ma yin // 12

ghaṭaḥ[1] kāraṇataḥ siddhaḥ siddhaṃ kāraṇam anyataḥ /
siddhir yasya svato nāsti tad anyaj janayet katham // 13

[1]MKV 89.3 : paṭaḥ.

bum pa rgyu las grub[1] 'gyur zhing //
rgyu ni gzhan las grub gyur na //
P f.17b gang la rang las *grub med pa //
de yis gzhan po ji ltar skyed[2] // 13

[1]'grub NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.
[2]bskyed NP, DṬ PṬ, Vaidya, and Bhattacarya.

samavāye 'pi rūpasya gandhatvaṃ nopapadyate /
samūhasyaikatā tena ghaṭasyeva na yujyate // 14

'phrod pa 'dus par gyur kyang gzugs //
dri nyid du mi 'thad de[1] //
des na bum pa bzhin tshogs pa //
gcig nyid du mi rigs so // 14

[1]do C and Vaidya.

rūpādivyatirekeṇa yathā kumbho na vidyate /
vāyvādivyatirekeṇa tathā rūpaṃ na vidyate // 15

ji ltar gzugs sogs ma gtogs par //
bum pa yod pa ma yin pa //
de bzhin rlung la sogs pa ni //
ma gtogs gzugs kyang yod ma yin // 15

agnir eva bhavaty uṣṇam anuṣṇaṃ dahyate katham /
nāsti tenendhanaṃ nāma tadṛte 'gnir na vidyate // 16

tsha ba med nyid du 'gyur te //
tsha ba min pa ji ltar bsreg //
des na bud shing zhes bya ba //
yod min de med me yod min // 16

abhibhūto 'pi yady uṣṇaḥ so 'py agniḥ kiṃ na jāyate /
athā[1] ⟨nuṣṇaḥ paro⟩[1] py agnau bhavo 'stīti na yujate // 17

[1]HPS anuṣṇaparo. Vaidya emends this to anuṣṇaḥ paro; Bhattacarya concurs.

gal te zil mnan tsha ba yang //

C f.16a
D f.16a

de yang ci *ste *mer mi 'gyur //

'on te mi[1] tsha na dngos gzhan //

me la yod ces byar mi rung // 17

[1]Bhattacarya: me.

indhanaṃ yady aṇor nāsti tenāsty agnir anindhanam /

aṇur ekātmako nāsti syāt tasyāpīndhanaṃ yadi // 18

gal te rdul la shing med na //

des na shing med me yod de[1] //

gal te de la'ang shing yod na //

gcig gi bdag can rdul yod min // 18

[1]do CD.

tasya tasyaikatā nāsti yo yo bhāvaḥ parīkṣyate /

na santi tenāneke 'pi yenaiko 'pi na vidyate // 19

dngos po gang gang yongs brtag pa //

de dang de la gcig nyid med //

gang gis gcig kyang yod min pa //

des na du ma dag kyang med // 19

bhāvas trayo na santy anye tatraiko 'stīti cen matam /

tritvaṃ yenāsti sarvatra tenaikatvaṃ na vidyate // 20

gal te [1] gang na dngos de rnams[1] //

med der gcig yod ces 'dod na //

gang gis kun la gsum nyid yod //

des na gcig nyid yod ma yin // 20

[1]NP gang la dngos de rnams. Vaidya: gsum dngos de gzhan rnams; Bhattacarya concurs, although he notes that his xylograph of the root text and Candrakīrti's commentary read gang la dngos de rnams and gang na dngos de rnams, respectively. All the commentaries that I have consulted, including the Cone, sDe dge, sNar thang and Peking editions of Candrakīrti's commentary, read gang na dngos de rnams. This suggests that the Tibetan translations were based upon a different version of this verse.

sad asat sadasac ceti sadasan neti ca kramaḥ /

eṣa prayojyo vidvadbhir ekatvādiṣu nityaśaḥ // 21

yod dang med dang yod med dang //

yod med min zhes bya ba'i tshul //

'di ni mkhas pas gcig nyid sogs //

dag la rtag tu sbyar bar bya // 21

ji ltar rgyun la lta[1] nyes na //

rtag pa yod ces byar[2] 'gyur ba[3] //

de bzhin tshogs la lta nyes na //

dngos po yod ces bya bar 'gyur // 22

[1]blta C.

[2]Bhattacarya: bya bar.

[3]Bhattacarya om.: ba; na NP and Vaidya.

gang la brten nas 'byung yod pa //
de na rang dbang mi 'gyur ro //
'di kun rang dbang med pa ste //
des na bdag ni yod ma yin // 23
'bras bu med par dngos po ni //
kun la 'du ba yod pa ma yin //
'bras bu'i don du 'du ba gang //
de ni 'phags la ma 'dus pa' o // 24
P f.18a srid pa'i *sa bon rnams shes te //
yul rnams de yi spyod yul lo //
N f.16b *yul la bdag med mthong na [1] ni //
srid pa'i sa bon 'gag par 'gyur // 25

[1]nas D and Vaidya.

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las mthar 'dzin pa dgag pa bsgom pa bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa bcu bzhi pa' o //

XV

tha mar med pa skye bar 'gyur //
des na med pa ga la skye //
yod pa [1] 'dod nas[1] skyes 'gyur ba //
des na yod pa ga la skye // [1]

[1]gdod nas CD. gdod mar PT and Bhattacarya.

'bras bu yis ni rgyu bshig pa //
des na med pa skye mi 'gyur //
grub pa las sgrub[1] yod ma yin //
de phyir yod pa'ang mi skye'o // 2

[1] grub NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.
[2] CD om.: 'ang.

de tshe skye ba yod min zhing //
gzhan tshe skye ba yod ma yin //
de tshe gzhan tshe mi skye na //
nam zhig skye ba yod par 'gyur // 3
de la de yi dngos po ru //
ji ltar skye ba yod min ltar //
de bzhin gzhan gyi dngos por yang //
C f.16b de la skye ba yod ma *yin // 4
D f.16b *thog ma bar dang tha ma rnams //
skye ba'i sna rol srid ma yin //
gnyis gnyis dag ni med pa ru //
ji ltar re re rtsom par 'gyur // 5

gzhan gyi dngos po med par ni //
bdag gi dngos po 'byung ba med //
de yi phyir na bdag gzhan ni //
gnyis ka[1] las 'byung[2] yod ma yin // 6

[1]CD om.: ka.

[2]CD add: ba.

sngon dang phyis dang cig car zhes[1] //
brjod pa nyid du mi nus pa //
de phyir skye dang bum pa la //
cig car 'byung ba yod ma yin // 7

[1]ces D.

sngar skyes pa yi phyir na ni //
sngar skyes rnying[1] par mi 'gyur zhing //
phyi nas kun tu skyes pa yang //
phyi nas skyes par mi 'gyur ro // 8

[1]rnyings C.

da ltar ba yi dngos po ni //
de nyid las 'byung ma yin zhing //
ma 'ongs las 'byung yod min la //
'das pa las kyang yod ma yin // 9

skyes pa la ni 'ong ba dang //
de bzhin 'gags[1] la 'gro ba med //
de lta yin na ji[2] lta bur //
P f.18b srid pa sgyu ma *'dra ma yin // 10

[1]'gag CN and Vaidya.

[2]ci NP, Vaidya and Bhattacarya.

utpādasthitibhaṅgānāṃ yugapan nāsti sambhavaḥ /
kramaśaḥ sambhavo nāsti sambhavo vidyate kadā // 11

skye dang gnas dang 'jig pa rnams //
cig char 'byung la yod min zhing //
rim kyis 'byung ba'ang yod min na //
nam zhig 'byung ba yod par 'gyur // 11
skye ba[1] la sogs[2] thams cad la //
slar yang thams cad 'byung ba ste //
de phyir[3] 'jig pa skye 'dra zhing //
gnas pa 'jig dang 'dra bar snang // 12

[1]CD om.: ba.

[2]CD add: pa.

[3]las: DṬ PṬ and Bhattacarya.

mtshan las[1] mtshan gzhi[2] gzhan zhe na //
mtshan gzhi mi rtag nyid ga [3] las //
yang na bzhi[4] [5]ga'ang yod pa yi[5] //
ngo bor gsal dar yod ma yin // 13

[1]dang NP and Vaidya.
[2]med NP
[3]gang CD.
[4]gzhi N.
[5]Bhattacarya: ga yang yod pa'i.

na bhāvāj jāyate bhāvo bhāvo 'bhāvān na jāyate /
nābhāvāj jāyate 'bhāvo 'bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate // 14

dngos po dngos las[1] mi skye ste //
N f.17a dngos po dngos *med las mi skye //
dngos med dngos med mi skye ste //
dngos med dngos las mi skye' o // 14

[1]la C.

dngos po dngos por mi 'gyur te //
dngos med dngos por mi 'gyur ro //
dngos med dngos med mi 'gyur te //
dngos po dngos med mi 'gyur ro // 15

jāyamānārdhajātvāj jāyamāno na jāyate /
atha vā jāyamānatvaṃ sarvasyaiva prasajyate // 16

skye bzhin pa ni phyed[1] skyes phyir //
skye bzhin pa ni skye mi 'gyur //
yang na thams cad skye bzhin pa //
nyid ni yin par thal bar 'gyur // 16

[1]byed CD

skye bzhin pa yi bdag nyid du //
bya ba skye bzhin par mi 'gyur //
skye bzhin pa yi bdag nyid du //
mi bya'ang skye bzhin par mi 'gyur // 17
gang gi gnyis po bar med par //
CD f.17a *srid pa yod pa ma yin pa //
de la skye bzhin pa[1] med de //
gang phyir de la'ang bar yod phyir // 18

[1]po CD.

jāyamānanirodhena jāta utpadyate yataḥ /
tato 'nyasyāpi sadbhāvo jāyamānasya dṛśyate // 19

gang gi phyir na skye bzhin pa //
'gags pas[1] skyes pa skye 'gyur ba //
de yi phyir na skye bzhin pa //
gzhan yang yod pa'i ngo bor snang // 19

[1]pa NP and Vaidya.

jāto yadā tadā nāsti jāyamānasya sambhavaḥ /
jāta utpadyate kasmāj jāyamāno yadā tadā // 20

gang tshe skye pa de yi tshe //
skyes bzhin pa la srid pa med //
gang tshe skyes pa skye bzhin na //
de tshe ci phyir skye bar 'gyur // 20

ajāto jāta ity eva[1] jāyamānaḥ kutaḥ[2] kila /
bhedābhāvād ghaṭo 'bhāvas[3] tadā kiṃ na vikalpyate // 21

[1]HPS: evam; Vaidya emends to eva; Bhattacarya concurs.
[2]Bhattacarya emends to kṛtaḥ
[3]HPS ghaṭābhāvas; Vaidya emends to ghaṭo 'bhāvas; Bhattacarya concurs.

skye bzhin pa ni ma skyes pa //
kho na skye [1] zhes bya bar grag[1]
khyad par med phyir de yi tshe //
bum pa med par cis mi rtog // 21

[1]'o zhes par grags NP and Vaidya; zhes byas par grags DṬ PṬ and Bhattacarya.

aniṣpanno 'py ajātāt tu jāyamāno bahiṣkṛtaḥ /
tathāpi jāyate 'jāto yato jātād bahiṣkṛtaḥ // 22

skye bzhin pa ni ma rdzogs kyang //
ma skyes pa las phyi rol gyur[1] //
Pf.19a de lta'ang gang phyir *skyes pa las //
phyi rol gyur phyir ma skyes skye[2] // 22

[1]'gyur C.
[2]te D.

nāsīt prāg jāyamāno 'pi paścāc ca kila vidyate /
tenāpi jāyate 'jāto nābhūto nāma jāyate // 23

skye bzhin pa sngar ma byung yang //
phyis nas yod pa min[1] par grag //
des kyang ma skyes pa skye ste //
ma byung zhes bya skye ma yin // 23

[1]yin C.

jāyate 'stīti niṣpanno nastīty akṛta ucyate /
jāyamāno [1]yadābhāvas[1] tadā ko nāma sa smṛtaḥ // 24

[1]HPS and Vaidya: yadā bhāvas. Bhattacarya emends this to yadā nāsti.

rdzogs pa yod ces byar 'gyur la //
ma byas pa ni med ces brjod //
gang gi tshe na skye bzhin pa //
med pa de tshe gang der brjod // 24

kāraṇavyatirekeṇa yadā kāryaṃ na vidyate /
pravṛttiś ca nivṛttiś ca tadā naivopapadyate // 25

gang tshe rgyu ni ma gtogs par //
'bras bu yod pa ma yin pa //
de yi tshe na 'jug pa dang //
ldog pa 'thad pa nyid mi 'gyur // 25

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las 'dus byas don dam du dgag pa bsgom pa bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa bco lnga pa' o //

XVI

kenacid hetunā śūnyam aśūnyam iva dṛśyate /

tasya prakaraṇaiḥ sarvaiḥ pratiṣedho vidhīyate // 1

rgyu 'ga' zhig gis stong pa yang //

stong pa min pa lta bur snang //

rab tu byed pa thams cad kyis[1] //

de[2] ni so sor 'gog par byed // 1

[1]kyi NP and Vaidya.

[2]'di C.

yadā vaktāsti vācyaṃ ca na śūnya⟨[1] m iti yujyate⟩[1] /

x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x // 2

[1]Vaidya: m nāma yujyate; Bhattacarya: m iti yujyate;

gang tshe smra po brjod bya na'ang //

stong pa żhes byar mi rung ngo //

gang zhig[1] brten nas kun 'byung ba //

de ni gsum la'ang yod ma yin // 2

[1]gis Vaidya.

gal te stong pa'i nyes pa yis //

stong pa ma yin 'grub 'gyur na //

mi stong nyes pas stong pa nyid //

N f.17b ci ste *'grub par 'gyur ma yin // 3

gzhan gyi[1] phyogs ni bzlog pa dang //
rang gi phyogs ni bsgrub pa ste //
C f.17b gal te *sun 'byin byed phyogs cig[2] //
dga'[3] na sgrub byed la cis min // 4

[1]gyis C.
[2]gcig C.
[3]gang NP and Vaidya.

gal te yongs su brtags pa na //
med gang de phyogs mi 'gyur na //
D f.17b des na *gcig nyid la sogs gsum //
kun kyang phyogs ma yin par 'gyur // 5
gang du mngon sum gyis bum der //
stong pa'i gtan tshigs don med 'gyur //
'di na [1] gzhung lugs[1] las byung ba'i //
gtan tshigs yod min gzhan du yod // 6

[1]gzhan lug NP and Vaidya, gzhan lugs: Bhattacarya.

mi stong med par stong pa ni //
gang las 'byung[1] ba nyid du 'gyur //
ji lta bur na cig shos ni //
med par gnyen po 'byung bar 'gyur // 7

[1]byung NP and Vaidya.

gal te phyogs nyid du 'gyur na //
phyogs med phyogs kyi ngo bor 'gyur //
P f.19b *de ltar phyogs med nyid med na //
gang zhig mi mthun phyogs su 'gyur // 8
gal te dngos po yod min na //
me ni tsha bar ji[1] ltar 'gyur //
tsha ba me yang yod min zhes //
gong[2] nyid du ni bzlog par byas // 9

[1] ci D.

[2] gang Vaidya.

dngos po mthong nas dngos po ni //
med pa zhes bya bzlog 'gyur na //
de ltar phyogs ni bzhi char la //
nyes pa spangs pa gang zhig mthong // 10
rdul phran la yang yod pa'i dngos //
dang du med der ji ltar 'byung //
sangs rgyas rnams la med nyid kyang //
de nyid phyir na ma 'brel ba' o // 11
gal te kun la gnyis min na //
gzhan gang zhig la yod dngos yod //
gal te khyod la'ang de rigs na //
[1]brgal ba[1] gzhan po ci ste byed // 12

[1] brgyal pa Vaidya.

dngos po kun gyi dngos med la //
rnam par dbye ba mi rigs te //
rdzas rnams kun la gang mthong ba //
de ni rnam dbyer mi 'gyur ro // 13
med phyir gzhan gyi phyogs la lan //
brjod pa min[1] par grags na ni //
gtan tshigs kyis bzlog rang phyogs
kyang //
ci yi phyir na sgrub mi 'gyur // 14

[1]med Bhattacarya.

sun 'byin byed pa'i gtan tshigs rnyed //
sla[1] zhes 'jig rten [2] na brjod na[2] //
gzhan gyi phyogs la skyon brjod pa //
nyid du ci yi phyir mi nus // 15

[1]bla NP.

[2]brjod na yang CD.

yod ces bya ba tsam zhig gis //
C f.18a *gal te de nyid dngos yod na //
med ces bya ba tsam zhig gis //
med par yang ni cis mi 'gyur // 16

gang phyir yod bdog ces [1]ming btags[1] //
de phyir med par mi 'gyur na //
gang phyir yod[2] ces ming[3] byas pa //
D f.18a de phyir yod *par mi 'gyur ro // 17
[1]mi gtags NP and Vaidya.
[2]med DṬ PṬ
[3]mi NP and Vaidya; min C.
gal te thams cad 'jig rten pas //
brjod pas 'jig rten pa yod na //
dngos gang de nyid du yod pa //
N f.18a de ni 'jig rten par cis *'gyur // 18
gal te dngos kun med pa'i phyir //
med pa nyid du 'gyur[1] na ni //
de lta[2] yin dang phyogs rnams kun //
dngos po med par mi rigs so // 19
[1]gyur NP and Vaidya.
[2]ltar Bhattacarya.
P f.20a dṅgos *po med phyir dngos med la //
srid pa yod par mi 'gyur ro //
dngos po med par dngos po ni //
med par [1]gang las[1] 'grub par 'gyur // 20
[1]ga la PT̆ and Bhattacarya; gang la DṬ.

stong pa gtan tshigs las 'gyur ba //
de phyir stong par mi 'gyur na //
dam bca' gtan tshigs las gzhan ni //
ma yin des na gtan tshigs med // 21
gang phyir stong pa'i dpe yod pa //
[1]des na[1] stong par mi 'gyur na //
bya rog ji lta[2] de bzhin du //
bdag kyang nag ces brjod nus sam // 22

[1]de ni Bhattacarya.
[2]ltar DṬ PṬ Bhattacarya.

gal te rang bzhin gyis dngos yod //
stong mthong yon tan ci zhig yod //
rtog[1] pas mthong ba 'ching ba ste //
de ni 'di ru dgag[2] par bya // 23

[1]rtogs NP and Vaidya.
[2]'gag Bhattacarya.

gcig yod gcig med ces bya ba //
de nyid[1] min 'jig rten pa'ang[2] min //
des na di yod 'di ces [3]med //
brjod pa nyid du nus ma yin // 24

[1]CD om.: nyid.
[2]pa yang CD.
[3]cis DṬ

sad asat sadasac ceti yasya pakṣo na vidyate /
upālambhaś cireṇāpi tasya vaktuṃ na śakyate // 25

yod dang med dang yod med ces //
gang la phyogs ni yod min pa //
de la yun ni ring po na'ang //
klan[1] ka brjod par nus ma yin // 25

[1]glan CD.

rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa las slob dpon slob ma rnam par gtan la dbab pa bstan pa ste rab tu byed pa bcu drug pa' o //

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